Thank you all for coming today.

To give the president.

Speak about Syria the before
ever present and lesser pain.

I like to just say that today's event is
hosted by system which is the center for

international strategy technology and
society which is an intense research

policy research arm and
it's also sponsored by generous support

from the Gray Davis in down and
on Minutes and down it was craeated

to honor General Davis who was Georgia
Tech Medal of Honor and an American hero

in the Korean War really affords the
center opportunity to bring to the campus.

Some of the leading people
in the world of academia.

And policy to really explore
contemporary issues related to security

challenges that are confronting the U.S.
today and the global community.

And I also would like to thank Faria for
all of her logistical support and

helping bring.

Professor Pape to town so I am very
pleased to predict introduced Fessor

overpaid who was actually my academic
advisor at University of Chicago who

I had the great privilege to work with so
I feel very honored that he is here today.

Professor Pape is a professor of political
science at University of Chicago.

And he specializes in international
security Ferrers terrorism.

Air power lots of other things and
now even more more projects.

His publications include the book's
time to Win The Strategic Logic of

Suicide Terrorism bombing to land
air power and corps in a war and

cutting the fuse the explosion of Global
Suicide Terrorism and how to stop it.

He's done work on economic sanctions
international moral action

humanitarian intervention and air power.

He's also the director of the Chicago
Project on security and terrorism which is

doing really cutting edge research on
Suicide Terrorism and just terrorism.

More generally now.

And his commentary on
international security is

in the New York Times The Washington
Post The New Republic The Boston Globe.

Sally sciences.

So we're very lucky to have you here.

Thank you.

Yeah thanks and I thank everybody.

It's a great pleasure to be here.

I haven't been to Georgia Tech before
really nice to see the campus it's nice

to see you folks.

It's nice to reduce some
old acquaintances and

I especially want to say how
wonderful it is for me to come and.

See Jenna in her new environment when
Jenna was at the University of Chicago.

She was a central part of
our intellectual community

in our department and
those of you who have gotten to know.

Jenna you can see some of
the reasons why she's brilliant.

She's really productive and
she really takes community building

seriously a lot of people do well
in one of those dimensions it's

really great when you have somebody who
does well in all of those dimensions and

just from the dinner last night and
everything I can see here.

I can see that she's just right
in a wonderful environment

to continue all that here.

So it's a really terrific
Janet really wonderful.

Today I want to talk about humanitarian
intervention which is the use

of armed force by one state in
the sovereign territory of another

to prevent the target government
from harming its citizens.

This issue with Syria is obviously
an important issue to talk about today but

I just want to remind you that
the subject of humanitarian intervention.

Has been one that's been around for
many decades.

Just in fact in the last
four decades since one

nine hundred ninety the United States
has led international coalition for

four successful humanitarian
interventions in the early ninety's to

help the Kurds in northern Iraq in the mid
ninety's to help the Muslims in Bosnia.

In the late ninety's to help another
group of Muslims that it's of And

in two thousand and eleven to help yet

another group of Muslims this
time near Benghazi in Libya.

In all four of those
cases the United States.

Leder national coalition that
successfully achieved the main

goal of a humanitarian intervention
that is saving lives and

in each of those cases tens of
thousands of lives were saved

by that humanitarian by those
humanitarian interventions.

Now the same time in
the last twenty years.

There are some very famous cases of
times we have not intervened Rwanda.

Therefore and other cases which
rings us to the question what

humanitarian crises do and
do not merit intervention.

That's really the question
I want to talk about today.

Now for
many years there has been a standard

answer to that question by purpose and
that their intervention.

Whether we talk about the genocide
standard embodied in the one nine hundred.

Pension or the relatively new
responsibility to protect doctrine.

Those are specific manifestations
of the basic arguments

that when we observe mass
atrocities the existence

of mass atrocities alone
triggers a duty a moral

duty on our part to intervene in order
to prevent those mass atrocities.

The standard argument typically begins
by quoting Hans a manual Conti's one

of the famous moral philosophers who has a
phrase in his work describing individuals

as having equal moral worth because
they are all members of the community of

mankind and therefore we should not
discriminate in the type of individua.

Jewels whether there are citizens or
citizens of other countries that we would

save so incensed saving
others is saving ourselves.

That's a standard way to begin
the argument on humanitarian intervention.

I'm going to talk about
that argument today

in a little bit of in a little bit
of depth in the context of Syria.

But what I'm mainly going to do
is prevent present an alternative

to that argument that alternative
I'm going to call the pragmatic

standard of humanitarian intervention
it except the first point

that mass atrocities trigger
duties moral duties but

not uncommon dish unholy
not unconditionally.

It's going to add a couple of additional
features which I think are very important

not just for political purposes although
they are for that as well but for moral

purposes this is an alternative moral
standard of humanitarian intervention and

then what I'm going to do is apply it
to Libya and then apply it to Syria.

So we can see how this would allow us
to discriminate and develop policies

in real world cases so
that we can actually save lives.

That's the real objective.

So what I want to do to begin.

Is I just want to call attention to
something you're probably already familiar

with which is standard dichotomy in
the debate on humanitarian intervention

which pits liberal intervenors
opposed to realist opponents.

If you open any page of Michael Walters
just an unjust wars especially the first

five pages or
if you open any of Gary Bass's work.

