It is wonderful this and

the before professors don't work and
I have good news.

Now of course more that's not really part
as I want and I'm still at it working

with one recently given Norma's good you
know I do he would say don't do it but

I want to as you know he is
the co-director of the center of strategy

that knowledge of and last month B.B.C.
two thousand and ten.

I mean now engine your legacy faculty

is going to give you your
a shortened version of why or.

It was really nice and
visionary you're working on projects that

break the nuclear
nonproliferation regime for

one thing closely was don't you see I'm
no draft important policy recommendations

for earning a reputation at Georgia
as one of the best teacher doesn't

know our program today is sponsored
by the hail organization of Mars.

Dr Russell and also by the four

world peers Council in Atlanta which
is affiliated Georgia State University.

The president will meet with executive
vice presidents ever existed.

Both in the body so gentlemen.

Just what we just have my little.

Welcome back.

OK I thought it was
actually becomes a little

more helpful that we're having
you guys and finally this program

is monitored by the General Brady this
memorial down which is part of ours and

after graduating from Georgia Tech
in nineteen thirty seven with a.

Major in chemical engineering
General Davis joined them or

retired years later as
a four star general.

He was awarded the medal water for
our injury in war under the revered

conditions at Charleston or
changing reservoir in what is now with

us on the actions of him and
his men don't list all their good.

I can honestly say it's not an
exaggeration and I consider it one of them

raise these theories as of my life
that I had the privilege to know

in addition to the gentleness
many individuals and

organizations made this memorial down and
possible.

I don't believe anyone from the lorry
Corps or made counselors here today.

Of course they were instrumental but
we do have members wonderful members

from the radiators chapter of the Korean
War vet and quite a few gentlemen stand

by our also have a number
of other veterans here.

I just love them better and

I am going to if you can
just one of our our a P.C.

instructors will be going to see you
in a little bit more on this film and

then before I turn the my government.

I'd like to recognize the importance of
what we've done many nice things with us

in war as over the years since the day we
have a very new member of your community

Deputy Consul General Hume he'll sue Mr

you know I am.

Thank you all very much and
enjoy the program professors don't you.

And before I get started.

I'd like you all to join me in a round of
applause for Angie who really runs this at

all let me just say here.

We made it through another academic year
and really it was due largely to this

success and the success of the year was
really largely due to the participation of

many of you not only the students and
faculty members across Georgia Tech.

But our friends outside.

So I really appreciate all of
your attendance for the litany of

parks and disappointments you've had
to endure throughout the year but

you are a large part of our success and I
have from today on this special would like

to thank the Cato institute
the rule of various council and

of course our own Ray Davis down.

This is the last event
of a long academic year

in many ways this was the year of nuclear.

So we had a number of talks on nuclear
energy as well as nuclear weapons.

You know a very changing landscape and
tried to look at how those two

elements two ends of the fuel cycle of
you will affect your national security.

We look at a technical perspective as
a regional perspective on all our academic

scholarly perspectives in the course of
policy analytic respect this year and so

it's really fitting that
the capstone of our program for

the year looks at really one
of the toughest nuts on U.S.

nuclear development in the U.S.
diplomat nuclear holocaust and

you primarily with Iran also
a little bit with North Korea and

it is with that great pleasure and.

Talking about these issues
that I want to invite you.

You know.
Welcome our speaker today

Dr Christopher Dr probably

historian of I Dream of those of us
in the school of national affairs.

We tried to avoid this by the way
this is a piece of political

scientist Look at the always funny
that you can't come up with the story.

You're in for
really really happy of really

historian into the mix of
this human eye doctor Preble.

Receipt is from Temple University
where he also taught as well as its

name clout University Dr Gravel has
written a number of books on U.S.

grand strategy book that looks
at some of the tradeoffs of

our intervention in Iraq especially
with respect to the war on terrorism.

Arnie is also true to his
The story is story background.

Look at the Kennedy
administration in this crisis.

I don't know if one can
suggest that Iran today

isn't willing to come out of
the missile crisis of yesteryear.

But we certainly have something to
do with that when we turn it over to

not throw who will talk
today about both Iran and

to some extent North Korea nuclear
challenges in giving to mom in

his own take on John Lennon by giving
to the offices thank you very much.

I am.

Thanks to Professor Stolberg for that kind
of an introduction thanks to all of you

for showing there are seats by
the way on this side of the room for

those who are standing and so don't be.

Don't be shy and don't miss out
an opportunity to sit down and

say it's great to be here thanks to N.G.

and to the World Affairs Council
of Atlanta and to.

The Davison down and I want to thank
my employer but I also want to thank

the Ploughshares Fund which has generously
supported Cato's research in this field

over the last few years including
the speakers series a series of

talk with my colleagues and I are giving
around the country on this topic.

It's actually the eleventh
time that I have spoken

on this subject since two thousand and
six.

My colleague even as we
speak is in Indianapolis

talking about this next week
I'll be in Kansas City.

It's an extremely important topic and

as witnessed by the great
turnout on a beautiful day.

It continues to be very timely.

So every time I prepare for this talk
I kind of revisit where we started and

what has changed since I since
I started this project and

you know when we started this project.

It was President Bush was president and

we of course have a new president in place
and a new president President Obama who

really made a point of drawing
distinctions between his approach to

this particular problem nuclear
proliferation the Iranian problem and

the North Korean problem tried very hard
to draw a clear distinctions between

himself and that of his and
his predecessor so that has changed.

We have a new president.

What has not changed.

I think is more important
than what has changed.

We have two partners
occasionally in the Russians and

the Chinese who say that they
would like to keep the number

of countries in the nuclear weapons
club relatively small I believe them.

I believe that makes sense for them to
wish there to be fewer rather than more

nuclear weapon states and yet for
different reasons they are and

still are reluctant to push too
hard on either Iran and North Korea

when you talk a little bit about why
I think that is and maybe in the Q.

and A we can we can explore that a little
bit more what else has not changed.

Well Iran continues to enrich uranium.

Depending on who you believe whether
it's President up in a job or

the Department of Defense and somewhere
in between is probably the reality.

Iran is either already a nuclear
power not a nuclear weapon state but

a nuclear power or
they are about a year away from having

sufficient highly enriched uranium to
create a single atomic bomb about three

to five years away from being able to
perfect that into a functioning weapon.

OK the North Koreans for example
detonated or conducted a nuclear test.

Years ago but the logic is that that was
not really a functioning weapon it was

more of an experimental device and
they continue to perfect it.

Even today there are rumors at the air
that the North Koreans are preparing a new

nuclear test.

That's all for the purposes of
trying to perfect a weapon.

Even as Iran continues with its uranium
enrichment program they continue to

profess that it is a peaceful program and
they continue to point to their rights

under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
to do exactly what they're doing now.

It is important to point out that
they are not in compliance with

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Technically speaking they have not been
fully cooperative with the I.A.E.A. and

and I predict that when the N.P.T.
review takes place later on.

Later this month next later
this month when the N.P.T.

review takes place that in May right.

It is still April considered my problem is
I'm I'm not connected to a to an academic

calendar so I get a little lost about
April versus may I understand it and

university is a big difference
between April and May may

want of the key vulnerabilities of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

as it exists today was precisely
the vulnerability that the North Koreans.

Plaited OK which is that you are entitled
to the peaceful uses of nuclear

power that was part of the bargain that
was struck with the nuclear weapons states

back in ninety six sixty eight and
that you could

use those rights right up until
the point of developing a weapon.

