Welcome back for the next part of our
program which consists of a panel

discussion on the various strategic.

Tensions and fault lines and in the euro
Atlantic strategic community and for

that we've invited the ambassador.

To moderate this session so ambassador.

I'll turn it over to you.

Thank you thank you very much to be honest
it's my first time moderating somebody

you're usually moderated
by the other side without

trying my best this subject that we are
going to discuss I hope will be a kind of

logical continuation of what
Senator Nunn as introduced in

the morning is that we
all profess that we want

you can weapons to play a less and less a
role in political and military relations.

The question is how you move from
the current situation to the these happy.

Fusion.

We all understand the nonproliferation
is a major concern for all of us and

we are working on this issue but
what about.

Relations between two of us and
their relations between need in

Russia where you're also have two
more nuclear weapon countries.

And I would also say that we have
a right a new situation in France

reintroduced to the military
structures opening it into the military

planning that would include in
that nuclear weapon countries.

So it's part of the reality that
we all need to deal with most

probably we have our own view
the leader countries have quite

a different view of what the security
challenges in Europe are including

those from the east because
we've seen recently need

resuming exercises next to us and

the Baltic republics some former
republics currently states and

some others saying that they need more
indigenous deplaning against who.

That's part of the current reality
of what as I said was part of

the Cold War Hengel is still with us and

we need to cope with this
hopefully trick operation and

hopefully in building more
understanding between all of us.

I would just add one final comment to
what I have to say on this issue and

maybe our distinguished
panelists would like to

comment on this in my personal
view my personal experience

what I was astonished about is that
we have pretty good relations.

Where absolute majority
of native countries.

Including the United States we're
having relations that our writers and

hopefully they will develop further.

And we have a much better.

Then we have with the same countries
where they are sitting and

need a leader doesn't have an army.

It relies on national components of
the same countries but which we enjoy.

Pretty good relations by and large if
you take Europeans absolute majority of

the Europeans our biggest
economic partners and E.U.

as a whole is our biggest
economic partner.

Ten times more important
than the United States.

And we enjoy a pretty substantial
dialogue on building economic

spaces humanitarian spaces together.

That would provide kind of
extension of ration from

here to Russia and when we have
the same countries in need it.

They take decisions that you
know this is a food allergy.

And that's a very missing situation.

And most probably the reason for
why it is that need it has only one tool.

One tool kit in the disposal
that is military mind.

And that military might include nuclear.

And so three countries members need.

And they are still considering us
as a last unpredictable neighbor.

So the question of what is it
that is still put our support.

And unless you identified clearly
you wouldn't find mechanisms and

strategy to properly address these issues.

I think we have a wonderful panel
today to address all of these and

other elements of European.

Transfers Atlantic security issues and
we have

people who represent three perspectives
one is from Russia and I'm very glad that.

The beginning of these discussions
will be done by my company to Europe

federal Kiana.

He's the chief editor of
one of our from not many

Russian speaking magazines that
are devoted to international politics

that we all want to read.

And it's journalist
with a lot of political

experience international and
by background.

Having worked for many Russian
national publications being part of

the President's Council
on Human Rights and

it's a person who certainly can add to
what I had to say about the Russian view.

Maybe more elegant and refined fashion.

This.

Thank you very much Ambassador
enormous owner to me to be

here to address such a distinguished
audience and I would like to

thank sound first of Starbucks for
this invitation.

It's my first time a Georgia Tech and
I really enjoyed being here.

When you know I'm discussing
your Atlantic security.

So I think first of all we
need to take into account.

Tremendous shift which happened early
twenty first century which means

that your Atlantics is not centerpiece of
international strategic affairs anymore.

Is it used to be beholden to century.

And they're the zation of this
change should be actually prism

through which Russians Americans and
Europeans

look into the future of security model
in northern and the Northern Hemisphere.

Since the end of called the Cold War all
major Your Atlantic actors experienced.

So the guide of strategic Dettori Sion yet

in very different scale of course Russia
collapsed and lost its superpower status.

Europe started to repeat lose its
strategic really once while it cheering

unprecedented level of peace and
wealth the United States faced growing

troubles with exercising its global
leadership as international system failed

to establish sustainable balance to
replace that one of the Cold War time.

So far coming situation in
the your Atlantic zone.

Depends in my mind on several.

Uncertainties.

First and foremost it's
the future development of China.

Twenty years on the end of
the Cold War China appears more and

more to have one that conflict.

China benefited a lot from call ups of the
Soviet Union and the economic liberation

with the West and significantly
strengthened its capacities on all fields.

Neither Russia nor the United States
how well thoughts throughout the G.

how to deal with China.

Although of course nature of
the challenges Moscow and

Washington are facing is a beating.

Is completely different.

Second uncertainty is future
of transatlantic relationship.

Diplomats and politicians used to say all
necessary nice words about this unity.

But it can conceal that fact
that the theater cries and

served to shores of
Atlantics are diverging.

You're basically decided to
go deep into self perfection.

And abandon global ambitions
which Europeans proclaims

something then years ago.

European need to members are deeply
divided about mission of alliance.

As East and Central European
countries insist on two limits

with Article five tasks in
order to secure their visa.

Russia.

And West Europeans don't see much of
Russian threat but at the same time

are not ready to take big risks to
carry out NATO expeditionary mission.

I'll say the initial
era of responsibility.

The question is whether the United States
will in the foreseeable future

efforts to manned NATO in
order to adopt this instrument

originating from the Cold War
time to a new reality.

Or prefer to construct.

New means to address challenges worldwide.

If the first how likely are attempts
to make NATO a back into something

quite close European club based primarily
east european threat perception.

If the latter.

That is American gradual disengagement.

Then how do European security
will be structured and

whether the United States and Central
European countries will try to compensate

this functionality of nature by
striking by a little security deals.

The way how do U.S.
conducts negotiations on missile defense

through his look at Poland and
Czech Republic and now with or

mania shows in a way prototype
of that kind of approach.

And certainty number three is
Russian strategic or intimidation.

Russia is facing several challenges.

That our growing instability in the south
which can turn fatal for Russian Elyse and

Central Asia.

After Western coalition
will leave Afghanistan.

This is the rise of China in the east and

complicated sometimes very confused
relationship with neighbors in the West.

Meanwhile the Russian leadership sees it.

Its country only as an independent
center of power and for the time being.

