Adam Stolberg.

And I'm an associate professor here at the
salmon School of International Affairs and

same time I could wreck the policy
research arm of the school the Center for

International Strategy technology and
policy and where and

in the capacity of both those institutions
I'm very proud to be able to host this.

As you all know and
can appreciate really in the last week or

so the civil war in Syria
has really taken its toll.

And all over the last more than two years
there have been over four million people

displaced two million refugees in
neighboring countries have been displaced.

There have been more than one hundred ten
thousand people killed including over

fourteen hundred people from
the most recent attack in August.

Needless to say the war in the possible
U.S. involvement in the conflict

continues to generate rather intense
international and domestic set of debates.

And for the past ten days or so
at the crux of that debate is been

a debate over whether or not the United
States should use military force on.

It but really since President Obama
laid down his red line for

holding the Assad regime accountable for
their use of chemical weapons others been

much consternation over whether and
how the U.S. should intervene in general.

In this conflict.

And to be clear since that red line
was issued the Obama administration

the president personally has found
himself caught a number of very divisive

the lengths at the top of which how to
balance the strategic imperative to

do something with to uphold
the sanctity of an international norm

against widespread opposition both at
home and abroad for U.S. military action.

At the same time the president's also
been him didn't buy a dilemma by how to

intervene and how to intervene in a man.

No man are forceful enough to produce
the desired strategic results but

in a manner that is politically tolerable
both at home and abroad and in fact.

The center of gravity of these debates and
of these dilemmas has

shifted somewhat over the last several
days due to the most recent diplomatic for

a initiated by the Russians and
while the international community

is breathing a collective sigh of relief
at the prospects of possibly peacefully

stepping back from the brink and following
through in a diplomatic solution.

There are a lot of debates and concerns
and challenges over the modalities of how

this would happen and some people suggest
that we find ourselves moving away from

the dilemmas of military intervention to
the dilemmas of the sort of hand to hand

combat of diplomacy over following
through on these agreements.

Amid tremendous uncertainty.

So needless to say there
is a lot of debate but

often lost in these debates especially
over the debates of the day are some of

the deeper issues that can inform the its
estimate because as President Obama has

turned his policy over to the Congress and
for for discussion.

It's also played into the streets and
into the into the halls of classrooms and

other for public for and so

as part of an effort to facilitate
an informed debate as well as for

the campus community to learn more about
what's here offered here at Georgia Tech.

I've invited some of my colleagues
to share some of their insight and

different angles and dimensions to
this conflict to help us not so

much give predictions
about what lies ahead.

But how to frame and
how to understand some of these debates so

that you personally have
become more involved and

engaged in understand
some of these challenges.

So with me today are as I mentioned
are four of my colleagues in the same and

School of International Affairs and
for those of you don't know.

Yes to.

Detectives have a school
of international affairs.

And those of us who study
international affairs look at it.

Look at the range of topics far from
a variety of different theoretical

policy analytical perspective some from
very technical perspectives and so

what we thought we did today is give you
a sampling of how we look at problems and

particularly the Syrian crisis that
faces the Obama administration

through these different lenses.

So again I've asked my colleagues to
maybe frame several different issues

from some of the legal issues both at home
and with respect to international law.

Some of the issues related to the W M D.

And the chemical weapons
dimension to the conflict.

Some of the regional security
dimensions to the conflict and

some of the non-state actor dimensions to
it and then I made say a few words about

the Russian to mention So without further
ado let me introduce our first before.

Who is my colleague Dr Robert Kennedy.

For those of you who haven't
who don't know Bob he is really

an institution in itself here at
the school teaching courses on U.S.

foreign policy on U.S.
intelligence issues and

he's going to talk a little bit about
some of the legal both domestic and

international dimensions to the U.S.
use of force so bump.

And just while he's setting up I think the
format to be each one of our president or

faculty members will give about a ten
minute or so ten fifteen minute so

presentation after which
we'll turn it over and

take questions and engage in a dialogue
because that's really what it's about.

Or where I think

I think they're right but

what is it OK.

If you're trying behaviors.

You're unlikely to get very much work on
the person you're trying to affect or

any of his colleagues by saying
we're going to find a publisher.

So making the comment that you are seeking
regime change cuts off a lot of and

news traffic effects some people
here on the part of the car or

on the car actors around
that might include Rush.

Secondly I think the person did wrong.

Try to correct.

More recently I need something
more like the red line

where they draw a red line you throw your
shit together side looks like you're not

a prophet and call your bluff and
that's the end of the person right now

the one fact that I will hear what are you

going to talk about during actual
legality and delivered to our viewers.

How you feel for.

We all know the president has just
read this or still want to take a less

rudely a little bit about the basis
that the law for presidential action

Galleria Chapter seven is what
I just should help to determine

the existence of any threat to peace
breach of peace rather aggression and

shelving recommendations to
decide what measures shall be

international law it is
the Security Council reactionary was

the principle here for the United Nations
the United Nations building the still

regions before the next
door to force character

doc in the cell phone in your
green cell or phone number.

You want and
through the civil gators of this dock.

Then Chapter seven gave the response
goes here to the next line.

OK So
Article forty one tell me what measures

not involving force that may be
created by your going through

Gallup we're talking about as little five
members happier because five members

have a veto power over any action taken
by the Security Council those members

are United States Russia Republic

trying France and the United Kingdom and

you know with the war with Korea with
the authority of the United Nations.

That's because the Soviet Union
walked out of the Republic of

China what they're trying
to provoke China Taiwan or

the one they can decide what measures
short of use of armed force quietly in

other words the forty two ships so
they can decide which measures.

Bar for smokers are necessary.

They decide which rights might take
them putting years of hard work

actually nothing in
the persons who are shown here

the inherent right political
that if you are attacked for

the security job
responsibilities germination or

all of the cases that's when you are under
arm attack for self-defense purposes.

You may take action rightly recognize
also recognize the way forward.

You don't do that if you are there's
a problem that you may act

we made out of it for the Bush Tucker.

But it's always good to
have the right watch what.

The

actors came out

right

to the mark

to

the fact that it is in that

market

power person.

Exercise upon them or

other circumstances which
make you fight for your job

of Christ cases reaffirm
presenters one such tax cap

and it goes on the second
it will take your

theory but this actually was

not related to your history for drivers

eighty six the Supreme Court for
the right path America

actually were probably good

for the best of this ability
preserve protect and

cost also designate for the for

medical part

as a consequence of this was trying
to do justice with Mr inquired how

the president Judy was not
truly a force of act or

treat of the United States according
to their expressed her and

sort of if it is not for
the Constitution for

the next life

then we have a case of a very very sick.

We are clear that this
case is feeling much.

Sorry for the Congress but
with such a very delicate line of

our president that has been the case

as commander in chief and by virtue
of the powers of office that he takes

and by virtue of that sort
of proof that he is the sole

person one of those

is right in that final run for

every other government the power
of the exercise of ordination.

So to a person past your part.

Drive the car up to the Vietnam war.

Or get off for

a year or

so the authorities are rather short.

That's like constitutional power.

Former territories

are going to get to my view

our final you

saw this as

well your actual

actions are looking

into the character airspace
formation in the market place

are they actually

actually for

one second and.

And finally.

Yes.

We go here for
the reporting that we talking about.

Well you were pretty much what

you should do that you know
what it is not sorry you know

not the press are equal parts on the road.

Why are they so right in your hand.

