

**DETERMINING THE IMPLICATIONS OF RESEGREGATION
IN THE ATLANTA PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM AND ITS
AFFECT ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT**

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SUMMARY

Despite experiencing a fairly calm period of racial integration, Atlanta's inner-city region is one of the most racially segregated metropolitan areas in the nation. This division spans all components of Atlanta's culture, including, most importantly, the Atlanta Public School System (APS). Children in Atlanta are neither learning within a racially diverse atmosphere nor receiving a quality, well-rounded education to properly prepare them for life's challenges. The development of the APS between 1950-1980 was characterized by distinct periods of segregation, desegregation, attempted integration, White flight, and resegregation. It is through this process that the demographics of the system made a complete 180-degree turn, going from a majority White system in the early 1950s to an almost 100% Black system in the early 1990s.

The continual sense of under-achievement, repeated poor rates of student retention, and an overall lack of quality classroom experiences within the majority Black APS all contribute to an unequal distribution of opportunity and support across the metro-Atlanta region since most majority White suburban districts bordering the city of Atlanta have the resources that the APS lacks, for example, generous funding, high parent involvement, engaged students, and a highly-qualified teachers. Ultimately, this unequal distribution contributes to the *achievement gap*, which is broadly defined as the gross disparity between average standardized test scores of White students and Black students. This paper focuses on the long-term effects of desegregation and resegregation, showing how Atlanta's unique racial history molded its educational system into a state of desperation. Atlanta's development as an emerging metropolitan region set the stage for a complicated, up-hill battle to create a uniform, diverse educational system that produces high-achieving graduates and promotes life-long learning.

Determining the implications of resegregation in the Atlanta Public School System and its affect on student achievement

The city of Atlanta has seen its share of significant events that affected not only the Southeastern region, but the country as a whole. The city's diverse demographic composition continues to serve as an inexhaustible feeding ground for innovative social change. Atlantans boast of their ancestors' great strides in developing a "city too busy to hate" through the promotion of a healthy relationship between the private and public sector while supporting a better quality of life for all. Those positive accomplishments unfortunately overshadowed any negative consequences that were inadvertently embedded within Atlanta's economic sector through the course of the city's development. Today substantial racial segregation continues to separate the city, even though Atlanta is heralded as having established good race relations early on. Incredibly high rates of inner-city poverty lie in stark contrast against Atlanta's façade of economic success and prosperity. These disparities reflect the current state of an "Atlanta Paradox."¹ Despite experiencing a relatively calm period of racial integration and subsequently transforming into a "magnet for Blacks," Atlanta's inner-city region is one of the most racially segregated metropolitan areas in the nation.² Racial division spans all components of Atlanta's culture. Residents are still contending with the aftermath of racially divisive local- and state-level policymaking during the Civil Rights Era. Native Atlantans first experience a vast lack of diversity when they begin school in the Atlanta Public School System (APS). Immersed in a community of teachers, administrators, staff, and peers from the same racial background, children in Atlanta are not learning how to interact in a racially diverse atmosphere and most are not receiving a quality, well-rounded education to prepare them for adulthood.

In the 2008-2009 school year, APS student demographics were as follows: 83% Black, 10% White, 5% Hispanic, 1% Multiracial, and 1% Asian.³ However, 2009 statistics showing the

demographic composition of the entire city of Atlanta were as follows: 51.4% Black, 41.4% White, 3.1% Asian, 2.2% Other, and 1.8% Multiracial. Taking a closer look at statistics only concerning the school-aged population in Atlanta in 2009, 26.9% of people under 18 in Atlanta were White, 65.25% of people that age were Black, and about 2.87% of this age group identified with two or more races.⁴ This broad data shows an obvious difference between the racial makeup of the school system and that of the geographical area that surrounds the system. These inconsistent statistics are more than just a representation of Atlanta's status as a demographic anomaly, though. The current status of the Atlanta Public Schools (APS) as a racially homogeneous system (with the vast majority of students, teachers, and administrators coming from minority groups) reflects the inability of Atlanta's leaders to develop a diverse, dynamic, long-term educational structure for Atlanta's children. This failure can be attributed to overwhelming challenges, such as coordinated state and local efforts to conserve segregated schooling during the Civil Rights Era, persistent setbacks due to widespread White flight towards Atlanta's suburbs, failed planning and organization on the part of Atlanta's Black populace, the conservation of de facto segregation through the *Compromise of 1973* (an action plan sanctioned by Atlanta's NAACP that placed limitations on the potential diversity of the APS as a whole), and the inability of the United States courts to establish judicial precedence to support the proliferation of policies that mandate integrated schools and districts.

The graduation rate within the APS was at a shockingly low 39.0% for the 2001-2002 school year. Since then, it has risen to 66.3% in 2009-2010, but that is still significantly lower than the current statewide average of 80.8%. (See: **Table 1**)⁵ In addition to poor retention rates, the APS lacks adequate post-secondary preparation for high school students – only 33.1% of the graduating class of 2008 went on to attend college. For the past seven consecutive years the APS

has failed to meet Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) requirements as defined by the 2001 Federal No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).⁶ AYP is an annual measure of student participation and achievement on statewide assessments and according to other academic indicators, focusing on accountability at all levels.⁷ Since APS has not met AYP for seven years, the district has had to undergo system-wide corrective action, alternative governance, and restructuring. Under NCLB, students who are attending a school that did not make AYP individually have the option to apply for a transfer to a different school in the district that did meet AYP. However, only six APS high schools were accepting transfers for the 2010-2011 school year and thirteen high schools were eligible for students to transfer out. Consequently, from 2007-2010, only between 1.3–3.7% of students eligible for transfers within the system actually moved to a different school.⁸

The continual lack of progress within the APS demonstrates that the district is incapable of providing students with the resources they need for post-secondary education or successful job placement after graduation. The lack of stimulating resources produces an unhealthy learning environment in which educators constantly struggle to effectively connect with each child, causing an unequal distribution of opportunity and support. These deficiencies ultimately develop into an achievement gap, causing APS students to fall behind their peers in other systems who have both strong support at home and abundant resources at school. Over 70% of APS students have been eligible for free and reduced meals since 2002 and the challenges they face growing up in poverty make it even more important that they are given equal treatment within the education system – if they have less in comparison to their middle-class peers at home, shouldn't they at least have an equal chance for success at school? Unfortunately, though, without the proper means to overcome their obstacles, the academic achievement levels of

students in the APS usually lag behind their peers who attend public schools in surrounding districts that receive more funding, more parental support, and more student participation.⁹