Even.

In even an last integration is
moot in a couple of years ago.

Partly because of growing self-confidence

partly because of deepening
skepticism because of the.

Existing institution and
their ability to work.

The hesitation with modernization
which is barely needed for

my country make the general
picture even more complicated.

The same time Russia becomes a target
of more active Chinese policy.

Enjoys sudden restoration of
relationship with the US yet

unlimited ereal nonproliferation.

And provokes some interest
of major European powers

which are trying to compensate
with by letter all ties level for

impulse efficiency of the European Union.

This variety on your circumstances
makes a glaring contradiction

to your Atlantic security agenda
which with minor corrections

resembles the Cold War design and
which is more dangerous.

The Cold War way of thinking.

Discussion is centered around divisions
which don't exist in reality.

And institutions which were supposed
to work in completely different in Mark

environment and I think best
there gave excellent illustration

of that referring to see if he treaty.

President Medvedev supposal about
new security architecture in Europe.

Is actually an attempt to
overcome fixation on nature as.

The main if not only if not the only
possible security actor in your Atlantic

area and look beyond all perceptions in in
a broader conflict into a broader context.

Scale of global changes is such that
there are doubts whether we can manage

the challenges only by reforming
existing institutions or

new situation demands completely
new creative approaches.

By the way idea expressed by Russian
foreign minister last year to call

summit of all the regional organization
operating in Eurasia NATO a C. collective

security through their organization
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

I think and widen Horace on and
give lay ground for

for a new framework in this vast area.

Is situational a redesign
is needed to address.

Any of existing international problem as
almost all of them originate from a lack

of correspondence between goals necessary
to achieve and means available.

Nuclear Disarmament and

that was mentioned part of the in
previous presentations can be achieved.

Only if major actors start to create
quality to a new Mortal of Will governance

or will order which never emerged
despite claims by me how Gorbachev and

George H.W. Bush twenty years ago.

This new framework should provide power
Sweed new instruments of security and

deterrence.

Otherwise all of them will
stick to what they have now.

A lack of functioning
international rules which is

to greater extent legacy
of last twenty years.

Encourage countries to work on
to strengthen their own cause.

Faceted rather to find operative.

Approaches.

In last twenty years
international system also became.

We can say much more
democratic in the sense that.

All nations state or
even non-state actors do what they want.

Time went to superpowers could
effectively force nations

to take decisions Has Gone With The Wind
of changes of the after the Cold War.

Discussion on your Atlantic
security it reflects

basically unwillingness by all involved.

To get rid of that worldview or the past
which comfortably placed Russia U.S. and

Europe in the center of political universe
main developments both regarding threats

and opportunities are now unfolding in
other parts of the globe and actors.

There are not necessary referring
to what is separating between past

parts Western civilization.

Which Russia historical and
cultural culturally belongs to.

But we can't reunited self due to and

they just that legacy of the confrontation
during during the Cold War.

I think Russia is still trying to prove.

And convinced mainly
itself that the strategic

call ups to political corpse
twenty years ago was an accident.

U.S. Steel have signs of triumphalism and
Europe is enjoying its escape East.

Stance.

Trying to do on the internal business.

Globalisation turns original and
all globalization to its regional and

global problems from terrorism
to nonproliferation.

Cannot be broadcast approached without.

Ridge.
You know perspective.

There is of course a great idea to try to
encourage other nuclear states to design

movement by restarting bilateral U.S.
Russia process but

we know of course that reasons why it
those countries want to get nuclear

are mainly at riginal
character original nature and

it is up to great powers to systematically
work on conflict resolution and

coordination of mutual interest
in each and every case and

this work and can lead to progress.

Also nonproliferation issue.

Which is mentioned the nuclear
threat reduction initiative as well.

I do conclude I can say
that your Atlantic security

should be seen in twenty first century as
an important but not the size of element

of the global puzzle which the world
situation is or is resembling now.

If we don't manage to do our
best to put pieces together.

If we want to see the picture then
this picture will emerge by itself but

I I I'm fraid the this picture
will terrify all of us.

Thank you very much.

THANK YOU THANK YOU THANK YOU.

We have very distinguished general.

With a lot of experience
working on us against us and

about building near relations with us.

General Boyd.

You work in Neda.

You had a distinguished military career
and most probably were one of the you.

People who are looking in Russia
true the sides of your are playing.

I hope that while you will
be presenting Kyo us.

You also will tell us
how these old feelings.

Haunting you.

If they are.

Thank you.

Now is that for an introduction.

Well first of all let me say this.

When when when I was
asked to to participate.

Today it was to give an it
give the American perspective.

Which i quickly.

Disabused anyone of thinking
that I could possess.

The American perspective that I speak for
this government or

I speak for the Department of Defense or
that I speak for the military.

I don't even speak for my wife who
serves on Senator Nunn N.T.I. board and

has been working in nuclear proliferation
issues since the Carter administration.

I represent nobody.

But perhaps myself I do have a long

association with with NATO in
various forms from a youngster.

Fighter pilot city
nuclear Victor alert and

in Turkey with a nuclear
weapon strapped to my belly.

With targets that I knew precisely
how to get there and what it was and

what it looked like and so.

All the way through.

My final.

Of four times in Europe for.

Three major assignments and many many.

Temporary assignments.

I was the principal force provider for
NATO as the as the deputy commander

of Europe the so the day to day
fellow that ran the European Command.

And provided all the U.S.
forces to date so.

I very much have.

Throughout my career
NATO was the centerpiece.

Yes.

Of U.S. strategy.

Relative to the rest of the world
certainly relative to the Soviet Union but

it eclipsed all other.

Aspects of American strategy so
I was born and bred in that environment.

NATO remains and
I was in Europe at the time that NATO

began to take on
a different character with.

The events that followed in one thousand
nine hundred ninety ninety ninety one.

And as the new security environment began
to emerge with the breakup of the of

of Yugoslavia in the Balkans
working with with first of all

not with NATO because NATO couldn't get
its act together relative to the Balkans

how to deal with the Bosnian war we we
in the early stages of that we worked.

Only through a coalition of
the willing and eventually.

Had.

A reluctance I think
a full NATO participation.

But the bargain that we
struck in those days

in the aftermath of the dissolution
of the Soviet Union with NATO.

I think could be characterized as one
in which the United States agreed to

continue to participate in
Gauge militarily with NATO.

