Let me first welcome everybody
Mike is Adam Stolberg and

I'm a professor in the salmon School of
International Affairs here Georgia Tech I

also co direct the policy research arm
of the school which is the center for

international strategy technology and
policy and

in the latter capacity is my real pleasure
today to be able to host this panel.

This is a panel of August colleagues that
are drawn from across the campus that

mention a few minutes really bring
a lot of expertise to bear on some of

these issues to help us think
through some of these challenges.

Well unless anybody's been hiding
out in some sort of spider hole for

the last well I don't
know thirteen years but

needless to say over the last two years or
certainly the last couple of months.

You will undoubtedly know that
the negotiations surrounding

the current deal and its could potential
consequences have been at the nub of

a very rancorous debate in
the United States and globally.

And the very effort to achieve
the agreement as well as the contents and

substance of the agreement have really
been the focus I of consternation

the protagonists such as many members
of the current administration including

President Obama himself claimed that this
is the best real world outcome that we

could have expected this joint
program of action this deal to curb

Iran's nuclear ambitions and
the best way to for close Iran.

Practical paths to a nuclear weapons and
to lengthen what is called the latency

period from what is estimated today
to be between two or three months and

up to a year over the next fifteen years
and they point to a number of achievements

in the deal and we don't have time to go
over all of them but we'll touch on them

today but that really focus on
some of the physical restrictions.

Can prevent an Iranian breakout or
rushed to the bomb.

During the period of this agreement and

they point to some of the successes in
removing ninety eight percent or so

of the highly enriched uranium as well
as removal of about seventy percent

of the centrifuges which
are the critical technology for

the enrichment in the creation of
the fissile material for the uranium path

to put a cap on the stockpile of
some of the lower enrich uranium for

the over the course of the fifteen years
and curbs on the production of plutonium

in the plutonium pathways there's
constant monitoring imposed on declared

facilities as well as obligations
in indefinitely to it here too and

hand safeguards to help monitor some
of the suspicious activities and

then of course this deal includes what
many people call is a snapback procedure

for sanctions where imposing sanctions or
I should say removing the suspension of

saying sanctions is
assumed to be the default.

So in short the proponents point to
this deal is really better than all

realistic alternatives the same
time the ardent critics and

opponents of the deal
point to some of the.

Challenges and
some of the negotiating snafu does

as some of the presenting some
lasting challenges of two U.S.

and global security and they point to
issues surrounding such things as Iran's

big question Iran's trustworthiness and
upholding the commitments

they suggest that the lifting of
the sanctions is premature ambiguous and

would be difficult to reinstate in the
event of Iran subsequent cheating there's

no such thing is complete and
impossible for

closure of routes to a nuclear weapon or
there's no such thing as no.

Any time anywhere inspections that
deal does not eliminate the cent

Iran's possession of sensitive stages of
the fuel cycle it can potentially provide

Iran with a windfall set of profits up to
some people say one hundred fifty billion

dollars to use at their own discretion
presumably for nefarious and Bishan Zz So

in short these critics that call
the negotiators amateur in the deal

itself suspect suggests that no
deal is better than a bad deal.

But one doesn't have to really engage
in partisan politics or taking

a really polarized situation to realize
that this is a very complicated and

heavy set of issues presented by this
deal and there are a number of very.

Challenging issues uncertainties and
risks associated with it Agreement and

the process of reaching the agreement and
the agreement itself has been extremely

complicated as I mentioned it's been
a protracted set of negotiations over

thirteen years the document itself is
about one hundred sixty pages includes

five annexes and each an extent
kluges multiple subsections So

this is not like many of the arms
control agreements of yesteryears.

And to endorse or operationalize
this agreement requires consent

by multiple parties not
only the signatories but.

Requires the domestic constituencies and
members of the various political

policy processes in different countries
it includes a number of unpublished

agreements such as that between the I say
the International Atomic Energy Agency and

Iran that has to deal with
understanding Iranians or

alleged act Milot military activities and
a pathway to resolving some of those

differences in the United States
this is a this deal or

agreement is not a treaty
therefore it's not.

Subject to ratification by the Senate
however as part of the arrangement

in partisan politics there was
an effort to get Congress involved in

the process Congress the deal is subject
to a congressional vote on the resolution

of disapproval of the arrangement and
if anybody's been reading the newspapers

today they know that it seems that
the Democrats have secured forty two votes

which not only an able
President Obama to veto any.

Negative resolution but
to really prevent the retina

negative resolution from coming to
India for coming to materializing So

needless to say this is a very complicated
deal in terms of its substance and

in terms of the process and as I mentioned
there are a number of key terms and

concepts that are remain ambiguous
such as how effective is the deal

even if the sides are going to adhere to
it to eliminate the different pathways

to the to Iran's nuclear program what
is the value of the nuclear program

to Iran what are the precedents that
are likely to be set by either adhering or

cheating to this deal how are we
going to settle the score and

clear the air in terms of some of
the ambiguity imput ambiguity surrounding

a possible military dimensions to Iran or
dealing with some of the non-nuclear

dimensions of a nuclear weapons program
what's going to happen after the fifteen

year period is over are we going to be
right where we are today are we going to.

You know sort of lengthen the time line.

And of course there are a number of
other deeper analytical issues and

strategic issues to think about beyond the
substance of the actual deal in terms of

what is driving or motivating Iran's quest
for a nuclear weapon as I mentioned before

one of the precedence that this sets for
the whole process of nonproliferation and

regional security and US foreign policy.

Interests and what are some of the broader
consequences for geo political

issues such as the relationship
between the United States Russia China

the geopolitics of energy Needless to
say there are a lot of heavy issues to

address by this deal so
with an eye towards helping us understand

this I've invited a panel of colleagues
that are called from across campus for

primarily the nun school to help
us think about some of the initial

takeaways from this deal and give us ways
of framing how we should think about

some of the broader strategic political
consequences associated with it

as President Obama said in a recent
speech in American University but

a week ago it is really him upon every
citizen in the United States to take upon

her itself to question some of the
assumptions surrounding this deal to avoid

not challenging conventional wisdom or
rushing to war to subject

the different arguments that we read or
hear about to systematic scrutiny so

that we can come up with the right
decision both for ourselves and for

our country and for international
security so rather than sit and

invites all my colleagues to
pontificate in indoctrinate and

as you know just be the purveyors
of specific bottom lines rather

I've asked them to help us
think about these problems so

that you guys can have your own takeaways
and come up with your own frameworks for

making sense out of this so
we lost a little time

with the with the techno
technical glitch so

I don't want to get into a long
set of introductions but

what I'd like to do is briefly
introduce each one of our panelists and

then what I have a couple of questions
to get the what are whistle and

get the process going and
I've asked a group of them to.

Yes Each one of these questions and
then once we've sort of

explored some of the specific surrounding
the deal some of the motivating

factors surrounding why Iran in this
case even seeks a nuclear weapon and

some of its strategic consequences both
for the region and for US foreign policy

we'll turn it over to you guys to really
raise some of the burning issues for

your own from your own perspectives so
I'm very proud to be able to.

Invite professor Larry Reuben from the
salmon school he's an assistant professor

here he's our resident Middle East
expert specialist not only on intra Arab

in interest really but also Arab Israeli
security issues he's also looked at

the issue of nuclear proliferation spiral
in the Middle East in great detail and

the whole issue of how Islam affects
the behavior of young different

regional actors sitting next to Larry is
another one of my colleagues it's She's

is an associate professor in the Sam Nunn
school it's Dr Margaret because Sol and

Maggie keeps us honest by making us
Ramana reminding us that we are part of

a Technology Institute here and she's
a real expert on some of the technical

issues surrounding W M D proliferation
nonproliferation emerging

technologies Internet and International
Security and generally the science and

technology dimensions to international
security policy sitting next to Maggie is

another one of our my colleagues is Dr
Jerry Hayes from the Sam Nunn school and

he's a specialist in international
relations theory as well as international

security policy broadly as well as
on arms control nuclear strategy and

nonproliferation issues and
he's written recently actually many of you

may have seen on some issues surrounding
why Iran is actually even interested

in a nuclear weapon that goes beyond
just material security considerations so

he'll talk a little bit
about those sitting there.

Stu Jarrett is and this is the first
time I get to introduce him as is

Professor John Gardner Americus at the Sam
Nunn School of International Affairs and

those of you who have are who are not new
to Georgia Tech probably very familiar

with John John is really one of
the leading experts not only on Chinese

foreign policy but specifically China's
foreign policy towards the Middle East and

Iran in particular and so he can
talk about a dimension to this issue

that is often lost in a lot of
the focus on just narrow U.S.

foreign policy interests in the region
sitting next to John is a colleague

of ours from the the N.R.E. program
the nuclear engineering program here

Dr No one her tell him no one
is full professor who is very

career and and
credentials as a specialist and

in safeguards in detection and
radiation materials.