This paper analyzes the development of the APS to find the connection between past policies that shaped the district and the current status of the system today. It will focus on the long-term effects of desegregation and resegregation, showing how Atlanta's unique, urban racial history molded its educational system into its current state and how an achievement gap has risen from these failures, causing Atlanta's students to consistently fall behind students in the surrounding area, the state of Georgia, and the nation as a whole. This investigation will show that rather than solely being the fault of the district's leadership in the past ten years, the APS's repeated failure to meet Georgia's educational standards can be attributed to a myriad of conditions. These circumstances include the dichotomy of a racist political leadership and an activist Black elite during the era of school desegregation, Atlanta's distinct urban growth patterns, the business-oriented mindset of municipal leaders after integration was complete, and the appearance of a schism between Atlanta's Black leadership and the NAACP concerning school policies after desegregation was legally complete. Atlanta's experiences as an emerging metropolitan region set the stage for a complicated, up-hill battle to create a uniform, diverse educational system that produces high-achieving graduates and promotes life-long learning.

During the 20th century, Atlanta saw phenomenal population growth: between 1960 and 2000, alone, the number of residents increased by 38.93%. As more and more people flocked to Atlanta, city planners and municipal leaders responded by building accommodating communities. Prior to Civil Rights legislation, however, all decisions maintained a strictly segregated neighborhood structure. Whether it was through zoning, public housing construction, community annexation, or the use of public highways as dividers, "White city leaders planned to

guide and segregate the Black population and maintain a majority White city.”¹⁰ This inherent sense of racial inequality in urban development was also a cornerstone upon which White educational leaders built the Atlanta Public School System. As the city was turning into a “world-class” metro-region, public schools remained separate and unequal between Whites and Blacks.

Beginning in 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas*, the concept of school desegregation took hold of the American political agenda and media outlets, persisting as one of the most important facets of racial integration at that time. Atlanta was geographically split upon strict racial boundaries in the 1950s and the city’s leaders turned a cold shoulder to the idea of integrated schools. State leaders even went so far as to enact laws that “included a plan for private schools and the closing of public ones, rather than desegregate them.”¹¹ In 1961, the school board adopted a plan for the gradual desegregation of Atlanta’s schools, directed by the federal district court and due to the success of the NAACP’s suit, *Calhoun v. Latimer*. This plan, known as the “Freedom-of-Choice” program, called for the gradual desegregation of the city’s schools at the rate of one grade per year, beginning with the eleventh and twelfth grades the first year. It stipulated that children were free to choose which school they would attend. In the eyes of Black families, though, this new “freedom-of-choice” was not free at all. In order to be granted a transfer into a White school, a Black student’s parents were interviewed, the student was required to undergo a “personality interview,” and the student needed to make satisfactory scores on scholastic and aptitude tests.¹² The plan failed to integrate schools at a sufficient rate and by 1966-67, 95% of Atlanta’s students were still attending segregated schools.

At that point, the Atlanta Board of Education had anticipated federal action and had ordered the complete desegregation of all grades in 1965-66. This order, lacking support for implementation, did nothing to further integrate the schools. By the end of the 1965-66 school year, only six schools could be defined as desegregated (more than 10% minority students), while there were 62 schools with 90+% Black students and 73 schools with 90+% White students. Since the Freedom-of-Choice plan did not successfully integrate the APS schools, in 1970 the federal district court ordered that the system provide free transportation to Black students, so they could attend the school of their choice. This plan was coined the “Majority-to-Minority” (M & M) transfer program since it required that students who represented the majority in a certain school be transferred to a school in which students from their race represented the minority. So, a school with a majority of Black students would have a portion of those Black students transferred to a school that had a minority of Black students (and a majority of White students), and vice versa. Transitioning students of both races into schools that had a minority of students within their race would assumingly balance the race ratios at most APS schools, and, at the very least, go further than the Freedom-of-Choice program in effectively establishing a more racially balanced educational structure. However, once the voluntary/application-based integration ended and the mandatory busing program began, White middle-class families began to leave Atlanta’s inner-city region *en mass*, fearing the effects of keeping their children in integrated schools.

John Letson, APS Superintendent from 1960-1973, attempted to delay desegregation as long as possible following the Freedom-of-Choice plan. Rather than choosing the quickest method to eliminate the dual school system, Letson supported a “go-slow program” giving Whites time to flee and even going so far as to announce the approaching integration of an all-

White school by sending letters to the students' parents, encouraging them to leave before the Black students arrive.¹³ As White families moved to the suburbs and out of the APS, Black families replaced them at much higher rates: in 1960-61, the school system lost 1,072 White students and gained 3,064 more Black students. This expanding ratio of Black to White students resulted in overcrowding within majority-Black schools since Letson and the school board refused to reallocate resources to accommodate the growing Black student population.¹⁴ Vast inequalities among APS schools were made clear in 1968 with the publication of the *Better Schools Report* by Better-Schools Atlanta, a biracial organization that sought to "bolster the claims of Blacks that racial inequalities persisted in the school system." The report announced that students in Atlanta's Black elementary schools had larger class sizes, fewer textbooks, and a lower proportionate value of available equipment. Furthermore, the 1968 report claimed that by the time Black students reached the fourth grade, they were one grade level behind their White peers; by the eighth grade, that gap widened to *four years*.¹⁵ These statistics provide a very important perspective in understanding the origins and development of the achievement gap in the APS – in 1968 Black students' lack of resources was beginning to have a detrimental effect on their learning and, therefore, set them behind their White counterparts as most substantive resources for success were withheld from their schools and transferred to the majority White institutions.