In exchange for
which NATO would increasingly.

Provide for out of area of operations.

But that is what is in is and

remains I believe to this day and
an easy relationship.

Increasingly And
I think some of the previous speakers.

Remarks reflect this.

And they Europe.

Nations of NATO and themselves have

very different perspectives on what
a collective security arrangement means.

And the last decade of
the twentieth century in the first

decade of the twenty first.

The United States is
increasingly confused about

what its real objectives
are with security.

We have focus on non-state actors
we focus on failing states.

We worry at that at some levels
about the periphery of NATO.

We worry about.

What the rise of China means.

Relative to our own security.

The United States does not have
clarity in its own thinking about.

The future of its security.

But I proceed from what I know best and

that is that one security arrangement
that I spent most of my life in.

And I also proceed from
Senators Nunn is Senator Nunn's

assertion at the outset today
that no security arrangement.

Especially if you look to the long term
objective relative to nuclear weapons

no security arrangement is a limit
Lee workable that Xclusive Russia.

I believe that.

I believe that by the way
although in a very.

Arbitrary and kind of and sophisticated
way in one thousand nine hundred three.

In the events that led up to the NATO
summit of January of nineteen ninety four.

The Clinton administration had called for
a summit.

In the first year of its.

Time in office without
a clear idea of what it is.

Wanted to achieve at that summit.

And as the fall approached and they were
getting closer and closer to that date.

In a sort of panic.

The Department of
Defense Secretary Defense convened.

A very very small group of people all of
the senior the five or four stars in and.

In Europe and and several people from
the think tank world and so forth.

To to try to figure that out
under the the context of

the pressures that are there or
the P.T.D. not the pressure but

the pleading of of several
former Warsaw Pact countries.

For inclusion into NATO recall
at the time the Czech Republic.

Hungary and Poland in particular.

Were hoping for a relationship.

Whereas with NATO.

The view that I advanced which gained
support from absolutely no one.

Was Why don't we just invite Russia to
join NATO as a full member of NATO and

worry about the security concerns of
the smaller former war SAP Pact nations.

When Russia itself feels secure.

Now that was a radical thought in it and
it wasn't didn't really thoroughly thought

through by myself and I will cheerfully
admit that to you but it seemed to me that

at that moment in history there was
a chance the thousand fact could happen.

The arguments against it by the way
were given particularly for

the military were were largely of
an operational nature what would we

do with them and
this is a military alliance.

They would not be interoperable
with us in any way.

And moreover the the.

Of.

Of the former Soviet Union is in shambles.

What value do they had how could we
operate within that to me was irrelevant.

What was relevant was
if this very insecure

moment in Russia's history if you
embrace Russia through your breast.

And give them that security.

Maybe that seventy five year that three
quarters of a century of exclusion from

Western thought and Western ideas and
well to Russia could be overcome.

Well it didn't happen.

And probably because if no other reason
I was not able to articulate it is

effectively as I should have but
I still hold that view to this day and

although that stand in
this is now how can we.

How can we do what Senator and and

what the whole of the I think the euro
Atlantic Security Initiative Group

has in mind how can we build
some kind of a comprehensible.

Security arrangements that if
it doesn't include Russia as

a full part as a as a full member
as a full and meaningful partner.

Now the first thing you have to
do it seems to me if your TRUE.

Track on that.

Toward that objective is for.

The existing NATO to have an understanding
of what itself is about at this point.

And it doesn't.

There is a very good piece of work.

That's just been released many Maybe you
have it although it was done by Rand for

the form of the Air Force but
within the context of a recast Dean

the strategic concept though
the work that's underway now and

that is supposed to be brought to
bear in the remember in Portugal.

And Rand.

And I'll use this as examples
because it it it encapsulates

most of the thinking that
I've done in a different and

less structured form five different
not scenarios that call them.

Our directions that
this alliance might go.

Number one to refocus on
Europe itself that is to say

the out of very operations that have
caused so many in in in NATO and knees.

Could be put aside and refocus on just
Europe itself and given the continuing.

Uneasy Nisson instability or
potential instability in the Balkans that

bears continuing presence NATO
presence watching and care.

The events of August.

Of two thousand and eight brought
a new sense of fear to not only

the near abroad but the periphery
states to even the central states of.

Europe so recasting your focus strictly on
Europe makes a certain amount of sense.

There are some arguments against that we
can talk about that and that if you and

if you wish.

Number two a focus on the Middle East
if there's one area in the world

where out of its own area that.

European nations in NATO nations.

Have a common set of interests
is probably the Middle East.

Certainly dependence
upon energy continuing.

Access to energy.

Certainly.

Iranian nuclear aspirations since of
war so maybe we could cast NATO in.

In the way that it did with
the partnership with peace for the former

Warsaw Pact countries with the kind
of training and and education and.

Limited Partnerships with
Middle Eastern nations.

And have that be the central focus.

Aside from its own security.

It's a really good arguments
against that if you can talk about.

The third.

Focus would be on failed or
failing states and in fact in Russia.

NATO is in gauge in a very uneasy way and

one of those enterprises at the moment
of course with Afghanistan but

with the Somalia of regard for
those places where.

Failing states or

failed states have the potential of being
a security concern to Europe itself.

Europe could focus on those and

develop the capabilities boys both in
counterinsurgency techniques both in

nation building that would be
appropriate to that world number for.

Non-state actors.

With our own U.S. obsession with
non-state actors although it's less so

I think in in Europe.

The world of cyber warfare.

For example emerging because we
most of our policymakers really

don't understand it very well but they're
beginning to recognize what a tremendous.

Threat this really is
how do you deal with it.

How do you deal with it with other lands
how do you deal with it with a partnership

of nations.

Maybe that's the area or
that and other aspects of.

Non-state actor activity
transnational crime and so miserable.

Number five.

A new alliance folk.

Yes on the liberal
democracies of the world.

Bringing Japan and New Zealand Australia.

India Brazil.

Into alliance.

Shared values and shared democratic
principles rule of law and.

And as a stabilizing force for
the whole of the world.

Those are the five scenarios all
have them in significant pluses and

significant minuses my own view is that
none of those by themselves is useful.

My bias is back to where we
began with the NATO alliance and

somehow a new arrangement of security
arrangement that includes Russia.

Russia does not have shared values
in many respects with NATO.