And those of you who are both
students in N.R.E. and

international affairs should be appreciate
that Dr tell is really one of the drivers

across campus for bridging the gap between
science technology and policy issues and

she just a great course on
international safeguards so

if you really get interested in some
of the issues surrounding this deal

he has a great program the really actually
allows you to touch your rainy I'm so

go go figure highly enriched uranium so
go figure so I found he so

I can see he's glowing already.

Next next to you next to Nolan we're
very fortunate this year because

joining us on the panel is Colonel Lonnie
Carson who also has a Ph D. and kind of

Carson Carlson is a U.S. Army nuclear and
counterproliferation officer and

he has a very long by a biography but
for me to tell you all about it

would have to lock those doors so
suffice to say he's here.

To talk about some of the.

Operational and strategic issues
related to some kind of proliferation

considerations associated with
the Iranian nuclear challenge so

without further adieu why don't we just go
ahead and get started and what I've asked

a group of my colleagues to answer
right off the bat is what are one or

two or
possibly three distinguishing traits or

features of this deal
that are important for

thinking about minimizing Iran's
incentives to develop nuclear weapons so

why don't we start with
Maggie on this one and so

what are your main takeaways with
what are the strengths of the deal or

what may be missing from the deal
that just is glaring and.

So part of.

What it highlights is this working.

And it's likely passing now as Adam
mentioned is a clear success for

nonproliferation the U.S.
domestic debate over Iran really has been

two debates in which each side
is arguing something different

one side there's a focus on nuclear
nonproliferation which is characterized

by a strikingly broad consensus in
the arms control community this side

recognizes that the deal what the deal can
achieves in terms of nonproliferation and

regional stability recognizes that
it's a much more comprehensive

comprehensive deal and there's a lot of
lessons that have been learned from past

experiences including
the North Korea do deal.

On the opposing side is a less
homogeneous but no less impassioned group

who is less focused all on
the specifics of the deal and rather

on broader concerns it illogical terrorism
economic and human rights issues.

As well as finding ways to isolate and
ultimately destroy

Iran's clerical regime regardless of
whether the there's a nuclear program for

them nearly any deal is
a bad deal this is sort of

the converse to the proponents where
any deal is seen as a good deal.

So both sides highlight legitimate
concerns with respect to our brand

it isn't authoritative regime it's a state
sponsor of terror and it has issued and

made highly incendiary rhetoric
directed at a US ally.

The differences point not only
to political differences in U.S.

domestic policies.

But point to larger challenges and
this is why it becomes more important

first of all articulating executing
strategy in the complex geopolitics

of the twenty first century this
is not the Cold War anymore and

then it secondly it points to different
prioritize Nations is nuclear

nonproliferation part that is nuclear
nonproliferation the priority

or should the U.S. national priority
be countering terrorism and

regime change.

Money do you want to take a child and

what are you one hundred to one to
three main takeaways from the green.

Party OK it sounds like First off I
have to satisfy the department defense

lawyers so while I am a military officer
I am not officially representing

the military today and therefore
any opinions are purely my own and

not those of the Department of Finance.

That out of the way I
can now speak fairly You

would not do it because you
want to still have a boss.

I too would like to say that way off what
Maggie talked about there a minute ago and

I actually want to have a little more
context let me answer that question so

I have a couple of very short
quotes here from the most recent

national security strategy so
the first one.

Is no threat poses as grave
a danger to our security and

wellbeing as the potential
use of nuclear weapons and

materials by irresponsible states or
terrorists another one

our sanctions regime has demonstrated
that the international community can and

will hold accountable while also opening
up a space for a diplomatic resolution so

you see nuclear threat highest priority
and you see diplomatic resolution being

a means so the end no no nuclear
proliferation but the means

diplomatic resolution and lastly you
know basically a comprehensive and

verifiable deal is the best way to advance
our interests strengthen the global

nonproliferation regime where that is
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and

enabler and to access peaceful nuclear
energy and that is one of the significant

points of contention on both sides of the
debate however we were retain all options

to achieve the objective of preventing
Iran from producing a nuclear weapon so

I throw that out because you know being a
military officer one of the things I tend

to be a little more for versed in than
many of the community is development and

implementation of strategy and ways and
means so you just heard the president

of the United States strategic and
state he doesn't want any more nuclear

proliferation particularly or
irresponsible states or

terrorists that's his highest priority but
he does want to exercise diplomatic means

first without going straight to
the military option but lastly

Well second to last is you know he doesn't
want to go straight to the military but

he always wants to retain those military
options which the United States does but

then lastly and once again part
of the the point of contention is

stating that Iran has a right to the
peaceful peaceful use of nuclear energy

that's basically the crux of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty so

what you see here is the administration
trying to keep the N.P.T.

viable into the future.

There.

Well I'm going to try to just make
a couple comments that potentially haven't

been made yet I think rather than seeing
it as a this actually has maybe without

going into the framing of the debate it's
hard not to say good versus bad because

we all absorb this information from
a political context of good versus bad and

I think most people here as outside of
the political context we want to see it as

you know effective not effective
What are some strengths and

weaknesses of it so I'll try to do that
but I'm sure I'm going to say good or

bad if it comes in there at some
point that's my disclaimer.

But one of the one of the things
I think to think about is

is rather than minimizing and I think this
does have to do with the debate minimizing

incentives for proliferation.

You know and whether it minimizes that
it's I think looking at it in terms of

the agreement increasing incentives for
nonproliferation and

that's another way may you may have the
side of delaying what you know what many

people critics have said in an editable
of that period of time by holding it and

not eliminating a program but looking
at it as far as what are the incentives

what are the types of carrots that.

That might be applied for for
not for increasing incentives for

nonproliferation up proliferating to that
weaponized will state but also retaining

the country or state within the N.P.T.
and being able to monitor it and

have it abide by internet regular norms
and rules of the international community.

You know the other thing
to say is that one of and

I think will go into some of the drawbacks
to is is a problem is the question and

this is many critics raise this is WELL AS
is part of what are the sticks and

they actually changed it all when it when
it comes to this and some may argue well

here you would have been a legitimate
means to pursue a military option in

that way if there's clear violation
would be one of the arguments for

that but there are others that have
kind of drawn that out we can talk about

a little bit more in Q. and A.

Gerry.

Your main takeaways.

Well my my main takeaway from the deal
is that it begins to account for

the supply side so we talk an awful
lot and a lot of the critics in

the United States address the demand side
can the United States guarantee that it

Iran will never be able to get access to
the technology to build a nuclear weapon

or will it will be put out of reach and
I think that's the wrong question

the technology is seventy years old and
any relatively advanced country

in the world is capable of developing
the capacity to build a nuclear weapon.

So we will never be able to
hermetically seal off any given state

of a sufficient level of technological
development from a nuclear weapon

we can make it more difficult
we can make it impossible and

so that that's the wrong standard what the
deal begins to do is it begins to address

the supply side why does Iran want a
nuclear weapon I have some arguments that

I would like to hopefully make over the
period of this discussion about the role

nuclear weapons play in Iranian domestic
society but you can see in the agreement.

Relaxing of sanctions on high
technology imports and exports to Iran

integrating Iran with the international
community giving Iran a sense that it

belongs to the international community and
very importantly integrating Iran into

a standard set of practices for nuclear
proliferation control so Iran is now

is obligated under this agreement to be
scum to sign on to the additional protocol

which is what most members of the N.P.T.
most of the N.P.T. have already signed

onto that just means that Iran is on
a state just like everybody else they have

to play by the same rules as everybody
else and that's very important if we want

to be able to begin to have a conversation
with Iran about how do you integrate into

an international system where
proliferation is not acceptable.

John.

My major takeaway from the deal
is the extent to which sound.

My major takeaway was the extent to which
the United States accommodated Iran's

demands in the process of negotiating
a steel between two thousand and six and

two thousand and
ten their own states sponsored supported

push through six United Nations
Security Council resolutions demanding

that Iran suspend nuclear enrichment or
in the band of nuclear enrichment.

That has been changed as was indicated by

earlier speakers has changed
yes there are limits in terms

of level of enrichment and quantity of.

Enrich but
the brand is now allowed to continue

to enrich my process develop its nuclear
side nuclear science nuclear technology

research on advanced centrifuges so
on and so forth.

So.