Nothing in this resolution voted or
come before Congress or a president

or not you were you surprised or

in my view or or.

If.

Thanks Bob the next speaker
is Dr Marcus Sol Maggie.

She's known to us as an assistant
professor here in the sand and school.

She teaches a course course
on W M D nonproliferation or

proliferation counterterrorism in Emerging
Technologies International Security and

I'm proud to say that she just came
back from a stent advising the chief of

staff of the Army on some of these issues
so Maggie is going to talk to us a little

bit about how the chemical weapons
dimension to the conflict.

I think that and I'm First up I want to.

It is awesome to see the standing room
only audience here and this is a testament

to Georgia Tech students and the Georgia
Tech community that we are interested in

the global community beyond
the campus beyond Atlanta.

And beyond borders and
that is really fantastic So

congratulations to all of you.

This is great.

Thank you.

The first thing I want to speak to
is that first the alleged abuse and

what now has been confirmed use
of chemical weapons in Syria.

Shows that chemical weapons
are not an artifact of history.

If no other lesson is to
be taken from this that

is what it should be too
often over the last decade

particularly in the United States and
in the western world.

The national security community has
sort of perpetuated this treatment

of chemical weapons that
they are a lesser included

danger of other weapons and that they
basically are an artifact of history.

Sometimes the chemical weapons threat
has been out rightly dismissed for

example two thousand and eight there was
the congressionally chartered bipartisan

commission on the prevention of
weapons of mass destruction and

terrorism as the Graham talent
commission that commission refused

to look at chemical weapons they only
consider biological and nuclear weapons.

And perhaps the greatest irony is
that in the commission's report

in the in the executive summary
they predicted that quote

unless the world community acts
decisively and with great urgency.

It is more likely than not that a weapon
of mass destruction will be used in

a terrorist attack somewhere in the world
by the end of two thousand and thirteen.

Well it's.

Their prediction was correct
because a chemical weapon was used

before the end of two thousand and
thirteen.

Wasn't a biological weapon it
wasn't a nuclear weapon and

it also was by a state
not by a terrorist group.

So that's the sort of the first lesson
to come out of this whole crisis

chemical weapons are not
an artifact of history.

A question that I've been asked a number
of times is why does this matter stick.

It's sort of the first answer
that is because the US has

taken a leadership position in
the international community and

preventing the political ration of WM D.

as Barbara articulated we have been
a leader in international agreements and

international organizations
over the past century.

Further on that we have
valuable allies in the region

who are very concerned with regard
to potential pool of peroration.

We also live in a globalized world
in which W M D are not likely to

be constrained by use of
usual geographic barriers.

There's another piece that

if one dives into the Iran Iraq War Of
the nineteen eighties.

It's well known that Saddam Hussein's

regime used chemical weapons
against its own citizens.

A little bit less are well
known is that they also used

chemical weapons against the Iranian
troops in the one nine hundred eighty S..

At that time a Rand had
made a decision to not

develop to not have any W M D programs.

As the A rainy and
saw all the use were subjected to the use

themselves of chemical agents
in the ran a rare war and

they saw that there was no response
from the international community.

The lesson they learned and this is a.

Very basic arms racing lesson was.

If we're not going to have these weapons.

We're going to be impacted
by them disproportionately.

So via rain Ians start a C.W.
program develop a C C W

agents and use them much lesser
quantity than the Iraqis but

this is why it matters to
have a leadership position.

It matters to ensure that
there are consequences and

that the world community does respond.

Again this is especially problematic for
chemical weapons and

as we extend it to terrorists
because if one looks at the use

of W M D by non-state actors
terrorists over the course of

over one hundred years eighty one
percent of the actually uses.

So that's not plots.

That's not attempted acquisitions
eighty one percent of the actual uses

by non-state actor.

Of a W M D agent has
been a chemical agent.

So that works out to be more
than two hundred seventy uses.

So if we're looking at probability.

This is where you're seeing it
come from a chemical weapons.

Another lesson to be drawn from the
experience that we're watching in Syria

which ties back to all these reasons
the United States should be concerned.

Is that there's a need for better
remote detection remote verification

remote monitoring technologies and this
is a great example of the intersection

of policy national security and
science and technology.

So there needs to be better verification
better technology methodology for

detecting chemical agents biological
agents nuclear agents and a lot of.

That requires investment
in basic research.

We need new areas a new work
in physics in chemistry and

biology to really advance to be
able to do remote detection.

Because there's a need for
investment in very basic research.

Better verification data is needed to
enable more robust political and foreign

policy choices when we've been waiting and
by we I mean some of the international

community has been waiting for the U.N.
report that was released today which was

the result of the inspectors who went in
and gathered data and they've come out.

They've set.
Yes

there definitely was chemical weapons use.

Now there Ban Ki moon is
being very circumspect

in not stating who it was most of

us consider there to be the overwhelming
evidence that was by the Syrian regime.

So you've got a need for responding.

But verification data better monitoring
data is also important because

those capabilities enable
nonproliferation efforts.

And if they are credibly communicated
if we can show that we detected with

great certainty as they were happening.

That also was affectively a deterrent.

I.E. if you use this we know who used it.

We know where it came from and
we can trace it back so

bridging across the science of
technology in international affairs.

If one looks to the history of
the Syrian chemical weapons program and

again this goes to a whole number of
these themes I'm sort of hitting on but

it dates back to the one
nine hundred seventy S..

Syrians are thought to
have first received.

Chemical weapons munitions
from the ship sions

as some people put it as
early as the early seventy's.

You might see as late as the early
one nine hundred eighty S.

late one nine hundred.

They also received chemical weapons and
munitions from the Soviet

former Soviet Union and more recently
their taining starting materials

as well as assistance from Iran and
some other suspected nations but

that's quite it's largely an indigenous
capability that is they can produce it on

their own no the some of the weapons
systems are coming from other nations but

the chemicals themselves largely
an indigenous production So

Syria's chemical weapons
are not a surprise.

And again this is one of these things
that goes to this idea of this is not

an artifact of history we've known it.

But it also points to a limitation within
the current international community and

the current international agreements
to sort of be able to do something.

You know we have to wait till something
happens to be able to do something.

In this lot of us goes
the Chemical Weapons Convention

the Biological Weapons Convention
is even more problematic.

It has no verification protocol
is even more problematic.

So I think hopefully you all of you know
there was a framework that was agreed

to by Secretary of State Kerry and

the foreign minister of Russia
lab Rob released on Saturday.

So this isn't a Nish all framework
between the United States and Russia.

This is not in agreement
on the destruction

of the de-militarized nation of
the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile.

The Syrians have seven days they are
supposed to report to the Organization for

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

That's the U.N. sort of watchdog
group that's responsible for

implementing the Chemical
Weapons Convention.

The Syrians are supposed to
report within seven days.

What is their stockpile.

What are their facilities.

What are their production facilities and

what is the state of
the weaponization munition.

It's so
we'll see if that happens first of all.

And then the timeline that
was proposed by Kerry and

Lavrov is extremely ambitious
the United States began efforts to destroy

our former often sort of stockpile under
President the first President Bush.

So that was where the decision
was made to actually

begin destruction of our former
Office of chemical weapons stockpile.

We still have over
thirty six hundred tons.

There are two sites Kentucky and
Pueblo Colorado.

Not likely to be destroyed.

I mean there's the question is are they
going to be destroyed before two

thousand and twenty.

I don't think so.