NATO you can put it the other way.

But how would we overcome that.

That's a real challenge but

if we if we conclude at the outset that
we can't really be secure without Russia.

Then it seems to us seems to me that
that's a motivation in that itself

to work on this problem maybe a membership
NATO worries about Russia as a member.

Having a veto over its activities.

There are ways that we can
deal with that I believe.

But as an objective that's what I
present today as an objective A and

a new focused not
excluding Transnet not it

excluding non-state actors not excluding
failed states but in a cute in them

and with a big objective of
some arrangement in which.

Russia.

Can be a real partner or
a real member of this alliance.

That's all I have to say for the moment.

Thank you very much thank the skies

are you sick New known scholar and

having been part of decision making
in Ian German government you

also combine the experience of
a scholar and statement and

you have a very good perspective maybe
working on transatlantic relations for

quite a substantial period of time.

But working from transatlantic
you certainly must have looked at

that says and
I wanted to ask you among gatherers.

Among other things.

What do you think about
what is Russia today.

I read something none
suggesting that Russia is

neither friend not trust that the law.

General Board just said
that Russia doesn't share

the same veterans which
I'm rated to challenge.

Or to propose needed to correct here but
I wonder for a scene from Europe.

What is Russia over you for
these transatlantic relations

because transatlantic relations
wasn't built basically.

To address a perceived threat
from the Soviet Union.

Thank you.

If you

were really the US Army you have to

address the security threats
first that were at the origin of

the decisions to arm In other words
you have to go back to politics.

Picking up a subject that raised.

If you go to the eastern
rim of NATO today.

And.

Look at their thirst sweat perception.

You can see that it is shaped I would
say sixty percent by the Cold War and

its memories twenty
percent by World War two.

And history and the rest.

By the new modern threats terrorism
weapons of mass destruction.

The further you go west and south.

The third item becomes more important.

That's the reality.

Of NATO.

Today.

Then what is the consequence
of that perception.

I see two in the conventional and in the
nuclear and I come back to your question.

On Russia.

We have to be honest.

And if you are referred to it

on the conventional side there is
still fear off Russian aggression.

It's alive and well.

Now personally I consider
that possibility is zero.

It's almost ludicrous to think
of an attack of Russia on NATO.

But there are people who believe that.

And if you go to the eastern rim of NATO.

You'll find them in the political and
military class that

was after all the reason for many of the
East Europeans to join to want to join to.

Want to join NATO.

I took part in the first round
of the seminar off the group

that is working on the new strategic
concept chaired by Madeleine Albright.

Their number of seminars and I presented
a paper there in which I suggested

that we should recruit
the priorities of NATO and

put actually Article Five
much more at the bottom.

Because there were more urgent
problems then fear of aggression to

turn aggression on NATO terrorism weapons
of mass destruction all these moves.

I was severely criticized by.

East Europeans in particular I was
said how can you in this situation

when Russian forces make exercises.

Attacking is Tonja or
after the war in Georgia.

How can you sort of degrade Article five.

I'm not eliminating it but I thought
it was it is less it is less important

indeed these fears have been so
strong in NATO.

That NATO which did away
with contingency planning.

We all remember you will remember
the burning contingency planning is

now in the process of recreating
contingency plans and

you all know what was going to happen.

The Russian military are going to study

their contingency plans they may be
exercises even and the plan was there

will do their own planning
reacting to this kind of planning.

So we have back to this mutual

reinforcement of threat
perception that we thought

we should have gotten rid off after
the end of the East West conflict.

It's there.

Now I'm not saying that Russia
doesn't have a certain responsibility.

It's not just a Western problem or
east central European problem.

Looking at the military doctrine.

And I hope the next is going to
say a little bit more about that.

The definition of so-called dangerous for
Russia.

Lots of NATO elements in it.

The war in Georgia.

There is a certain responsibility too but
the fact remains we have

back into this field of mutually
reinforcing threat perceptions.

Second consequence the nuclear side.

We must remember that during the Cold War
nuclear deterrence was absolutely central.

For the entire political and
military class often a top.

It was considered as the equalizer
to deal with what was perceived

a commencement superiority of the was at
that time something incidentally which now

seems to be the case in Russian military
thinking and I hope Alex a dress that.

The entire political and
military class had to deal with protest

through the decades governments very
endangered because of nuclear weapons.

I worked for him which meant who
actually lost power at the end

because he pushed through
the double track decision.

So the nuclei element
was extremely important.

And it is for

that reason that the remaining nuclear
weapons have such enormous symbolic value.

As the very important
instrument of reassurance.

Although we know they
are antiquated no military

commander is going to use a nuclear
weapon and one of those tactical nuclear

weapons they're all as war fighting
weapon has disappeared and yet

they are there now
the the old sinking on this.

You could see it came out when
several governments Germany methyl and

spent a large selection Burke and
Norway a little while ago.

Actually it had been preceded by the
former Foreign Minister Steinmeier he had

proposed at first but now it's five
governments arguing we should remove this

remaining American
tactical nuclear weapons.

Their reaction to their proposal.

How what importance disproportionate
importance is still given

to these unusable tactical weapons.

So what conclusion should be drawn.

I have to first it seems to me.

We must go back to
the politics of security and

now I come back to a point that
Senator Nunn made and that asked me about.

We must go back to the politics of
the relationship between Russia and

the West or Russia and and
and the members of NATO.

Unless we really address that we are not
going to make significant progress

in the fields of disarmament.

It's the political nature of the
relationship which defines the relevance

of weapons.

Perhaps one example which shows what
can happen if you look at France and

Germany who fought three bloody
was in less than a century.

No German is worried by French
nuclear weapons no Frenchman is

worried by Germany's largest conventional
force why because the political

relationship has changed and that hasn't
fallen from heaven from heaven but

it's the result of of work of
active work of politicians.

And of leaders that has been done
this kind of work has to be done

between Russia and
the West in the coming years.

And there's one very
important element in this.

You have to remove the conventional
drive us off the feeling of insecurity

which leads to the role
of nuclear weapons.

As a means of equalizing in other words.

The wreak the revival of conventional
arms control in my opinion

is a necessary precondition.

For starting serious nuclear
disarmament in Europe.

The ambassador mentioned earlier the
comment the treaty uncle mentioned forces

in Europe which at the moment
is not working it's a spend it.