Now with this is for ten or fifteen years
what happens after ten or fifteen years.

I studied China and China does think
in terms of fifteen thirty fifty years

one hundred years a number of countries
think in larger longer time frames and

we do what happens after ten or fifteen
years after the limits are expired and

Iran's capability is is nuclear
capabilities are much more advanced

another thing that the United States
accommodated is a lifting of the of the in

part the ban on imports of weapons systems
let me read to you just very briefly

from the Security Council Resolution one
thousand nine hundred nine of June two

thousand and ten this is in the the second
year of the bombing ministration.

The Security Council
decides that all states

prevent the director in direct
supply sales and so forth.

Any battle tanks armored combat vehicles
large caliber artillery systems combat

aircraft attack helicopters worship's
missiles or missile systems spare parts

and components and so forth next
provision the Security Council decides

that Iran shall not undertake any activity
related to ballistic missile capabilities

capable of delivering nuclear
weapons weeds restrictions are to be

abandoned as part of the part of
the deal phased I had to stand but

still the idea is they will collapse so
what we're talking about is ten or

fifteen and probably Iran is going
to use a part of the increased

income to acquire these advanced weapon
systems from Russia I'm not sure about

China what China do the Russians certainly
would do that so they're in ten or

fifteen years around is going to have
much more powerful military capabilities

to to address any contingencies.

We run States invested over and
over a period of ten plus years and

try tremendous amount of diplomatic
energy political level political capital

to push through the sanction regime
to give our teeth multilaterally

bilaterally that has been dismantled or

is been dismantled why are we doing
that as I understand it the idea

is to work out a.

Accommodation with with with Iran
a strategic or approach mom with

around like with the US or approach my own
with the People's Republic of China nine

hundred seventy one seventy two a still
Irish have a different ideologies but

we work together we have
common interests I believe

if if this isn't fact whatever and
desires.

It was it is worth around as a great
power as a regional power is

the engine civilizational state we're
talking about a state which has truth.

Thousand Years of capacity go back
to our command in power there fought

the Greek city states to a standstill
the Parthian empire that fought the Romans

to a standstill the only civilization that
the Roman Empire was not able to defeat

is a sign of empire which for four hundred
Europeans the Eastern Roman Empire the.

Highly Persian Empire the Safavi
one after another the Persians

are an imperial people they feel they are
proud where of that they are proud of that

Iran is a great power which is not
going away if Iran the leaders of Iran

actually desire a strategic approach
with the United States here is.

I think this is a real gamble but

I think it's chorus parapets is probably
an exact Gamble which is taking

wealth which is worth taking to
the Uranian leaders and people desire to

redefine relationship between their
the Islamic Republic of Iran and

the world community and the United States
I don't know and I don't pretend to know

I know there are a lot of people
I've been to read a couple times and

all my people I meet
the restaurants the stores the.

Hotels and so forth desire more
access to the international community

more easy access to the United States
to get out from under this umbrella of

crowd around here there's
a longing in around for

greater international connecting
the stone for economic opportunity but

on the other hand you have people
like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard

the Guardians Council the Islamic
foundations which dominate the economy

the supreme leader the Bashir core the.

Bashi core the internal security fogs
whatever they want I don't I I'm pretty

confident that they don't want our new
redefined relationship the world because

there is a who through the route to
subversion trickle laps of the revolution.

He what the outcome of this is
going to be I don't pretend to know

we're talking about the evolution of a
nation of seventy some million people with

incredibly complex diplomatic Yeah
internal politics over a long period of

time I don't know what the outcome will
be I think this is a gamble it's a real

gamble which is probably the end
of the day worth taking.

But.

That's what I that's where I come down
on thank you let me turn to some of

the technical issues associated with
the deal and you've been silent here why

don't you give us your thoughts on some
of the specifics related to whether or

not this deal does effectively limit the
you're gaining amply Tony Emma possibly

covert past of the bomb or its impact and
safeguards and latency eccentric OK

let me just follow up something Jared said
about seventy years old technology and

I always tell my class nuclear weapons or
Bronze Age technology

if you if you want prestige you should
go nano materials and nanoparticles

nano technology all stablish you now
internationally with that reputation.

You know to to back up a because I
don't know what the audience is but

I mean there are two routes to a nuclear
weapon right one is to enrich uranium

which requires a rather extensive source
of energy often takes a rather large

area and we know that some of
the facilities in Iran are underground but

that is a way to the easiest weapon
you know it's not the easiest route

necessarily to the material but
it is is a more simple weapon you know

as proof of that when we drop the bomb on
Hiroshima as a high enrich uranium weapon

we didn't even detonate one for practice
because we knew it would work so so so

it's it so the weapon is easy but either
have to go with highly enriched uranium or

you have to make plutonium
plutonium weapons are much more.

Sophisticated.

But if you make plutonium you can usually
separate the plutonium out by a chemical

process so you know a much smaller
footprint I think in the seventy's when

people worried about folks making weapons
in their garage by steel interdicting

plutonium shipments in the U.S. They said
you needed some about the size of a small

winery to to do all that chemistry so
it so that said there are two pathways so

so so we see different things we see that
in the agreement we see the limitation

of centrifuges which would be the primary
pathway in Richmond we see that

you know a vast reduction in those how and
only the older ones are allowed the newer

ones obviously have higher separation
capacities we do see in the agreement that

the development of newer higher
technology centrifuges are allowed but

in limited numbers you know
more kind of like a R.

and D. situation so the end of ten
years something happens with that so

that kind of addresses the highly
enriched uranium side.

On the plutonium side
we have an Air Act not.

I'm not sure my pronunciation is correct
but but we have this heavy water reactor

that's being redesigned if you look at
the agreement they give the parameters

they give you for
nuclear engineers they give you the flux.

And it and the idea there is to
make it difficult although I think

the fact sheet the White House put up said
impossible to make weapons grade plutonium

I think that's not something any
engineer would would concede

what is some of the strange
things though in in the in

the modification of that is they're
allowed to make isotopes for

medical industrial applications what do
they do that takes high enriched uranium

rods puts it in the reactor associate
with that is a chemical processing

facility to extract those isotopes So
you know I had on one thirty one take.

The molybdenum ninety nine which most of
you would know from medical procedures and

tech Newseum ninety nine and

the deal there is I would first say that
OK you can read you had some uranium

targets you pull them into the same
chemical facilities you could extract.

Plutonium weapons grade so it's a map so
all this kind of in the end boils down to

watt not going to stop with that but
a matter of monitoring what's going on in

inspections are key what why do we
mean by continuous inspections Why

do we mean NS in the you know these quote
secret agreements that I won't comment

on because I'm not quite sure what's
in the loop what's in the media is

correct the scutcheon of those but
I mean a in all of

this inspections inspections in
a timely manner continuous inspections.

Or very important so that's a that's
a key element you know tectonically I can

say yeah there are things
that obviously reduce.

The ability to quickly enrich uranium or
make plutonium but not totally eliminated.

They'd be lining they can ask you to
pick up this point about inspections and

what are the capabilities that we have
without getting into really sensitive

issues but
to to in terms of the intelligence and

our capabilities to conduct
these types of inspections.

Well that's one thing you have to give
the negotiators considerable credit for

as you just heard a discussion about the
enrichment aspect of the fuel site but.

Really the agreement covers the entire
fuel cycle everything from tracking

the war all the way through this fuel and
that disposition so

not only is there tracking
you verification of that but

in the process of doing that you
can basically gain intelligence.

Through the various aspects of that so
there's a considerably more

intelligence that can be forthcoming
to us United States and our allies.

By going through this verification process
than what we have right now pre deal which

is essentially none or national level
highly classified intelligence which is

you know typically not on
the ground it's just and so

forth in your conference little room.

So it opens up a considerable amount of
information as far as the verification

side the other thing the deal does there's
a lot of to go shit about the fuel aspects

but if you actually read the agreement
they hit on all all the aspects of weapon

design everything from the neutron
generators the computer modeling

mall type multipoint explosion
technologies all these things we actually

need to weaponize something other than the
most rudimentary Your any I'm going type

device so once again through that
verification process a considerable amount

of intelligence that can come forth and
so operationally what that means you know

whether it's from the military perspective
but also from the diplomacy side is it

gives you that it increases that latency
time that you know Professor Stolberg

mentioned we have the opportunity for
additional indicators and

warnings that increase the president's
disputed you know decision space

the last thing you want is some
indication and warning to come out where.