You know so the timeline going forward
on the destruction of the Syrian arsenal

which is gas to made it to
be about a thousand tons is

looking at the projecting it out
in about a year to two years.

That's not likely or it's very ambitious
would be fabulous if they did it I

wouldn't expect it particularly
because this has to be negotiated.

Yet through the organization for
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Another piece that I want to highlight

in this will be my concluding
remark is if a framework or

a actual negotiation deal is put
in place to destroy the chemical

weapons there will be international
inspectors from the Organization for

the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
who oversee the destruction of

the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile.

Now that is what they are there to do.

They're not there.

This is the same thing we think we have
inspections that come to the United States

their inspections that go to Russia as
they are destroying their stockpile

all inspectors from
the international community

are there to verify
destruction of declared.

Stockpiles.

They're not there to look for hidden
weapons they're not there to look for

new weapons that might be transferred N.
they're not there to look for

any evidence of purely produced
weapons beyond what might be declared.

So they're all whole lot of
political ration challenges.

If.

You know it's a agreement is
made that will go forward and

these especially are going
to impact other states and

other actors in the region with
them to conclude my comments and.

Transferred over.

Thanks Maggie thank you.

The next speaker is Dr Lawrence Reuben.

Larry is an assistant professor
at the Sam Nunn school and

he's our resident Middle East expert

Larrys research looks at both the Arab
Israeli dimension to some of the regional

conflicts as well as some of the intra
Arab dimensions to the conflict.

Larry also looks a broader
regional security issues such

as the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in the region and

nuclear energy issues there as well as
some of the terrorism issues there and

Larry's going to talk few minutes
about Syria's regional context and

some of the consequences of
the conflict for regional security.

Thank you very much.

Today's hearing.

So with these unpredictable
events in the last week and

in fact the last few weeks or
will say in the last I don't know

two three years I've been
teaching classes here.

It only makes sense.

I think to to use my
time to two objectives.

First I want to give a bit of a context
to understanding Syria in the broader

Middle East and from a broader
geo political perspective and

this in a sense means what Syria has meant
for the Middle East in the region and

how or why it affects regional
structures and alliances and

second I make a few comments on why the.

And.

An initiative might mean or
might what it might mean and

what it might not mean for the region.

Let me start with the context Series been
an important battleground in the Times and

a sense of fulcrum.

Middle East politics its trans national
identities it links its internal and

external relations of both influence and
been influenced by the wider We

region as its kind of snuggle between
more powerful states more traditionally

powerful states from the one nine hundred
fifty zero zero was a battleground for

intra Arab struggles at one time
between Egypt and Iraq and also.

Also with Egypt against conservative
western ally monarchies such as

Saudi Arabia.

Want to fast forward really quickly
to the one nine hundred eighty S.

Syria Iran developed a strong alliance
after Iran's revolution in one nine

hundred seventy nine when it became
the is on the Republican Iran and

they've claimed to be supporters of the
Palestinian cause oppose Western imperial

intervention and also claim to share Shia
ties when it's politically expedient

both also shared Iraq as
enemies the focal point

though of their alliance started with
their shared interest in Lebanon.

Where Syria did intervene a number
of years before in the Civil War and

then later against or more involved
drawn in more against Israel's invasion.

The Syrian Alliance and converged
around Hezbollah which Dr Jordan will

talk about a little more
a Shia non-state group and and

this is all that was opposing Israel
in its invasion of the time as well as

Western influence the relationship anyway
grew both basically as a rejectionist

front in the one nine hundred ninety S.
against the Arab Israeli peace process and

many of the others so to speak Western
interests as well as might be known

as moderate Arab states you might have
heard of before this is put Syrian and

important as an important focus of the
Saudi Arayan rivalry and yet another one.

I'm going to bring up.

Which.
Become one of the central poles

of international politics
the Middle East and

this rivalry starting proximately after
the Iran revolution in one thousand nine

hundred nine consisting of say
Saudi Arabia this Arab Sunni state versus.

Iran a Persian Shia state battling for
things like Islamic leadership

in the in the world as well
as in the is on the keris but

particularly Arabs on the coral
as well as Gulf security.

And broader influence but particularly
focused in the and the Levant.

So as the Saudis and the Iranians competed
Saudi policy has been one of containment

largely of Iranian influence through proxy
battles that have They've taken place

sometimes along sectarian
Sunni Sunni Shia lines and not always but

with a latent Saudi mission of kind of
rolling back this Iranian influence and

by in a sense peeling away is
what I've heard many times

in the region from many Arab officials
this is kind of the strategy of what

they want to do to bring
it back to the Arab fold.

So for.

For Saudi Arabia this is a way to strike
in this this this potential opportunity

as well as the Syrian civil war a way
to kind of strike the main artery

of Iranian influence in the Arab
world in the Arab Middle East and

particularly the Levant for
Iran this is Syrian particular

how important it is it's a key element
of she did reach into the region

to be able to influence politics as
spoilers in the Arab Israeli conflict and

to fulfill ideological ambitions as in
Lebanon by having a Shia party there.

This is mentioned briefly in a second also
connected somewhat to domestic politics.

So but evading factors are some
of the reasons why the Saudis

a very very status quo oriented state so
much so

that was against many of
the uprisings that took place.

Supports the rebels in its in
the two plus year civil war and

why Iran has staunchly
backed the Syrian regime.

Even when the Iranian policy of supporting
this Saad regime during the Civil War has

come at the expense of losing a lot
of support in the Arab world.

I support that I worked extremely hard
in the last decade in the two thousand

to try to get so I mention now two
thoughts about potential implications for

regional peace and security.

The first is that there seems to be
even if this initiative goes forward.

If it does not help.

Basically if it goes forward
I don't see there much

effect on a political settlement
on the ground in Syria.

It may have in a sense.

Extended the lifeline to the Assad regime.

So you now have two world powers agreeing
to work together with the regime.

This gives an incentive for

survival of the team especially some of
the parties that may support the rebels.

And even if there are problems or or

complications along these lines it puts
puts the parties in an awkward position.

So the important part players in the
region wouldn't be entirely against many

of them would be entirely against the end
of civil conflict with Assad in power and

as mentioned briefly
including the Israelis for

the Israelis Assad is the devil that
they know and it's been that way.

It's understood to be a rules of the game.

Vendi with with occasional breaches.

But this could mean.

Assad could again secure the borders and
chemical weapons may be checked.

If the initiative or
proposal goes forward.

Well there's considerable
domestic debate in Israel but

what it's interesting policy should be the
important overarching question though for

Israel is what does this
agreement mean for Iran and

what lesson will a long run learn
from it and more importantly though

what what will Iran learn from
the United States behavior on this issue.

This is been of most concern for
Israelis and

Israelis all along especially
in the last two weeks.

More importantly though
if this issue is put for

the restaurant to sensei on the on
the flipside this attention could

now be directed back to the most
important issue for Ron for Israel.

Iran's nuclear program which is also
a concern that the Iranians that

the Israelis have had that
the interest has been done.

Elected in what they deem is
the most important issue but

this also goes for the Gulf states
as well in particular Saudi Arabia.

This is missing of the what the main issue
should be Saudi is clearly more to gain

than Israel for instance when with
the end of the Syrian of Syrian Iranian

alliance through peeling away Iran Syria
from Iran back to the Arab world but

the Saudis to want the attention
focused on the Iranian nuclear problem.

The biggest threat for them.

One could argue in fact that the end of
the Assad that ended the Assad regime and

the Iranian alliance may
actually though I would say make.

