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CERCS Technical Report Series

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Author: Bauer, David × Author: Blough, Douglas M. × Type: Text ×

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Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
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    Redactable Signatures on Data with Dependencies
    (Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009) Bauer, David ; Blough, Douglas M. ; Mohan, Apurva
    The storage of personal information by service providers entails a significant risk of privacy loss due to data breaches. One way to mitigate this problem is to limit the amount of personal information that is provided. Our prior work on minimal disclosure credentials presented a computationally efficient mechanism to facilitate this capability. In that work, personal data was broken into individual claims, which could be released in arbitrary subsets while still being cryptographically verifiable. In expanding the applications for that work, we encountered the problem of connections between different claims, which manifest as dependencies on the release of those claims. In this new work, we provide an efficient way to provide the same selective disclosure, but with cryptographic enforcement of dependencies between claims, as specified by the certifier of the claims. This constitutes a mechanism for redactable signatures on data with release dependencies. Our scheme was implemented and benchmarked over a wide range of input set sizes, and shown to verify thousands of claims in tens to hundreds of milliseconds. We also describe ongoing work in which the approach is being used within a larger system for holding and dispensing personal health records.
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    Analysis of a Redactable Signature Scheme on Data With Dependencies
    (Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009) Bauer, David ; Blough, Douglas M.
    Storage of personal information by service providers risks privacy loss from data breaches. Our prior work on minimal disclosure credentials presented a mechanism to limit the amount of personal information provided. In that work, personal data was broken into individual claims, which can be released in arbitrary subsets while still being cryptographically verifiable. In applying that work, we encountered the problem of connections between claims, which manifest as disclosure dependencies. In further prior work, we provide an efficient way to provide minimal disclosure, but with cryptographic enforcement of dependencies between claims, as specified by the claims certifier. Now, this work provides security proofs showing that the scheme is secure against forgery and the violation of dependencies in the random oracle model. Additional motivation is provided for a preservation of privacy and security in the standard model.
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    A Patient-centric, Attribute-based, Source-verifiable Framework for Health Record Sharing
    (Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009) Mohan, Apurva ; Bauer, David ; Blough, Douglas M. ; Ahamad, Mustaque ; Bamba, Bhuvan ; Krishnan, Ramkumar ; Liu, Ling ; Mashima, Daisuke ; Palanisamy, Balaji
    The storage of health records in electronic format, and the wide-spread sharing of these records among different health care providers, have enormous potential benefits to the U.S. healthcare system. These benefits include both improving the quality of health care delivered to patients and reducing the costs of delivering that care. However, maintaining the security of electronic health record systems and the privacy of the information they contain is paramount to ensure that patients have confidence in the use of such systems. In this paper, we propose a framework for electronic health record sharing that is patient centric, i.e. it provides patients with substantial control over how their information is shared and with whom; provides for verifiability of original sources of health information and the integrity of the data; and permits fine-grained decisions about when data can be shared based on the use of attribute-based techniques for authorization and access control. We present the architecture of the framework, describe a prototype system we have built based on it, and demonstrate its use within a scenario involving emergency responders' access to health record information.
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    Minimum Information Disclosure with Efficiently Verifiable Credentials
    (Georgia Institute of Technology, 2007) Bauer, David ; Blough, Douglas M. ; Cash, David
    Public-key based certificates provide a standard way to prove one's identity, as certified by some certificate authority (CA). However, standard certificates provide a binary identification: either the whole identity of the subject is known, or nothing is known. We propose using a Merkle hash tree structure, whereby it is possible for a single certificate to certify many separate claims or attributes, each of which may be proved independently, without revealing the others. Additionally, we demonstrate how trees from multiple sources can be combined together by modifying the tree structure slightly. This allows claims by different authorities, such as an employer or professional organization, to be combined under a single certificate, without the CA needing to know (let alone verify) all of the claims. In addition to describing the hash tree structure and protocols for constructing and verifying our proposed credential, we formally prove that it provides unforgeability and privacy and we present initial performance results demonstrating its efficiency.
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    Copy-Resistant Credentials with Minimum Information Disclosure
    (Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006) Bauer, David ; Blough, Douglas M.
    Public-key based certificates provide a standard way to prove one's identity, as certified by some certificate authority (CA). But standard certificates provide a binary identification: either the whole identity of the subject is known, or nothing is known. By using a Merkle hash tree structure, it is possible for a single certificate to certify many separate claims or attributes, each of which may be proved independently, without revealing the others. Additionally, trees from multiple sources can be combined together by modifying the tree structure slightly. This allows claims by different authorities, such as an employer or professional organization, to be combined under a single tree, without the CA needing to know (let alone verify) all of the claims.