They did something in secret they're just
about ready to go they've broken how we're

now in a crisis and the president's got to
send bombers or whatever the case may be

immediately that is not how we like to
conduct diplomacy and military operations

so the agreement from the military
planning an operational consideration side

opens up some considerable opportunities
to give the president more decision space

and options on how to you know counter any
cheating or you know illicit activities

and then you have something that yes
OK is this one working out fantastic

I'm actually just sort of picking
up with something Nolan said and

he talked about it from the perspective
of an engineer looking.

Yet in those details in it and

what I think we see in this agreement
it reflects technical expertise and

science diplomacy which is an area that
often doesn't get a lot of attention and

also I think reflects the fact that
the secretary of energy early monies

is not just a typical policy wonk
here is someone who's coming from

the university lab where he has
a robust Engineering Research Group

working as well as a policy expertise so
it is this

involvement from some as
I called ground zero.

Individuals with technical expertise
that one can see the fingerprints

in some of these details that have
often been lacking in agreements

that were crafted largely by folks

who were more typically policy
wonks lawyers those who are have

much further separation
from the engineering side.

Let me shift gears a little bit and we can
obviously pick up some of the technical

issues in the Q.
and A But let's step back and

look at some of the bigger analytical
issues surrounding the deal and

one of them has to do with you know why
I'm so concerned about this and so.

Help eliminate what you know how should
we think about what is motivating Iran

in this context why why should we you know
what it what it wants nuclear ambitions or

what are the some of the motivations
there what may be the link between

their nuclear program with large and
other security concerns either

by our political issues or
possibly their identity or

President how do we think about
what's driving this program.

OK Well the first point that I want to
make is the one that John made it so

Iran is an intern civilization and
they recognize that same way China

recognizes their engine civilization
Russia recognizes theirs and so.

From a standpoint of
prestige we have to consider

that Iran being marginalized
the international system.

Being treated as a pariah state
not just by the United States but

by other states in the international
system has problems in terms of

Iran's what we call in social psychology
positive distinctiveness we all like to

feel good about ourselves that's part of
the reason why we cheer for football teams

right when the football team is successful
in the field you haven't done anything

you've been sitting on the couch but
you still feel good about yourself.

You enjoy positive distinctiveness from
the success of the group that you're

a member of the national groups are no
different we see this in the United States

so we don't like to talk about for example
how Native Americans were treated during

Clooney appeared in the United States
because it reflects badly on us so

we don't talk about it very much or
Iran has this same drive for posit

distinctiveness and nuclear weapons as an
important technology symbolic technology

I think Nolan is correct obviously he's
correct the nuclear engineer in the group.

Nuclear weapons are not a super
sophisticated technology but

they are exemplary of national
capacity there are very few weapons

technologies that you can develop that
are more symbolic of national potency than

nuclear weapons nanotechnology
might be a stronger indicator

of technological sophistication but
it's really hard to see.

Where its nuclear weapons are very easy to
see so even though the technology is old

it's also it's very easy to see and not
very many countries have developed nuclear

weapons the five permanent singer
the five legal powers under the N.P.T.

who are also the permanent five members
the Security Council North Korea.

India Pakistan and South Africa
had them then gave them up and

we were pretty sure
the Israelis have them.

But that's it so out of the almost two
hundred countries in the international

system that's not very many so if you're
able to develop a nuclear weapon that puts

you in some pretty prestigious
heights in the international system so

the positive the desire for positive
distinctiveness in Iran gives leaders

in Iran who want to pursue nuclear
weapons the space to do so

because they enjoy the support from the
public if you look at the two thousand and

nine green movement which was
an abortive perhaps attempted it and

an Iranian spring the leaders of the green
movement did not repudiate the nuclear

program it is symbolic of
the power of Iran and if we want

to deal with that we have to address that
positive distinctiveness which is part of

the point that I was making earlier that
the program that the Iran deal begins

to address that begins to bring Iran in
from the cold recognizes as John says

that Iran is an important very important
state in the international system.

And so if we begin to think about
I hear an awful lot so I was

listening to a podcast this morning Bob
Kagan was on and and he was talking off

a lot about the U.S. the U.S. the U.S. all
everything is from the U.S. perspective

never mind that this was negotiated with
the other permanent members of the U.N.

Security Council plus Germany plus
the E.U. with a representative there so

this is not just an arrangement
between the United States and Iran but

there's no there's almost no reflection in
the media about what does this look like

from the Iranian perspective Iran has
is arguably now with the exception

of ISIS in one of the most secure
situations it's ever been in its archrival

Saddam Hussein is gone its rivals
to this to the south in the in

the Arab Peninsula are suffering
from weak Well prices.

So from a security standpoint which
is often one of the drivers for

acquisition nuclear technology Iran
is sitting pretty good and yet

we still have these concerns
we have to think about that.

I think I'll leave there next.

I actually want to pick up a theme that
is sort of woven through a couple of

the different remarks
the nanotechnology and

I relate this back to
nuclear if it will so

the mid two thousand knots for
a five o six I was looking a lot at

Iranian Now technology in particular
was looking at a lead statements so

what the leaders of Iran what are they
saying about nanotechnology and

I kept running into these comments
from individuals particularly in

the the modulus which are there Iran's
Cleveland of the congressional reps making

equivalencies in particular one statement
stands out that the United States does

not want to rant to have nuclear
technology and nanotechnology.

And you know so other than both of
them beginning with the letter and

sort of what do they have in common
Well I mean one could say I think if you

looked at it from a less sophisticated
view you could say well they're both what

technologies one is a proven weapons
technology one's a potential but

more importantly to what Jared was saying
these are indicators of prestigious

these are indicators of
international capacity and

indicators of pristine that are taken and
seen as very important

when he was head of Iran Ahmadinejad
made statements about nanotechnology

particularly that Iran was the leading.

Muslim nation pursuing nanotechnology So
this is very important and

by the way if you go talk to folks
in Turkey they dispute that.

So again it's who's got this leaving
in these different areas of technology

when we do this and we've got a little
bit we're short on a little time so

why don't we move to I'm sure we'll
pick up some of these points in the Q.

and A But let's touch on some
of the strategic implicate.

Ations of this deal and Larry want
to you talk a little bit about how

this would resonate in the region itself.

Start by saying one of the things
that I mean I think that the grand

will say the grand hope or vision probably
with the ministers one of them might be

that it would transform the region
in that way and I don't.

There might be it might be great if it
works out that way but I wouldn't put my

bets on it in that happening it doesn't
mean it's a reason not to go forward with

a deal in that way but I don't see
it happening that closely and in

that manner in the long term part because
the local conflicts that exist there and

even Either way that a deal or
no deal goes through or an agreement or

an agreement you're going to still going
to have many of the perceptions among

the regional states that would would
occur one way or another the way these

narratives are played out whether it's
an alliance between the United States and

that if this happened in ten years ago
when there was talk about this grand

bargain during the Iraq war between
Iran and the United States and

many of the Sunni states threatened by
amping up their activities in Iraq and

some of our allies doing this too so

you've got basically these types of
effects that go along in the region and

the number another of others that
could come out from this to it.

Is that is the U.S. actions having these
types of effects what they might be is to

sometimes assure some of our allies in the
region may have this effect by if it might

be supplying weapons desired
weapons to say like the Saudis or

the immoralities or
the Israelis but I think more so

if the Saudis in a moralities you've got
the effects how is it going to affect Iran

maybe it will trigger that that security
threat that would seem to be reduced when

it lost one of its main adversaries
with Iraq and also after the U.S.

withdrawal from the region and
you may react there or

amplify that security aspect that
could drive proliferation or

of also with the Israelis those types of
sensitive technologies going to some of

our other Gulf Gulf allies of
course assure them but then.

But then.

Threatening or seeing that somehow
threaten the Iranians and then you have

the local contest conflicts that probably
won't go away in any anytime soon

we are seeing some movement potentially on
the you know on the on the Syrian front

with without going too much into some
of these local conflicts and they and

people have made these you know I've said
well it might have something to do with

the shifting of perceptions of maybe there
is some type of way to get because of

the nuclear agreement to have Iranians and
potentially the Russians come to some type

of political arrangement there we don't
know if that would have happened with or

without this with or without this deal but
the fact is this is going to even if there

is some type of political arrangement in
Syria which has effects throughout Iraq

and it will affect populations
in Saudi Arabia and in Jordan.

This will this would still be the case so
that's not necessarily to put a damper on

this in this deal arrangement what I
what I want to say is these are some of

the the broader implications that could
go a number of different directions

of different scenarios John maybe you can
come into a little on the extra regional

implications specifically how does this
play with China what's what China's

interests here what is the relationship
of Iran that are play here and

what do you what do you think
the implications are for that angle.

China welcomes the.