He's a professor at Princeton who's done a
lot of work in humanitarian intervention.

You will see a straightforward
common dichotomy which is the debate

on humanitarian intervention for the last
two hundred years actually is described.

There's a debate between liberals who
think in terms of international norms and

realists who think in terms
of the national interest and

according to this crowd.

If we could just get
rid of those realists.

If we could just overcome those real
US they we don't have to quite like

eliminate them but
maybe we could overwhelm them politically.

Then we'd have a lot more international
intervention for humanitarian purposes.

Well I'm going to tell you that
realists are not the problem

there is a problem there
are other issues but

there are moral issues at stake which
are not commonly engaged by the current.

Theory approach to humanitarian
intervention by the proponents.

But before we actually get to that.

Let me just develop this a little bit
more of the the standard approach

in the context of Syria because
in the context of Syria.

We actually have not just
general liberals who would

support humanitarian intervention but we
have theorists of human intervention who

are actually in the Obama
administration running Syria policy and

basically they're like
an academic who's just kind

of fulfilling their theory there and
it's actually kind of funny.

Many many academics from University
of Chicago are sometimes criticized

as being ivory tower academics who just
want to come to Washington to impose their

theories Well I do observe that in this
case but they're not coming from Chicago.

Samantha Power is a brilliant woman.

She's a long term advisor
to President Obama way

back before he was president started when
he was in the Senate and she's written

this really phenomenal book very important
book on humanitarian intervention called

A Problem from Hell and
Susan Rice is also in the administration.

She has also been a long time.

Proponent of humanitarian intervention and
was one of the keys.

Sources for Samantha Power in her
book A Problem from Hell on Rwanda.

Because Susan Rice was the assistant
secretary of state for the current

administration for Africa for Rwanda
mystically during the Rwanda crisis.

And so these are two folks who have
long thought very you know a lot about

humanitarian intervention and essentially
have accepted the standard liberal

approach to humanitarian intervention and
this is an approach

which let me just kind of map it out for
you in a logic flow so you can follow it.

And by the way.
Gary Bass would agree with this.

This is really quite a common approach and
has been for

about two hundred years that when
there is a mass atrocity events.

The key issue is to bring media coverage
to that mass atrocity events and

that media coverage is then going
to produce a shock to the public

conscience because now publics are going
to understand the gravity of the evil

in the awful things that are happening
to human beings and then once we have

the mass atrocity with the media covering
it in depth and them and the public shock.

Now we can bring public pressure
against those political elites.

The realist political elites so

overcome those realist stops the goals so

humanitarian intervention and that's
how we get humanitarian intervention.

This is all the way through
Samantha Powers book

this basic logic and
if you follow the way.

She has approached the problem
in Syria and in other issues.

She's following this.

This is something that is not just a
theory this is something that's being put

into practice.

Well if this were right.

Why don't we just sort of apply
this logic a little bit to Syria.

And see how well it's working out.

Well you might know that there was a gas
attack in Syria on August twenty first.

And yes on August twenty
first twenty second.

There were some questions about
exactly what happened but

increasingly in the weeks after that
August twenty first attack attack.

There was full luminous media
coverage on this events.

I was actually in China last
night I was telling folks I'm

running a China conference in November.

I was in China.

On August twenty first
when this event happened.

And yes I'm being emailed
by people in the media but

when I came back on the plane on Monday.

What was it the twenty fourth or
something out of

August the moment I landed because
of all the work I've done here.

I was like comedian we inundated with
the media are we going to bomb Syria all

those issues and so forth which I know
a fair bit about because of my my work and

then within a couple of days I was flown
to New York for four days on Al-Jazeera to

be on Al-Jazeera America around the clock
because we have just suddenly well

with all that news media coverage
was about folks was bringing

fantastic attention to the atrocities
that were happening in Syria.

And in case you're wondering
whether you know we have the hard

evidence Well actually we don't just
have media coverage but the U.N.

report which has come out if you go to
the appendices of the U.N. report and

that's what I'm going to show you the
actual hard evidence I don't mean claims

of the hard evidence the hard habitants
is really depicted in that report.

So this is these are this is evidence
of the people dilation of the victims

who died this is a standard characteristic
of Saron and this is in the U.N.

report this are the toxicology reports
of the actual bodies from the autopsies.

So this isn't just simply
again claims of use of sarin.

I mean this is what it means to actually
verify that Sarah was being used and

then on top of that you probably
noticed that after the U.N.

report Vladimir Putin
suddenly stopped complaining.

Well there's a good reason why he suddenly
stopped complaining go to the appendix

of the U.N. report and you're going to
find some really interesting gathered and

not only that Assad's shells that
the chemical weapons were fired by Assad

shells the Russian on the shells

so suddenly maybe Mr Putin doesn't
really want us looking too hard or

where those shells came from.

If so what I paid anyway if you go and
look you'll see that

as close to beyond a reasonable
doubt as we could ever have.

We know serin gas was used.

We know as again as beyond
a reasonable doubt as we could have

that it was used by Assad's government and

Nonetheless we're not
using force to intervene.

Think about that for a moment.

What's wrong here.

We've just followed those steps so
Samantha Powers theory but

we're not intervening in fact
she's proposing we intervene.

She got the president to talk about
intervening and we're not intervening.

OK.

Let's just kind of expand
this a little bit more

the evidence has been indisputable.