Iran more resolute.

In pursuing its nuclear program.

If it's if it suffered such a huge
strategic loss which I mention would also

play out domestic politics as well
it could push them further that

could be a flip side to it but what this.

I want to talk about what this deal
might not mean for the region and

what it might not mean
is the end of fighting.

It's highly possible that this initiative
as a drags it could lead nowhere and

the civil war could continue and

turn Syria into eleven on eleven on
a country that's that fought Fishley for

civil war for fifteen years and
it's still rocked by.

By ethno ethno religious
a sectarian fighting.

Syria's diverse ethnic religious
ties across borders and

it's already has foreign intervention.

At the regional global level
the only difference is that one of

the diff main difference is a serious
strong military institutions and

particularly ethnic sectarian groups
who survival is tied to the state and

survival of the regime at this period.

The results could be the worsening of
humanitarian crisis one that's basically

brought hundreds of thousands of refugees
into neighboring countries including

Lebanon Turkey Jordan and and
is threatening some of the places or

can very much threatens political
stability in those countries.

So I hopefully laid out a couple of key
points for Syria falls into the broader

regional context and its relationship
to other issues such as the Iranian.

Nuclear question.

I also welcome questions in queue and when
it comes to the other countries that I

wasn't able to talk on talk about in this
short period of time but I want to leave

you one other broader broader question
at least I've been thinking about.

In the context of say the military
seasoning seizing power in Egypt in early

July from the Islamists who gain power
after the Arab uprisings and with the dual

possibilities of this continuation and
consolidation of Assad's power.

One question might ask is What does what
does this mean this new event potentially

this initiative that would get
the great powers to work together and

reinstate Assad to some extent or
continue fighting.

What does it mean for the Arab uprisings
are they over is this period over and

more particularly what does it mean for
regional peace and security.

Thank you thanks Larry.

And finally I'd like to
introduce our next speaker.

Dr Jenna Jordan and Jenna is one of
our most recent acquisitions here at

the salmon school and I'm very proud
to be able to host a panel with her.

Jenna.

As expertise is on the study of
international terrorism some people say

she's our resident terrorist but
we'll leave that for

you to decide she has specific
expertise on some of the terrorist

groups of direct relevance to the Syrian
conflict has Bella and also Hamas.

She is probably known to a number
of you who are casual readers of

international relations as well
because a lot of her technical and

research is also found its way into
some of the popular literature on

assessing alternative strategies
of counterterrorism terrorism.

She also does work on
unmanned air vehicles and

the international security
implication of population transfer so

Jenna's going to talk about the non-state
dimension particularly the Hezbollah line.

Thank you so much.

OK so my comments they're basically going
to focus on the issue of non-state actors.

Specifically I'm going to
look at the relationship.

And other militant non-state actors
that are operating in in Syria.

So I'm going to first start with Hezbollah
and then I'll talk more about the Syrian

rebel opposition groups so Hezbollah has
a very important relationship to Syria and

I think one that kind of complicates some
of the strategic decisions that the U.S.

faces and other actors face
in the region has received

political financial military assistance
from Iran and Syria has been an important

route by which this assistance
has been able to reach Hezbollah.

So that has very important
implications for the whole for

the civil war which I'll talk about so

Hezbollah has also provided important
support for Assad's forces and in Syria.

And some people argue
that without their help.

There's like thousands of Hizbollah
fighters fighting on the side

of Assad's forces.

It's unlikely that Syrian forces would
have been able to reclaim Qusay are in

June and they'd have a harder time
holding Damascus and other key areas.

It's not really clear how much you
know who's the head of Hezbollah.

Actually supports Assad or

whether they're trying to help Iran who
supplies this important military support.

Now interestingly Hezbollah
sort of historically has

been held in very high
regard in the Arab world.

They've been they've achieved lots
of political goals they've been very

successful they have lots
of support on the ground.

However their support
was somewhat diminished.

When they started to support Assad in the
in the uprising in early two thousand and

eleven and people have argued that
it's further declined as Hezbollah

fighters have been joining Syrian forces
on the battlefield against the opposition

who are primarily sonny.

And the Saudis in Lebanon on have
more recently sort of been emboldened

by the success of the Sunni
opposition in Syria.

And ideally would like to undermine
the Shia hold on power in Beirut.

So you see the.

You know the sectarian dimension I think
is really quite relevant to the conflict.

And in fact in Lebanon recently
there's been a sort of increase and

sectarian attacks in Beirut and
other cities as well.

So in a way Hezbollah's actually
taken a bit of flak for

sort of straying from its traditional
enemy which has been Israel and

this is led to this increase and
conflict in Lebanon and many Lebanese.

Sunni's feel a connection with the Sunnis
in Syria and have become to see has

ball as sort of more of an enemy now
in a more extreme interpretation.

I think you could argue
that the sectarian conflict

of a sectarian conflict in Lebanon
on some of argue that hub Hezbollah.

Might even see the war in Syria as
vital to its own survival in a way.

You know they see a Sunni
fight as inevitable but

they'd rather do it on the battlefield in
Syria than in their home in Lebanon on and

has both fighters see that they're
fighting all the extremists and

the Americans who are backing them.

So there's lots of different dimensions
going on in the conflict there and

the idea really is that whoever controls
Syria is going to control them so

that that intensifies the battle in Syria.

Where our Moreover if Assad leaves power.

It's going to be very difficult for
Hezbollah.

So that complicate things further.

And then just even on sort of thinking
about you know potential strikes when

you know this was more obviously and

the rhetoric just you know a week
ago it seems like a month ago.

Hezbollah sort of claimed that they
would carry out strikes against Israel.

If the United States launched
military action against Syria.

So how credible those threats are I think
is unclear but that was in the discourse.

So now I want to turn and

look a little bit at some of
the non-state actors and Syria.

There's lots and lots of them.

And I want to talk both a little bit
about the opposition and then there

was a royal to the Assad regime and
now the uprising against Assad is very.

Disorganized Some estimates
have said there is

like twelve hundred rebel groups
operating fighting Assad and

it relies to a great extent on
foreign support not just US support.

Now the overall uprising has grown
large enough and it's been successful.

It's pushed regime forces out a vast
areas in the north and the East in Syria.

So I'm just going to mention
a few of the of the groups.

So the Free Syrian Army is probably what
sort of most well known to everyone.

It's what's in the you know
in the media the most and

this name is sort of the most popular
amongst these autonomous armed faction.

But there's no real structure
to the Free Syrian Army.

Most of these actors had been
backed by not just the U.S. but

by Turkey by Katara and
the Saudi Arabia and have been trying

since two thousand and twelve to develop
a more centralized rebel leadership.

And use their control over funding and
weapons to sort of organize local

groups into larger alliances
to be a more effective force.

And then there's the supreme
military command the S.M.C. and

this was sort of the most recent attempt
to create a central leadership for

the Free Syrian Army for the F.S.A.

in December twelve a sort of really began
to try to create a sense of leadership.

And the rebels actually have been told
that they must endure the M.S.M. C.

and its political goals in order
to gain access to future arms and

shipments and the U.S. and the U.K. and
France actually announced that that would

be the organization through which they
would channel any support for the rebels.

And it's big.

I mean it's substantial and in June
two thousand and thirteen the S.M.C.

claimed to control eighty thousand
fighters although interestingly they later

said No actually it's three hundred twenty
thousand so it's hard to know you know for

all of these groups it's very
hard to do a sort of headcount at

all kind of militant
clandestine organizations.