The new one is not ready
fight the Adopt a treaty

we should really make an effort
to to address the questions of

imbalance of threat perception
through conventional arms control and

in particular there is one particular
element in it that's confidence building.

Even I'm perfectly aware of all
the difficulties that we now have

just think of the flank problems
of Georgia solve the seizure.

They are all there but that shouldn't
stop us from starting the process and

using that instrument as
a confidence building measure us

as a measure as a means for dialogue
between between Russia and the rest.

Also as a means of dialogue
on talks on doctrine and

the role of various kinds of weaponry.

This second conclusion.

Should be in the nuclear field.

We should start and
in fact we have now started

the debate on the role of tactical
nuclear weapons that will be done.

Anyhow.

In the new concept.

We will see what will happen.

The United States will do the nuclear
posture review it will have to address

that question as well.

But on top of it.

We should seriously consider it
negotiations between Russia and

and NATO you can think of different models

you can start by laterally
between the U.S. and Russia.

You could include the European
nuclear states you can

create some element of
NATO participation but

in any case Dialo on
the roll with the hope

that we can remove and remove.

If the weapons and so
to speak make them disappear.

In our doctrines and in reality.

My and I'm aware here that are significant
differences among countries for

example in Western Europe.

Between France.

Which still strongly believes
in nuclear Terrance Britain.

Which wants to stick to its weapons for
quite a while.

And the other NATO members but
still we have to start the process.

My final thought.

There is growing support.

All over for
eliminating nuclear weapons and

also for the Syria goal at the end but
we cannot deal with that.

So to speak with technical means as
if that were separated from the rest.

It would only be successful if we
place it in the political context and

also in the context of the conventional.

Constellation which which so
to speak drives.

The rationale for nuclear weapons.

Thank you.

And so I enjoy so
much in my role of moderator so and

attempted to ask my questions first.

After you have heard people say Russia
isn't a friend isn't a trusted ally.

Doesn't share question that it's what you
think you are independent observer and.

Governmental employee itself might

speak a little bit more objectively
maybe than me but for the Russians.

What is the United States today.

I would claim that when the Cold War
was over there were illusions that just

because the world has changed America is
will become immediately initial friends.

Did occur.

What is the view of
normal Russians you know

Russians discuss international things.

Usually at the kitchen with their
friends and their and their own lives.

What people are thinking about I
mean talking about Americans and

the West in the kitchen.

Of course there are very much
different perspectives and

Russia is despite pleas in the West
that there is a direct their income

to Russia has such a variety of views and
feelings that probably exceeds the.

Same here in the United States in
terms of the two day life as as

I could could could see people in
the Russia especially younger people.

They enjoy all the positive and

negative fruits of American culture and
the miracle way of life.

Russia is part of a globalized world and.

In this regard American presence in the
Russian society is very use huge and it's.

Now part of the life of many many
Russians especially in big cities in

terms of sociological opinion
polls that we see unfortunately

the gradual degree addition of perception.

And now I don't remember exact numbers but
I think last polls by live.

Are the center show that there are a
majority of Russians don't see America

as as our friend at
the same time I think that.

The main problem was not with
the Cold War because the Cold War time

when the Russia and when Soviet Union and
U.S. were an equal basis.

And in the way the Russian
people did respect the open and

as as it also happened
in the United States but

the post Cold War development
played much more negative role for

American perception because for
many Russians that which had.

In the ninety's with all
the best science that.

Aspects of transformation

is associated with American
influence rightly or wrongly.

And the.

Feeling that the United States made.

The United States exploited
the weakness of Russia is very strong.

And unfortunately this when George Bush Sr

in his State of the nation state of
the Union address general ninety two

proclaimed the United States
of America won the Cold War.

That was a decisive moment because since
that time this disc was a winners and

losers.

When Americans were winners and then
joined a certain degree of triumphalism

and Russians which did not feel
themselves as losers initially

because actually the elimination
of communist regime was.

Basically the internal process and
internal favor but after that.

Unfortunately there's a very
poisoned debate about the loser

whether Soviet Union Russia
variation were losers and

unfortunately we see until now a lot
of intellectual efforts to prove that

Soviet Union did not last lose
the Cold War but just surrendered

because of because of certain
special special with the.

Then time leadership.

So this is a very difficult process
of nation building as a nation state

because Russia never tried to be
in the nation state recently and

as as they just today just this experience
of call ups of ninety nine to one.

Thank you General.

Could I ask you something.

As a general you might give
us a better perspective.

NATO is expanding its role in.

It took a while for them but

they went beyond their
classical Donna responsibility.

But they are also are now considering
added roles like energy security.

Navies considering a new role
with the talking all that.

It has managed to curate and I'm trying
to digest what it means for Russia.

And what type of tools need it can bring

into everything for
signal energy security say Europe need

is thinking about its role in artics
the only to kill is the talk.

It is military and we are trying
to digest what it is for us to.

And with all the.

Post Cold War hangover.

Or I would say that the biggest problem
in our relations is Terra types.

We judge each other by
the stare at that that we have

inherited from the past rather them.

But what we actually are now and
guided by stereotypes.

I'm trying to understand what type of
Neda we'll see day after tomorrow.

Well it professes.

It's all in energy security or
safety not exist when you can either and

tell us what it can be but it's a very
very very complicated question.

I agree with you that

we have distinct stereotypes and

and insist the race in those from our

sort of national historical
narrative is difficult.

And we usually what is in it for
what could be to bring to

Russia that would be useful to Russia.

I mean it's Which is.

Korg questioning.

The the very idea of we have

much more in common with each
other than we have an opposition

to each other that who the kind of
things that we see merge you know

in your own furniture as well as
the rest of the world transnational.

Fragmenting nations along ethnic and
religious.

The violence the proliferation
the potential pool Perper preparation.

Those are all things that we share and
if we're working together with common

inside a security arrangement of some
kind that we both have shared objectives.

We share with you you share with us
in ways that we simply don't do.

I mean I that's not very specific but it.

It seems to me that it's the framework.

It's the acceptance that.

We can together be more secure.

Then we can separately.

Very generic

when NATO adopts a new mission to
ensure an energy security for us.

That means it might be tempted to a secure
access to social Savannah Georgia and

the question is what type of role
it might as well be another danger.

Would it be another risk.

Of the culture.

I think it's a bad idea
to have an energy NATO.