Let me just be clear.

But we haven't acted.

This is a problem from hell that fits
her model of the problem from hell.

This is Samantha Power herself
involved in running the policy

as close as could be and it's not working.

I tell you folks.

The problem here is not
an execution of strategy.

I think the problem is more
fundamental with the approach and

let me just broaden this out a little bit.

The fundamental issue
with this approach is.

It assumes that in a democracy.

It's public opinion that's going to drive
humanitarian intervention public opinion.

And that would mean if that were true
there wishes see a strong relationship

between public opinion for
intervention and actual intervention.

Right.

Let's look at those relationships.

Now we don't have a huge gender go for
we don't have three hundred cases so

we can't do.

Jenna's like marvelous at large and

studies we can't do
the Jenna study on this.

Exactly.

But we can look very closely
at the handful of cases that

we do have both ways.

And what I've done is I've a raised them
for you in the order of public support for

intervention and what you're going to
see is there is no relationship between

public support for intervention and
our actual decision to intervene.

And in the case of Rwanda
one of the high points.

Here for public intervention.

The elites in the Clinton
ministration did not intervene.

They just simply did not
intervene in the case of Libya.

There never was strong public support for
the intervention and

that thirty nine percent folks after
Obama decided intervene normally

you get a rally around the flag effect
which is when the president decides to go.

We're all patriotic and we say yes
Mr President we're going to support you.

Not in Libya.

Not in Libya and having talked to
folks in the West Wing about this and

they are really bummed out about it and
why don't we.

They talk about the great
success of Libya and

the humanitarian intervention
because it's a political loser with

the public not just Republicans one of the
things that you might find really ironic

is go look at the old tapes of
John Stewart on The Daily Show and

how Jon Stewart thought about
the Libya intervention.

You would have thought that he
was coming from the Tea Party.

OK completely opposed to
the humanitarian intervention and

you know heaven forbid we save ten
thousand fifty thousand lives in Benghazi.

OK but that's just to show you that
public support here is not the problem.

Yes or no.

For me.

I'm sorry it's August.

I'm sorry I just I'm sorry I just know
that's supposed to be that's August.

That's that's my mistake and
just typing it up last night or

the night before actually so
you know I take it back.

Now it's not it's not April
it's August and it's actually

if I remember it it's August twenty
eighth just to be really Perseid So

it's like a full week after the.

The events and when it's clear that Obama

is going to everybody thought before
Obama pulled back we were going to bomb.

You see what I mean so
that rally around the flag effect

should have been occurring at that point
sir but thank you for catching the type.

But the bottom line here is
that there's something missing

from the Syria debate and
that's what I want to present and

I want to present an alternative way
to think about the conditions for

humanitarian intervention and then I want
to apply them to cases where we succeed in

cases where we have it and I want to talk
about what I call the pragmatic standard

of humanitarian intervention the pragmatic
standard of humanitarian intervention

has three pillars the first
pillar is mass homicide.

So would agree.

What the standard.

Liberal theory of humanitarian
intervention that mass homicides

are the crucial thing that we are trying
to prevent in the stopping to save lives.

That's absolutely true and it also agrees
with their their reading of cons the.

We should begin with the principle
that we are all individuals

individuals of equal worth in
a community of all mankind.

But where it departs is it actually
goes on to read the rest of cons.

So yours.

The usual theories of humanitarian
intervention like to quote cons and

just kind of strip out
a single sentence from it.

Well actually as general
as I began my career

many years ago as a graduate
student in political theory.

Not actually in I.R.
and at the University of Chicago.

I get to teach one of my
four courses every year in

our great Common Core where I get to
keep teach cons I get to teach to teach.

So I basically get to teach the thing
I loved in the first place which was

political theory and what's really
stunning is to kind of read cut cut

has lots of material
about saving others or

saving strangers this is a problem.

He thought a lot about but
he did not think it was an unconditional

duty meaning that you should execute
that duty under all circumstances

at all times that in his lexicon
would be called a perfect duty.

What you must always do and
never violate Khant also for

those of you who know Qantas famous for
having imperfect duties which are duties

you should fulfill under some
conditions but not all the time saving

others is a version falls in
the category of an imperfect duty.

That is for cons he really thought quite
hard about the conditions under which you

would save others and let me just give
you more of a real world individual

example to and then will be a little
clearer with the actual pillars.

So let's say that I'm on
the street right in front of a.

Georgia Tech hotel and conference center
where Janet has just picked me up and

there's a busy street right there.

And there's a woman who's pushing
a baby carried across the street and

she loses control of it in
the baby carriage is going out and

there are cars coming at fifty
miles an hour and that baby.

If it is definitely going to
die unless some intervention

happens in the only possible intervention
is for me to rush out into the street and

push the baby away but
that car is coming at fifty miles an hour.

So it's strangely likely I'm going to
die as a result of that intervention.

So should I intervene to save the baby.

OK.

The way conforte answer that
question is it depends on

the prior promises I have
already made in my life.

This is an emergency one that
has come out of the blue

could not have been in Space X. pecked it.

But here I am an adult
I have three children.

I've made promises to the welfare
of my three children that

I'm going to ensure their welfare
over the course of their whole lives.

So the problem for
cons in the way he thinks about this is

that new event that's
the emergency events.

You might under some circumstances go and
say that baby even if it means you die.