Now there's also more hardline.

Islamist factions that are operating
on the part of the rebels and

this is where the complications arise that
you hear about in the media so often.

So there's the Syrian Islam that front.

They work fairly well with the S.M.C.
they're not part of it.

There's all in SAR which is
another prominent Salafi faction.

And and then there is the I.S.I. us which
is the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and

this is probably sort of the most
well known of the hardline groups and

they actually helped to create all Nusra
which is another one of these groups that

actually been designated by the U.S.
as a foreign terrorist organization and

it's these groups that represent
the al Qaeda presence in the area.

So that's why I just want to end my
comments on talking a little bit about

that connection.

And how specifically these groups have
reacted to the agreement over the last

couple days.

I think it's important to mention
before I talk about their specific

reaction is that there's lots of conflict
between all of these opposition groups.

There's lots of in-fighting.

And there's also been a more recent kind
of backlash against the heavy handed

tactics that have been carried
out by al Qaeda affiliated I.S.I.

Yes many of the Syrians actually
interestingly sort of like the I.S.I.

asked because they were tired of all the
corruption and the Free Syrian Army but

the very like harsh interpretation of
Islamic law that was invoked by the I.S.I.

is hard for lots of Syrians to handle.

So you have this infighting
amongst the rebels.

You have declining support for the I.S.I.

Yes And people argue that it could
kind of hurt the position but

it presents a more a real opportunity
I think for the more moderate rebels.

To kind of become more
to the forefront and

if the moderates could actually sever
their relationships with the al

Qaeda affiliates then they could
possibly elicit more support for.

For the Western backers.

So the question kind of becomes what's
the bigger threat is that Assad or is.

The rise of the I.S.I.

Yes And on this run and those are some
of the challenges I think that.

Some of the you know
are very very real for

thinking about the street
the strategic dimensions.

So everyone in the international community
sees this agreement as a success.

You know except I would say the rebels.

The widespread view is
that everyone gains.

Right.
But the rebels.

The rebels sort of feel that the agreement
with the U.S. It shows that the U.S.

actually wants to prolong Assad's rule.

So this complicates things and I think it
puts the U.S. in a very strange situation

because the agreement in theory does
sort of allow at least a temporary

continuation of Assad's regime and the
idea that they're protecting the rebels

from further chemical attacks not
conventional attacks but chemical attacks.

But the U.S. is still funding the rebels
who accept expect more support.

But see it is unlikely.

Now given this sort of change of the ends.

So I feel that this sort of the risks and
here and this is that it could

be a way to sort of embolden the alliance
between more moderate and hardline rebels.

That's just you know I think that
could be one potential outcome and

then just finally sort of from a foreign
policy perspective you know the U.S.

has not been great in dealing with
non-state actors it's a challenge.

It's hard to combat non-state actors and
this.

I just think about from a counterterrorism
perspective more generally.

So I think the U.S. needs to think
about individuals on the ground and

how we can provide support to people so
that they aren't be being given

support primarily from militant
organizations and my own research.

I think a lot about popular support and
local support and

how oftentimes militants
can capitalize on this and

if they're the ones to provide
support it can give more sort of.

Sort of allow for the radicalization
of different movements and

I think these are some of
the potential things that the U.S.

needs to think about in
terms of the relationship.

With non-state actors.

So it's time.

It's tough balance between.

I think U.S. support for
the rebels and and

the sort of you know seeming support for
Assad with the given agreement.

So it.

Thanks for listening and

of course before I turn it
over to you guys for some Q.

and A I want to talk a little bit about
the elephant in the room that we haven't

talked about which is Russia and how do
we understand what Russia is doing now.

I don't pretend to divine any
motivations for from Vladimir Putin but

it's important to keep in mind a couple of
things about the Russian leadership and

I would argue that in general it's
a very conservative cynical and

a competitive approach to international
ations that is embraced by the Kremlin.

It's conservative in the sense of not
withstanding President Putin's elegant

op ed in The New York Times which I'm
sure many of you wrote where he espoused

the importance of respecting the sanctity
of international law especially those

related to territorial sovereignty
any championed universalism over U.S.

exceptionalism Putin First and
foremost understands politics and

in that regard his status quo or
hit that suits him at home.

Given his relative position and it also is

the lesser of evils internationally and
especially in the Middle East.

Putin generally his approach to domestic
politics is one where while he is indorsed

democratic principles he feels much more
confident with managing the process so

that the outcome is more decided in those
of you who have studied what democracies.

I mean may find somewhat of an irony
to that understanding of managed

democracy in addition Putin in his
new incarnation as president or

renewed incarnation as
president has found.

So often a slightly on President situation
where he's actually experiencing

more domestic political opposition
both during his election and

most recently and the mayoral elections
that took place across Russia where

a number of his favorite candidates
are parties fared actually quite poorly

not only in Moscow but
some of the more conservative regions and

while we in the the West and particularly
United States focus a lot on sort of

the liberals and
the people that we like the real story.

There has to do with the emergence of
populist nationalist groups especially in

and not only in the hinterland but
also in Moscow so Putin has a real

incentive in this crisis to stem some
of the tide of discontent at home

be asserted is leadership by demonstrating
that on the international scene.

So he's a conservative and

the leadership into generally
conservative that's also cynical.

Their Russian leadership is generally
pragmatic if not hard headed realist

Russia isn't generally is motivated
less by ideals of human rights or

even prestige and more about material
interests and power relations.

I would argue that the number one
concern for Russia in this conflict has

to do with stability or at least not
the proliferation of instability.

If you read the Russian
discussion of Islamic

fundamentalism there is a very
close link between their

discussion of groups like al-Qaeda
Nuestra and Chechen rebels and so

for them they draw drones distinct
connection between instability and

radicalization in the Middle East and
their own problems with domestic terrorism

in dealing with difficult demographic and
ethnic problems at home.

And therefore I would argue that the real
fear in Moscow is not so much that

the U.S. is going to finally get its act
together and reassert its primacy in the.

Region and restore U.S. influence it's
that the U.S. is going to bungle the job.

And it's going to promote more instability
that is going to exacerbate Russia's real

problems on its own front tears and they
also some of the hypocrisy that others

have mentioned has not been lost on the
Russians that they find it hard to believe

that we're combating the same groups
in Mali as we are supporting in Syria.

So they're sort of wondering.

Despite the platitudes
coming from Washington.

If we two are not realist about this
of course there are some other material

interests but I would argue that they are
primarily secondary those with respect to

arms exports to Syria in the region
Iran energy with oil and

pipeline issues not only.

With our particular with the with
the Eastern Mediterranean developments.

Some of the impact on pricing issues
there's also a relatively modest naval

resupply base that could
be at risk in Syria.

And there's also some concerns
about Reus wrist stablish in

Russia's relevance and
via the assertion of sort of a global

international order with the Security
Council first and foremost which is a very

self-serving interest based argument
because Russia does have a seat and

Security Council it can do all
the things that Bob had mentioned so

Russian dition to being a conservative
in their orientation is also cynical.

And finally I would argue that
the leadership is also competitive and

not competitive in the sense that of
a confrontation and seeks to challenges

head on because Russia today is not
what the Soviet Union used to be but

it's more about being opportunistic rather
than risky exploiting weaknesses and

opportunities to advance those
interests that I had mentioned.

If you remember President Putin
is a judo master and.