Corn joint come Prince a plan of
action in fact China was a major

architect of that it's very interesting
China played an active media.

Ran us conflict over
the past several years.

If you look at the.

Well the reasons for
this go in the evidence for

that it's a very dramatic departure
from China's practice in the past in

which it basically sat back and let
the other powers were cut the problems and

they usually after getting what
it could from the United States.

China in the past balance very delicately
between between Tehran and Washington.

Over the sand starting in two thousand and
twelve actually two thousand and

thirteen which two things which E.G.
pinkos the power and

secondly you were in prison or holiday.

In Iran the Chinese
stepped up to the plate in

a very high profile high level.

Good offices to mediate a conflict between
the reason that China did this trying to

play the significant peacemaking role in
this relationship lauded by John Kerry and

Zarif Iran's foreign ministry
why China did this was

basically a conclusion that if rainin U.S.
relations continued on the trajectory they

were on and throughout the two thousand
eight hundred two thousand and eleven and

twelve while on a recent power
that the result would be war.

The result would be war and while there
was a significant voice in China or

said yeah let the Americans get another
war in the Middle East well good

that was not the mainstream voice in China
the mainstream voice in China was that her

voice and endorsed by China's top leaders
including the polar bear was a war

between the United States and
red would be a catastrophe for China.

It would stop the flow of oil from
the Middle East China China gets

about over just over half of its oil
from the part from the Persian Gulf.

But the global economy gets about half
of its sixty percent of its oil from

the Persian Gulf if that all was
cut off because of war the could

well throw the global
economy into recession.

Neither of those events occurred of a
Chinese or supplier global supply be good

for China's economic development or for
its modernization war would lead to.

You refugee flow do lead to
radicalization throughout the region.

And not too far away from
from the Persian Gulf is

China's Muslim province of John so
refugees and

Islamic terrorists would flow from that
region to the region of China China's

own stability would be at risk.

Then you have this year economic aspects
China saw a lot of stuff to arise.

All of the water infrastructure
development projects in Iran that would

be disrupted so basically China
concluded that if if it sat back and

continued its traditional policy of
balancing between the United States'

interest that that would not
serve China's interest that a war

would be catastrophic and that China
should undertake active peace diplomacy

to avert that it's significant China
played a very significant piece making

little of us understood active
peacemaking role at this juncture and

it's actually a major departure towards
what she calls a proactive more

proactive diplomacy
appropriate to a great power.

Why don't we just ask the last question
before I turn it over to you guys Lani Why

don't you touch on the implication of this
deal for US foreign policy and sort of

doesn't the how how does it support our
broader foreign policy interests and

what else should we be doing besides just
fixating on this deal to either reassure

our allies and limit the damages of any
gaps or other types of complimentary

actions that can be used to
reinforce what U.S. interest.

Sounds like an entire panel of its own.

Actually just came from three years in
Europe where I ran a security cooperation

program write a few million dollars to
work with nations to build their capacity.

And what I learned from that was my first
time overseas in that type of capacity.

He is that you have to ultimately
negotiations include balancing the U.S.

and their interests it's
not a one way street.

So to get to Adam's question is I think
it's one of the debates out there is

what is the role where where does the U.S.
leadership in the world right now are we

abdicating leadership by capitulating
as part of this deal and

what I would argue based on
the experience I just had is in for

a little more context as for the last
two or three years I've heard the German

population I read their newspapers every
day British news they all wanted sanctions

to end the state I lived in in Germany has
already sent a trade delegation to Iran

the British have already
restored diplomatic relations and

opened the embassy they
were ready to go so

sanctions were just about ready to
enter whether the US wanted them or

to or not frankly I'm surprised there and
you know what they did

because of what I saw as the trend within
the European nations I worked with.

But getting back to the role of the U.S.

far as leadership is desist Rees
you represent capitulation or does

this represent real politic where we see
where the trend is going and we try and

salvage the best deal that we can and
I would argue that the U.S. made the right

decision by getting what they could out of
the deal when it very potentially within

a few months could simply the option
may not have even been there.

All right why don't we go ahead and
open it up I think we have one or

two mikes here.

Chris you want to grab one does anybody
have a question here there we go and

we give this.

Can I just ask you to confine your
question to one question so that we can

try to get these answers out real quick
and keep it to a question please.

OK real simple question do you think
there's any possibility to get

the human species at.

And a humanitarian way so
that these people and future generations.

Live better and what I mean by
that is in all these countries

they're great people who are humanitarians
and do wonderful things and

if they cluster together at churches
mosques temples and a guy goes

on the good things they did then
all this stuff will go away and

all those weapons and the money that
goes to them can go to health care and

making everybody supply a good happy
peaceful life is that any possibility.

You know.

You're the scholar of the right.

So you guys writing this down because I'm
solving the world's problems right now.

I don't I don't I honestly don't know
the answer to that but I do think that

taking count of the social dynamics
in these countries like Iran and

thinking about the ways
in which we can empower.

Often indirectly the people who have
this humanitarian perspective and

disempower the ones that do not
is as close as we're going to get

it's very difficult to change what
states do internally from the outside

when you try to push oftentimes you end
up reinforcing the very dynamics that

you're trying to eliminate because it
looks like you're being imperial or

you're trying to dominate and
that produces a reflexive backlash again

gets back to posit distinctiveness and
a sense of where it is Lonnie

ontological security right a sense
of your own place in the world

when that's threatened you
respond as it's threatened.

So by trying to be more careful and
conscientious.

So for example.

Treating Iran's nuclear program
not as an existential threat but

as a program like anybody else's
program that should be regulated as

anybody else's program is
regulated we can disempower or

at least give tools to those who look at
the world that we do the humanitarians

we can give them tools for taking forward
policies that are more amenable to

the world that we would like to see a more
humanitarian role distance of Lee and

we can deny some tools to those who
would go in the opposite direction but

in the end that's all we can do we can
give them tools we can't make them

use them and we can't always predict how
those tools will play out in domestic

politics in other countries so
I could give a theological answer but

I'll refrain but I think in some sense
we're all flawed right we're all

a little selfish you know are governing
the limit night that I don't think so and

in some people that selfishness plays out
in rather dramatic ways to seize power and

so it would be great and

I think there are ways to minimize
you know the situations we see

in the world but probably never to
totally eliminate them saw Don't call me

a pessimist but you know that's that's
how I see it the question over here.

Do any of you believe
the deal is non optimal and

if so how could it have
been realistically better.

Than many house I say
all inside inspectors

sitting in the rooms with the tech
hers watching everything move in and

out unlimited access and
none of this I'm going to tell

you I'm going to be there in twenty
four days to inspect a facility so

you can clean it up move things around I
think I think that would be the ultimate

thing now whether you can I don't think
you can negotiate that but I mean I.A.E.A.

has some opportunity maybe
to do something stronger but

continuous monitoring it's not clear you
know exactly what that means you know so

I would say inspectors.

As.
Somebody want a person on the panel

attention whatever the appropriate
benchmark to even address that is it

a technical optimality issue or
are there other factors that may affect

the incentives or make it raise the bar
sufficiently high to discourage

others while cheating anybody have a take
on another non-technical benchmark.

No takers OK All right well let me let
me turn it back and forwards the next

question OK.

Is there any reason
the United States responsibility.

I.

Know.

The agreement really only deals with
the potential weaponization of Iran's

nuclear infrastructure I do and I should
point this out earlier Iran has a legal

right to develop enrichment and
other forms of nuclear energy technology

it gets that right through being
a signatory to the Nonproliferation Treaty

there's that was the grand bargain the
permit the five legal nuclear powers got

to keep their toys although they they
have they vowed to eventually disarm and

everybody else said OK we won't develop
nuclear weapons but we have a legal right

to develop nuclear energy technology so
that so so actually this is another way

in which treating Iran's program as
something special is a problem because

it's not special it has a right to that
technology and if we treat it in that vein

that's going to go a long way towards
resolving I think some of these problems.

Can I add to that I think
furthermore if you have your own

civilian nuclear power program
you want to control your and.

Fuel cycle so you don't depend on
anyone else just say like we would be

nice if we produced all our petroleum and
within the borders the United States so

we didn't have to worry about someone
cutting off the supply so so so

there's you know the technical basis
to look at that and say Yeah the whole

fuel cycle we'd like to control so
that we have fuel and we need it.

Well it geopolitically my might
doesn't work so that you know but

you know geopolitically the U.A.E. Saudi
Arabia are all looking at nuclear power

capabilities here in the next decade or
so so yeah Be careful creating haves and

have nots because they get
to do it gentlemen mentioned

Jared mentioned you know just that
that human selfishness interaction and

how does that ultimately work out.