The future implications of consistently underfunding majority Black schools were, for the most part, ignored during the 1960s-70s. Due to the changing school structure under these various integration plans, the APS Board of Education as a leading body operating under Superintendent Letson was uninterested in improving the lives of poor minority students, who comprised a greater percentage of the APS population, year after year. *Before* desegregation,

Black schools existed in the shadows of White schools, receiving used textbooks and operating out of smaller, worn-out facilities. *During* desegregation, White school officials were able to continue the state of inequality as Black families completely took over middle-class White neighborhoods since property values had plummeted, and previously all-White schools transitioned to almost all-Black schools, making it easy for the school board to solely focus their resources on the remaining all-White schools. *After* desegregation, when the system's demographics had made a complete turnaround, Black activists and educators stepped in with plans for "produc[ing] an excellent educational system for Black students" – plans that ultimately fell through due to lack of coordination, commitment, and financial resources.¹⁶

Rather than being founded in a sense of progress by taking action in order to create a more efficient education system, all attempts to lawfully desegregate the Atlanta Public School System during 1950-70 were made in reaction to whatever mandate the School Board was handed. The government, civil rights groups, and community activist organizations repeatedly reprimanded the Atlanta School Board.¹⁷ As Atlanta's schools developed during the 1970s, Black families saw an opportunity for their children to reap the apparent benefits of attending White schools. As Black students became the majority in most APS schools, the racial demographics of the teachers, administrators, and other school staff members also conformed to this growing racial homogeneity. As the schools underwent this transition, the general mindset within communities surrounding the schools also changed. Rather than continue struggling to create an environment in which each race was equally represented, Black parents put their trust in Black community leaders to take administrative positions within the district and, thereafter, to make the "right" decisions for Atlanta's Black students. Unfortunately, however, these hopes for a better quality of education never came to fruition.

The *Compromise of 1973* was the integration plan implemented *after* White flight took its toll on the racial composition of Atlanta’s population – for the 1971-72 school year, the APS had 71,000 Black students and only 28,000 White students – in stark contrast with the 1960-61 school year, which had 57,120 White students and 44,880 Black students.¹⁸ In part, the plan was compiled by some of Atlanta’s most influential Black leaders, including Benjamin E. Mays (former President of Morehouse College and the first Black person elected to head the Atlanta school board), Lyndon Wade (Director of the Atlanta Urban League), Lonnie C. King, Jr. (President of the Atlanta NAACP), and Jesse Hill (President of Atlanta Life Insurance Company), and was presented by the Atlanta NAACP. These men represented the Black community during school integration discussions with White business and professional leaders. They spoke on behalf of the families, asking for a 78% increase in the number of children attending desegregated schools and a 91% increase in the number of desegregated school facilities in addition to the appointment of a Black Superintendent and various Black personnel to top-level positions, increasing the administration’s race ratio to almost 50-50.¹⁹ In exchange for these modifications, there would be no more busing within the district in an attempt to distribute the dwindling population of White students throughout the entire district. Looking at **Tables 2a and 2b**, a more complete picture of the *Compromise* plan shows exactly what was “compromised” on both sides of the table.

In the end, the *Compromise* only integrated 3 of the system’s 86 segregated Black schools, contrary to both the requests of the School Board (who wanted to integrate 10) and the NAACP (who wanted to integrate 27). Also, the plan ended up moving only 4% of the 59,826 segregated Black students to integrated schools, even though the School Board requested that 9% be moved and the NAACP requested 30%. In contrast, the plan ultimately integrated 100% of

the mere 20 segregated White schools that remained in 1973, moving all of the 7,728 segregated White students to integrated schools. Furthermore, according to this student assignment plan, “no school would contain less than 30% Black students” and “White students would be transferred only into schools where the resulting enrollment would be 30% White.”²⁰ Integrating White students into previously integrated schools and leaving the majority of Black students in segregated Black schools was counterproductive to the ultimate vision of the national NAACP, which was to have a mix of Black and White students in the majority of schools, with as few segregated Black schools as possible. It was during the debate over the plan that Atlanta’s Black leadership, under the direction of Lonnie King (Atlanta NAACP President), shifted their focus from the national NAACP’s insistence of placing White and Black children in the same classrooms to the idea that Black children would be “ensur[ed] improved education – whether in racially separate or integrated schools.”²¹

As Atlanta’s NAACP leadership recognized and affirmed that all-Black schools would no longer be seen as inherently inferior and integration was **not** the only means of achieving equal educational opportunities for Black children, they effectively “conceded the futility of total desegregation [within] the APS.” The Atlanta NAACP’s decision to halt their demands for cross-town busing in return for the placement of Black educators and administrators in high-level positions was vehemently opposed by the national NAACP and, consequently, appealed in the U.S. District Court (Atlanta) by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Atlanta branch of the American Civil Liberties Union. The appeal was subsequently denied by the court, but the national NAACP, under Executive Director Roy Wilkins, took action into their own hands by suspending Atlanta’s local chapter from the national organization and removing local NAACP leaders from their executive positions. Within the city, though, both White and Black leaders

praised the plan as “Black leaders asserted that the time had come to move beyond the goal of integration as an end in itself toward that of providing high-quality education for all children” and White leaders “welcomed the compromise as further evidence of Atlanta’s character as the ‘city too busy to hate.’”²²

Even though the plan was heralded as a breakthrough in solving Atlanta’s educational problems, looking at the situation from a more practical viewpoint, there were just “not enough Whites to go around” and, therefore, Black leaders felt they had no choice.²³ Lonnie King claims that the Black community did not actually give anything up with the implementation of this plan and, therefore, it was **not** a compromise – it had only been labeled as such within the media. He said that reporters were attempting to link this education plan to Booker T. Washington’s historical “Atlanta Compromise” speech, which supported an “accommodationist” strategy of Black response to racial tension in the South by promoting a sense of shared responsibility. King insists that this was not the case within the APS because there was, to put it bluntly, “nothing to be shared.” Black students held a system-wide majority by the time the plan was implemented, and White school board leaders had made it blatantly obvious that they would never support fully integrated classrooms, as evinced by their passive acceptance of White flight out of the district. Black leaders saw it as their personal responsibility to achieve “greater control over the education decisions that [affected *Black*] children [in Atlanta.]”²⁴

Continuing to analyze the sequence of events during the 1970s-80s that set the stage for a resegregated school system in Atlanta, it is important to understand the role the courts played by not only inhibiting previously successful integration policies, but also by setting precedence to conveniently ignore changing residential patterns and support anti-integration policies within many areas that were already struggling with population fluctuations. For example, looking at