OK nuclear breakout capability
as we say the North Koreans were

the first to be a signatory to
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and

therefore supposedly bound to
it using their rights under

that treaty to expand their program and
then withdrawing and declaring themselves

a nuclear weapon states three other
nuclear weapons states India Pakistan and

Israel have never been signatories of the
N.P.T. So they're in a different class of

themselves but I think the North Korean
case is the most important

relative to the Iranian case and that's
about I'll say a little bit more about

North Korea later but I want to I want
to emphasize that one connection.

OK And I think it does show
the vulnerabilities and I predict

that when they will try very hard to close
some of those loopholes in the N.P.T.

review but I also and
somewhat skeptical that they will succeed.

The last thing I want to talk about a
little bit towards the end is a little bit

about U.S. foreign policy as we've been
conducting over the last twenty years

at least since the end of the Cold War and
what it implies for nuclear proliferation.

Let me although I do understand there
are a number of people here who are very

focused on on Korea for
good reason I want to talk just

briefly in terms of background about Iran
and how we got to this stage with Iran and

Iran that is enriching uranium
professing to do so for

peaceful purposes professing to do so
as a deterrent against the United States.

How did this all come about.

Well most of us can
remember many of us and

getting older but many of us can remember
the Iranian revolution one nine hundred

seventy nine which is kind
of our starting point.

But of course the Iranians are taught.

They don't remember but they're taught of
another interaction with the United States

back in one nine hundred fifty three when
the US CIA in cooperation with the British

overthrew a popularly elected governor
a popular government and installed an ally

of the Shah on the throne and
this different narrative frames so

much of what the Iranians
talk about To this day we

recall the Iranian revolution we recall
the hostage crisis this is when would

the United States impose sanctions on Iran
essentially unilateral sanctions which

have been in place ever since then we've
expanded those sanctions a few times over

the years with the talk about there
was a nuclear program under the Shah.

We have to remember that that there are
some suggestions that the United States

actually helped him along that route but
in two thousand and

two an Iranian exile group revealed
the existence of a six secret

nuclear facility in Iraq and
a separate one in the tons in Iran and

this was in the context of
a ramping up of war with Iraq.

My favorite quote kind of trying to
put the war in Iraq in the context of

Iran's nuclear plans was.

Richard Perle a close ally of
the Bush administration although

not a member of the administration who was
When asked what kind of message the Iraq

war would send to countries like Iran and
Syria.

He replied.

Your next.

Meanwhile this was going on.

We had talks trying to restore or
or some kind of control and

supervision of the Iranian program again
they were not cooperating with the i and.

Inspectors and they were not
the root the revelation of these

secret facilities really kind of shone the
light on how little we knew about what was

going on inside of Iran and ever since
then two thousand and five thereabouts.

We have tried to reengage the Iranians
into some series of talks

all the while they continue to
perfect their Richmond program.

In fact last year in September.

It was revealed that they had
another site in comb which is

mainly known as a religious site of one
of the most important religious sites and

Shia Islam but now it's also known as and
as a nuclear facility

the Iranian program has moved forward
throughout this period in kind of fits and

starts and one of the things that my
colleague Justin Logan highlighted in

a paper he wrote in
the subsequent years ago is how

wrong we have banned in predicting
when the Iranians would actually have

a nuclear weapons capability we
have never gotten this right.

We have always exaggerated
how quickly they would do so.

Partly this is to overcompensate I
put I I submit to overcompensate

by how badly the intelligence services
estimated the Arrange the Iraqi nuclear

program recall after the first Gulf War it
was discovery of an Iraqi nuclear program

which was far advanced far more advanced
than intelligence services predicted so

I still think there is this
residue of kind of exaggerating or

overstating the extent to which your Iran
is making progress and of compensating for

those mistakes back with respect to Iraq.

All of our work all of Cato's work on this
subject has been framed in the context of

trying to understand what motivates
Iran to want to acquire nuclear weapons.

Now I'm going to put on the table and
I'm a.

Lou some number of you
write out of the gate

that if you believe that
the Iranian government is intending

to do to develop a nuclear device
with which it will immediately

initiate hostilities in the interest
of hastening the end of the world.

The so called twelve twelve or she is and
if you believe that completely.

I will not be able to change your mind.

If that's what you believe
then this talk will not

submit be particularly convincing to you.

I believe contrary that Iran
over the years sense the time

of the Islamic Revolution has demonstrated
remarkable restraint in important

context and that they are not suicidal
the leaders of Iran are not suicidal and

that they will not behave so
differently than other

really quite reprehensible people who also
had their hands on the nuclear weapon.

I'm thinking of people
like Joseph Stalin and

Chairman Mao Chairman Mao after
all acquire nuclear capability

at the time that he was murdering
millions of his own people.

Was part of the Cultural Revolution.

So not a nice guy.

OK.

I believe and
I think there's evidence to support that

a lot of what the Iranians are doing
is intended as a deterrent.

And there is one piece of evidence
that emerged how many people here

were aware of the fact that
in January of this year.

Secretary of Defense Bob Gates
issued a memo to

the National Security Council
the National Security Adviser Jim Jones

warning that the Obama administration did
not have a program did we see a show here

how many people are aware of this
that this memo was well OK so

here's how many how many of you keep
your hands up even modernising OK So

so there's a fair number of
people that heard this story.

How many of you are aware of secretary.

It says a correction less than twenty
four hours after the New York Times

story saying that the New York Times
had mischaracterized his story.

Good good many of you.

That's good.
I'm very encouraged by this is good.

This is good last night was the New
York Times New York Times Shanker and

Thom Shanker and
DAVID SANGER New York Times.

OK How many of you are aware of
the person in the Obama administration

who leaked the document
to the New York Times and

I thought it would be the most
important piece of information I

could take away from Atlanta and
unfortunately I couldn't get my point is

that when senior administration
officials surreptitiously

leaked documents to journalists with for
example the New York Times

they have their own agenda which is
after all the subject of my first book.

John F. Kennedy the missile gap but
that's another story for

another time you can invite me to talk
about that some of this dispute within

the Obama administration within the U.S.
government over what to do about Iran.

I think ultimately is founded in
dispute over what we believe what they

believe what the individual people in
the administration believe the Iranians

will do with that weapon
how their behavior.

It will change if at all
with that weapon weapon.

And I think the most important
piece of information that came out

of the Gates memo on this meeting
the existence of the Gates memo and

all that secure Gates didn't dispute it.

Was he predicted that the old
that the Iranians would

reach a nuclear breakout
capability they would have.

They would have perfected the enrichment
cycle they would have developed

a sufficient amount of material to create
a weapon they would have perfected

the various technologies to weaponize but
they.

Not go the final step to develop a weapon.

Why would they not do so.

Partly to remain in compliance with
the N.P.T. as it currently exists again

presuming they don't fix that loophole
next month but if that's true.

If Gates is right you
do not hasten the end

of the world by possessing
the pieces of a nuclear weapon.

You do however have
a deterrent against regime

change the type that we affected against
Iraq in two thousand and three and

comparable against Serbia in
one thousand nine hundred nine.

If you have all the pieces but
not the weapons.

You seem to understand I'm saying.

I think this is a piece of information
which has unfortunately been missed.

So the rest of my talk is going
to be framed around this argument

that they wish this weapon as a deterrent
and then the question is what can we do.

To convince them that they don't need one.

Why would you need a deterrent.

If you had nothing to fear
from the United States or

other members of the international
community because for

all the talk about all
the nuclear proliferation.