But not if it means you violate a promise
to save someone else's life that

is to protect other people because
promises for that very important for cons.

Those are perfect duties.

We are not in a world in concert world
where we can just willy nilly on our

own accord violate those past promises
because in his view the violation

of past promises breaks down all
the social trust in society and

basically does massive harm to
that community of all mankind.

So those past promises really mad.

Quite tremendously.

And so what that would mean is in this
is in his lexicon that if the cost

to the individual of executing
the duty to save others are relatively

low then you must do it
then you must do it and

if they're relatively high then it really
does depend on what the you've made

other obligations to other people and
it's not good enough that you would say

Yeah my kids they probably think fondly
of their dad for having died that way.

It's not good enough folks
because that's just me.

Deciding I get to break my
promise whenever I want to.

You know and if I want to be have you
know the nobility of dying that way.

That's a benefit to me.

Right.

That Conway look at that and
say No that's just being selfish.

The real issue here again
is there was a promise.

And what are you going to do
about those prior promises and

we as adults often have serious promises.

So that's import So

anyway how does that translate into
thinking about humanitarian intervention.

That means in addition to the pillar of
an ongoing existing mass homicide campaign

that we're sure about we should also
have low cost intervention plans.

Well cost intervention plans and
it's because we actually

have an obligation our military
forces our political leaders this is

true in the United States to
take an oath in office to defend

the security of the United States
they are promising to do that.

That is a moral promise that is something
that caught would call a promise.

And yes that's why they're being
elected so it's a two way street.

The promise is also being
accepted on the other side and so

this is not something that's just so
easy to violate cording to consonant

ethics where we're just simply going
to decide we're going to throw away

thirty thousand military lives
to go say folks in Syria.

No that's not that's not the trade.

The real issue is violating
the promise to the American public.

That's the big deal.

Yes we're getting there.

We'll get there.

So now we're getting to that we're
talking about the moral principles first.

OK of intervention just in general and

we'll get right to that point but
there's a third issue.

The third issue is it may well be the case
there's an ongoing mass atrocity.

It may well be the case we have a short
term intervention plan to stop it

in a snapshot.

But what about the consequence for the
public the people we're saving over time.

Do we have an enduring security plan so

that our intervention in the short term
does not lead to an ungovernable chaos in

the long term that kills many more
people than the mass atrocity

campaign in the first place if we
intervene in the short term and we do save

a few Ives' if we lose many more down
the road because of our intervention.

We're not morally ahead
we're morally behind.

So I put forward there are really three
pillars of humanitarian intervention.

Number one the existence of
a mass homicide campaign.

Number two the existence of
a well a viable low cost military

intervention plan and number three
a viable plan for a long term security.

Notice how those other two points
by the way the existence of

a mass homicide campaign ordinary people
or journalists they can pick that up.

They don't need to work with folks who are
quote knowledgeable about military affairs

to in three you have to
actually work with other folks.

So one of the big things I'm calling for
here is a true

working relationship between
different parts of Washington for

humanitarian intervention which by the way
does happen in the those four cases.

Where we've actually seen it and
let me talk about that and

let me apply this to Libya
because Libya is a clear case of

the pragmatic standard at work where
all three of the pillars were met.

And I would say by the way in all the four
cases I talked about the Kurds in northern

Iraq the Bosnian Muslims the Muslims
in Bosnia the Muslims in Kossovo

these three pillars
were met there as well.

But let me talk about Libya.

This map shows the Libyan revolution or

uprising around February twenty eighth
about ten days after the Libyan uprising.

Well Larry knows but not a lot of
people know much about Libya and

one of the key things
you might not know is

you might know that Libya is
about twice the size of Texas.

You might know it has about six and a half
million people you might not know that

most of Libya is just
a gigantic sea of same hand.

People who don't live all the way through
with in fact it's impossible because

it hazardous so blistering way hot
throughout most of Libya nearly eighty

five percent of all the population of
Libya lives in about a dozen cities just

on the Mediterranean coast and have for
a whole long period of time that is

where the people of Libya live and
what you see here on this map and

I don't know if the colors are coming
through as well but the red

are the are the cities that have broken
away on mass from the Khadafi regime.

What you see is that within ten days
seventy five percent of the population of

Libya broke away from Khadafi not
just a few seventy five percent.

That's a massive area of control.

But the Libyan rebels we could call
it in technical terms a sanctuary.

This is a man.

Area of control by the Libyan rebels
now you could look at this map.

And by the way I would I would
suggest there were some folks and

I do think Samantha Power and

some were some of those who would look at
a map like this and did and say you know

just a little more push we could
actually get regime change in Tripoli.

And if you go back and

look at the New York Times right
around February twenty eighth.

You're going to see there is a debate in
Washington the Obama administration about

whether we should do.

We're going to change in Tripoli.

You'll see there
are proponents of that and

then you will see that
there was an opponent.

Bob Gates Secretary of Defense who said
if we do regime change in Tripoli.

We're going to end up with an occupation
an occupation in fact if you know my work

from suicide terrorism what defines an
occupation is controlling the government

not the number of troops on the ground an
occupation it's likely to produce a lot of

terrorism and that would be
anti-American terrorism and so

we should not do regime change in Tripoli.

Well there was an alternative approach
the alternative approach was to recognize

that even though this was the state
of affairs on February twenty eighth.