Atlanta in 1960, there were a little more than 300,000 Whites living in the city. Over 10 years, 60,000 Whites fled the area, and during the 1970s, another 100,000 Whites left, fleeing to the suburbs and creating a tremendous rift in the previously crafted social structure. Rather than realizing these substantial changes and devising new plans that could possibly counteract the *de facto* resegregation of previously segregated White communities into segregated Black communities in the 1970s, the Supreme Court consistently ruled against civil rights advocates and “dramatically limited the effectiveness of efforts to achieve desegregation and equal educational opportunity.”²⁵ As a result of changing urban demographics, school desegregation efforts instead needed to create interdistrict solutions²⁶ involving multiple school districts within a geographical area during the 1980s if there was to be any hope of a demonstrated increase in the number of integrated schools. In 1974, Detroit-area schools were involved in the *Milliken v. Bradley (1974)* case, in which a federal district court mandated a necessary multidistrict remedy to end *de jure* segregation in the area due to the mass exodus of White families out of the urban area and the overwhelming concentration of Black families within the city limits. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that this multidistrict technique was impermissible, concluding that “without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy.”²⁷

A more pertinent example of the courts’ damaging dismissal of multidistrict integration arose from none other than our very own Atlanta, Georgia: *Armour v. Nix*, filed in 1972 and finally heard in 1978. The plaintiffs, Black parents with children attending Atlanta area schools, requested that an interdistrict remedy be implemented in order to create a truly integrated school system. After the liability portion of the trial during which some of the accused school systems were dismissed, the U.S. District Court in Atlanta heard the four remaining defendants

in March of 1978: the DeKalb County BOE, the Fulton County BOE, the APS, and the State BOE. The plaintiffs (Black parents) claimed there was “evidence of historical governmental activity [that] tended to separate residents on a racial basis within the city” and, therefore, they demanded there be “interdistrict transfers of students to correct the effects of prior unlawful agreements between school districts to concentrate Black residents within one area and exclude them largely from others.”²⁸ Even though the parents exhibited evidence of residential violations that had previously excluded Blacks from certain areas, they failed to show that there had been a constitutional violation with an interdistrict effect.²⁹ And, without an interdistrict effect, the court stated that there could be no justified interdistrict remedy, citing the decision in *Milliken v. Bradley* as precedence for this decision. Additionally, the court maintained that once a school system is “operating under a court-imposed plan and has not been shown to be in violation of that plan, the fact that the system has ‘slipped out of compliance’ with the precise terms of the plan due to normal demographic shifts in population [does] not justify judicial intervention.”³⁰ Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s action, finding that governmental discrimination in housing and schools had ended before the action was filed.

The question is, however, how the court was able to declare schools in the area as **not** under the vestiges of discrimination at the time the case was filed, since it was officially opened in 1972, before the *Compromise of 1973* was even discussed or implemented and while the APS still held a significant amount of racially segregated schools. Furthermore, at that point the system was still without any clear plan for the future other than the Majority-to-Minority program, which did nothing to increase racial inequality in the system. These court rulings had substantial effects on all metropolitan areas within the Southern U.S. that had experienced White flight as a result of integration fears and racist tendencies.

Another important aspect of schooling that could have been remedied by the courts but was unfortunately disregarded and therefore negatively affected the quality of education many Black students during the 1970s was the gross disparity in school funding. Two different Supreme Court cases³¹ concluded that the state had plausible concerns about maintaining “local control” of education funding that was constitutionally adequate, rejected the notion that education is a fundamental right, and then reaffirmed that education is not a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause. These national measures, combined with the effects of Atlanta’s *Compromise of 1973* permanently plagued the Atlanta Public School System in a cycle of segregated schooling, unable to overcome the problem of White flight through lack of any successful measures, which may could have included interdistrict remedies and a nationally equalized source of educational funding.

The Court’s lack of aggression and determination concerning the permanent eradication of segregated schooling, coupled with unbiased decision-making, resulted in a nationwide escape from the desegregation efforts of the late 1960s-early 1970s. Not only was intra-city busing not an option after these initiatives were implemented – now there existed no possibility of transferring students between districts, either. The Atlanta region was at a standstill regarding the demographic composition of its schools and yet, there were still more roadblocks to be met in the near future. And, it is at this juncture that Dr. Alonzo Crim became the first Black APS Superintendent in August 1973.

Crim’s duty as leader of Black education in Atlanta was a daunting task and during his time on the administration, he was both praised for “managing an urban educational program that really works” and reproached when the next year’s test scores ranked APS students at the very bottom state-wide (behind poor, rural, all-Black systems).³² Into the 1970s-80s, Atlanta’s public

schools were resegregated with a quickly emerging and fast growing Black student majority.³³ Statistically, in 1968, there were 38% White students and 62% Black in the APS. By 1980, those numbers changed drastically, to 8% White and 91% Black and in 1988, there were 7% White students and 92% Black students. The Exposure Index (a percentage of Blacks' schoolmates who were White) for Atlanta's schools remained very consistent from 1968-1988, dropping only from 5.7% to 3.9%. This is a stark indication that neither the *Compromise of 1973* nor any of the other desegregation programs helped to diversify the APS student population.³⁴ No possible inner-city integration plan could change these statistics beginning in the late 1980s – the APS was primed to begin the 21st century as a resegregated, racially homogenous system.

The consideration of race relations on a broader scale also adds an important piece of the puzzle in order to determine how resegregation has affected schooling and achievement in Atlanta. By focusing on wide-ranging racial trends, distinct social tendencies can be detected and their implications can be understood within Atlanta's specific conditions. These extrapolations provide insight for Atlanta's future, possibly helping the community to generate solutions that will help the APS move past resegregation. So, when comparing the Southern U.S. with other regions across the nation, there was and continues to be substantially more contact between Black and White students in the South than in other areas of the country. The South also remains the only region with a significant number of Black students in the education system. These phenomena can simply be attributed to the fact that most Black Americans were located in the South during the beginnings of desegregation, and, consequently, since the South has proportionally more Black families than any other U.S. region, as integration took hold the South actually transitioned into the most integrated regions in the U.S. These positive changes toward integrated communities did, in some cases, translate into other facets of life in the regional

South, namely educational systems. And, even though there were certainly periods of success in achieving school integration well into the 1980s, there has been a steady decline in the number of students attending interracial schools in the South since the early 1990s. Gary Orfield analyzes this phenomenon and provides telling statistical data in his piece, *Schools More Separate*. Looking at **Table 3**,³⁵ it is evident that after peaking in 1988 with 43.5% of Black students in majority White schools, there has been a steady decline over ten years in the South, with only 32.7% of Black students attending majority White schools in 1998.