There is in the world and
there has been some and

there are troubling signs that other
countries are thinking about it.

I am more struck by how few
countries have it then how many and

again this is a prediction going back
to the mid one nine hundred sixty S.

when there were predictions that there
would be twenty to thirty nuclear

weapon states by fifteen years ago and

there are eight and
Iran would be nine times.

We say in our work that a key component

of what is driving Iran's behavior is
there observing our approach to nuclear

weapon states as opposed to non-nuclear
weapon states over the last twenty years.

Not even.

Long.

What can we do to convince them
that this is not worth it and

Well what we've been
doing which is sanctions.

OK you impose sanctions on them you
cause you raise the pain threshold right

you make it more painful for
them to do this you you

cause them economic harm and
this and you they look at this and

they see the rational calculation as well
that in turn is worth this much to us but

you know having a functioning economy is
worth this much to it it's better that we

have be on good economic relations
with the rest of the world will

will relieve the sanctions from us
by coming back into full compliance.

OK And and that's one way to do it.

This is what we've been doing and I think
there's been a lot of movement on this

one question just over the last few weeks.

OK When I first did the dump
on this a couple weeks ago.

The consensus view was that there would
not be a third round of sanctions

by the U.N. Security Council.

Apparently there were some
offline talks with the Chinese

during the nuclear review conference
back in D.C. two weeks ago and now there

is some suspicion that the Chinese
would in fact go along with a new round

of sanctions will find out within the next
few weeks I predict then the question is

will they be effective will multilateral
sanctions supported by the Russians and

the Chinese Chinese cooperation is huge
here because the Chinese are the second

largest consumer of Iranian oil and
they also have an extensive

number of relationships built up with the
Iranians to expand development of Iranian

oil fields so Chinese cooperation
is huge Russian cooperation is

important too because the Russians are
tightly connected to the Iranian nuclear

program the nuclear power program must
uncivilly And so the Russians presumably

need to need to have the Russians
cooperation in order to make this stick.

The problem is that sanctions
have a very uneven track record.

OK.

Most of us recall.

The sanctions against the South African
regime which were instrumental and it is

argued were instrumental in causing the
South Africans to to halt apartheid and

open up the government to to to all
members of the South African country.

In fact a lot of the economic harm and

pain that was imposed on the South
Africans were not a function of sanctions

or a function of private sanctions
it is divestment campaigns and

things like that that are not state to
state in some respects those sanctions

came later the other problem
in a country like Iran is that

the pain is most often felt by
the least politically powerful.

And the benefits flow to the few
politically powerful that was

also the case under Saddam Hussein's Iraq
which was under sanctions of course for

a long time Saddam figured out ways to
extract even more revenue from the sale of

things on the black market and whatnot and
there's some evidence that the I.R.G.C.

the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
is doing the same thing in Iran today.

And so I think it's important to note
that key pro-democracy activists

both inside of Iran and
outside of Iran warn of the harm

that is being done to the democratic
movement by sanctions as they exist today

that the minute a judge government
is able to blame the West or

outsiders or the hostile enemies for

the harm that is coming to the economy
when in fact it's really a function of

the incompetence of the government and
their absolute incapability of driving

this this government in this
country towards identity.

It's already a very strong country but
they have they're able to grab on

to this and
undermine in some respects the legitimacy

of the pro-democracy movement I
think that's a legitimate concern.

So the bottom line on
sanctions is I'm skeptical.

I'm skeptical they're going to work.

And I have to say to you that there is

a sense of kind of fatalism
in Washington right now that.

Yeah they're probably not going to work

that you go through the motions you
do this because you can't do nothing.

OK.

And yet you prepare for when
the sanctions don't work or what's that.

That's more than we had sanctions
against Iraq and it didn't work.

And we kept kind of strengthen
the sanctions and they didn't work.

And we supported opposition
groups inside of Iraq or

outside of Iraq on this borders and
that didn't work.

And eventually we got the war.

Now I hope it doesn't come as
a great surprise to any of you that

I think this would be bad.

I think this would be bad in
fact I would go so far as to say

that war with Iran would be worse
than a nuclear armed Iran I would say

that very care very categorically just as
other people like John McCain has said and

then used to say that the only
thing worse than war with Iran

is a nuclear armed Iran so John McCain
takes the opposite position to me tonight.

Why do I think that war with Iran would
be very very bad and worse certainly

worse even than having a nuclear weapon
but one it wouldn't eliminate the program.

Even the advocates for military action
do not submit that a military strike

would destroy the program for ever.

They say it would set it back.

And the logic is you set it back far
enough that you have a change of regime

inside of Iran and then you don't worry so
much about that new regime having

nuclear weapons or you count on that new
regime of not having nuclear weapons but

that's really what it's about it's
about setting back the program.

How long for six or eight years.

Somewhere in that neighborhood.

OK Because you can destroy facilities and

many of these facilities and you know
you can destroy the cities it's tough.

OK.
Many of them are buried deep underground

which is why we have
stories we have reports of

the Israelis requesting assistance for
deep penetration strikes you even have

some people even some Americans talking
about the need to use nuclear weapons

to get at Iran's nuclear
program talk by the way

which wasn't helped by the release by
the Obama administration of a new nuclear

posture review that specifically made
exceptions for countries like Iran and

North Korea that yes in fact we could use
nuclear weapons against these countries.

If they were not in compliance
with their obligations.

So.

And then there's the danger of
retaliation and escalation.

The simplest way I've heard this express
there been three recent war games

conducted with respect to war with
Iran was conducted by the Brookings.

The Brookings Institution.

Back in December and they published their
report and the leader of this program.

Ken Pollack said the problem
is how do you stop it.

How do you stop the war even if
the strikes are directed only at

the facilities that are responsible for
enriching uranium and preserve and

thought to be perfecting a nuclear weapon.

OK Is that practical think about this from
a military perspective we're going to send

in our planes and we're just going
to take out the nuclear facilities.

Now.

Because we're not going to send in
our planes that also taking out

the anti-aircraft facilities and

the other missile batteries around
the different nuclear facilities.

So you take those out as well.

You've got to take out the command and

control facilities that
control all of these things.

Many of which are located in population
centers in or near population centers.

So keeping this limited to the nuclear
program gets very very hard.

Even if you score a very decisive strike
on the Iranian facilities and you do set

back their program severely what incentive
do they then have for holding back.

None or almost none.

How can they retaliate.

They can retaliate against the two hundred
thousand US troops one hundred thousand in

Iraq one hundred thousand Afghan a stand
which is a day's drive away from Tehran.

They can respond that way they can respond
by asymmetric attacks that is kind

of terrorist style tactics in the Straits
of Hormuz and in the Persian Gulf.

OK As a Navy guy who spent a little
bit of time in the Persian Gulf.

It's true enough time but it was enough.

I can tell you that I'm not really
very fearful of an Iranian navy.

It doesn't really exist actually
OK I am however fearful of

a bunch of guys I R G C S driving
Boston Whalers wired for terrorist style

attacks suicide attacks against big boats
and air and oil tankers in the strait.

OK.

Someone asked in the dance of
this you know how realistic is it

that the Iranians could actually close the
strait this is one of the kind of worst

case scenarios to talk about roughly I've
seen the numbers like forty percent of

the world's oil flows through the Straits
of Hormuz something like that it's

not quite that high.

There's been some diversification
in other things but

it's a lot a lot of oil comes
through the Strait of Hormuz.

OK.

Could they close it down.

