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ItemKnowledge Sharing: The Spillover Effects of Process versus Outcome Accountability(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2022-07-13) Wu, SuyunWhereas prior literature has examined how process and outcome accountability affect task performance, in this paper, I experimentally investigate the spillover effects of these accountability requirements on employees’ knowledge-sharing behavior. Because outcome accountability draws attention to task output, employees who produce higher output may be more confident in their performance and, therefore, are more willing to share task-specific knowledge. In contrast, process accountability focuses attention on exploring new task strategies, which may negatively affect short-term output. As a result, employees who engage more in exploration may produce lower output, yet these employees may be more confident in their performance and more willing to share knowledge. As predicted, experimental results show that employees with higher output are more willing to share their knowledge under outcome accountability but are less willing to share knowledge under process accountability. Mediation analysis confirms that employees’ confidence in performance underlies these results. The influences of knowledge sharing on the productivity of coworkers who receive the shared knowledge are also examined.
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ItemTrust versus Rewards: Revisiting Managerial Discretion in Incomplete Contracts(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2022-05-02) Hu, WenqianIncentive compensation is often characterized by incomplete contracts. While managerial opportunism has been documented as one of the most pronounced problems with managerial discretion in incomplete contracts, prior work has not investigated the underlying mechanisms driving a loss of productivity. In this study, I experimentally investigate whether replacing human managers’ decision making with algorithm-generated bonus schemes that mimic managers’ decision making improves employee productivity. I find that compensation determined by algorithms generate higher productivity without sacrificing the residual profits. Further, the productivity-inducing effect of algorithms is stronger when the rewards are not contingent on the performance signal. These results are consistent with the idea that it is hard for managers to establish credibility for rewarding employees for their performance in incomplete contracts. Employee productivity can be improved by enhancing their trust in the rewarding mechanism, even when they are not paid a more generous bonus scheme. This study advances our understanding of the behavioral factors influencing employee productivity in incomplete contracts and the potential ways algorithm-based evaluations can be used to improve firm outcomes.
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ItemIDENTIFIED MOTIVATION AND THE ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF INFORMAL CONTROL SYSTEMS ON SUBORDINATE BEHAVIOR(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2021-06-23) Kugel, JonathanDue to the limits of formal management control systems (MCS) for tasks with unobservable/non-contractible inputs, firms often preferentially select subordinates who exhibit identified motivation (strong perceptions of importance) towards the firm’s mission. While prior literature examines the “crowding out” of identified motivation by formal MCS, less is known about how informal MCS asymmetrically affect subordinates both with and without identified motivation. Given the difficulty in preferentially selecting subordinates with identified motivation relative to those without, I seek evidence of an informal control regime that can best utilize subordinates of all motivation levels. Using the frameworks of Self-Determination Theory and Stewardship Theory, I experimentally test subordinates’ goal congruence and subsequent cooperation with the superior under conventional directives vs “nonformal communications” (unofficial management guidance). Results confirm that informal controls do not crowd out identified motivation yet do impair alignment of amotivated subordinates’ actions to firm objectives.
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ItemThe hidden benefits of control: The effect of peer competition on employee responses to restrictive controls(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2019-12-16) Samet, Jordan A.Managers must decide whether to grant their employees the freedom to make their own choices or to restrict their employees’ decision rights by proscribing specific actions, behaviors and decisions. Prior research finds that employees perceive restrictive controls as a signal that their manager does not trust them to behave appropriately. While this might be true sometimes, I argue that an employee’s belief as to why a restriction was imposed could depend on contextual factors, such as how competitive the workplace is. Specifically, I predict that, compared settings where there is little peer competition or the competition is not salient, experiencing stronger peer competition will push employees to view a restrictive control through a lens of how it affects their performance relative to their peers, increasing the likelihood that employees will view a restrictive control as improving fairness. If so, employees might respond positively to the imposition of a restrictive control rather than negatively, as suggested by prior research. The results of a laboratory experiment suggest that employee reactions to a control decision depends not only on the presence of peer competition, but also on the perceived cost incurred by management to impose the control.
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ItemThe unintended effect of group identity: an experimental investigation of benefit asymmetry and employees' cooperation(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2014-07-01) Xu, HuiThe primary purpose of this study is to investigate whether the effect of group identity on individuals' willingness to cooperate is moderated by benefit asymmetry (i.e., mutual cooperation may benefit some group members more than others). I conduct an experiment in which participants act as group members for a hypothetical company. Consistent with expectations, I find that a strong group identity promotes employees' cooperation rates, but only in situations in which benefits resulting from mutual cooperation are symmetric. When the benefits are asymmetric, employees' willingness to cooperate depends on whether they are disadvantaged or advantaged as well as the level of group identity. Specifically, the disadvantaged employees are less likely to cooperate when group identity is high. In contrast, the advantaged ones' willingness to cooperate is unaffected by the level of group identity. Results of my study suggest that, in situations of benefit asymmetry, inducing a high level of group identity may have unintended negative consequences on group performance as well as organizational productivity.
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ItemThe effects of ego and external stress on group cooperation(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2014-05-16) Liu, YuebingI conduct two experiments to examine the effects of different types of stress on individuals' willingness to cooperate. The experience of stress is characterized by the primary cognitive appraisal of threat. It activates the emotion of anxiety and induces stress coping behaviors. I posit that because different types of stress differ in terms of the secondary dimension of cognitive appraisal, the responsibility of possible failure, they lead to different stress coping behaviors in collaborative contexts. Based on the attribution of threat, I classify stress into two types, ego and external stress. Under ego stress, the possible failure is attributed to one's capabilities. Ego stressors, such as lack of skill, cause individuals to worry about their capabilities, posing a threat to goal achievement. I argue that ego stress motivates an individual to seek affiliations for joint protection. I provide experimental evidence that ego stress increases cooperation. Under external stress, on the other hand, the possible failure is attributed to factors in the environment. External stressors, such as environmental uncertainty, cause individuals to worry about threat related factors in the environment, which also may hinder goal achievement. I argue that external stress motivates people to avoid risks, including the risk of being exploited by a partner. I provide evidence that external stress reduces cooperation.