Regionally, in the South schools are not only becoming more Black – they are becoming more White, too. Residential segregation is creating racially homogeneous communities in both urban and suburban areas. Since this change has been gradual over the past decade, legislators and judges are less likely to concede these setbacks, failing to notice the negative changes. Many Southern regions are clamoring to terminate their desegregation plans – not necessarily in an attempt to make schools segregated again, but in an attempt to prove that they have completed the arduous process and have established a seemingly peaceful community and unified school system. However, even though a community may claim to have a strong hold on racial equality and interracial living, Orfield claims that “most Americans live in metropolitan areas, housing remains seriously segregated, and most current segregation is between school districts of different racial composition, not within individual districts.”³⁶

Freeman agrees with this analysis and goes further to interpret segregation within Georgia: “the observed racial makeup of students differs more when one compares school districts [with one another] than if one looks across schools within [the same] districts.”³⁷ This conclusion is in-line with the present day situation in and around metro-Atlanta. The **Atlanta Public School System** is a city district, geographically located within Fulton County, but serving

only those students who live within the city limits. The **Fulton County School System** serves families who live within the county's borders, but outside of the city limits. By comparing the racial demographics and the poverty level (as determined by those students who are eligible for free and reduced lunch) of these two school systems, many trends show interdistrict differentiation on the grounds of race and student achievement. Analysis of the similarities and differences between the two districts shows how each district's racial makeup has an impact on student achievement, and the validity of such analysis is affirmed by Freeman's previously stated conclusions regarding resegregation trends in Georgia state schools.

Looking at **Table 4**, it is noted that in APS schools, the percentage of nonwhite students has increased +4% between 2002-2010 and in Fulton County it has increased +12%. This high increase in Fulton County's nonwhite student population suggests that some minority families are moving out of the inner city region and transitioning to the more suburban areas immediately surrounding the city. This would be a positive change if it was creating a more racially equal atmosphere in Fulton County, but the statistics also show a -11% decrease in the number of White students in the system. The implications of these demographic changes in Fulton County are very similar to those of White flight on the APS back in the 1970s-80s: instead of combining the minority and majority races in schools through integration, minority students end up *replacing* the majority student population and the school gradually makes a 180-degree turn to being completely segregated within the opposite race. In alignment with the changes in Fulton County's racial composition as Black families are branching out of the city and into the suburbs, the number of students in the APS at poverty level has seen a -2% change and in Fulton County there has been a +11% increase in the number of students at poverty level. These complementary

changes³⁸ indicate that the movement of the nonwhite population into Fulton County correlates to the movement of families below the poverty line out of the inner-city region.

Considering that Fulton County schools saw a large increase in the proportion of nonwhite students *and* a coordinating increase in the number of students in poverty, it is apparent that in Atlanta and its immediate Metro region, the suburban school systems are becoming segregated at a much faster pace than the Atlanta City schools. However, this interpretation must be taken in context since there has been little divergence in the proportion of White vs. nonwhite students, as well as among those who are living in poverty in the Atlanta city area. This is direct evidence that correlates Freeman's findings in 2001 to present-day developments in Atlanta. She stated that by 2001, the segregation indexes³⁹ of urban and suburban districts were almost equal, showing that residential segregation in inner-city regions is merging into the surrounding suburban regions, creating even more segregated school atmospheres and promulgating the problems that districts have proven incapable of fixing, to this day. The higher the segregation index, the greater the degree of black-white segregation, and in 2001 Georgia's urban districts measured 62.9 and the suburban districts measured 63.9. These indices correlate directly to the changing ratios of White to nonwhite students, also seen in the **Table 4**. In the Fulton County system, the ratio has decreased exponentially in 8 years, with a 0.32 decrease and a substantial differentiation in the number of nonwhite students compared to Whites. In 2002, the system was significantly integrated with a 0.85 ratio. However, in just 8 years, the ratio decreased to a 0.53. In the APS, there has been miniscule growth towards racial equality, with a mere 0.04 increase in the White to nonwhite ratio between 2002-2010. This change is in stark contrast with the great decrease in Fulton County's racial equality.

Trends of increasing resegregation have often been dismissed because many Southerners believe that there is simply “nothing” that can be done. Orfield draws a compelling conclusion in his report, *Schools More Separate*, focusing on the need for more stable residential integration through successful strategies that compel White homeowners to embrace integrated communities and schools. He points out that “many suburban communities are now facing the problems of unstable and rapidly changing racial enrollments and the emergence of segregated schools and communities.”⁴⁰ This is *exactly* the trend that Fulton County is experiencing through the dispersion of minority families from the city of Atlanta into the surrounding neighborhoods, and it is clearly seen in the data presented. Attracting white families into these rapidly-changing suburbs is integral to our success in racial equality – if suburbs can’t resolve these challenges, then the trends will continue and educational systems will continue to become more and more segregated, following residential patterns and growth.⁴¹

The Black community relied on APS officials to make the ‘right’ decisions when it came to school curriculums, policies, regulations, new school construction, and zoning requirements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, however, any expanded availability of educational opportunities for APS students has gone unnoticed; higher rates of student success and achievement have not been reflected in test scores, graduation rates, or post-secondary education. Within Atlanta, racial division and segregation led to a general sense of apathy towards the poorly run educational infrastructure. A disproportionate number of youth in poverty attend APS schools, and disinterested students, who represent specific racial and social class groups, have led the APS to a downward decline. The demographics of APS students have continued to change throughout the 1990s-2000s, with a steady increase in the percentage of students who receive Free and Reduced Lunch from 2003-2009. (See: **Graph 1**) Even though the district’s

racial composition remains majority Black, there has been a steady decline of Black students as a percentage of the student population from 1994-2008, falling from 90.53% to 82.76%. At the same time, White students as a percentage of the student population have grown substantially from 1994-2008, increasing from 6.68% to 10.25%.⁴² Even though these statistics show a promising future for racial diversity, statistics concerning student indicators/retention rates, standardized test scores, and post-secondary education still place the APS at the bottom of the nation's school districts.