Well they could try and they wouldn't
have to of course seal it shot to cause

a lot of trouble because if you make it
really dangerous and really difficult for

ship captains maybe the ship captains will
decide to go somewhere else that we don't

want to bring oil from Saudi Arabia we
want to bring oil from Nigeria we will and

which is also not a great place but hey
you know we're waiting on a curve here we

want bring oil from Canada we want to be
you know think about all the other places.

If you're a ship captain and
you're an oil company.

We want to ship oil from
it's not worth the trouble.

OK so that's really what
we're talking about here.

Part of the reason why we forget that it
would be very very hard to even think

an oil tanker is there really really
big and oil does not light on fire and

a good human gets explosion because crude
oil isn't that flammable right we know

that if you do you know the whole you know
chemistry want to one you take the flame

and you drop it in a it's
just going to go out.

So anyway.

And these tankers are quite resilient.

Again not not something to dismiss
lightly but it but it's out there on

the last thing which I haven't talked
about if that's not bad enough.

Is the ability for the Iranians who have
been active supporters of groups like

Hezbollah for many years and
supporting terrorist strikes around

the world not just in the region and
yes perhaps even the United States.

I mean some suggestion
that that if al Qaeda.

If al Qaeda and
Hezbollah were sports teams.

It would be the farm team and Hezbollah
would be the major leagues guy can't be

dismissed lightly just can't be right.

So that is why we argue for what we call
a grand bargain it's not a unique idea

to the Cato Institute there are a number
of other people have talked about it.

What does that mean a grand bargain is
recognition which we've not had with

the Iranians since one thousand seventy
nine formal diplomatic recognition

normalization of economic
relations with Iran and

in exchange they would agree to come
into full compliance with the N.P.T.

which includes intrusive
onside inspections.

OK that's it.

What are the drawbacks of
this plan going to try and

be honest about them
because there are many.

One of them is that affords legitimacy to
a government that is reprehensible and

I do not wish to do to suggest otherwise.

OK this is a reprehensible government is
not a democratic government by any stretch

of the imagination and they do
horrible things to their people and

they support terrorism around
the world all bad things.

OK And so I don't wish to dismiss
that they are also don't for.

Yet.

Fostering instability in Iraq and
threatening to do so in Afghanistan.

In fact there's some evidence
that they already are doing that.

So I'm not trying to make any excuses for
the Iranian regime.

Another reason why this
isn't a great deal is

it might fail in the sense that Iran has
made and broken many promise promises over

the years not the least of which is
their obligations under the N.P.T.

And while you are affording
them this legitimacy and

extending recognition to them and
allowing them to repair their economy.

They would continue to enrich uranium and
then pull a North Korea on you says.

Congratulations kick out the inspectors
conduct a test and become a nuclear

weapon state in a matter of a few hours or
not quite but a few days.

OK that would be bad.

If we cannot convince and
this is another key point

if we cannot convince them to
completely halt their nuclear program.

I would be willing to contemplate

a indigenous enrichment program in Iran in
exchange for these intrusive inspections.

This is always been the kind of sixty
four thousand dollar question is Where is

the American Red Line
where would we demand

the Iranians where where we demand
they come into compliance and and

in fact the Obama administration and
President Obama himself not quite in so

many words affirmed that the Obama
administration position is no

enrichment on Iranian soil that is
their position that is their red line.

We have attempted They have attempted the
Bush administration tried the same thing

to have a kind of joint partnership with
the Russians where the enrichment is

conducted in the third site
probably in Russia and

then the Iranians get access to
the to the nuclear material.

It does have some applications for
medical purposes.

That's what they say but it's actually
there's some truth to that but I.

Also if they ever needed it or
wanted to use it for

power purposes that's
that's out there as well.

For many people this is just a bridge too
far that that allowing the Iranians to

have what effectively the Japanese
have for example is not acceptable.

So that's where we are that's
where we are right now.

And I would like to tell you that we
have that I have a bit more confidence

that the sanctions will work but
the Iranians will wake up one day and

say this was a this was a huge waste of
time and effort let's let's come clean

etc I want to spend how much time

I say should've done this before I
started actually to take my watch off and

I live a much time are about fifteen
of fifteen more minutes that I want to.

Yeah but fifteen moment.

I want to close down just
a little bit about talking about

how the Iranians in the cues they've
taken from the North Koreans and

this whole concept of deterrence
deterring whom by home from home.

The United States behaves has behaved over
the last twenty years or so since the end

of the Cold War as the world's policeman
right you hear this set all the time and

one of the key ways in
which we play this role.

Is by providing security guarantees
to other countries who might

be tempted to develop nuclear weapons of
their own there's a very famous article

written in the early days of the post Cold
War by John Mearsheimer predicting that

countries like Ukraine and Germany
would acquire nuclear weapons because

why wouldn't you acquire nuclear weapons
after the collapse of the Soviet Union

nuclear weapons were very useful as
a deterrent and you wouldn't want to

risk not being able to defend
yourself with a nuclear deterrent.

Well no disrespect to John.

He was wrong.

OK A lot of countries didn't
do choose to do that.

I've already alluded to the fact that I'm
struck by how few nuclear weapon states.

There are not by how many
Why is that why is it that

other countries have not chosen to go
the route of North Korea and Iran.

Well partly it's because
they don't feel much need

because they don't feel
particularly threatened.

OK And some of those countries that
don't feel particularly threatened

are covered by the U.S.
nuclear umbrella countries that could

easily frankly develop a nuclear
weapon if they went down that road.

I'm especially thinking about
Japan I've already alluded to them and

I've written a bit about
Japan over my seven years.

OK.

I think it's worth having
this conversation now.

OK Because in the context

of talking about Iran talking about
trying to create an alternative to Iran.

The Iranians talk about wanting to
have a nuclear free zone in the Gulf.

One of the key concerns about
an Iranian nuclear weapon is would it

spur other Gulf states.

The Saudis and other G.C.C.
states to acquire a nuclear weapon.

Of course the Israelis already have one.

You know that's out there.

What would it take to convince all
the states in the region to formally

forego a nuclear arsenal to demolish
all their weapons and do what.

Well one one offer is to
incorporate them in NATO or

some other security umbrella
under the U.S. umbrella.

OK And
that is an option that's out there and

I think I predict you will hear more about
this in the in the coming months and

Adam and I were talking about this
before is in the Nuclear Posture Review

which the Obama administration
released this month.

Right.
First the first part of this month.

Gosh is this month really has gone
a long time I was on vacation in Hawaii

to be in line.

So I have another excuse for
just losing a week here somewhere.

But but in the Nuclear Posture Review
they talk about this very candidly

about the extent to which countries
have grown dependent upon the U.S.

security umbrella which is heavily
dependent upon U.S. nuclear weapons

goes back to the Eisenhower administration
the fifty's and what will happen.

How will their calculus change as we
go from High Point twenty two thousand.

Now twenty two hundred active down to what

fifteen hundred thousand
five hundred zero.

How will they behave well I talk about
this a little bit but I'll admit that

I have not given it nearly as much study
as I think we should be giving this study

because one of the things we need to
think about is is that reaction to

a withdrawal or a weakening or diminishing
of the strength of that U.S. deterrent.

Why Clee to or even possible

to encourage other states to rearm with
good old fashioned conventional weapons.

And I put that out there on the table.

I also argue from
the opposite point of view.

OK That in fact withdrawing these
security guarantees might not spur any

such behavior because many countries
that once would have needed such weapons

to defend against their neighbors
don't much fear their neighbors and

in fact their neighbors aren't
really their neighbors anymore.