But it's not a school.

You know this thing that has been proposed
that there are mechanisms available of

solidarity we have
the International Energy Agency.

We have the European Union for
example there are ways of helping and

not to if there if there are shortages.

I don't think that is and it now.

Or do I believe that
the fact that not on all

accounts of the values that Russia is
different from the rest that that should

in any way into the West to cooperate
closely I think Senator announced

formulation that you can't have
European security without its perfect.

We the question of value is absolutely
secondary we want to agree on security.

We have to we have to help with the Soviet
Union which had very different values

are matters of security and
and we can do it so.

I and the idea that apparently
seems to be in the.

In the rend proposal
which I have not read.

But the idea has been around
a global NATO among all liberal

democracies I think that is an exceedingly
bad idea that one can cooperate

with the other democracies hopefully but
then it comes near to so

too to a counterproposal to
the United Nations where the U.N.

and who is a democracy.

We want.

What would you like to doesn't does
that mean that Russia is outside

you would differentiate and would do
exactly the contrary what we have to do

namely to engage Russia
in a common effort.

To have a better secure security system
in Europe but a way we already have

in the alliance of democracy as an
institution that gathers from time to time

and Russia isn't in white it and
it's not works well as far as we can see

and founder of various I think
taken Asia with the argument

that Russia is pursuing different values.

Yet in some areas.

I'm sure.

Sometimes yes we differ as far as
we're concerned seen from Russia where

the first reaction of the United States to
the eventual shisha where Russians will

point blank.

When the shisha as well.

Boned and shelled by a multiple
launch rocket systems and

we were we were denied
the right to defend them.

That meant that the Russian lives
were made less of a valuable tools

than the American So could you imagine
what would have happened had the American

peacekeepers window would have been
shot point blank by diesel engine.

When I was looking at the situation
I fully understood that life

as dear to us as American lives aren't to
the Americans most probably is now that

is not as valuable for
our friends in the West as it is for

us here we have differences and
we need to overcome them.

But before.

I'm tempted to continue to question.

Good.
We all heard before.

To the audience.

And we have mikes going up and down
the hallway I just ask you very much for

your name and
to whom you're asking the question.

Hi AT THE MONEY Was that
what kind of I'm looking for

Steve Maryland and
I have a question to Professor Kaiser and

to whoever else on the panel
that would like to entertain it.

I completely think you first of all for
a very stimulating discussion and

I completely agree with you that
we need to go back to politics.

First you know before getting it.

Nuclear issues but you have suggested that
we start framing the debate in terms of

Russia and the West or Russia NATO but I
would submit that we just started sort of

the narrow thorny issues in the
relationship so I think we need to look at

the relationships between Russia and the
Baltics Reeses to Russian Poland because

that's where you get a lot of
that kind of negative feedback.

And so how would you work those
relationships and what should the role of

the United States in facilitating that
dialogue be because as we know you know

a lot of those countries
are participating in Afghanistan.

So obviously you have a very strong U.S.

commitment to the security
of those countries.

So thank you.

I would argue that.

The problems that some
of these countries have.

With Russia.

What not totally disappear but

would be positively affected if we
made a much more deliberate effort

to redefine the relationship
between Russia Russia and the West.

I personally happen to believe that we
missed our chance after nine hundred

ninety and
I happen to agree with what the ambassador

said on the way the NATO Russia Council
is used it for those who want.

I was one of them for

those who who supported NATO
enlargement to a central Europe.

It was done on the assumption that we
did that we would at the same time

restructure the relation
with the Russian that

that didn't happen to the degree that
was necessary and it seems to me.

We are right in the middle of doing it
again if we do not pick up the proposals

by the president yet if and
by basically discarding them.

There's no discussion on them
because they're considered S.

so way out that we don't get there.

Now of course there are some by a lot of
questions although on the whole between

Poland and
Russia they have basically disappeared.

I mean there are some how
to deal with history up but

on the Baltics it's different and
and they're of course they both both

sides have to address them but
I do not believe that that means

that you have to make contingency planning
for a Russian attack on the Baltics.

I think that is counterproductive.

But it's literally counterproductive and
I'm just waiting for the for

the Russian military to use that as
a pretext to have their own military plan.

As an experience that occurred
contingency planning.

They're working on it before
your next question gets and

yeah the relationship between
Russia neighboring countries.

As a relationship in the whole post common
east wall from say is big you stand to a.

Romania and Poland.

I suppose and by one common problem.

Almost Human that communist countries
are using history as a political tool

in two days they do their business and

there's a very bad precondition for
any reconciliation.

The secret of success
of the European Union.

Was that countries in
Europe Germany France for Thorwald

decided not to use history in politics.

They do they politics.

Nobody forgot about history of
course Frenchman Germans and

all others they remember everything but
they read magical and

decided to phase out this this this
problem because the new book that progress

is more important than all historical
troubles in post common assault.

It's not the keys yet
in Poland in the store near in Ukraine

in Russia in Turkmenistan everywhere in
different forms of course I hold that

now we are starting to get to go over
to the next phase because the peak

of this heat history
using is over in Ukraine.

It was usually first presidency
in Poland presidency in Russia.

I hold that last year with
a very ridiculous attempt to

restore Elements of Style in this
in political the bit that was

also there is also over because
everybody not see that how

fruitless that it can bring
anybody to do anything.

Let me add.

Let me add a bit to that I
think that after World War two

France and Germany established
a commission in which they would

examine each other's textbooks
that their children would regret.

You are using a hugely
effective tool if if

if I can no longer slander you in
my textbooks and teach my children.

What terrible people you are that's
going to have a long term and

a very positive impact Israel try to
do the same thing with Egypt Egypt

wouldn't have any part of it but
nonetheless it's a tool that I think

might be very effective Poland and
Germany did it too is that right.

Saying.

My name is Robert Franklin I'm president
of Morehouse College here in Atlanta and

Martin Luther King Jr
was a student Morehouse

he's been as a student he
had a number of essays and

comments exploring the paradox
between the way in which science and

technology that nurtured human progress
and the prospect of human extinction.

My question though is really anticipated
by the last exchange of kind of a soft

power question what signs of hope.

Do you see in Russia and
Europe and even in this country.