One statistical indicator that has been previously touched on shows the discrepancy between the success of APS students and that of students in nearby districts – its called the *the achievement gap* and it is loosely defined as the difference between average standardized test scores of Black students and average standardized test scores of White students. Urban regions are most known for harboring an achievement gap within their city school system as the district as often aggregately receives lower scores when compared to a suburban district. There are numerous contributing factors, but consistent characteristics include a disparity between the achievement levels of middle-income White students and the achievement levels of low-income non-White students (who, most often, represent the majority of the student population in urban school districts).⁴³ Studies that analyze the achievement gap most often look at math and reading test scores at the 4th and 8th grade levels. These indicators are used throughout the nation and provide a constant variable for comparison. When looking at APS student performance, it is obvious that there are widespread issues preventing children from learning at a decent level. In 2003, the Achievement-Level Percentage (ALP) for APS students in grade 4 math was 50% below basic and by 2009 it decreased to 37% below basic. For students in grade 4 reading, the 2002 ALP was 65% below basic, which decreased to 50% below basic in 2009. Looking at grade

8 math figures, the ALP for 2003 was 70% below basic, decreasing to 54% below basic in 2009. Lastly, for grade 8 reading figures, the ALP for 2002 was 58% below basic, dropping to 40% below basic in 2009.⁴⁴ There are many other statistical figures that show Atlanta's poor quality of education in comparison to national standards – a consistently low graduation rate, an unsatisfactory retention rate, poor attendance, and only a small percentage of students who go on to study at the post-secondary level (including both college and technical schools). As the proportion of middle-class students dropped in the APS through the late 1990s, at-risk Black children became the majority and the achievement gap became more than just a difference of test scores between students within the system. APS schools began to represent the harms of an achievement gap at a system-wide level, experiencing a sharp decline in each of the student indicators previously defined.

“Anyone who wants to explore the continuing inequalities need only examine the test scores, drop out rates, and other statistics for various schools in a metropolitan community and relate them to statistics for school poverty (free lunch) and race (percent Black) to see a distressingly clear pattern.”⁴⁵ Generally, standardized test scores are the lowest from minority and low-income schools, and there is a very strong correlation between the percentage of students in poverty and the average test score of a student body.⁴⁶ Minority students in at-risk schools face many more challenges and roadblocks and experience far less inter-class competition when preparing for life after the K-12 stage. Many poor students do not even have the opportunity to take Advanced Placement classes in order to prepare for college because there just are not enough qualified teachers available. Furthermore, high teacher turnover (a teacher leaving his or her school for any reason) is also an issue in minority schools. For example, in Georgia, White teacher turnover is much higher in predominately Black schools: in 2000, 31.2%

of White teachers in Georgia schools with greater than 70% Black students left at the end of the school year. Not only is there high turnover with White teachers in predominately Black schools; in 2000, 20.6% of Black teachers at >70% Black schools left at the end of the year. It is clear that economically disadvantaged students are destined at the outset to experience hardships that students in higher socioeconomic communities do not ever see or know.⁴⁷

Realizing the gross inequities in educational opportunity that have been forged by years of racism, urban renewal, and segregation in Atlanta is the first step towards fixing the problem. In her article, “Social Class in Public Schools,” Jennifer Hochschild explains the hardships that students face in urban school systems by outlining certain “nested inequalities” which are based on social class. She describes the “disproportionate failure of urban schools,” noting that *class* and *race* are most often indistinguishable when characterizing students in the nation’s worst schools. The connection between race and social status and how often those attributes *completely determine* a child’s ultimate level of education shows a “deeply embedded pattern of class disparities in schooling.”⁴⁸ Racially homogenous structures like the APS push society away from the goal of diversity and equality. If children grow up surrounded *only* by people of the same race and ethnicity, then they will not be taught to accept others because they simply will not interact with them. A lack of respect for and suspicion of someone “different” may pervade their lives through adulthood. This fact of life goes for *all* races and backgrounds.

The APS molds the lives of almost 50,000 children and young adults every year. Structural racial divisions must be broken down in order to break the cycle of inadequacy in Atlanta’s public education. Once the APS realizes the appropriate course of action to support student opportunity and foster positive growth within its schools, Atlanta’s children will finally have the chance for a quality education. Unencumbered by the harsh vestiges of racism and

segregation, the APS has the potential to develop into a leader within the national realm of inner-city education.

Table 1: Atlanta Public Schools Indicators: Graduation Rate and Enrollment		
School Year	Graduation Rate	Enrollment
2001-2002	39.00%	55,812
2002-2003	43.10%	54,946
2003-2004	54.30%	51,315
2004-2005	71.90%	50,536
2005-2006	68.80%	49,965
2006-2007	68.30%	49,773
2007-2008	71.70%	49,101
2008-2009	68.90%	48,147
2009-2010	66.30%	47,944

Source: GA DOE Governor's Office of Student Achievement, Annual District Report Cards, 2001-2010.




Table 2a: Comparison of School Desegregation Plans to Current Degree of Desegregation				
Action	NAACP (1/16/73)	School Board (2/73)	Compromise (2/22/73)	Current Degree of Desegregation
Students				
Increase in number and percentage of students in desegregated schools	+ 21,316	+ 8,933	+ 11,479	# students in desegregated schools:
	+ 78%	+ 33%	+ 42%	27, 239
Change in number and percentage of students in segregated (Black) schools	- 17,752	- 5,389	- 2,357	# students in segregated (Black) schools:
	- 30%	- 9%	- 4%	59, 826
Change in number and percentage of students in segregated (White) schools	- 7,728	- 5,179	- 7,728	# students in segregated (White) schools:
	- 100%	- 86%	- 100%	7, 728
Schools				
Increase in number and percentage of desegregated schools	+ 43	+ 10	+ 17	# desegregated schools:
	+ 91%	+ 21%	+ 36%	47
Change in number and percentage of segregated (Black) schools	- 27	- 10	- 3	# schools segregated Black:
	- 31%	- 12%	- 3%	86
Change in number and percentage of segregated (White) schools	- 20	- 13	- 20	# schools segregated White:
	- 100%	- 65%	- 100%	20
Source: Research Atlanta, Inc. "Analysis of Atlanta Compromise School Desegregation Plan," 1973, p. 7.				