They're part of the same country.

I'm thinking about France and Germany
which for all intents and purposes.

The U. is well it's just one big country.

OK or it's moving in that direction and
the notion of France and

Germany going to war again as they
did twice in the span of a few years

right back in the early early twentieth
century is all but unthinkable.

So maybe countries will choose just
choose not to go down that route.

We just don't know and
that's my point a close with this.

Well I'm close to closing.

Yeah I'll close but nothing too
excited here I've got a few other

points to me why is it that so

many countries around the world are are so
nervous around us power.

Well I'm reminded of two
there are two stories or

phrases going around in my head.

One is called the Levine doctrine and

it's attributed to Michael Ledeen
Michael Ledeen used to be for

many years affiliated with
American enterprise and.

The think tank in Washington now is with
the foundation of events of Democracies

and frequent commentator I'm sure you've
seen around Wright's National Review and

other places Wall Street Journal etc And
and many years ago.

He was attributed to have
said every ten years or so

the United States needs a pick up
some small crappy little country and

throw it against the wall just to
show the world we mean business.

Now.

Now again this is apocryphal OK I'm never
heard Michael Ledeen deny that he said it

but I haven't but I suspect any kind
of like the fact that people associate

this this talking with them and so I think
it's useful and it was pot it was it was

put out there on the web by
a friend of his Jonah Goldberg So

again if you know your real friend you
wouldn't attribute the statement to

a guy who didn't think was good so
how does this work right.

You pick up a crappy little country and

you throw it against the wall just to show
you business well this is where my my take

away from the war in Iraq inform so
much of what I do.

Because even if it were true that

Saddam Hussein had nuclear weapons or
a extensive nuclear weapons program.

Even if it were true that he had massive
stockpiles of chemical and biological

weapons that he would had weaponized and
was prepared to disperse by I guess it was

you a visa over New York City that was one
of the stories we heard prior to the Iraq

war even if it were true that Saddam
Hussein was supporting the al Qaeda.

Folks all over the world and there was
some meeting between Iraq invasion and

an al-Qaeda in Prague
which didn't happen but

if this even if it were true even if
our some troops walked into Baghdad and

in one of Saddam's palaces found
a picture of Saddam Hussein with his arm

around Osama bin Laden handing him
a fifty thousand dollars check.

You know like they do at the football
games you know gigantic check.

You know from like Toys for Tots right.

I ask you is one trillion dollars
spent in Iraq and fourth.

Thousand American dead and
tens of thousands of Iraqi dead and

tens of thousands of our
of Americans wounded and

some of them permanently disfigured for
the rest of their lives.

Would it have been worth it if we had
found that could it have been different.

Could we have not spent a trillion dollars
and lost four thousand American lives and

cetera et cetera et cetera.

Had we got it differently this is
the other argument that said well this is

the problem a bit of incompetence of the
Bush administration was just stupid and

that's why it was so much trouble.

We have a smart bunch of guys in
the White House this time around.

So they'll know how to knock around
the country and throwing in so wall and

have it not cost a trillion dollars and
so many lives right Zain what I call

the incompetence dodge I say no I say no

there are better ways to prevent linkages
between states and non-state actors.

There are better ways to limit nuclear
nonproliferation nuclear proliferation.

There are better ways to limit the other
forms of proliferation of dangerous

weapons around the world than by invading
and occupying medium sized countries.

So I close with this and
if you have any any baseball fans here

baseball fans you know baseball it's
really fallen into went to a game last

night was a good time the Braves and the
Phillies were the Phillies were in town.

It was a good game and
I'm reminded of a scene.

Maybe you're not baseball fans you're your
movie fans Bull Durham movie Bull Durham

this ring a bell.

You got there and I'm reminded of a scene
this is kind of a corollary to the Levine

doctrine which I call
the hit the ball doctrine.

OK You remember there is this guy nuclear
loose story of Bull Durham is this

pitcher throws you know hundred miles an
hour and he's brought down to the minors

to learn how to be a major league pitcher
and he's linked up with this wise catcher.

Kevin Costner who is teaching
them the ways of the world and

this guy has notoriously poor control
throwing the ball all over the place you

know hitting the ball hit in the bat boy
going into the dugout into the stands and

he comes out one day.

And he's thrown.

Just B.B.'s OK just right.

Hitting the center of the glove
every single time strikes out

the first two guys did on like six
pitches or something like that

the catcher walks out says hit the ball.

So what are you talking about head the
boat what we mean I'm throwing fire and

B.B.'s is like you don't want
this guy to dig in here.

OK the pit the cat and
the hitter in seeing what you're doing and

he sees you're around the plate.

He's going to dig in.

You need you need to hit the ball you
need to shake them up a little bit.

OK so
that's what he does goes back throws and

then Costin looks up to hitters and
I don't know where it's going.

I don't know I would dig
in there if I were you and

the guy takes one swing it's that that is
I'm not certain in here against this guy.

Here's the corollary to
the Latine doctrine.

Right.

Even if it were true that

we could find the correct crappy little
country to throw against the wall.

There's been an awful lot of
kind of hitting the ball moments

around you know around the world the last
few few years here in the United you know

United States and
I ask is it so strange for

other countries around the world to be
questioning but wisdom of having us.

Be the only one that are responsible for
hitting hitting the strike zone around

the world and all of these reasons
it seems to me or why we should try

to really think our approach to
nonproliferation with countries like Iran

and North Korea not focus so much on what
we expect or worry about them doing but

asking the question why just why might
they feel the need to have these weapons

and can we put them in a place like
other countries most other countries but

have chosen not to I think
we can thank you very much.

So we have plenty of time for
questions about plenty of time.

Thank you for your attention.

Thank you.

There there is a lot that
I put on the table that

I just kind of laid on the table
which I did not do you

want to you want to take questions
you want to do you want to.

I'm whatever tell it.

You're doing well.

All right.
I'm good I'm good thank you.

Alright but
there is a I want to know what I

want to hear it.

OK so

that you know that

that the it is for
the Iranians that for me correct.

I think it is correct or

I could have done that I apologize for
the right right.

And right now you are right.

It's right versus

just I asked what

was going with it or

not you

don't have to go and vote for me.

You or I will in my notes.

I mean I implied that
the United States is supporting

organizations has support organizations
that are committed to overthrowing

the Iranian government the evidence
is that we're continuing to do so.

Although for obvious reasons.

It's kept concealed he is correct that
we supported the Iraq versus Iran in

the Iran Iraq war.

So there are there are other reasons.

Again I don't however wish to excuse and
I don't intend it to be implied that I'm

excusing the behavior of the arraignment
ministration regime because I am not.

They also are you know have done horrible
things to their people they behave

in a reckless way that's not an argument
for overthrowing their government but

it's important for
just putting the facts on the table.

I know that if you search on the web
that you know about my right right.

I'm lying.

It's like it's real and

it's you know you want something of
a strike against their lives right.

My world and what we can and
I think is really happening.

We have that I think we have right.

The answer to your first question is yes I
think you might be trying to provoke them.

OK A colleague of mine several years
ago wrote an article to that effect

as a question that I'm sure

it Ron is not a an ideal or

perhaps even suitable candidate
to lead a pan Islamic revolution.

OK for several different reasons
one is because of divisions and

Sunni and the Oman.

OK Another is the fact there Persian and

therefore deeply distrusted by most
Arabs and most other non Persians.