Considering the history of American and
Israeli said if you an intervention in

Iran how can the Americans public
the American public for nations and

Iran ensure that the U.S. or other nations
won't intervene negatively on their

program to try to sabotage how can
we how can they be sure we'll play.

They but they they can't it's
a they're trusting us not to.

Let me just add to that when this is
a very complicated issue from the Iranian

perspective because this particular
agreement requires certain types of

sanctions to be relaxed but allows for
other sanctions to remain in place so

if you're from the if you're a city and
tear on.

You may be suggest you may see a situation
where you think that you're adhering to

the basic spirit and certainly principles
of the UN tenets of the agreement yet

there's still other sanctions in place
some of them have actually been related to

the activities adjacent to
a nuclear weapons program or

their activities in that region and so
there is a concern about moving goal posts

from the Iranian perspective
just as we have concerns.

Shirking and cheating and playing fast and
loose with the spirit of the agreement so

that isn't that is not an insignificant
issue given the complexities of

the sanctions that are in place and the
ambiguity is of different understandings

of what which sanctions are going to
be removed when I mean it's spelled out

in the agreement but the countries seem to
have slightly different interpretations of

it so that is something to stay tuned on
where we haven't we have already over.

Ma'am you referred early on to
lessons learned from the North Korean

agreed framework could give
us some examples please.

So some of the.

Some of the the specific lessons have
to do with the specific timetable for

the verification some of them
have to do with the ability to.

To have technical verification means and

the very the specificity
that we've seen in it.

So those are some of the the critical
ones that come from the technical on

the material side from a.

Political side there has
been significantly longer.

Negotiations development in
terms of the relationships

particularly among
the technical negotiators

that was not present in the same
level in the North Korean.

Agreement.

What will be interesting to see is with
the next administration do they follow

the same pattern that the administration
subsequent to the North Korean deal which

was to do this goes in some ways so the
question before who follows through who

doesn't and who starts a cascade
of not following through and

this well we don't like the agreement it's
a non-optimal agreement let's rip it up

well do we have any agreement
with the North Koreans right now.

Do we have any inspections when
the North North Koreans right now know.

You know so this is you know it sort
of be careful what one's asking for

in terms of well we're going
to get a better agreement

one of the chief lessons that should
be learned from the North Korean

nuclear agreement is yes might think
you're going to get a better agreement.

But often you don't get.

With the unfrozen assets and
sanctions relief and all the money sort of

flowing into the Iranian economy there's
been concerns about how that's going to

affect their funding towards their
iest terrorist organizations or

military groups and do you think that's
an important factor to consider and if so

do you think it's likely to affect any
local conflicts around the region.

You know that's a good question and
one and

I think a fairly strong criticism I think
I'll probably go back in terms of my

initial answer to say as far as a look at
analyzing the agreement itself more about

you know in the proliferation domain
these these issues are important but

they're peripheral and that's is as Dr
coastal first framed it that way this is

how opposition has framed it and I don't
think it's entirely I mean it should be

dismissed because these are concerns and
as I talked about some of the strategic

issues there are things that we need to be
aware of and it's I think when it comes

to certain conflicts it would give Iran
undoubtably extra capabilities to be able

to play around in its neighborhood and
some of them are extremely important and

it's not just about having the strategic
leverage if it's Syria which is

essential or supporting Hezbollah
in southern Lebanon and

these are almost on an ideological level
seem to be on par at various times and

statements if you look closely with
the cause of revolution itself and

what those losses are just as I said

just a stressed strategic they're
also there could be potential.

Ideological and this would of course give
the extra funding there but the question

again goes back I think to a larger
one with regard to is are we talking

about the deal and I think in those times
answers Yes your answer might be yes it

would given these capabilities but then
it's a question of looking at the deal

itself and are we better off in that way
than that having nothing parallel or

potentially nothing as it was
say in six to nine months and

I think this is that's been
that's the strongest argument.

So I want to I want to add to that.

So in the first instance Iran
has tremendous financial.

Demands at home they have infrastructure
that hasn't been developed they have

technology technological sectors economic
sectors that are badly underdeveloped So

it's not as though that money is
going into a country that looks

like the United States right
that much that money is going

to a country that's been badly battered
by sanctions the leadership may choose

to divert those resources to military
adventurism in the region but

they're going to have their own legitimacy
problems at home it's true that

Iran's governance has this autocratic
theocratic nature to it but

it is also has democratic aspects and
we are we do see elements or

concerns of about legitimacy
in Iran's government so

I doubt very much that they're going to
take ALL hundred fifty billion dollars and

sink it into playing games in Syria or
Levanon And I also want and

this is going to make John really proud
because he's a he's a realist Iran also

is seeing the limits to their own
military capability in the region so for

example there was a general for the cuts
force who became very prominent last few

months last six months or
so has been very vocal but

as Iran has figured out that they can't
do whatever they want Yemen without

provoking a counterbalancing
coalition by the Arab countries and

they can't do whatever they want Syria and
they've realized the limits of.

The power he's disappeared from
the media and that and this

appearing in particular because he had
foreign policy legitimacy foreign policy

authority within Iran is gone we don't see
him anymore fact there's evidence that

they are right Iranians have appointed
a minder to keep him under control and

the foreign minister now is now
the voice of Iran's foreign policy and

this is very significant this is a shift
from militarization to diplomacy which is

exactly what we're asking them to do.

It's not likely that Iran would spend
one hundred fifty billion dollars buying

weapons but it's not an unlikely they'll
spend a billion dollars a year buy and

weapons which is about what
China purchases annually from

the Russian Federation and very very
advanced weapons shooting down American

airplanes attacking American ships and
so forth that's why Russian systems

were designed for the very good a billion
dollars a year will go a long way but

I think that the basic question
is whether Iran continues to be

revolutionary pursue
the Islamic Revolution.

And I come back here to analogy with with
China the right US reproach China the U.S.

are approaching with China work and large
part because Mao Zedong understood to

forge a new relation of their own states
China had to pull back from there for

it to drive United States out of
Southeast Asia support insurgencies in

Southeast Asia and so on and so forth and
I read thread of Chinese policy for

the seventy's is stepping back
step by step stepping back from

global capitalist and
anti-capitalist revolution.

That was that the strategic basis for
this became a very

real China US cooperation I think
that Iran has to make the same choice

if they continue to try to drive
the United States of the Persian Gulf and

sure that the security affairs of
the Persian Gulf countries lotto.

To the Persian Gulf which is a Rans
professed objective that we won't do this.

It won't be our approach much.

As.

I hope it is but I think that's
a decision that Iran still has to make.

Let's make this.

You know instead of quick comments we get
to next question that's when I tell you

back to this to strategy pieces that
I mentioned at the beginning is

from the operational perspective even a
country the size of the United States with

the resources we have can only do so much
so you have to learn to prioritize and

bureaucracies don't often do that well but
whether you agree with the strategy or

not I would argue in this case based on
the president's strategic direction for

what he considers the greatest risk to be
and what resources to apply to it that

the deal does directly tie
into that strategic end state.

We have a question over here.

Do you think this will be the stepping
stone needed for the United States to open

up the Iranian embassy and vice versa.

He was right.

I would love to see that happen but
I don't think it's going to be I think

there's going to need
to be more work done.

So.

So.

You know.

How has the deal shifted the power
dynamic between conservatives

in Iran most notably the I.R.G.C.
and then the civilian government and

moderates like President Rouhani and the
civilian people at large who in my view

don't really like the R.T.C.
and is kind of put up with them.

They touched on some of these things but
I don't know do you have anything else

to add to that in terms of.

No I don't think so.

You have to so I've been trapped.

To Iran recently so I don't know I
don't know what's going on and and

it's very difficult to predict what's
going to the outcome of the agreement

right we we say we debating now it's
a good agreement it's a bad agreement

it's all hypotheticals we won't know
whether this empowers Rouhani is

a relative moderate versus
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard or

the Qods force we won't know until this
thing plays out because it's going to

depend on decisions those policymakers
make in their own country and how they use

the tools that this agreement gives
them Larry do you have something there.

Well I think I just go it's more
of a wait and see policy of

what what happens really within the mester
politics of Iran and how it reacts and

frames discussions outside of it and
I think it's something I mean it is one

of the things that you could be aware of
is that it is a very vigorous discussion

you have their limitations of the types
of discussions that do take place when it

comes to selection of who runs for office
but when it comes actually the vigor of

discussion there is a fair amount
doesn't get covered as much here but.

And he said that things will change in
the shift and if you do pay or follow it.