It was really quite likely that kid
off the the state had disintegrated.

But it was quite likely that Khadafi would
have enough force remaining that he would

be able to start taking towns and so
the key issue was going to be even

though it wasn't even under threat
on February twenty eighth Benghazi.

The key issue was not Tripoli.

It was going to be saving Benghazi and

that if we should reorient our policy
not for regime change in Tripoli but

humanitarian intervention in Benghazi.

And moreover the way to deal with
Gates was not to say he was wrong.

He's some evil realist and
he's wrong is to say he's right for

the goal of regime change in Tripoli but

wrong if we explicitly read JACT
regime change in Tripoli and.

Support humanitarian intervention in
Benghazi and moreover this was a mission

that we had of clearly viable low
cost intervention plan to execute.

Because given that Libya
is a gigantic sea of sand.

There is only this area to protect and

it's only the road along the Mediterranean
that you need to control and if you go

back and look at your military operations
in World War two you'll see that

was true in Cold War too as well there's
been one one real road to really protect.

So if what that meant was that if
Gadhafi was going to take his eight

to ten thousand remaining loyal forces in
about four to five hundred vehicles and

going to tax city after city after
city in order to regain them.

He was going to have to do it in one and
only one way.

There were not fifteen
different strategies.

There was one strategy that strategy was

to have the armor columns go
city to city to city to city.

And so this was going to
be extremely predictable.

This was also going to be a mission that
American offshore airpower both Navy and

Air could handle and
handle extremely well.

Because hitting clusters
of armor in open road and

basically we got them right there
cluster of armor in open road in

desert environment that are very
far away from there not colocated

with urban areas is the perfect mission
for today's persuasion guided air force.

We have the sensors to do this we have
the air power to do this and we did this

extremely well which is why we could
basically run a ten day air campaign and

then quote lead from behind because our
humanitarian intervention really succeeded

in saving Benghazi and
then after that that left the decision.

Of what to do next.

Not up to the United States.

Not even up to the Europeans it left
the decision of what to do next up to

the rebels in Libya the rebels
in Libya from that point on

they were in control of should
they cut a deal with Gadhafi

should they decide to topple
Gadhafi on their own.

They're the ones that made that decision
and truth be told a big reason why

the Republicans especially the Republicans
were not interested in supporting this

is because we didn't pick
the replacement to Khadafi the rebels.

And there's a lot of complaining
about that because people don't like

the character the the nature of the rebels
that have replaced Khadafi However I

just simply tell you that since
this basically the conflict

ended has been almost no violence
in Libya almost no violence.

OK yeah there was some
anti-American violence.

It's I really do think it's too bad
that the Libyan ambassador was killed.

I don't mean to minimize that.

Altogether.

But the fact is you have
not had a bloodbath of one

hundred thousand people die.

You just haven't had that this has been
an extremely successful intervention and

it's been one that fits the dictates
of the three pillars I just laid out.

So let's now look at Syria.

Syria is very different.

Very different.

First the main problem with Syria.

Is not that we don't have some plans
that would be low cost to intervene.

The question is do we have plans that
would actually intervene in a way that

would produce security for
the people who are dying.

As of now about one hundred
thousand people have died in Syria.

And what I want to do is talk
about some of the differences and

explain why we're having such a hard time
coming up with a viable intervention plan.

Both in the short term and
for enduring security.

First what I want to do is show you
the map of rebel activity in Syria.

You could pick.

Almost any map in the last year and

you would pick you would
see something very similar

the picture has hardly changed except
by a half a kilometer here or there.

Basically what you have is no.

Large area of rebel control.

Unlike Libya where seventy five percent
of the population centers broke away.

Here you have bits and pieces of parts
of the population centers breaking away.

You don't have homo genius areas
of a sanctuary of rebel control.

You have divided control in area
after area after area after area.

This is an extremely difficult problem

an extremely difficult problem right from
the get go but why is that there's been so

much fragmented control that's
sort of the real underlying issue.

There's really two
structural problems in Syria

that are constraining us
that we have to deal with.

Number one is as this gentleman
pointed out the fragmented nature of

the Syrian opposition
the Syrian opposition is.

An umbrella term that we use for
about three dozen opposition groups and

those opposition groups
are very different entities.

They're not only led by
different leaders but

some are Kurdish some are Sunni some are.

Some are Islamic Some
are secular you have a whole

variety of different
types of rebel groups.

One of the rebel groups Al nurse or a
which is which has gone from being a teeny

tiny ones who increasingly a medium
sized one is effectively the group

that was funneling serious suicide
bombers into Iraq during our occupation

of Iraq to kill Americans in Iraq and
now has the side of that they're going.

Turn their guns on the Assad regime and
by the way if we decided to intervene

with boots on the ground they would
love nothing better than going back to

the only admission of killing Americans
here because that's just part and

parcel of what they were you know sort
of organized to do in the first place so

we have a collection of rebels that are
just barely organized in holding together

against the common enemy of Assad that
would actually be even more likely

to unify against an common enemy against
the United States as an intervening power.

This is an extremely serious problem
which is fantastically limiting

our ability to intervene.

But that's only structural problem
number one the fragmented nature

of the coalition.

There is a second structural
problem which is even worse

which is the true underlying
structural problem.

This is a demographic map of Syria.

You probably have never seen
this particular map of Syria.

