Title:
Algorithmic Pricing
Algorithmic Pricing
dc.contributor.author | Blum, Avrim | en_US |
dc.contributor.corporatename | Georgia Institute of Technology. Algorithms, Randomness and Complexity Center | en_US |
dc.contributor.corporatename | Carnegie-Mellon University | en_US |
dc.contributor.corporatename | Georgia Institute of Technology. College of Computing | en_US |
dc.contributor.corporatename | Georgia Institute of Technology. School of Computer Science | en_US |
dc.contributor.corporatename | Georgia Institute of Technology. School of Industrial and Systems Engineering | en_US |
dc.contributor.corporatename | Georgia Institute of Technology. School of Mathematics | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-04-25T13:03:32Z | |
dc.date.available | 2013-04-25T13:03:32Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013-04-08 | |
dc.description | ARC Distinguished Lecture presented on April 8, 2013 from 3:00 pm to 4:00 pm in room 1116 of the Klaus Advanced Computing Building. | en_US |
dc.description | Avrim Blum is a prominent computer scientist who in 2007 was inducted as a Fellow of the Association for Computing Machinery "for contributions to learning theory and algorithms." Since 1991 he has been a professor of computer science at Carnegie Mellon University. His main work has been in the area of theoretical computer science, with particular activity in the fields of machine learning, computational learning theory, algorithmic game theory, and algorithms. | en_US |
dc.description | Runtime: 52:36 minutes. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Pricing and allocating goods to buyers with complex preferences in order to maximize some desired objective (e.g., social welfare or profit) is a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. In this talk I will discuss some particularly simple algorithms that are able to achieve surprisingly strong guarantees for a range of problems of this type. As one example, for the problem of pricing /resources/, modeled as goods having an increasing marginal extraction cost to the seller, a simple approach of pricing the /i/th unit of each good at a value equal to the anticipated extraction cost of the /2i/th unit gives a constant-factor approximation to social welfare for a wide range of cost curves and for arbitrary buyer valuation functions. I will also discuss simple algorithms with good approximation guarantees for revenue, as well as settings having an opposite character to resources, namely having economies of scale or decreasing marginal costs to the seller. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 52:36 minutes | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1853/46837 | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Georgia Institute of Technology | en_US |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | Algorithms and Randomness Center (ARC) Distinguished Lecture | |
dc.subject | Algorithmic pricing | en_US |
dc.subject | Pricing mechanisms | en_US |
dc.subject | Resource allocation | en_US |
dc.subject | Approximation algorithms | en_US |
dc.subject | Social welfare | en_US |
dc.subject | Profit | en_US |
dc.subject | Combinatorial auctions | en_US |
dc.subject | Economies of scale | en_US |
dc.subject | eCommerce | en_US |
dc.title | Algorithmic Pricing | en_US |
dc.type | Moving Image | |
dc.type.genre | Lecture | |
dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
local.contributor.corporatename | Algorithms and Randomness Center | |
local.contributor.corporatename | College of Computing | |
local.relation.ispartofseries | ARC Colloquium | |
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication | b53238c2-abff-4a83-89ff-3e7b4e7cba3d | |
relation.isOrgUnitOfPublication | c8892b3c-8db6-4b7b-a33a-1b67f7db2021 | |
relation.isSeriesOfPublication | c933e0bc-0cb1-4791-abb4-ed23c5b3be7e |
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