Table 2b: Total Administrative Personnel in Salary Levels Affected by Plan						
* the School Board did not submit a plan for this section *						
Administration Salary Levels	NAACP Plan (1/16/73)		Compromise Plan (2/22/73)		Current Status	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Level I (\$42,500)	1	--	1	--	--	1
Level II (\$30,000)	1	1	1	1	--	--
Level III (\$19,500-27,000)	2	7	4	5	2	5
Level IV (\$17,000-25,000)	2	3	3	2	2	3
Level IVa (\$17,000-25,000)	4	5	--	--	1	5
Level V (\$15,000-23,000)	10	20	16	20	5	20
Level VI (\$9,000-19,000)	103	105	104	100	94	104
Total	123	141	129	128	104	138
Percentage	47%	53%	50%	50%	43%	57%
Source: Research Atlanta, Inc. "Analysis of Atlanta Compromise School Desegregation Plan," 1973, p. 7.						

Table 3

Change in Black Segregation in the South,* 1954-98

Percent of Black Students in Majority White Schools	
1954	0.001
1960	0.1
1964	2.3
1967	13.9
1968	23.4
1970	33.1
1972	36.4
1976	37.6
1980	37.1
1986	42.9
1988	43.5
1991	39.2
1994	36.6
1996	34.7
1998	32.7

Source: Southern Education Reporting Service in Reed Sarratt, *The Ordeal of Desegregation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966): 362; HEW Press Release, May 27, 1968; OCR data tapes: 1992-93, 1994-1995, 1996-97; and 1998-99 NCES Common Core of Data.

Table 4

Comparison of Race and Poverty Level Percentages and White to Nonwhite Student Ratios* in Atlanta City Public and Fulton County Schools								
Year	Atlanta City Public Schools				Fulton County Schools			
	Nonwhite	White	Poverty Level	Ratio (W:NW)	Nonwhite	White	Poverty Level	Ratio (W:NW)
2002	93%	7%	80%	0.08	54%	46%	32%	0.85
2003	92%	7%	71%	0.08	56%	44%	33%	0.79
2004	94%	7%	70%	0.07	56%	42%	32%	0.75
2005	93%	8%	71%	0.09	58%	42%	33%	0.72
2006	92%	8%	75%	0.09	59%	40%	37%	0.68
2007	91%	9%	75%	0.10	62%	38%	36%	0.61
2008	91%	10%	76%	0.11	64%	37%	37%	0.58
2009	90%	10%	76%	0.11	65%	35%	39%	0.54
2010	89%	11%	78%	0.12	66%	35%	43%	0.53

Source: Georgia Governor's Office of Student Achievement Data, available online at www.gaosa.org. "Nonwhite" data is comprised of Black, Hispanic, Asian, Native American/Alaskan Native, and Multiracial students and "White" is a singular category.
*White to Nonwhite Ratios calculated by (sum of White students in district)/(sum of Nonwhite students in district)

Table 5

Percentage of Students who Reached the "Exceeds" Level on the Math Portion of the Georgia Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests (CRCT)				
Year	4th grade		8th grade	
	Atlanta	Fulton	Atlanta	Fulton
2002	10%	26%	7%	26%
2003	15%	30%	7%	25%
2004	17%	28%	9%	32%
2005	15%	29%	10%	33%
2006	18%	29%	14%	36%
2007	26%	37%	17%	35%
2008	22%	30%	10%	24%
2009	27%	36%	18%	31%
2010	22%	36%	15%	35%

Source: Georgia Governor's Office of Student Achievement Annual Report Card, available online at www.gaosa.org

Graph 2





Table 6

Percentage of Students who Reached the "Exceeds" Level on the Reading Portion of the Georgia Criterion-Referenced Competency Tests (CRCT)				
Year	4th grade		8th grade	
	Atlanta	Fulton	Atlanta	Fulton
2002	29%	51%	27%	57%
2003	38%	57%	28%	56%
2004	37%	54%	31%	62%
2005	43%	58%	33%	64%
2006	21%	38%	7%	23%
2007	28%	41%	11%	26%
2008	32%	41%	15%	32%
2009	34%	42%	21%	42%
2010	24%	40%	18%	42%

Source: Georgia Governor's Office of Student Achievement Annual Report Card, available online at www.gaosa.org

Graph 3



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- ¹ Sjoquist, David L. *The Atlanta Paradox*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2000, p. 1.
- ² Frey, William H. and Dowell Myers. "Racial Segregation in US Metropolitan Areas and Cities, 1990–2000: Patterns, Trends, and Explanations," April 2005. Available online at <http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr05-573.pdf>
- ³ Georgia Department of Education: Governor's Office of Student Achievement, *District Report Card, 2008-2009*. Available online at <http://www.doe.k12.ga.us> (hereinafter cited as GOSA Report Card)
- ⁴ U.S. Census Bureau (2009). American Community Survey. Available online at <http://factfinder.census.gov>
- ⁵ The 27% increase in the APS graduation rate in 9 years (from 39% in 2001-2002 to 66% in 2009-2010) is significant and, therefore, may be seen as an indicator of the systems' continuing improvement. However, the Georgia State Board of Education made some considerable changes to the K-12 curriculum beginning in 2004, implementing the use of newly defined Georgia Performance Standards (GPS) and adopting the Common Core State Standards (which are closely aligned with the GPS's). After this shift in instruction, almost every achievement indicator concerning Georgia's schools rose considerably. As GA's students were "phased in" to the new curriculum's procedures/testing during the years 2003-2007, there were various "transitional" tests given to students who were receiving mixed instruction as a combination of the old and new curricula. Therefore, the first large 11% jump in the APS graduation rate (from 02-03 to 03-04) and the other large 17% jump (from 03-04 to 04-05) can be attributed to the changing requirements that students were expected to complete in order to be considered prepared for graduation. Since the new standards have become more solidified, we have seen the APS graduation rate steadily waver around the 70% mark between 2004-2010. In the past three years, though, there has been a continued decline in the percentage of students who matriculate, and the district continues to have a much lower percentage of students graduate than does the state as a whole (which, in 09-10, was 81%).
- ⁶ GOSA Report Cards, 2001-2010.
- ⁷ AYP requires schools to meet standards in three areas: **Test Participation** (for both Mathematics and Reading/English Language Arts), **Academic Performance** (for both Mathematics and Reading/English Language Arts), and **a Second Indicator**. AYP holds each local school district and each individual school accountable for the academic success of students. To make AYP, each school and district must meet the following criteria: 95% participation or above on selected state assessments; each school, as a whole, and each minimum size student group must meet or exceed the State's Annual Measurable Objectives (AMO) regarding the percentage of students scoring proficient or advanced on State assessments; and each school must meet the standard or show progress on a Second Indicator. In defining AYP, each state sets the minimum levels of improvement, based on student performance on state standardized tests, that school districts and schools must achieve within time frames specified in law in order to meet the 100% proficiency goal. These levels of improvement are known as Annual Measurable Objectives (AMO).
- ⁸ Atlanta Public Schools Data, "NCLB and Title I Schools." Available online at <http://www.atlantapublicschools.us>
- ⁹ Vanneman, A., Hamilton, L., Baldwin Anderson, J., and Rahman, T. (2009). *Achievement Gaps: How Black and White Students in Public Schools Perform in Mathematics and Reading*