OK so they need some other reason to
rally a kind of pain an Islamic movement

around them and one of those would be
if they were attacked by Israel for

example and that is the kind of thing
that if it were to take place would

potentially joining together
groups that and countries that for

many years have not gotten along very well
it would be a heck of a gamble on his

part because even as of course he's not
known for his prudence or wisdom either so

you know you can't rule these things out
but there are a number of other countries.

Again countries in the region who
you could not count on them to

to join with Iran even
in that can situation.

What should or

won't what would I advise the Israelis to
do some of what they have done already.

Which is to bolster their defenses
against a an attack and we talk about.

Iran's capability I think it's important
to focus on what they actually have in

terms of you know capabilities
to Dave in the most

the most kind of pessimistic estimates say
that they have enough material perhaps for

one device but not a weapon.

It's still three or five years away as I
said many of those predictions have proved

wrong in the past but they are Israelis
also have a deterrent of their own.

OK And they have taken some steps in
recent years to strengthen that deterrent

the ability to survive a surprise
attack but not yet ready.

OK sure I can talk about that
you're sure you know that's a good.

That's a good.

That's a good example because so
dirty bomb right in radiological dispersal

device that is not a a Horowitz from a
style bomb but a traditional conventional

bomb you put in a truck or something but
you you put in your raining and

you spread through the blast
uranium around some area.

OK.

A fearsome scenario not as
fearsome a scenario as an actual

detonation which would have a blast effect
which would incinerate you know thousands

tens of thousands depending on where it
takes place whereas the actual immediate

effects of a radiological device are much
less so it's kind of one of these risk.

You know risk versus cost calculations
right the likelihood of someone being able

to assemble a dirty bomb is much greater
than their ability of being able to

assemble a functioning nuclear device but
the harm that would come of it is less.

OK.
Why do you ask this question.

This is one of the questions that came
up in the context of the the nuclear

conference back in Washington a couple
weeks ago in the Talking about

control of us our materials why do we.

So focus so much on the control of its
own materials that were useful for

weapons purposes and not on on dirty
bombs which you don't need the same

degree of sophistication it's much easier
to assemble etc I understand those.

Concerns I would say you have a right.

You know certainly reasonable concern
about the Israelis have a reasonable

concern about that.

How do you defend against that while
you defend against the way we defended

against a lot of things since nine eleven
which is you have you know different

monitoring systems you have different
methods for controlling access to your

country which you know the Israelis
have been perfecting for

years the United States
is doing the same thing.

Can I can I promise them that they're
not going to be the victim of an attack.

You know what they're basing alternately
their security on is their own deterrent

not the United States defense but
they're determined.

I think was important.

You know.

The Israelis have always been kind of
cagey about the existence of their arsenal

but there was a moment a few years ago
when a very senior Israeli official said

publicly when it comes to destruction
Iran can be destroyed as well and

he wasn't speaking about Iran being
destroyed by the United States.

So I think at the end of
the day the into your question

is what what are they hanging their
security on for now it's their turn.

Maybe in the future if we move away
from that kind of thinking it's

about trying to minimize
the the sources of hostility but

that's a very very hard thing because
after all you know Israel is occupying

territory that the Iranians say is is
the territory of all of all Islam.

It's not a very if it's not a very
satisfying answer but it's an honest one.

Yes or why I did.

You know that.

Well I'm glad you asked that question.

So the North Koreans it is a little
bit different from the Iranians.

So let me talk about that little bit.

Unlike the Iranians that still have

something of value to the rest of
the world that black stuff in the ground

North Korea has nothing
of value to anyone.

Sadly tragically because their country
is governed by a horribly incompetent.

Dream mother things so
they have managed over the last few years

to use the existence of their
nuclear program to extract

concessions aid support
from other countries

and they have also derived
hard currency from the sale

of their technology guy
the Syrian reactor that was just

destroyed a few years ago evidences
that was based on a North Korean design.

So that's one of the reasons why the North
Koreans want a nuclear program is it's one

of the only things they have that's of any
value to them but I also think that it's

partly a function of deterrence guy that
they think the likelihood of the US.

Affecting a kind of Saddam Hussein style

decapitation attack against
their regime is much diminished.

When they are in possession
of a nuclear weapon and

again I'm I'm I'm careful to use
that term because it's not even

clear to me that the North Koreans
have a nuclear weapon.

Yet they're perfecting
the technology to get there but

they don't have it yet with them being
close be a sufficient deterrent.

Perhaps perhaps that's the reason why the
Bush administration did not take action

against North Korea in two thousand and
four and two thousand and

five at a time when George Bush was
speaking of his he loathed Kim Jong il.

I mean there's no no it's no mystery
about how George Bush viewed that regime.

OK.

He hated the man hated the regime
reprehensible all of it.

The lot so there are two.

Those are the two reasons that I
can come up with OK on like Iran.

OK which has you can you can
point to this theological

argument an argument that is is used that
is invoked by a minute job and others.

Ok about the Madi about about it.

Cetera.
You have none of that with North Korea.

OK North Korea's not trying to export any
kind of religion at all the regime is just

trying to hold on to power.

That's all they're doing OK
they can export anything.

So I do think that in that
one crucial difference.

You kind of take off the table want
to dish an election nation for

why they might choose to happen.

Yes Or is it love then reading the wrong.

I want to go that might be
threatened by you know why have they

not never been that's to question you
know what's going to find it's not

just they don't confuse me and the group
the lies that were brought to justice and

I'm going to answer your second question
with a really tongue in cheek and

please don't take this seriously.

But A.Q. Khan has been brought to justice.

He's under house arrest.

No that's not an answer.

I'm told or

I've heard rumors that for
all the complaining that the United States

has not been able to be brief him which
is the story that was submitted for

public consumption to the Pakistani people
who see it gone as a great hero of their

country that perhaps he in fact
has been interrogated debriefed

sucked full of sucked dry of information
by our people or by people we trust.

I certainly hope so because he did have
an awful lot of information that would be

valuable for preventing the proliferation
of dangerous technologies.

I don't have an answer for
you without that question and

that as far as India and Pakistan go.

I don't think that Iran fears
either of those countries per

se but the Iranians do.

And they've used this very cynically
they do object to the double standard

that the United States has displayed
both towards India and towards Pakistan.

OK.
Remember Pakistan became an avowed.

Grew up and state the United States
imposed sanctions on them.

OK when India did the same we never
had very good relations with India and

our relations worsened after India
moved down that route and yet we had

the Indian nuclear deal from a few years
ago which the Iranian said at the time and

have said ever sense there
is a double standard here.

Your affording legitimacy to a country
that is not a signatory to the N.P.T.

has never even professed to be
abiding by the N.P.T. rules and yet

you are extending them benefits of nuclear
power and the contributions of technology

from Merican companies among others and
other Western companies they have a point.

OK.
They have a point which I think gets into

a broader discussion about
the vulnerabilities and weaknesses and

loopholes in the N.P.T.
that need to be close to we need.

I'm a believer in nuclear
power as a concept.

I do think that nuclear power especially
has an important role to play in terms of

reducing carbon emissions and things like
that which you know is one of the key

drivers in a country like India which
is trying to grow very rapidly but

not you know so

demolished their their atmosphere that
that it's not a place worth living and

that's a perfectly logical reason why they
want to move forward with nuclear power.

We need to push much harder for not for

for proliferation resistant reactors
they're not proof reactors but really act

reactors that don't create as a byproduct
weapons and weapons grade material.