In culture in the popular culture and
in university life for

accelerating and sustaining these
eradication of nuclear weapons

textbooks is a suggestive example but

are you surprised that there is not more
energy in youth culture I think that this

is going to take a long time we should be
talking more about what our children and

current generation college students
are learning both sides of the Atlantic

put it could I say what I for

example think we have missed our chance
after the Cold War ended and should

have been fought was in some thought
was of Russian students in the West.

Wouldn't it be nice to have as many or

often soon as this Chinese students now
in this country are invested in Europe.

It's that kind of effort that.

It is have to make Of course
governments have to provide a framework

to to effect the neutral
perceptions schoolbook commissions

work very well in
Europe France Germany Poland Germany.

You can do that in order to eliminate
the devise if nature of history and

look forward.

But that requires governmental
action at the top to do it.

And it can be done.

Not all aspects of this cultural exchange
has a positive effect either I think.

I once over a beer in a big gas house
with a very senior official and

in the Czech Republic.

In this is a time frame would
have been about ninety three or

ninety four I ask him.

What he worried about tonight we
couldn't sleep and he said Russian.

Economic domination by Germany
cultural domination by

the United States and I said What do
you mean by that and he says there.

He gave me the number of tens
of thousands of American kids.

In Poland.

Charles Bridge go out there in
period with nine year rings in

orange colored hair smoking dope.

We don't want our children
to look like your children.

We don't want your printer graffiti and
your drugs.

I never get asked my kids don't
look like that by the way but

but nonetheless I my point.

Yes I think this is there's.

There are limits to this
that this business of.

If only we can do it you know we show
our culture out on everybody every

the world would be great.

I'm not sure that that's it through.

Them.

As as it was mentioned yesterday and
today.

Nuclear arms is not the boat warfare it's
a cycle of politics more about psychology.

So I think that mutually learn
about strategic cultures

in different countries in the US and
Russia in China

in other important factors that will
be very useful to understand it

first on the stand then to jump to
conclusions whether we need to be afraid.

On the.

Question of.

I'm less concerned

about cooperation being impeded by Russian

views of the United States of them about
the views of the United States of Russia.

You've mentioned a holdover from the cold
war not having shared values and

things like that.

There is a suspicion of Russia's north or
Terry in country particularly your

former president and
current prime minister Mr Putin is much

less of Mr Medvedev but
there are a number of things that there's.

That have happened that have caused us
suspicion that are susceptible of more

than one view give a couple of examples
first of all after Beslan the tragedy

there was a change in the Russian
political structure where from now on.

Well first of all there is a difference
in the way members are elected to your

legislative body but also.

The governors were appointed from
Moscow instead of elected locally.

No matter that same way they do it in
France in this way it's done in India

many people in this country saw
that as as authoritarian and

something different and I know that
the Russian point of view is that

this is actually seizing control
from local power bosses and

actually an increasing democratization
of the Khodorkovsky as the.

And you cos.

Many people in this country saw this is
the persecution of a political opponent of

the regime and the taking of private
property and I know that the Russian view

is that this was a robber baron
oligarchy that had taken assets that

rightfully belong to the Russian people
and was a recapture of those assets.

We mentioned the the perception of
the war in Georgia and I guess you

could mention cause of also put it totally
different views of these where do we see

the Russian point of view that this is not
something that is contrary to our culture.

Why does Russia not do a better
job of pointing out that they view

things very differently other of the only
thing I can remember after Georgia that us

out an interview on The Charlie Rose Show
with with Sergey Lavrov where he

was excellent in explaining the Russian
position on a number of issues but Russia

doesn't do a very good job of pointing
out that there's more than one view.

Of Russian actions and
that perhaps the sharing of

values is greater than our foreign
policy establishment our Congress and

the American people actually
realize that I understand I was us.

That's very brief.

I'll try to be brief.

However I would like to give a lecture
on this issue because I also

first of all I agree that we do last and

then available a job in explaining of
cells and as far as I'm concerned.

I believe that a lot of difficulties
that we have between us.

Results of steerer that.

You have the numerator seems to be
incriminated to Russia being legit

the last Democratic and the others for
what preventing the in out of

the composition of Russia as it happened
to the sort of union by reintroducing law

and order by making dead deal
local the situations of members.

The duration will be compatible with
that of the Russian Federation and

the whole by introducing a little
bit more central I wouldn't

say government but
system that helps even to spend this money

from the federal budget with the control
of the federal government in order to make

them compatible with the programs
that they were lucky to have but

here people believe that it's not a way
of introducing fire and we are removing

Democratic Ikey of the ninety's
which is pure wrong.

Talk to the Russians we
needed somewhere stability.

It's a young economy.

It's a young democracy.

Only eighteen years old.

What we have gun true from a state where
the state owned everything can be have

all of us that means neither one
has had any position in the state.

Or to a country where sixty seven
percent sixty seven percent if not more

of the state has a sound now in
private hands here we go it in and

most senatorial way.

No Remember your beginning
the conquest of the Wild West.

How much blood of us but
we do it within a thousand years.

What you've done two hundred fifty So
mistakes were taken.

But the overall tendency including
by President Putin introducing

more order in the country is something
that we need it is something that

is supported by the people is something
that gives him the popularity but

he does it Joy when it
comes to stereotypes.

How do we deal about it.

We said we need to explain ourselves.

I find Americans thinking about Russian as

if we are continuation of
the Soviet Union in disguise.

Even the term Russia hasn't
changed one A P R C experts told

me that one of your biggest problem that
you need to learn to deal with is that for

a month or have America.

Since you were rushing to so
it you know you are still Russian.

When you are no longer.

So you.

And nobody understands much
of the difference except for

the changing borders.

What is it by the way of becoming a long
and that used to be in the Soviet Union.

But it's a different country would have
different system where the various And

I would submit exactly the same that
are yours that are coming the areas

where the prime focus on the well
being of people pursuit of happiness

of people there as the most important
priority of the president to go

the way we do if we cope with
the problems that we are facing but

that is the purpose of the government the
pursuit of weapons of people but for that

we need to ensure that the security of the
states are predictable reliable long term

what we do about perception will work and
you will try to do better.

We said we would welcome more exchanges.

We would certainly welcome exchanges and

culture we have a wealth of culture
wonderful culture that is almost unknown

if you go outside of Washington and
the Kennedy Center and reported them.

In New York where Russians so
promised them in a scene.

We need to learn more
about American culture.

Last year.

