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ItemEvaluation of strategies for repeat procurement(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2011-12-12) Held, Christopher M.For the past several decades, there has been a fundamental dispute between the appropriate mechanism for repeat procurement. On one hand, the supporters of Porter (1979) advocate a competitive setting where short-term contracts are used to increase buyer power and lower supplier prices. On the other hand, the supporters of Deming (1986) advocate the idea of long-term contracts to align buyer and supplier incentives. This trade-off between long-term and short-term contracts has fundamentally affected the practice of procurement, with most suppliers opting for hybrid strategies such as Incumbent Biasing: a strategy characterized by short-term contracts with frequent rebidding with an advantage given to the incumbent. This work examines this hybrid strategy to determine its effectiveness. First, we create an empirical model that identifies and measures the trade-offs between the Porter and Deming strategies. Using this model, we find that Incumbent Biasing has an impact on procurement performance via two mechanisms: first, Incumbent Biasing decreases bidding competitiveness in repeat procurement bidding, which decreases performance; second, Incumbent Biasing has a moderating effect where it improves incentive alignment between the buyer and supplier and improves procurement performance. We show that depending on the current contract design, the net effect of Incumbent Biasing on overall procurement performance can be either positive or negative. This is first work to empirically test the impact of Incumbent Biasing on procurement performance and the first to identify the positive and negative mechanisms by which this impact occurs. Using this research, managers will be able to identify their firm's position with regards to incentive alignment with their supplier to determine if Incumbent Biasing has a net positive effect for their firm. After identifying the impact of Incumbent Biasing on procurement performance, we contribute to the literature by testing this analysis through two additional extensions. First, using secondary data analysis we show that our construct for procurement performance is correlated with firm performance. We do this by comparing the answers to our procurement performance construct items to the change in gross margin of the publicly traded respondents in our study over time. This shows that our construct is not only reliable, but that procurement performance has a positive impact on overall firm performance. This is the first work to provide an empirical construct for procurement performance that is validated via secondary data analysis of firm performance. Second, we test a competing theory to Incumbent Biasing which is Multi-Sourcing: the strategy of spreading a contract to multiple suppliers to maintain competitiveness in bidding. Approximately $46\%$ of our sample identify as using both strategies simultaneously and we test for an impact between the two. We show that the two strategies to not impact each other and can be viewed independently. Subsequently, we test two Multi-Sourcing constructs in our model and find that there is no significant impact on bidding competitiveness from Multi-Sourcing. Subsequently, we examine the impact of repeatedly awarding a contract to a pool of bidders. In our model, one contract is bid repeatedly over time, resulting in bidders gaining information about their competitors' cost. The academic literature is mixed on how a buyer should approach this type of contract bidding interaction. On one hand, it is argued that establishing an awarding structure that favors the incumbent decreases the frequency of switching, and thus cost. On the other hand, it is argued that an awarding structure that favors the non-incumbent (entrant) bidders places competitive pressure on the incumbent and generates low margin bids. This issue is further complicated by the practice cited in the academic literature of ``defection', where entrant firms either perceive a bias or believe that their cost is uncompetitive and will not bid in future stages. We create a framework that explores the apparent contradictions in these recommendations and gives conditions when biasing toward the incumbent or entrant should be implemented. We first characterize bidders based on their effort to bid and their cost to supply the contract. We then show that in the case of low effort to bid and high cost for the entrant, entrant biasing is optimal; when the reverse is true incumbent biasing is optimal. Using the results from our analysis, we provide guidance to buyers facing a repeated procurement
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ItemEssays on sustainable operations(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2010-06-15) Agrawal, VishalWith the increased attention of different stakeholders on the environmental performance of businesses, several firms are increasingly focusing on product recovery and reuse activities which are not only profitable but may also help to reduce the environmental impact of their operations. This dissertation focuses on managerial challenges associated with such value-added recovery and reuse activities. The first essay examines how a firm should bring a product to market, in particular, whether to lease or sell products. Motivated by claims that leasing can be an environmentally superior to selling, we analytically investigate if either leasing or selling can be both more profitable for a monopolist and have a lower total environmental impact. The second essay first experimentally examines the effect of remanufactured products on the perceived value of new products. This effect is then incorporated to analytically investigate an OEM's strategy in the presence of competition from third-party remanufacturers. In the third essay, motivated by a major IT company, we investigate the optimal product recovery and remanufacturing strategy for a firm that can offer trade-in rebates to achieve price discrimination. We also consider the effect of potential entry of third-party remanufacturers on the firm's recovery and remanufacturing strategy.
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ItemRevenue Management Performance Drivers: An Empirical Analysis in the Hotel Industry(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2007-06-22) Crystal, Carolyn RobertsRevenue Management (RM) is an important tool for matching supply and demand by segmenting customers into different segments based on their willingness-to-pay and allocating scarce capacity to the different segments in a way that maximizes firm revenues. The benefits of RM are well accepted in the hospitality industry, and the technical aspects of RM form a rich analytical research stream. However, the research is missing a holistic examination of important elements of effective RM. The literature shows that market segmentation, pricing, forecasting, capacity allocation, IT use, organizational focus, aligned incentives, organizational structure, and education and training contribute to effective RM. We group these elements into two concepts: RM technical capability and RM social support capability and propose that these nine elements positively impact RM performance. We develop scales to measure our constructs and collect responses in the hotel industry. Our survey yields interesting results. In line with expectations, we find evidence that forecasting and organizational focus positively impact RM performance. On the other hand, the results show evidence that improved organizational structure negatively impacts RM performance. We provide a few explanations for this non-intuitive result and proposals for future research.
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ItemSimple Newsvendor Bounds for Inventory Distribution Systems(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006-12-19) Lystad, Erik D.To date, closed form optimal solutions for stocking levels in arborescent multiechelon inventory systems have not been obtained. These problems exhibit the joint difficulties of requiring an allocation policy as well as a stocking policy, and the multidimensional nature of their state space makes dynamic programming formulations impractical. In this dissertation, we introduce procedures that approximate multiechelon networks with sets of single installation problems. We first use this technique to solve for base-stock levels in a distribution network with asymmetric retailers. Second, we use this technique to analyze delayed differentiation production processes and provide guidance as to when the strategy is most warranted. Third, we modify the technique to account for inventory that exhibits perishability and solve for stocking policies for distribution systems when the inventory has a fixed shelf life.
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ItemCommitment Decisions with Partial Information Updating (ed.2)(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004-12-21) DeCroix, Gregory A. ; Zipkin, Paul HerbertIn this paper, we extend the results of Ferguson [10] on an end-product manufacturer's choice of when to commit to an order quantity from its parts supplier. During the supplier's lead-time, information arrives about end-product demand. This information reduces some of the forecast uncertainty. While the supplier must choose its production quantity of parts based on the original forecast, the manufacturer can wait to place its order from the supplier after observing the information update. We find that a manufacturer is sometimes better off with a contract requiring an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources. On the other hand, the supplier sometimes prefers a delayed commitment. The preferences depend upon the amount of demand uncertainty resolved by the information as well as which member of the supply chain sets the exchange price. We also show conditions where demand information updating is detrimental to both the manufacturer and the supplier.