OK we need to think through how you

can see a proliferation of nuclear power
technology but not a proliferation of

nuclear weapons technology and other words
come up with some way to deal link or

we link in a tighter way
the connection between power and

not having weapons but I don't back to
your original question I really don't

think their behavior is driven
by a fear of any in Pakistan.

I think it's you could make
an argument that they they were.

Zant the legitimacy and respect that
India and Pakistan have won and

for which they have not paid a very
stiff price at least not recently.

And that if Iran is Iran's nuclear
ambitions are motivated by security

and the United States has
a gross asymmetry of power right

now in a part meantime things we've
made this grandma had a right with frame

from the Iranian perspective right
that an offer of negative or

even positive security guarantees
is nothing but a cheap tall and

given those power asymmetries
that we would have to make for

many years concessions to that
that may not be very powerful for

any kind of the US administration can you
clarify what are you thinking about in

terms of additional concessions My point
is if you mean given the gross a century's

talk of you know promises not to do
anything but high Talk is cheap right.

We would have to do
something tangible right.

Pull back from a region where I would have
to do something else to be a grand bargain

right and just the sheer power regardless
of what I read regs are ministrations So

my question to you is what do we do
to make our diplomacy credible right

context of these groups in the seventy's
and if Iran is indeed what it was

the short answer that question is it
couldn't be guaranteed by us alone.

OK you need to have other countries
who are party to this grand bargain.

Also that is not the way we've positioned
now I just go back a little bit

to the history of when we started talking
about this and again it's not it's not

unique to Cato although the two papers we
published on it were a little bit ahead of

other places that came out with
the same thing at the time we did it.

We were not aware of the.

Outreach to the Bush administration in
the immediate aftermath of the Afghan war.

OK two thousand and two when there
is evidence that through us was

an intermediary an Iranian official
approached the US government with an offer

for what essentially we put on the table
three years later in our report we weren't

aware of this document because it came
out after we published our paper and

basically what the Iranians agreed to or
proposed under this under the terms.

Well what we are proposing which
is normalization of relations with

you know eliminating the sanctions and

in exchange the Iranians would come into
full compliance and also see support for

terrorism that was another thing
that was supposed to on the table.

Recall that this was a time in
which the Iranian leadership was

truly divided between people who wanted
greater ties with the United States and

those who were the imminently opposed

the the Bush administration's response
to this overture was to ignore it.

And the explanation for

why they ignored it was basically Actually
it was received in May of two thousand and

three as I think back about what was
going on around May of two thousand and

three the absolute high point
of American power we just

you know deposed Saddam Hussein and we
have people like Pearl saying Who's next.

And they were very confident that they
held the cards and they did not have to

accept any kind of a deal that would
make any concessions to the Iranians.

Well I think has happened since then.

Presuming that this was
a legitimate offer is that the U.S.

response or non-response so
marginalized people inside

of Iran who were in favor of engagement
that it strengthen the hand of the UK and

it just types who were
bitterly opposed to guy but

so that would be a very That would be an
argument even against my own case right.

But without predicting the imminent
victory of the green movement in the.

Democracy movement in Iran.

There is a certain kind of flux or
fluctuation in Iranian domestic

politics where some of those people who
are in favor of engagement rise rise

in influence and then decline in influence
and cetera and not win in a job if we let

him is eighty eight perfect is
perfectly suited to implode.

Ok to really demonstrate his
incompetence for the job.

OK And if that were to happen.

You would have a new group of people
come to power in Iran without it without

a violent overthrow without some kind of
revolution that's not what I'm proposing

who would believe it credible enough to
even engage in discussions you're right

that I'm going to just not a position to
do that but the last piece of the puzzle.

I've seen it tossed out recently I don't
know how seriously is that you would need

another country another powerful country.

Another nuclear armed country to
be the guarantor of Iran and so

it's not just a negative
security guarantee but

an actual security umbrella and
I've even heard China tossed out

there isn't a country that can perform
that role whether they would wish to do so

is another question but I think
you're right that it's not enough for

us to make a negative security guarantee
that is a promise not to attack they would

need to have some kind of assurances from
a protector or or a even a multilateral

body to be protect or what I say Are you

really never

heard that put on the table never put
never heard that put on the table later.

Yeah but that wouldn't be we would
not all we would not we're not in

a position to offer that that's
not our that's not our security.

That's the Yeah Yeah right.

And I would say that would
be a bridge too far.

Absolutely.

That's not what we're
putting on the table.

Yes or yes or

majors.

That right.

Yes right

leg right.

Yes yes yes.

Yeah.

Let me just yeah I'll return to that I'm
not I'm not an expert on the subject but

let me just say that my understanding
about the the harmful effects

that can be dispersed by
a dirty bomb would not

immobilize a city or even a large portion
of a city you could get it's bad enough.

I'm not trying to minimize the harm but
I think it's important to kind of keep in

perspective the differences of
degree between a dirty bomb at

a radiological device and an actual
atomic weapon big big difference.

Go ahead.
Yes I'm less sure.

Right.

You are right you will
be offset by Yes sure.

This is all

of this but now which the end game being

the party bits and pieces meaning
a breakout breakout capacity right.

Yes OK Yes a freeze.

Yes yes we still face

almost capability

to use We're already got this thing

right there.

But we'll gauge right terrorism.

Yes.

It means that

right now.

Yes let me say quite categorically
that I am not sanguine

about an Iran with nuclear weapons and
I agree that it would there would be

that some of the reasons that might
inhibit their support for asymmetric

warfare terrorism and cetera fear of being
struck by the United States or Israel or

other countries would be mitigated by
the possession of a nuclear weapon or

the ability to retaliate.

OK I'm not I'm not me.

Dismiss that at all what I
what I don't believe which

is a related concern which I don't think
is a valid concern is the fear that

they will transfer this technology or even
the device to a terrorist organisation.

Again it can't be ruled out completely.

But I think the likelihood of
that is very small no country.

None has ever done that has ever
transferred that technology partly

because they can't be confident that it's
not going to be used against them or

used against a country that
they don't much dislike or

used against a country that they do just
like and yet the retaliation will be not

against the non-state actor but against
the state actor because we are improving

our ability for nuclear forensics to
trace back technology to the source.

OK So I think those are the Iran
support for terrorism is an important

part of the top discussion about why then
having a nuclear weapon is worrisome.

But again I think it's important
to differentiate the two and

you have OK I think that
there might they become

more shall we say adventurous as a nearly
nuclear arms state than they are.

Hard today.

Yes perhaps although it also has to be
said they're pretty adventurous right now.

So there's question of how much more so
when they become they're pretty

pretty adventurous now with one hundred
thousand troops to their west and

a hundred thousand troops to their east.

You know I think it would not be and

it would be a matter of
increment is not one of degree.

You know Stan I'm saying yeah.

Good question though.

Yes you're right next time.

Yeah I'm right

you're very

very bro.

Control the six point three
billion people or control that.

Right right.

No real thing.

RIGHT RIGHT RIGHT RIGHT RIGHT RIGHT.

You know people every

day are very police cars.

My God you know we really write that

all right we're right on track or

where you want Rand.

Yes we have no number we're all for

all their might.

Or they are you know like this all

the rest right.

You know you're right about that.

Yeah I know that all right.

I've heard all year and
I'm right right right.

Live on Iran.

Right.

So the question is the question is who
who who is driving this decision making.

Right.
And why why is there are two explanations.

OK And I think both of them are valid and
I don't they're not mutually exclusive.