It's not classified.

It's just the type of map that doesn't
typically show up in the newspapers

in the.

Or on the media.

Remember I told you that
I went to Al-Jazeera for

those four days right after I got off
the airplane was there for four days.

And so there's a lot of time to talk
to the journalists in the newsroom and

everything and as they're interviewing
us here you know there's a lot and

I just told the executive producer I said.

You know do you want to see a map that
explains why we can't solve this problem

and he kind of chokingly said sure
because he'd seen tons of maps.

So I showed him this map and

then when I explain to him what
I'm about to explain to you.

He actually let me produce my own segment
on Al-Jazeera with one call one and

I did this ourselves.

He assigned us a little team of
people to kind of write a script and

then to do the map design for this and
then we actually did the thing and it was

it was we've produced our little segment
and in one said he had he had never seen.

Social science on T.V. So we started
calling it S. US T.V. It was in it's this

type of a map that's really helpful in
explaining the true underlying problem and

let me just kind of walk you through what
you're seeing in the different colors.

Well first of all there are twenty
three million people in Syria.

About seventeen million live in this
western corridor of the country and

that's where the lion's share
of the killing is occurring and

just in case you're wondering
only about thirty percent of this

quantity of people are mobilized
only about thirty percent.

So as bad as things are in Syria they
can and probably will get a lot worse.

A lot worse.

We have not yet
seen the peak of the civil war in Syria.

The average civil war folks since
World War two goes eight and

a half years growing to two years here.

Syria's certainly not minor
compared to the average civil war.

So this is we may well have
a long way to go with Syria.

But what's happening inside
of this map is you can see

that there are different
groups there Kurdish groups.

There's Sunni groups
the Sunni are the yellow

there are Druze groups Druze a kind of
a strange monotheistic religion that it's

its own religion this is
the purple there's the red.

Those are the Christians and
then there's the dark green there the owl

whites there the Shia
effectively in Syria.

We have at least five major groups and

notice how they are deeply
intertwined in their settlements.

Patterns.

This phenomenon of having
different ethnic groups that

are deeply intertwined
in settlement patterns.

We've seen this type of
problem before in by.

In the mid one nine hundred ninety S.

And in Baghdad from two thousand and
five to two thousand and eight.

So when you have different ethnic

groups that are deeply intertwined
in settlement patterns.

Once you get any killing going on.

You can get going for
a whole variety of reasons.

Each of those groups starts to fend for
themselves for their own security.

You end up getting fragmented coalitions
you end up getting whole people switching

sides and
it's because the nature of the security

dilemma as it's called when you
have fragmented intertwined

ethnic groups creates a cycle
of violence that can fuel.

It's create fuel on its own that
can spiral up and spiral up.

That's what's been happening in Syria and
it's likely to continue to happen

even if Assad falls many people would like
to end this conflict with a single bullet.

Let's just get rid of Assad and everything
will be fine once you understand

the nature of the actual
demographic problem.

No it's going to get
worse if Assad falls and

let me just zero in on so
Assad's base the base of the Alawite.

Is up on the northwest.

That's the green.

And that is a group of
people about thirteen or so

percent of the Syrian
population who are they are pro

Assad the morning thing else they're
pro themselves they're pro themselves.

The reason they're pro Assad is because
they really are a minority here and

they really are living in
an area where they have

a buffer zone between
them in the Sudanese but

that buffer are the Christians and
what could easily happen here.

If Assad falls is that that
community is going to start to feel

increasingly vulnerable and
they're going to want to.

Control increasing.

The perimeter around their community

which means probably putting some of
those Christians in the crosshairs.

And the Sunni's on the other side of that
are probably going to be in a similar

situation.

So this problem that I'm talking about
a demographic problem is one that not only

exists in that corridor as a whole but
specifically exists around the area.

That would be Assad stronghold and
so therefore the hope of the notion

that yeah we just topple Assad and
everything is all hunky dory.

Well not for the mission of saving lives.

Not for the mission of saving lives.

This is this was always
a very difficult problem.

And I'm not telling you.

Assad's a nice guy but I'm here to tell
you what's the best plan to save lives not

simply get rid of an evil dictator but
so what what.

That's what's kind of come back for
a second.

So what does.

What could we do what
would be a good idea.

Well the most important thing to do
is to as I told you notice that this

part of the country even though there's
already been one hundred thousand dead.

This is probably.

About ten times worse than Bosnia.

And five times worse than Syria.

I'm sorry than Baghdad.

You could end up easily here
with a half million people die.

Not just simply one hundred
thousand that would

not be weird by the nature
of this type of conflict.

Moreover you could end up with
many more millions of refugees and

so you have to think about this this
is going to be a problem that's likely

to going to get worse.

Even if Assad falls and
what are we going to do.

We're going to send those
million refugees into Turkey.

We're going to send them into Lebanon.

We're going to send them into Jordan
we're not sentiment into Israel.

Where are we are what
are we doing here with the.

With the problem.

I think what we should be focusing on
is not are not ways to topple Assad.

I think what we should be focusing on
way are ways to build enclaves or.

Rockets of stability inside of Syria.

I think that's the most
important thing we should do.

And specifically what I would
do is I would try to build

pockets of stability inside of
Syria around the areas that

are already mostly homo genius
with respect to ethnic groups.

So I would pick for example Aleppo.

