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Scheller College of Business
Scheller College of Business
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ItemMulti-Period Remanufacturing Planning With Uncertain Quality of Inputs( 2008-01-11) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Denizel, Meltem ; Souza, Gilvan C.In this paper we consider production planning of remanufactured products when inputs have different and uncertain quality levels, and there are capacity constraints. This situation is typical of most remanufacturing environments, where inputs are product returns (also called cores). Production (remanufacturing) cost increases as the quality level decreases, and any unused cores may be salvaged at a value that increases with their quality level. Decision variables include, for each period and under a certain probabilistic scenario, the amount of cores to grade, the amount to remanufacture for each quality level and the amount of inventory to carry over for future periods for un-graded cores, graded cores, and finished remanufactured products. Our model is grounded with data collected at a major OEM that also remanufactures. We formulate the problem as a stochastic program, and illustrate how the deterministic version of the problem yields solutions that cannot be implemented in practice. The stochastic program, although a large linear program, can be solved easily using Cplex. We provide a numeric study to generate insights into the nature of the solution.
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ItemSupply chain coordination for false failure returns (ed.3)(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005-11) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Guide, V. Daniel R., Jr. ; Souza, Gilvan C.False failure returns are products that are returned by consumers to retailers with no functional or cosmetic defect. The cost of a false failure return includes the processing actions of testing, refurbishing if necessary, repackaging, the loss in value during the time the product spends in the reverse supply chain (a time that can exceed several months for many firms), and the loss in revenue because the product is sold at a discounted price. This cost is significant, and is incurred primarily by the manufacturer. Reducing false failure returns, however, requires effort primarily by the retailer, for example informing consumers about the exact product that best fits their needs. We address the problem of reducing false failure returns via supply chain coordination methods. Specifically, we propose a target rebate contract that pays the retailer a specific dollar amount per each unit of false failure returns below a target. This target rebate provides an incentive to the retailer to increase her effort, thus decreasing the number of false failures and (potentially) increasing net sales. We show that this contract is Pareto–improving in the majority of cases. Our results also indicate that the profit improvement to both parties, and the supply chain, is substantial.
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ItemSupply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns (ed.2)(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005-02-22) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Guide, V. Daniel R., Jr. ; Souza, Gilvan C.False failure returns are products that are returned by consumers to retailers with no functional cosmetic defect. The cost of a false failure return includes the processing actions of testing, refurbishing if necessary, repackaging, the loss in value during the time the product spends in reverse supply chain (a time that can exceed several months for many firms), and the loss in revenue because the product is sold at a discounted price. This cost is significant, and is incurred primarily by the manufacturer. Reducing false failure returns, however, requires effort primarily by the retailer, for example informing consumers about the exact product that best fits their needs. We address the problem of reducing false failure returns via supply chain coordination methods. Specifically, we propose a target rebate contract that pays the retailer a specific dollar amount per each unit of false failure returns below a target. This target rebate provides an incentive to the retailer to increase her effort, thus decreasing the number of false failures and (potentially) increasing net sales. We show that this contract is Pareto–improving in the majority of cases. Our results also indicate that the profit improvement to both parties, and the supply chain, is substantial.
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ItemSupply Chain Coordination for False Failure Returns (ed.1)(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004-09-14) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Guide, V. Daniel R., Jr. ; Souza, Gilvan C.False failure returns are products that are returned by consumers to retailers with no functional or cosmetic defect. The cost of a false failure return includes the processing actions of testing, refurbishing if necessary, repackaging, the loss in value during the time the product spends in the reverse supply chain (a time that can exceed several months for many firms), and the loss in revenue because the product is sold at a discounted price. This cost is significant, and is incurred primarily by manufacturer. Reducing false failure returns, however, requires effort primarily by the retailer, for example informing consumers about the exact product that best fits their needs. We address the problem of reducing false failure returns via supply chain coordination methods. Specifically, we propose a target rebate contract that pays the retailer a specific dollar amount per each unit of false failure returns below a target. This target rebate provides an incentive to the retailer to increase her effort, thus decreasing the number of false failures and (potentially)increasing net sales. We show that this contract is Pareto-improving in the majority of cases. Our results also indicate that the profit improvement to both parties, and the supply chain, is substantial.