Follow these issues you'll see them over
the next especially over the next few

months.

John did you have something that.

Revolutions do come to an end and
I think that.

Among the youth of rain especially.

For for a new path and for.

An opening for for greater.

Contact greater greater freedom
the problem is the institutions of state

power established by the revolutions
must protect themselves.

And opening.

Powerful subversive forces
not sure they can control and

again how this will come out
I don't pretend to know but

it's you know it's there's
a fundamental of the deep debates.

You know what the future of the country
I think one thing to there's

an interesting angle that may
be worth exploring is that.

In Iran this agreement also is being
subjected to approval by the equivalent

of the Iranian parliament which most
people have generally thought is more

conservative but the discussion that's
gone on there is that this is going to be

then a legal document suggesting that
it's going to be binding in some way and

this is something that you know we
don't generally pay attention to

the political sensibility is that
this is usually more of a satrap or

of political or
of the parliament is very conservative but

the dialogue about this and having legal
standing within Iranian society is one

that may be quite interesting to look at
even within the existing institutions

I think we have a question
here in the middle with Mike.

Going back to that note do you believe
that the increase in the structure and

the spending and perhaps
an increase in wealth of the people

that this interim agreement and other
international trade would bring to Iran

would push towards a more democratic and
less militaristic government

that's just.

Out on this issue that we have we don't
unfortunately have a real Iranian expert

here so I think that question gets into
some the nitty gritty but is there any.

I would suggest while they
are very distinct differences

one can look to what was the effect of
bilateral and Trilateral agreements with

the Soviet Union I mean we had a lot of
nonproliferation did that lead to was that

the peace that led to significant
governance change for the Soviet Union.

Not really.

They were important for stability but

you know it's because we're
focusing on it and because this is.

Significant in the context of
us a rainy and relations in

the last you know twenty five thirty years
I think we're really focusing on it.

And I'm a little concerned that people
might be putting too much expectations on

this single agreement.

You know one one can be hopeful but
let's also be realists.

I think there's somebody here do you
believe that given us experiences in

Iraq and Afghanistan and Syria and
Somalia and Libya that military

intervention in Iran was ever
even a realistic option.

Realistic from what sense in the sense
that the political leaders in

the United States might have chosen to do
it or it was like a war it was likely to

be successful either way.

We'll give it to the tip of the spear and
Lani want to.

Go I mean not to be flip about it but
military options always remain on

the table I mean the president has said
that repeatedly you know once even once

this deal was you know agreed upon so.

Realistic you know hindsight being twenty
twenty now we ask about Iraq before and

you may not consider that realistic but we
certainly have the necessary capabilities

to ensure that is
the president has stated that

Iran will not become a nuclear weapon
state so whether that's realistic and

whether or not it happens
there's no way of knowing but

if it gets to that point once again
the deal gives us the indications and

warnings and that increase latency time
that we have other options straight thing

going to that high intensity military
conflict that you know there are some

other preferred options before we go there
but we certainly have the capabilities.

Personally individual a I have no
desire to go you know spend time in or

in but you know we do we're told to and.

That option will remain
on the table here who.

I think Maggie's
clarification is important.

In the United States we have
this firmly grounded belief in

the efficacy of military power so
I think it was probably

a possibility I'm sure somebody war
gamed it somewhere they had a plan.

Whether it would be effective
I don't think so right so

you have to think in to effect of his in
two ways right materially he may have been

effective in the short term we have
developed incredibly sophisticated

capable penetrating ordinance
that would be able to take out.

Their installations that we are aware of.

But in the long term it would do
nothing but ensure the development

of a nuclear weapon in Iran what we often
forget the United States is that Iran and

that what the Iranians do not forget is
that Iran has been victimized by the West

repeatedly right that's in part with the
one nine hundred seventy nine revolution

was about that's what brought
the ayatollah is to power was

the abuse by the west towards Iran
replacement of most cetera so

an attack against Iran would
simply reinforce that narrative to

the point which no politician in Iran for
the forseeable future would be able to do

anything other than completely support for
a nuclear weapons program so

if we wanted the best thing we could
do to ensure a nuclear weapons outcome

in Iran is to bomb them because
eventually they will dig deep enough or

find someplace we cannot find and
build a nuclear weapon there.

Another thing to consider also is that
with the agreement it does provide some

of the transparency that we don't have
right now about what they're doing and

if they resist what they're not willing to
do which would then would enable to make

the US to make a stronger case for
ratcheting up the pressure so even

with the deal being incomplete or have
being sub optimal as somebody mentioned

it could actually still strengthen
the case in materially and certainly

diplomatically if you had to make
the decision to go to the next step so.

It's not an either or
issue necessarily And

I think that's one of the things
that some of the folks and

the strategic level of it making we have
the where is the next Mike right there.

State seems to be in the steel mainly for

political reasons whereas China is helping
out as one of you mentioned earlier

to protect its investment in Iran although
the argument could be made that we're

protecting our investment in Israel
the consensus seems to be the U.S.

is in it for political reasons you
forsee with say Saudi Arabia I

think somebody mentioned Saudi Arabia
is pursuing nuclear energy.

A reversal in the roles where the U.S.
has to step in because

China would feel threatened.

And China John China trying to China.

China.

Cannot mix in the Middle East.

By its desire for.

Exports or investments.

By the desire to maintain a positive.

Long term economic development regime
survival in order behind that.

But Will China step in.

To take place in the Middle East
a couple years ago I.

Spent a couple weeks
going to think tanks and

trying to ask you know
exactly that question.

Question Is China Rising.

In the Persian Gulf Middle East and
the phrase that we were told again and

again and again and
it's never been the same for.

Intellectuals and establishment
think tanks was was this China.

In the Middle East for
China China successful development.

Positif cooperate relationship with United
States partnership with the United States

because not because they like
the Americans because they realize that

Americans control access to global capital
global export markets global technology

global Irish cation you know China wants
all that stuff the Americans have a strong

say in this cycle of the way China looks
at the American policy in the Middle East

is we're a bunch of drunken imperialist
Runamuck I don't say that it's phrase much

more politely but that's because look at
the Chinese bottom line is Americans want

to dominate the Middle East where they
control the control of the Middle East so

they can turn the spigot off to Japan
India China Taiwan whoever consumes that

so America what the American policy about
is basically intro the Persian Gulf as

a stepping stone for
global hegemony I think that's nonsense.

I think.

That's the Chinese view but if that's the
way if that is in fact the situation then

I say to seeking global Germany smasher on
this and that guy in the Middle East for

trying to come along insert itself in
that would be an excellent way to spoil

the positive macro climate that
China has created for its long

term development drive a positive climate
predicated upon us Chinese cooperation or

super friendship.

You know I just I think I guess I
would see the assumptions probably in

the question a little bit differently
rather than saying is they agreement being

driven politically I would
see it driven by what the.

Commander in Chief to find
the sheikh interest in seeing in our

in our in terms of our strategic interests
but framed at the level of the truck

as a political ploy to do X. or Y.
or Z. or something like that and

maybe the you know the language is changes
that way and I think I see that the same

thing as well when it becomes a question
of if part of the what you had said about.

The interest are moving
through the agreement was.

To I guess might be reading too much into
it stave off a potential Israeli action or

a military strike on there which has been
one of the arguments I'm not sure and

it wasn't us relief and
I wouldn't say that this was also a a V.

You know this agreement was done for
or against in that way this is a again

seen in terms of what the United States
she took interest in the region

people have made the argument that
saying saying if we don't go through

the United States we don't go through
with this the Israelis will do X. Y.

but you can also make the argument
this process started a long time ago

well before some of the the ramping
up of the rhetoric that occurred and

even under the previous administration of
trying to figure out what are we going to

do about the Iranian proliferation problem
OK Listen we've got about ten minutes so

what why don't we just ask.

Questions.

That.

If there was a major geopolitical change

in the Middle East how could that
severely affect the efficacy of

the Steel's.

So how exactly is this deal
constitutional because really whether or

not we call it a deal or a treaty
it is in all of for all intents and

purposes a treaty and essentially we've
taken it to the point where instead of

having the Senate have two thirds approval
to prove the deal instead they had to vote

to even have a say in the deal at all so
what kind of precedent does that set for

the future and how could it not just
be undone on day one of the new

presidency.

My question is obviously now we have
all these inspections and such but.

I'm actually a nuclear engineer so
my curiosity is what detection methods do

we have any in place with Iran to
know what their capabilities were and

I guess similarly What do
we have a North Korea.

QUESTION First of all thank you all it's
nice to hear this discuss and call manner.