And I would concentrate.

Economic aid and
arms deliveries to expand the area of

control of the rebels around
the suburbs of Aleppo.

So that we could build
an actual on Klav of security.

That would not be authentic.

You know prone I mean Aleppo is a long
way away from the stronghold here.

So if you build an enclave of security.

This is own this is not really going to
help you topple Assad in a direct sense

but what it is going to do is
create an area of security for

future refugees and for the population as
a whole and basically build stability or

help stabilize the parts of
the country that are the most stable.

So over time we could try
to spread that stability

to the west stable parts of the country.

And that I think is
a pragmatic way to intervene.

I think that would save lives and I think
it would be the most we could do to save

lives because the other
options would likely be worse.

And that's what that
says on that last night.

So let me stop there and
take your questions.

Yes or no.

Thank you.

So much.

Really.

Yeah I would if.

We were talking about doing this from
a standing start in two thousand and

ten but not now in two thousand and
thirteen and

certainly not even by the way by
the summer of two thousand and eleven.

So you're right that that is an issue but
we are already are facing

the disintegration of
the state you aside I think

has virtually no hope of regaining
control over the entire country of Syria.

I'm not sure any group is going to be able
to control the entire country of Syria

we and it's because of the demographic
problem I just laid out

if you looked at
the demographics in Libya.

You would see that there
are different tribes

there are a weapon main tribes
in Libya but they live.

Not in inner mixed areas like this they
actually live in their own puddles their

own pools and that's why what you're
seeing is fragmentation in Libya at

the local level that's
really pretty peaceful.

You know is it the best of the is that
you know like living here in Atlanta.

No I'd still rather live here but
it's actually nowhere

near as ugly as what was going to happen
in Benghazi here what's happening is

you're getting a lot of fragmentation and
killing as as we speak.

And what I'm doing is trying to pull that
back stop but you're right that a price of

this is accepting that that fragmentation
will probably go on for a long time.

There's just no better alternative.

I think it's been.

In the perp think.

Yeah

I think that's I think those
are pretty weak arguments.

So first of all the air plan that we were
talking about which was basically the.

One hundred or so

cruise missile tomahawk attack plan
that was this limited air strike.

Option that we were describing.

Once you see the demographic problem I've
laid out you can see how this is going to

have no effect whatsoever on that.

It may make it slightly worse but it's
certainly not going to actually touch any

of the core issues that are occurring
inside of the country and and you can also

see that as a half measure it very likely
persuade rebels inside the country

that Americans are basically half hearted
and aren't really going to do anything.

They're just going to do something to make
themselves look good and then walk away.

The problem though with the actual
getting rid of the chemical weapons.

I do think it's it would be wonderful
to in the near term have the stocks of

chemical weapons by Assad destroyed I'm
not really telling you that there's

no value to that whatsoever.

But I do think it's important for

you to know that chemical weapons
are incredibly easy to make.

They're incredibly easy to make
sarin nerve gas you don't you don't

need a thousand tons of chemical weapons
to kill tens of thousands of people.

OK a few gallons is
going to go a long way.

Right.

Even just simply two hundred pounds.

Would go a long way in Damascus or
Aleppo probably putting tens

of thousands of people at risk
even with just two hundred pounds.

That's something that's going to be fairly
easy to reproduce at these well wobbles

unless we truly were able to control all
the so plants all the fertilizer plants

all the areas of processing that could
be used inside the country or for this.

So I'm not thinking that
we're about to you know

completely wipe those
chemical weapons away.

However I do think that well
the main benefit here is that

what we've mainly done is driven
a wedge between Assad and Russia.

So the most import.

Thing I thought so
when I got off that plane.

The most important thing I thought was
we shouldn't be talking about bombing

we should be organizing our diplomacy to
drive a wedge between Russia and Syria and

it's because even Russia would have
a hard time publicly supporting

an ally that was gassing its
people on the spot at the moment.

And yes you know that we could say There's
no evidence there's no evidence there's no

evidence but you know look at how you know
you embarrassed the Russians enough and

you put them in this position and
even even the you know the crass Russians

are going to have a hard time doing
that and that's the main thing them.

That's really what we really
get out of this which is we've

driven this way edge
here between Russia and

Syria which is why I think Sirius coming
forth with those chemical weapon sites

because they don't want to lose
the Russians they need the Russians.

Yesterday.

That's one thing.

Well the United States.

So the reason all everybody
sometimes people wonder why is it

always the United States.

Why is it always United States.

Well because we are the world's
sole superpower we

are the biggest state on the planet where
the eight hundred pound gorilla we really

are the easiest state to build
cooperation or coalition around.

It's not that it's impossible.

Exactly.

To have other coalitions.

It's just that it's it's much easier for
us to to

bring others along and also then to
coordinate actions that actually work.

We've seen collections of African
countries try to intervene in Sudan and

Darfur and what we've seen is they've
come kind of too little too late.

At the end of the came when there's
not much to do and you know.

And so it's not exactly
that nobody else can do it.

It's that there really are some tremendous
advantages for the United States.

And I think that that's why it tends to

be we tend to be at the center
of that discussion.

However I want to I would point out that
in the case of Libya I thought it was

terribly important that we build
a coalition that involved the key regional

actors here because having
an international coalition.

There's actually two fundamental reasons
that are very helpful for this number one.