As a judo master you don't seek to
bludgeon your rival but rather you.

Look for weak points and the United States
in the bomb and ministration in particular

as my colleagues of outlined has
provided a litany of opportunity and

demonstrated ambivalence and
decisiveness to say the least that it's

provide opportunities for
Russia to gain some stature on the cheap.

I would argue the challenge for

Russia of course is going to be if in fact
this framework agreement does get legs

because all of a sudden Russia has
now been forced into the limelight.

The expectation is that Russia can deliver
on this framework and I would argue that

the relationship with the Assad regime is
one more of a marriage of convenience.

And there are limitations to that
relationship address at present.

There's a convergence of interests of it.

Ultimately the Assad regime is
worried about its own survival and

Russia about the spread of instability and
has generally had a relatively sober I

tore Assad and promoting
the interests that I've mentioned so

therefore I would argue that the challenge
for the Obama administration is not so

much getting this framework agreement but
managing the process to maintain and

preserve Russia's incentive to
follow through on it and to shore up

I would argue Russia's relations with the
Syrians who that the Syrian leadership.

To deliver on this arrangement and
so it's not so much about trust and

we're not necessarily trusting Lattimer
Putin in the Russian leadership we're not

deferring to them as part of leadership
is getting others to do what we want them

to do as well and there.

Russia's presenting both a challenge and
an opportunity in that regard but

with that let me stop the formal part of
our panel and flip it over to you guys and

we have a couple mikes on different
sides of the room that will go around it

will try to capture as many of
the the presentations as possible.

There are some plants out there but
I'll try to have them when I will.

Well we have one over there.

So why don't we do that first.

Now.

You know you can I just ask you to
identify yourself and ask one question.

But you can address it to at least to be
like OK let's try to meet their quota.

I'm Dr Borowitz I'm also at the Sam
Nunn School of International Affairs and

my question is you know really seems like
one of the challenges with taking action

here is it's not so much about
affecting change in Syria as it is

about how whatever action is interpreted

by a wide variety of different groups I
think you represent many different groups.

So what I'm curious about is
from each of your perspectives.

What's the most important lesson or
point that

ideally the Obama administration would get
across with whatever action they take and

what kind of mis interpretation would
be most costly or the lawyers problem.

OK why don't I turn to Larry once
you take a first crack at that

sort of the question is I'm giving myself
a chance to think about your question.

What were the basic lessons but instead of
correctly the the awkward we'll take it

live work right.

But I don't think from the American
perspective I would guess that I don't

think necessarily that action would have
been driven by thinking of the lesson.

The lesson that the Arab states
would take away from me and

I think I would guess the American
partners which is probably exacerbated

when it comes to trying to find a way
to policy or dictates or things because

you can look at most recently the Egyptian
example supporter and you know

it's been accused by both sides of the of
supporting the military supporting your.

So I would see the political issues being
the first diversion frictions perspective

and then I guess in terms of
how you know how the actual

actors on the ground see things they might
interpret this I think it's actually

kind of the last few days.

Some of the actors have
been kind of quiet.

So you're just you're kind
of out of the picture but

I'm sure very very very
different from you.

So I don't want to go to
the Turkish border but I am.

Yeah I'm afraid of the sort of
repetitive from my comments but

I feel that the Obama administration
needs to be very clear about

who they're supporting in
this particular conflict.

I think that I mean obviously
the administration is afraid

that if the Assad regime falls that
there is going to be you know in Islam

ist group that's going to come to power as
we've seen a lot of other situations and

I think that's a very real
fear however you know funding

rebels that are all kind of Granted I
mean the funding has been limited.

You know so they've received kind of light
weapons they haven't received like a full

you know heavy amount of
weaponry at this point but

you know they are receiving
you know rebels that are with

you know al Qaeda very clear
affiliations are receiving support so

I think that there's just a lot to
me I feel that there's lots of.

You know this sort of lack of clarity.

I think is very real to
the rebels on the ground and

I think really influences how they see and

how they're mostly how they're likely
to align with one another potentially.

First off I totally concur.

Bob with respect to the problems of red
lines but to add to that with respect

to the Obama administration I'm going to
take it a little bit different direction.

I think that needs to recognize that
when members of the administration

argument are addressing issues that
are fundamentally stick politics

issues they can have international
politics repercussions and

I'm speaking specifically to Secretary
of State Kerry's comments when he was

testifying to Congress in which
he was totally in domestic

politics context made some
comments regarding Well

if we use boots on the ground or
if there's a U.S. military action.

There are other states in the region
that are going to pay for it.

Which effectively said.

The U.S. military was going to
be treated as a mercenary army.

And now it's a domestic politics
issue that he's addressing which is

the debt which is the cost but
that has international Republican

cautions as well as repercussions within
the defense community so that would be

the think about both the domestic and
the international consequences

of what you are saying particularly
in a globally connected world.

Thanks.

Yes please.

This is going.

Just like one action

that they're

going to next question

is a chemical warfare.

Thank you wanted to but

with regard to the red line which article
in the paper analyzed the statement.

Exactly.
It was made by President Obama

in the first instance
it was clear statement.

It was clear in a statement that
the intent was to draw the red line.

It was clear originally
that he attempted to extend

that to the international community.

This is an extraordinarily
complex situation and

there's no doubt that there was motivation
to try to keep the government from using

chemical weapons because
we knew they had them.

That kind of statement recently might
have been a better statement made before.

Instead of the way he put the question
when he was responding to that issue

earlier earlier context.

It's not surprising results
not surprising the relatives.

Week two team with not
a lot of experience.

The kind of mistakes that we.

Could have got a better job strategically.

Leaves were working for for.

So with respect to the question of
his agent orange a chemical weapons

per international law as well as
any sort of technical perspective.

No it is unquestionably
not a chemical weapon.

Nor is white phosphorus
which one occasionally sees

on the Internet cited
as a chemical weapon.

Neither of them are chemical weapons
the Chemical Weapons Convention has very

specific schedules of both
chemical agents as well

as precursors that those
are what are constitute chemical

weapons nine hundred twenty five
referring to the Geneva Protocol.

I mean this is where we start to get
into some of these internecine sort of

international law pieces Syria it
is a member of the there isn't

a state party to the Geneva Protocol
the Geneva protocol only prohibits use and

it only prohibits the use in
an international conflict.

So technically the Geneva protocol
does not prohibit use in a civil war.

So these are these weird little little
pieces in the nine hundred eighty S.

with respect to decisions
going on in Iran and Iraq and

that was where you had international
politics largely of the Cold War that were

really driving in the predominant
piece there was you know we were war

supporting a we were we were engaged in

containment as our overall strategic
doctrine and it was politics versus the.

Union.

Thanks.

We have.

Right.

Right.

OK Well thank you.

All right.

And I think that this as I mentioned in
my remarks I think that Russia has much

much of its attention is really on
the negative consequences of a U.S.

action and I think there's a lot we can
talk maybe offline in lot of you already

know that Russia felt somewhat spurned by
the Libyan episode where they actually

signed on to that a lot of people sort
of make sense make the claim that

Russia lost stature in that but Russia
really the deal that Russia made about

signing on to Libya had more to do with
U.S. support for what was going on within

Russia then within the region and
so they have also seen the outcome

of the Libyan episode and some of
the uncertainty and instability there so

it gets back to my bigger point
now question is whether or not.

Russia can be induced to play
a constructive role and I agree with you.