OK One explanation is the good old
fashioned kind of military industrial

complex going back to Eisenhower's
farewell address right as you have in many

countries not just in the United States
a group of very interested parties

parties that derive benefit from
the manufacture of these weapons and

they they don't control but they have
great influence over the decisions

on how they are deployed how they're
expanded how they're set are OK and

we know these facilities there you know in
the nuclear context there are the labs.

There are the the various
branches of the service and

services that have responded cetera.

Just the United States.

That's one explanation and
I've written about it and

I think there's some validity
to it which is an argument for

having you know greater democratic control
which is exercised through Congress

which is more focused on the big picture
as opposed to driving hundred fifty jobs

to their district to manufacture You know
the tail assembly or the part of a part of

the tail assembly etc etc The other
argument though is a bit more.

I'll admit charitable there were

in the earliest days of
the you know Cold War really

smart people thinkers who thought
about the implications of deterrence.

They were not personally interested in it.

They did not derive any
tangible benefits from it and

they thought through the implications
of having a few very

very powerful weapons as opposed
to many many less powerful weapons

carried by people you know
on their on their two.

Heat right.

The old the old style of warfare and

let me just say that I'm not
ready to throw out entirely.

The logic of deterrence.

So I would say that there is an argument
for it and if we're moving beyond it.

Deterrence based on nuclear weapons.

What will replace it.

That's all it's just
a question worth asking.

And I don't have an answer but I but that
the answer to your question is I don't

think it's all driven by the worst
possible connotation you can come up with

a with a a logical and and
fair description for how people behave

in a security context that is not
mendacious it's not you know crazy.

And that's what I've tried to do here and
that's how I conduct.

You know most of my work doesn't just
in terms of relating to Iran but

a lot of other countries.

Good question.

You've already had it.

You've already had a bite at the apple
Yes ma'am I'll get back if we

have time to get a few more minutes right

away not right

here but I'm curious.

All right that's right yeah.

I need to raise your right.

Yes or less.

Yes.

Yes but I mean that's that's
a really great question.

The truth is I know less about
the domestic politics to draw a comparison

of course you did have a very

animated group of kind of.

Pro free Chinese the Taiwan lobby
as it was called still exist but

it's much less influential today than
it was back in the fifty's and sixty's

that looked upon Beijing and
what they were

doing very much from the perspective of
the Kuomintang OK it was like that and

that's that's how that's how
it was described defined and

there are elements of that
today in the United States.

OK there are there are a in opposition
groups here in the United States who for

perfectly legitimate reasons look upon
the I've been in a job regime and and

the mullahs not happen in a job but
the the theocracy and are deeply resentful

of it and I think for perfectly good
reasons I'm more interested in talking

about not the domestic politics of it but

the strategic God We know we know now that
Harry Truman was presented with plans for

severely degrading if not

completely immobilizing the Soviet nuclear
program when he became aware of it.

We know of similar plans presented to
the Eisenhower with respect to the Soviet

program we know of plans presented to
John Kennedy and then to Lyndon Johnson.

Interestingly the plan to
Lyndon Johnson was presented to

him by the Soviets which here's
where it gets interesting.

The fact that the Soviets came to the
United States and quietly around the kind

of did one of these where you know they're
building this weapon into bad for you.

They did that when you
help us take it out.

And that kind of side conversation
prompted people like Nixon and

Kissinger and others around them
to say gee if the Soviets are so

fearful of the Chinese weapon.

Maybe we shouldn't be.

We don't know the difference today.

If you don't have that kind.

And of dynamic right you don't have that
kind of you know he wins I'd you know

the zero sum game right in the same
way that it played out then so

I don't see I don't see the kind
of resolving itself the way it

was all the way it resolves itself is is
to go back to what Eisenhower said which

is in about so many words this is crazy
when you come to me with plans for

bombing the Soviet Union in the stone age.

OK this is crazy and
one of the reasons why it's fascinating.

I think it.

It reveals.

On one hand it reveals the fact
that our was a military man.

OK.

He was not particularly squeamish per
se about warfare he understood it.

He could look it in the face and
he understood what it meant.

OK And so the question he asked was not
how horrific it would be to kill fifty or

seventy five million Soviets in
this Russians in this attack.

But what do you do with it
after you've demolished it

right and that seems to me to be a really
good question and this gets back.

This is an ironic to me good.

Last question because it gets back to the
are going to made at the outset right is

if it were so easy for

us to significantly degrade another
country's ability to wage war.

OK and be confident that they would not
reassemble that capability any time soon.

If it were easy.

We would do it much more often but
it's not because it is not enough.

It's not just that it's immoral but
it's not strategic to take a pot

shot at some country and the you know
the leader is driven from power or

dead and then just say well come what may.

Whatever whoever replaces him has
to be an improvement over what

went before we don't do that
we don't operate that way.

And again part of it is a moral code
moral component because we don't believe

it's responsible thing to do but

part of it is just not strategic you
don't roll the dice like that right.

So it is not reasonable.

It's not realistic to.

I think they would take a pot shot at
the Iranian regime we would degrade their

military capability we would hope as it
has been said that a popular uprising

coincides with its follow
soon thereafter and

that popular uprising will be
capable of overthrowing a new job.

Plus the mullahs that have ruled the
country since seventy nine and that's all

to the good because if it doesn't play out
that way if it doesn't look like Germany

in one thousand nine but looks like
Hungary in one nine hundred fifty six.

What do we do I submit
we don't stand by and

let them let them be crushed if
we did it would be horrible.

You know horribly immoral
in its own terms and

that's why we don't think and
we should not think in a kind

of blahs a way about throwing crappy
little countries against the wall.

So it's about two o'clock which is I'm
not one last question you have not yet

asked the questions or
go ahead go ahead go ahead.

If in fact the United States is able to
ran over the no lines in this question.

And if we brought in Russia and
China right.

Yes over this will have
a great year in terms

of ministration where they stand
right this particular point and

also maybe even when he said

this I mean I wouldn't a made
the proposal but in think was

politically salable at some level I mean
some things are hard but they can be done.

So I think that if it was framed
like I framed it you could

make the case that look this is a bad
thing but what's the alternative is worse.

We should try very hard to achieve this.

It's worth it and you can make that case
the American people and again I do think

you know the recent experience in Iraq is
is hanging over a lot of what we do and

I think that that the calculus is very
different today than it was seven or

eight years ago.

So if you frame it in those terms
like we're trying to effect

a good end which is an Iran that doesn't
have a nuclear weapon but we don't.

I want to do it the way we tried in Iraq.

This has a chance of working and

I think you could mobilize enough
public support to make it work but

it's a good question and I mean while
in Congress they have passed for

example sanctions both in the Senate
in the House hasn't been reconciled yet

in conference for gasoline sanctions which
the Obama administration has resisted.

OK They've even they've urged Congress not
to go down this road and yes move forward.

So there is some evidence that
Congress is as it has adopted a more

confrontational posture a more
less supportive and gauging it

could that be clawed back at the Obama
administration went back to them with

a more with a different proposal the Obama
hasn't handed them with the alternative.

And so again it's a question of doing
nothing appearing to do nothing or

doing something that you can go
to your constituents is a look.

I'm worried about this and
this is what I've done so

the Obama administration went to
them with a different package.

You could do that you could make the same
argument look I'm concerned about this and

I support the president I think again
in the context of the Democratic

caucus you have support the country
of the Republican caucus who knows.

All right well thank you all very much for
your time thank you very much.

Thank you.