Given the obvious shortcomings of

from a perfect inspection
regime like Dr Talmage and.

Dr Reid said interesting about rewarding
nonproliferation to what degree do

you guys think professors think
this is trying to in place or

engender a norm of nonproliferation
while not robbing the Iranians of

the threat of potency while actually
removing the actual danger of.

Being close to a breakout.

But where is the money.

To.

Get one more of them or.

Just what sort of economic disruptions or
repercussions could we expect

to see both in the regional economic
markets of the Middle East and

internationally with this deal in
place also relating specifically to

the oil market that has been very
volatile in the last year or so.

OK great so why don't we go.

Back this is the future Larry yeah I want
you to know that that's a tough one so

I mean I forgot my crystal
ball of you know what might be

considered geo political change and
what they might be but I think just

thinking around what might and
I want to say what are realistic because

very often we can run the system
given in my classes these games and

the outcomes that occur in some of these
past games are things that we wouldn't

think from the beginning think
are realistic but they've not.

They've happened two years later but
I guess with that I was some of the things

they think about might be something
like a collapse of the Syrian regime and

what you know one or two possibilities
of what might that look like and

thinking about how might that affect
Iranian security and assuming all things

are equal as in you know there are so many
assumptions here the United States and

Iran do or don't still trust each other
right there's so many of variables there

on the might I think it's it's a type of
agreement though to kind of summarize and

let other other people sail it more where
it's not necessarily guaranteed it's not

ironclad that everyone's on board people
there's a lot of distrust you know that

involved I think it's become
pretty clear on both sides

what the critics of course said because
there's so much distrust that means

that there is you know we're not
going to go through with it but

you know those proponents say well it's
as we know we've heard from many people

on the panel this is the alternative
is you know is potentially worse and

even a measure of less trust that that's
going on but it's a good question to think

about and also play around with you know
taking my class or something like that.

Seamus just what we want you to touch on
the domestic political dimension to this

in terms of possibly a little bit on
the norms issues OK so you is this

is this constitutional absolutely States
the president of the United States makes

arrangements with other countries all the
time that do not rise treaties are very

clear his very clear legal definition
has very clear legal obligations.

The United States Senate does not get a
say on most of what is conduct in terms of

foreign policy by the United States so
this that the the Obama

administration I think is somebody here
pointed out wanted to get Congress

involved to generate legitimacy for
this for exactly the reason that you.

Ask so that the present next president
can't just go and change it but.

The next president could go and

change it the idea is that by having this
arrangement it locks the United States in.

Because it's not just a U.S.
Iran agreement it is an agreement between

the permanent five members of the Security
Council the European Union and Germany

with Iran and the United States then faces
not only tremendous pressure to hold

the line but in the event that the United
States defects our sanctions are not

going to be successful in forcing Iran to
change their behavior by themselves so

the only way that the United States
can have an effect on Iran if a future

president wants to change this arrangement
is to get the other parties on board.

And terms of reinforcing norm the nonet
norm of nonproliferation I think it does

is.

In short all that Maggie have
a greater go at this but

I think it does because it demonstrates.

As long as Iran doesn't build a nuclear
weapon as long as it keeps Iran within

the nuclear nonproliferation regime that
it reinforces that norm that you're not

you if you sign your sign and you stay in.

I'll actually sort of
address both of those too.

Much more sure concisely
the constitutional issue using among.

Only in the best it's way.

In some ways the Senate
wants it to not be a treaty

because if the Senate if it was a treaty
than the Senate a lot more people would

have to take a stand on a stand that
would particularly have ramifications so

there are on both sides of the aisle

there's a lot of folks who would never
acknowledge especially on C.N.N.

M S N B C or Fox News that they like
this but there are a lot of folks who

are quite happy happy with it beyond
a more specific answer that Jarrett

with respect to the norms of
nonproliferation I would say I would use

the word that it it reinforces it or
it sort of in some ways resets it and

backs what I started it with you know
that this debate that's going on.

In the United States over the deal.

It points to a broader debate about
the approach that the United States is

going to take to international issues and
international challenges you know balance

between military options versus
looking to diplomacy and

other avenues to address
international challenges and

it is a this is not the first nor
is this the only place receiving this

two thousand and seven former Secretary of
Defense Gates and his Landon Lecture he

was the secretary of defense advocated for
greater funding for the State Department

and that was in the context of
counterinsurgency in the context of being

able to do reconstruction
in post conflict areas so

there is this sort of balancing that
in the United States we're looking

at right now so
it seems far as nonproliferation V.

approach it reinforces
the norm of diplomacy

as at least the first step because
concurs that they will fly that

all options remain on the table
John Good point I would suggest

the word I would suggest someone of the
most important geo political changes that

could result of this is increasing
cooperation between the United States and

on matters of common interest or
been talks between the United States and

Iran so my clue is are on Afghanistan
we share interest there in preventing

a return to power the Taliban there been
talks headed by Ryan Crocker on Iraq

we have common interests in stabilizing
and preventing a sectarian civil war

we have common interests and ISIS if
the United States and Iran I think that

the that this is part of the offer
that's on the table for around for

a broader more cooperative partnership
if the United States and around

the can can establish this this would be
a true view a political revolution as.

And yet again as the one hundred
seventy two Revolution reproach

Montreal United States and right now and

China are known to have
anything on Section eight.

A follower of Professor Rubens lead and
say there's a safeguards course in

the spring well or we'll talk about
that but I mean you know it's not like

I can stand outside a building we could
because you Raney I'm mentally Tony I've

done a survey have highly penetrating
radiations plutonium has some neutrons so

if you ever see neutrons floating around
you say hey there's something funny here

it's not natural for that to occur but if
I'm outside the building what you'll see

is are some discussion about environmental
sampling so if I'm outside the building

of I take a you know some soil sample
I might be able to see something but

I have to count that with special
equipment in a laboratory and

so one of the downsides
of this thing is if this

agreement secret the so-called secret
agreement between the I.A.E.A. and

Iran are true they don't allow
the Iranians to take the samples.

And it's not really clear how they're
going to keep the chain of custody they

talk about videotaping it and I don't know
whether all of that is true or not but

that's what you read in the media so so
so it's a challenge to detect if you're

inside the building much easier right
standing right next to the pipe it's

flowing through much easier but from the
outside you know and and from a industrial

viewpoint you may not want people
looking at your proprietary methods for

doing something a little differently
than is done in other place and

that's in the world so I mean there are
there are technical issues that you say

yeah are legitimate but it but the
detection is a challenge if they detonate

a weapon it's easier probably to
pick that out through multiple.

Things like you know shock waves and.

Ultimately released radio
isotopes in the atmosphere and

things like that so
I'll talk to you more if you want to yes.

Let me just make two.

Points in closing one there was a question
about international energy implications

of the deal and as Rueben in her tell have
noted there is a course on the geopolitics

of energy that I would strongly urge you
to take next semester but suffice to say

in looking at that issue there's been
a lot of attention made to well this

is going to mediately free up Iranian
energy exports in particular oil and

natural gas and
those are two very different systems and

they will side there's some projections
that they have seven hundred thousand

barrels a day that they can deliver that
could affect the price between ten and

thirty percent but that is really
dependent upon what others do as well and

specifically what Saudi Arabia Rabia does
and what what goes on with demand in China

and also the innovation
in the resilience of U.S.

producers because as those prices drop
as begin to hurt Iran as well and

the ability to realize that hundred fifty
billion dollars windfall may be a lot

smaller and gas the infrastructure
is in disarray and so

there's a lot of investment that needs
to go into that infrastructure it

before it can go on line in the region and
the same time we're having discoveries in

the eastern Med you've probably been
reading about what the Italian firms have

discovered off of Egypt and what Israel's
been doing so this is to be Stay tuned and

it's a very complicated set of
issues related to pricing and

some of the geopolitics associated with
these these investment projects but

again this is of course the you can learn
all about that next semester and finally

let me close by noting again how heartened
I am by how seriously everybody here

has taken this issue is as I mention
President Obama has stated explicitly

that this is arguably the most
significant foreign policy issue

that we've faced since the invasion
of Iraq in the early two thousand and

it's imperative that we as citizens and
especially as future leaders here take

our obligations seriously and really think
systematically about issues don't take a.

Wisdom on its face don't rush to war or
make rash decisions but but

think systematically about these things
and I hope today with my colleagues and

some of the comments that you guys
are shared with each other that we've

begun to scratch the surface and
do more than scratching the surface so

that you have a better sense
of what these issues are and

how to begin to think about them so
with that let me thank everybody for

coming here tonight and especially my
colleagues for sharing their thoughts.