That's the real challenge because I I
would argue that they actually have quite

limited influence over the Syrian
government and to the extent

that the Obama administration
has an overarching strategy.

It probably should focus on some of the
broader regional players in the dimensions

that Dr Ruben mentioned with these
of Iran and with Saudi Arabia and

some of the other stakeholders in this and
where Russia could play a more

constructive role but I think if we
confine it to the Syrian conflict.

I think our interests are different and
Russia's leverage is much more limited.

Let me take another question have it as
you can OK the next course incidents that

have the microphone here
right here right before.

OK videos that international affairs and.

My question is more with idealistic
question the kind of fun to think about

with regards to Russia supporting
Syria against groups like al Qaeda and

other factions.

Is it possible that the U.S.
can gain in a good way.

Some of the sure missed.

Attacks or or or future attacks
that are being planned by al Qaeda

before focus towards Russia
through church instead of the U.S.

since the Russians Russians
fighting against also defer to

our counterterrorist expert about this
strategy of redirecting terrorism so

yeah I'm not really sure how to
answer that to be perfectly honest.

I mean it doesn't really seem likely.

I don't know what to say.

Beyond that I mean there is an interesting
connection with the Chechens and that

one of the actually like very prominent
hardline Islamic hardline Islamic groups

is actually led by a Chechen and
Syria which is kind of interesting.

But as far as that I mean I think that at
least for in this particular conflict.

I mean al Qaeda is focused in the region.

They're not thinking beyond they're just I
mean these particular groups are operating

really in Syria and perhaps in Iraq as
well but that's that's predominantly.

Spillover into and yeah I mean I think
that that obviously is a concern.

I mean that's always a concern with
finding rebels with with with arms is that

the conflict could have
the potential to spread.

You know I mean that's always a concern
and that's I mean that's a big concern for

the U.S. That's been and I think that's
probably one of the reasons why the U.S.

has held off supplying you know
large amounts of arms to the rebels.

So that's definitely a concern you want
to want to come to really keep in mind.

Big picture in my mind the big picture

is bringing Russia into
the community of western states.

So the last thing we want to do is become
their ad the sure in the first thing

we want to do is encourage them slowly but

surely once again to be a player in the
international community working with us.

This does a cardigan off.

You may have seen the article
mentioned recently from Russia.

This may provide a partial opportunity for
that.

The second thing we need to keep in
mind is there are only eight states not

signatory to
the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Syria is one of them.

Now if we can come out of this with
Syria giving up its chemical weapons and

there's not an easy task.

But if we can come out of this with
that that is a major advance for

us it's a win in the international system
after which if we want to play again with

other rebels some of us is General suggest
that we can play with Keep in mind

the big picture here where we're trying
to go with the inter international system

as opposed to what are we
trying to do with whatever.

The other kind of groups.

Thanks Bob.

However I'm hesitating giving you a mike
I'm hoping you're not going to go

ballistic on this but go ahead.

Hi Nick Selby any undergrad.

I feel like a lot of the frustration among
American citizenry involves the focus

of the American government
pursuing a military Syria option.

What Dr specifically blocked
the United States from pursuing and

nondestructive option.

But why why did we default to

the military option as opposed to
not exploring some of these others.

I can speak to in a larger context.

I'm actually second former Secretary
of Defense Gates in two thousand and

seven little.

Landon Lecture at University of
Kansas articulated very well

that is of the last thirty years in
particular the State Department and

very much in particular
the USA ID has effectively been

decimated in its ability to do two
acts beyond program management

in terms of number of
individuals who employ aid.

So that limits your capability
right there where as there

been a whole number of things that
in the past had been done under

the State Department that are now
effectively being done by

the military because they're
the ones who have the capacity and

the capability to do it because
they've got the budgets to do it for

example I have a good friend right
now who is chief of humanitarian mine

program it's D. mining program in Africa
who's also a major in the army and

a former Army Ranger nobody else Bob
you want to know we've actually done.

We have sanctions on Syria
that we have import other tool

relative leverage that we have I'm
sure with these other two minor

This is probably why the president
early reduction regime

force in the blue shirt.

My name is Christopher you high
school student and why school and

I was wondering how we would address
the refugee crisis in Syria.

Aside from the conflict itself.

As far as U.S.

policy is a question of
well I think you will be

working with clearly working
with regional regional partners.

Allies are not allies even in the sense
because there is an incentive so

that many of the countries that
don't have this don't have political

instability there you could look at
a broader perspective of what for

instance a country like Jordan has
gone through since the Iraq war.

Hundreds of thousands of refugees coming
through in the period since the Iraq war

coming out and then also having to absorb
so many Syrians in last period time Turkey

especially and in the recent period and
in particular.

Levanon and people talk about
these types of events there.

I think if this at this point the
United States is no particular what its

actual physics its its actual
specific policy is towards that.

But I know that it's trying to working
with international community to provide

sometimes humanitarian relief but I think
it's a question of how it's going to

do this so that this humanitarian problem
in those countries don't become an upward

inordinate strain on the actual political
stability of say countries like Jordan who

not just from the demographic perspective
are really strain but also from a resource

perspective other countries to weather
the storm better Turkey but the door.

It was a difficult dire strait in that
way Lebanon from this experience.

Thanks to make it do you want to
add something here on the right

to protect this is one of the issues that
has not received as much attention here in

recent benefits speak briefly
about the in the very little role

that responsible to protect this is a new
idea has had very little mobilizing

force in in the Syrian crisis
the have in two thousand and five.

Agreement at the UN General Assembly that

countries have a responsible to protect
populations that are under attack.

If the home governments
do not do anything.

And recent events interventions in Libya
and then in the Ivory Coast certainly

elevated the hope of the supporters
of our two peat that a new dawn.

Said.

Again because both of these
interventions were at least partially

justified by reference to
the responsibly to protect.

By the home governments of
the of their populations but

it seems to me that Syria
has showed what for

and Rhonda show that it's if there is no
willingness to intervene there is going to

be no intervention and one striking thing
to me is somebody who teaches human rights

is just how little movement there really
was from the very beginning and even now

if you really do anything effectively
to stop stop the killings in Syria.

There were some.

At him is that the U.N. Security Council
early on the U.S. led with him.

To condemn Syria but
at no point was he didn't heed States or

anybody else really ready to
enforce you know measures

such as humanitarian corridors or
a no fly zone so even.

Measure short of full scale
use of force did not have

you know even U.S. support not to
mention broader international support.

Thanks.
And that was one of the plants that was Dr

missed by break here.

The salmon and scrub there's somebody.

In the back way back there.

But

anybody want to take on
the credibility issue.

You can start it Bob.

Well I think that's a red herring.

There not a lot of people are making a big
deal about that I'd say should lose but I

think the fact United States demonstrates
a significant flexibility here.

Is credible of its own you
know on its own sense.

As I said earlier if you keep
your eye on the bigger picture

longer term opportunities here.

What we are doing now is
probably the best thing to do

under the circumstances we
are population didn't want to use force.

The president doesn't want to use force.

The only people that would really
probably like us to use force are some

very hardline country.

And of course the rebels who would see
that as possible up to take advantage of.

Some dissipates in the Syrian rebels and
perhaps some of our allies and

friends in the region that
support the rebel effort.

I don't just go that by
noting that credibility

is really in the eyes of the beholder and
notwithstanding that

President Obama keeps reminding us that
all of his statements are credible.