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- on the National Assessment of Educational Progress*. National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education. Washington, DC.
- ¹⁰ Bayor, Dr. Ron. *Race and the Shaping of Twentieth Century Atlanta*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996, p. 54.
- ¹¹ Hornsby, Jr., Alton. "Black Public Education in Atlanta, Georgia, 1954-1973: from Segregation to Segregation." *Journal of Negro History*. 76(1): 21-47.
- ¹² National Education Association Commission on Professional Rights and Responsibilities, "Central Issues Influencing School-Community Relations in Atlanta, Georgia," Aug. 1969, p. 4.
- ¹³ Bayor, pp. 221-251.
- ¹⁴ Kruse, Kevin. *White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 165.
- ¹⁵ Hornsby, p. 33.
- ¹⁶ Bayor, p. 250; author's interview with Lonnie C. King, Jr. (co-author of the 1960 Appeal for Human Rights, published by the Atlanta University Center to protest the devastating effects of racial segregation in the all sectors of the community; President of the Atlanta NAACP during the early 1970s; main negotiator of the *Compromise of 1973*, the APS plan that ultimately rejected school busing in return for the integration of Black administrators into the highest APS positions)
- ¹⁷ Bayor, pp. 224-232.
- ¹⁸ West, Paul. *School Desegregation in Metro Atlanta, 1954-1973*. Atlanta, GA: Research Atlanta, 1973, p. 4.
- ¹⁹ Research Atlanta, Inc. "Analysis of Atlanta Compromise School Desegregation Plan." March 1973, pp. 1-7.
- ²⁰ Ibid, p. 3.
- ²¹ Hornsby, p. 39.
- ²² Plank, David N. and Marcia Turner. "Changing Patterns in Black School Politics: Atlanta, 1872-1973." *American Journal of Education*. 95(4): 584-608.
- ²³ Ibid, p. 40; author's interview with L. King.
- ²⁴ Ibid, 39; author's interview with L. King.
- ²⁵ Chemerinsky, Erwin. "The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: The Courts' Role." *School Resegregation: Must the South Turn Back?* Eds. John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 29-47. Print. See p. 33.
- ²⁶ Interdistrict solutions would effectively counteract the effects of White flight by coordinating relationships between mostly Black urban and mostly White suburban districts to decisively assign students to each district's schools so that each race is equally represented.
- ²⁷ Ibid, 34.
- ²⁸ *Armour v. Nix*, United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. 24 September 1979. U.S. LEXIS 9609. Web. 1-2.
- ²⁹ An interdistrict effect is some action, policy, violation, law, discriminatory practice, regulation, delineation of boundaries, etc... that adversely effects the residents of more than one connected district through discrimination, segregation, denial of rights, physical damage, suffering, etc...
- ³⁰ Ibid, p. 11.

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- ³¹ *San Antonio Independent School District vs. Rodriguez (1973) and Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools (1988)*
- ³² Sartor, Lou. *Atlanta Public Schools Timeline*. Available online at: http://www.mindspring.com/~sartor/gradyhs/APS_chronology.html (Mr. Sartor is a History teacher at Grady High School and received his M.S. in History from Georgia State University.)
- ³³ Boger, John & Gary Orfield. *School Resegregation: Must the South Turn Back?* Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press Books, 2005, p. 61.
- ³⁴ Rivkin, Steven G. "Residential Segregation and School Integration." *Sociology of Education*. 67(4): 279-292.
- ³⁵ Orfield, Gary. "Schools More Separate: Consequences of a Decade of Resegregation." Harvard Civil Rights Project, Cambridge MA: 2001. 55p. See p. 31, Table 8.
- ³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 2.
- ³⁷ Freeman, Catherine, Benjamin Scapidi, David Sjoquist. "Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994-2001: Trends, Causes, and Impact on Teacher Quality." *School Resegregation: Must the South Turn Back?* Eds. John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. 148-163. Print. See p. 152.
- ³⁸ As in, the percentage of students in poverty in the APS decreases and the percentage of students in Fulton County increases.
- ³⁹ Segregation indexes are defined as indexes of dissimilarity and are measured as $(100*(B_i/B) - (W_i/W))/2$, where B represents the total number of Blacks in the geographic area, W represents the number of whites in the geographic area, and i is the unit of observation (in this sense, school district).
- ⁴⁰ Orfield, *Schools More Separate*, p. 8.
- ⁴¹ *Ibid*, p.9.
- ⁴² National Center for Education Statistics. "Common Core of Data." Dataset, Available online at <http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat/index.asp>
- ⁴³ U.S Dept. of Education: National Center for Education Statistics, 2009. "Achievement Gaps: How Black and White Students in Public Schools Perform..." Statistical Analysis Report, p. 4.
- ⁴⁴ National Center for Education Statistics: Institute of Education Sciences. "The Nation's Report Card Reading 2009 and Math 2009 – Atlanta Public Schools grades 4 and 8."
- ⁴⁵ Orfield, *Separate Schools*, p. 13.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid*, p. 10.
- ⁴⁷ Freeman, Table 7.6, p. 158.
- ⁴⁸ Hochschild, Jennifer L. "Social Class in Public Schools." *Journal of Social Issues*. (59)4: 821-826.