The only top performer that we had he was
one pops in from the United States but

I would submit that how I
would be loved by teenagers in

America can offer much more in terms
of cultural world to Russia as well but

it's almost nonexistent the presidents
have established a presidential commission

that will look at different ways
of explaining our relations.

They have established sixteen
sub commissions that cover

almost everything under the more.

Starting with economy and
ending with culture student exchanges.

They are still in the infancy and

we will take first of maybe
somewhere in the summers to.

How big a difference.

They can make but
I would say that the best way of

changing perceptions both
ways changing stereotypes is

by working together on positive projects
the economy is one of the keys.

We have enjoyed a trade between us.

Thirty six billion dollars.

Prior to the crisis after the economic
crisis a drug to twenty six twenty seven.

And it's not nearly enough your
president speaking in Moscow and

dressing the business forum in Moscow

last year was suggesting that it was
only one percent of your foreign trade.

It's negligible.

US isn't our biggest trade or
even trade partner either.

So these kind of times
that in other states with

other countries determining
the quality of elections are almost

absent and
it makes our elections even in good times.

We're enjoying now a better than
the tree very relevant still for

a general because they don't have and

so it on the being of the ties
between societies and the I would say

positive interdependency of economy
culture in their reading skills and

if you have to be thankful and why don't
we do this we have three questions left so

why don't we have each person state
their question succinctly and

then we'll have the whole cut your
rebound faculty in that one school

a common thread of this conversation has
been the need to redesign institutions.

We've talked about reconciliation and
confidence building but

then the next problem typically is
running into sovereignty issues.

The reason French and

Germany have done so well over the last
sixty years is because they were willing

to curtail their freedom of action in
the context of your people feel and so on.

So.

You know in your visions of
Frida's signing institutions.

How do we assure since there
is great urgency we were told

that we move beyond
the stage of just talking.

You have a question up here.

What's interesting about real quick.

For the reasons why the Soviet Union
fell apart was money.

We're broke.

They're broke.

China has all this kind of cash.

How is that kind of an equation and
this issue.

Let's have the last course just govern
from the James Martin Center for

Nonproliferation Studies and
on the subject to tactical nuclear weapons

particularly I would be interested in
Professor Kaiser's the pinion as someone

who's been in on the discussions about
the need a strategic concept but

certainly I've noticed in the discussions
over the posture of you and

the Strategic Concept a kind of a helpful
polarization between the Bloc who say that

we need your movies weapons right away as
a sign of our commitment to disarmament

that we really mean what
we're talking about and

the block you say that you know
this would be catastrophic.

It would fracture the alliance we
would have really embraced occurring

all over the place.

It seems to me that the middle
position says that this

is a situation where yes these weapons
are militarily insignificant but

they are strategically still significant
some relationships especially Turkey.

So my question is What
are the preconditions to

coming to a point in time if I
don't think we're there yet.

Just like that you know if you do
the top of the mountain where we

can in the near term hope
to remove those weapons.

What do we need to actually
do to make that possible.

When we go down the price will so.

I take I take the last first of

all if I come back to my main
major point we do have to

improve the political relationship
that is all fine only and

that is not sufficiently
happening we have to work on that.

If you have a different
relationship between Russia and

the west that will already
make a difference.

Second we don't need to
dialogue about doctrine.

Let's talk about the usefulness
of these old antiquated weapons.

I presume we will have lots of
military say let's get rid of them.

We can't use them anyhow
they have no value.

Let's have a debate on this let's talk
to the Turks Yes The Turks have pay

Craig attention to it to
protect our nuclear weapons.

There are other ways
to reassure countries.

Then by these rather antiquated systems.

What are the ways.

Let's discuss it.

Agree with the NATO how to do it with
with it with the relevant members.

There's no need to remove them right away.

I agree with you there is a block you can
go to gradually let's have agreements

about it and talk about it.

Between Russia and the West but
the with in a foreseeable future.

They should be removed and Russia
should move them further backward and

also deactivate them.

We don't need them.

I would certainly underscore one
point at least there in that

is that if you could get rid of
the status agreement to get rid of

the sings the first camp
champagne corks that would pop.

Would be among our military and
they're useless.

There are a nuisance.

They absorb all constraint resources in
their protection we need to be guarded.

Yes they're absolutely.

He you have a very provocative point about

what broke notice what's where
the ramifications of that.

My sort of you know we're not there.

Off the Russians best but.

Stand by for
some significant reductions in what

he United States spends on defense
over the next five to ten years.

It's inevitable.

I mean it.

We we will have a twenty trillion
dollar debt by the end of this decade.

Will Service that.

Now by borrowing.

And will deny many of
the things that we need.

Defense expenditures as a result
it's going to shape reshape and

I don't know how yet but
it's going to reshape very much.

How this our nation sees itself
in its in its security context.

Got a little something else to talk
about the Russians couple of words

we are not broke.

We sold during the crisis contractional
Russian economy about eight percent.

It's difficult it's a huge blow.

But we have accumulated six
hundred billion dollars

reserves pride to
the trusses we had spend.

Amounts two hundred fifty
billion during the crisis to

smooth transition through
this difficult year.

So the expectations are that when the our
own world economy will start to rebound.

We'll have even a little
bit higher a better

curve than the others were not broke.

However we had a very difficult
low that we are yet to come.

Here to have a comment on the southern
shore down on money I think that

huge redistribution of resources financial

resources in the world is an unintended
consequence of liberalization and

that will shape a lot of development in
the years and decades to come Asia will

play a much much bigger role than than
anybody would expect five seven years ago

about European Union European Union
experience is absolutely unique

we can expect that it can be
repeated anywhere because this

idea to overcome sonot is what's possible

only in special circumstances
under American security umbrella.

Would sort of dread and so on.

I think that next institutions

should be based on more traditional
principles in the history.

We had the a couple at least
of successful experiences of

concerts of Nations which worked for
for a period at least.

So whatever market let me close this
morning session and invite those of you

who are going to be attending our luncheon
to join us now and the next building.

You have the whole way and
they'll be people that are still un.

BUT THANK YOU THANK YOU
THANK YOU THANK YOU.

Before you get up though I would also like
to announce that David Hoffman the author

of the book The Dead Hand is
actually here and more than happy to

sign copies of his books that are on on
sale outside of this auditorium as well.

So look forward to seeing you
at the afternoon session.