He may believe them but that's really
beside the point and another thing to keep

in mind about credibility is that it's
a graduated scale not everything is equal

and you demonstrate credibility in
number of ways and there are a number of

conditions that have to be taken into
consideration such as the balance

of power of the balance of risk
the pain tolerance the issues at stake.

How clearly you articulate
these issues and

I would also argue and there's been
some scholarship on the scene and

we talk a lot about the problems of
a democracy and all of the pulling and

hauling in problems with transparency and
it's very difficult to play poker and

in in the democracies but
international diplomacy is not

really about poker it's very little
you very rarely just only about

information it's also about incentives and
frankly there are some advantages to.

The democratic institutions and
that there been a number of scholars that

have talked about democracies
being very good at leveraging

the transparency of those institutions
such that when they do issue a threat.

It is credible because there
are restraints we're not going to go

politician is not going to
make a declaration that he

can't support based on the transparency
of the political process and

therefore when they
articulate a decisive threat.

They've got the country behind them and so

there's a confirmatory effect on that as
well so credibility is a red herring.

If you just sort of look at any
articulation and extrapolate from it.

There are conditions matters what
the what the targets perspectives

are and there are some even some
advantages in these very transparent

domestic political environments like
the demat democratic structures that we

have let me say we have
a couple more minutes.

So let me pick somebody else back there.

If there's no Mike you can just you know.

You

want to let me start on Saturday
the Syrian government did submit

to the UN a notice of
ascension to the C.W.C. So

that is indicating that at least
they are supporting their acting

they have thirty days and by the treaty
in thirty days it enters into force and

they will be a state party and
to the treaty which then

opens up some of other consequences
within international law.

So just wanted to say
that Syria has made that.

You know as far as the rest
of your question I'm

going to pass that over to
my colleague to comment.

I mean I think this is a very
cynical sort of response.

And I don't mean it to be a sense
of this is an arguable have

made sort of a more realist kind of
argument but you know that the U.S.

strategic interest in the region was very
much sort of in favor of a civil war and

that it's basically sort of
bleeding has ball on Iran and

you know training of resources and
things like that.

So you know yes we have this agreement and

then the civil war continues so
perhaps it's just sort of status quo.

You know there.

OK.

Yeah that's a great question.

I mean I think this potential
scenario is not going to have

a following Assad regime and and anything
by any means and I would guess and

I really make predictions or you know
many political science colleagues not

here like me but I don't think it's
going to end overnight by any means.

And if not even more brutal civil war and
continue external intervention even

behalf of them on behalf of the rebels
various forces jockeying for

time the question of course then as
it's a question of border security.

Many of the issues that go along.

I would imagine the true direction still
of whatever groups are there are still

directed towards the conflict itself as
opposed to the errant mortar fire that you

know that may lead but the issue I think
is the is the humanitarian slash REFUGEE

one that again may may cause even
greater problems of continuation

of what's happened recently and
probably increase in the future.

Yeah yeah I mean as always.

I agree with Larry.

But just Also I'm sort of thinking about
the way in which potentially Assad could

fall I mean I also hate
to make predictions and

you know I feel that we can't
really predict like if Assad falls.

Who's going to come to power and

what the state is going to look like
if it's going to be a failed state.

If any think about.

Well if it is you know oftentimes militant
organizations take very much advantage

of a failed state kind of situation where
there is a lack of of state capacity and

they are able to go in and kind of provide
for people in a way that a state isn't

able to but also thinking about
the way in which Assad could fall I

mean thinking about whether he falls to
really know whether he just loses like

a next election right or whether he
is imposed by a foreign regime and

that's a very different
kind of process you know.

There's lots of interesting studies that
are coming out looking at foreign imposed

regime change and

kind of the effectiveness of this and it's
been shown to not be that great and not.

Had that great launching implications
particularly for democracy itself

it's sort of depends on and how you're
thinking about a side leaving power.

You know I think that's an important
thing to keep in mind to keep in mind

is the START treaty which they after which
we got to see every elections came out so

quite possible.

What we're looking at is a transition
period where we would actually agree to

step down under certain circumstances or
at least have a fairly action

going to the other thing that I think is
the emphasizes the what would happen next.

And we're talking about this
is why I'm really skeptical

of a political settlement of any sort.

We're talking about the brutal civil
war that's that's it is about both

religious but also these religious
sectarian along sectarian lines and

these groups are tied to
the some some Christian groups as

well as them the Sunni businessman's are
aligned with the regime but in particular

the only sect many parts of that are
aligned business survival and without it.

Everybody knows I think it's
not it's not really a shock.

It would be an absolute
bloodbath even more so

than one hundred thousand
people that have died.

I think we have one more question for

me I graduated from Georgia take
a couple of years ago but state.

My question is related
to international law and

stepping back a little bit
from the present situation.

How does international line between and

nations coming

right through and

what is the diplomatic channel or

international.

The line between supporting diplomatically
forces actually defeating in solving

nations on terms of international law
with three my understanding and I'm

not an energy national or scholar I just
gave you what I what I understand of that.

But your national law does not speak
to the issue of whether states can

get involved in conflict except
through the UN Charter Chapter seven

defines how States will act
in those situations and so

beyond that you know I mean there are laws
about the Geneva Conventions on how you

treat prisoners prisoners and those kind
of things you can break those laws people

accuse United States of broken though of
having broken those laws recently but

in terms of international law of action
that can be taken that is governed by

Chapter seven of the U.N.
charter and so unless you can get the U.N.

Council and its five members to either
agree or agree to abstain a vote.

The international community can't
does not act in that regard

individual states can take
action as they see fit.

Short of war in terms of sanctions and
those kinds of things but

of course hostilities is
governed by chapter seven.

Let me and I see a very
enthusiastic student back there and

I'd love to end with a with that
enthusiasm so please ask questions

Bob you want to take a stand.

I was impressed with the comment after

at least with regard to his understanding
natural law specifically the three

cases in which the president can use and
not use partially going to oppose

the natural law that you are never really
certain where McCain is going to be

sometimes something
doesn't seem supportive.

I think the division United States
is going to continue to be

between those who oppose Obama and
the Democrats who oppose

opposition but not all Republicans think
we should be going you know we should

McCain has said he thinks
we should be more powerful.

So we'll still he may not go along with
the president because he wanted to

be more forceful what's really going to
be here in terms of domestic politics.

If we fail.

That is breaks down

breaks down fundamentally because it

is in noncompliance with what do you
agree to do at that point in time.

I think we're going to
see the consensus for

action even though to be in
violation of international law.

I think the president will get authority
to use weapons of feats to having

said that presidents frequently have
operated outside of domestic law and so

his threat of using force that breaks down
is credible in the eyes of others because

presidents in the past have ignored
domestic law not gone to Congress and

acted on their own and my view is that
the president is making that threat and

from very respected for his perspective.

It's credible.

Thank you Bob let me just close by

noting one thing when I
first came to Georgia Tech.

I was asked to give a lecture at your
department H.T.S. on the Vietnam War and

I was very fortunate to be able to meet
a professor who was on campus during that

period and on route to the lecture
he mentioned to me that.

He didn't remember the Vietnam War and
he the only thing he did remember is

that nobody talked about it on
campus during that period and

I'm heartened by the turnout today and
the quality of questions and

the enthusiasm with which you guys
are taking your responsibility

which is the think hard about these
issues because they do matter.

So with that let me thank you.

And please enjoy join me in thanking our
panelists for sharing their expertise in

getting this kind of the.