If it's a unilateral
humanitarian intervention.

It's going to be easy for the rest of
the world to think that we especially that

states have an ulterior power motive for
doing it that even if it looks

like we're doing humanitarian intervention
as long as it's just us doing it.

Man there's got to be you know there's
the rest of the world we deeply suspicious

they're going to think There's some real
estate advantage here that they're really

getting out of this and we just don't know
it all right so the coalition on one hand

is a check on the ambition of
the of any of the partners.

Number two though what
the regional actors in particular

if if they're going to be
costs things that go wrong.

Often they're going to affect
the regional actors first so

we don't want to be in a position where
we have a double standard where basically

we say yeah we're Americans.

We just don't die because we're sort
of somehow Westerners or America.

It's OK for the regional folks
to you know pick up the pick

up the the pieces when we have a behind.

That's not a good policy to be and so
you want to have a combination of you want

to have a coalition for a variety of
purposes and you you want to have.

Different parts of a coalition
in different areas.

Second question.

Well.

I think that under current
conditions that agreement would

not be worth the paper would be would be
signed on to be a pike rest agreement.

You know easily made easily broken.

So in the case of Bosnia which is one

where we actually had the Dayton Accords
we actually had a confessional based

agreement that happened in the fall
of one thousand nine hundred five

after the structural conditions of
the demographic problem was largely fixed.

Was largely solved so Bosnia initially
from ninety two to ninety five

looked like this intermixed area and you
couldn't stop the killing and so forth and

so on but if I showed you the maps
of where people ended up.

You would see that.

They ended up in essentially
homogeneous areas.

That the would move them separated
peoples into these homogeneous areas and

that the Dayton Accord line
was to the half a kilometer

along the borders of those areas and so.

This is something that I call for
these middle ground positions so

realist think I'm a liberal
liberal think I'm a realist.

You know what you can.

And so if realists is won't pay enough
attention to the mass atrocities

the Wiggles won't pay enough attention
to what you have to do save people.

OK And the real structural change has to
occur it's not just good it's not enough

to just get people in a room to sign a
piece of paper at least I don't think so.

To be blunt and putting a little crudely
but the truth is I think it has to be

married more to the real structural
conditions on the ground yesterday.

Yeah

yeah.

Fox Fox News is just in the media
is just yeah you ought to go and

look at the number of people there
actually dying or read one Coles block.

I mean the truth is what you're hearing.

Is not is not being calculated
according to the people that are die.

I mean go and
it's we are we live in a world.

Where I honestly think there
are more people dying in

Washington Park which is the community
right near the University of Chicago

than in most of the major
population centers of of Libya.

There are they're under however
pretty tight control by the local

militias the tribal militias
in each of those areas.

So it's not the case that this is a wide
open democracy that's easy to become for

trouble and I'm not telling you that.

But what I am telling you is that
the security condition here is

is not what I suspect most
Americans think it is from

the constant reference to quote
the awful conditions and in Libya.

What people I think are what
Fox is really upset about.

I think is that a number of pro
Islamic groups that is explicitly

Islamic groups that are interested in
Sharia law that are just pro Islamic

are getting a lot of public support
in Libya and you saw this in Egypt.

That is you see basically that we
have a situation where the median

voter in the Middle East
is very Islamic OK.

And we'd like to believe that's not true.

Actually it's not really sure that
that's exactly true in Syria but

it's true in many areas of the world and
I think that's probably true in Libya.

OK I didn't mean to insult you.

Sorry sorry I didn't mean to I
didn't mean to insult you but

it won't just the numbers
don't bear it out.

Sir we don't have it's not
OK I I was just trying to save

in the way that most people could remember
and I'm sorry if I if I insulted you and

I really didn't mean to and
I apologize I did not mean to

hear.

Yeah.

Yeah yeah

yeah yeah yeah.

Well.
Well sir what I would say is if we had let

the seventy to one hundred thousand
people get slaughtered in Benghazi.

What we would have found was an even
more massive exodus of people from Libya

those stockpiles sir were not protected by
the Khadafi regime during that period of

time in fact what could I had done if he
had opened his stockpiles because what he

was asking the population of Libya
to do sir was in fact to go and

get those stockpiles and
kill what he was hoping he

called them the cockroaches that were
the rebel groups that were opposing him.

So I definitely hear you that there's
an issue with those stockpiles.

What I would tell you what I think is that
that issue would either have been the same

or worse had we let the hundred thousand
people of Benghazi get slaughtered.

So I just don't buy that the right
thing to do to avoid the problem.

You just laid out was to stand
aside while Benghazi got nailed.

Yes mag.

You're.

Right.

Well.
Well here's what I think.

I mean just this side here on that.

Well yeah well so
it's the forty two percent number.

This was not April but August.

Right.
So basically it boils down

Maggie I think what you're asking is what
would happen with that forty two percent

number in the public and what I what
I think having studied not only this

humanitarian intervention but
having been involved in advocating for.

Saving the Muslims in Bosnia in the mid
one nine hundred ninety S. is that

the real decisions that are happening are
happening with the leats in Washington.

Typically in the White House and

although we'd like to believe
in a democracy public opinion.

Drives all the decisions of our wheat so
I think it drives some and not others.

I think that the.

The fact is that the successful
humanitarian interventions

typically are successful and then
the public really forgets about them they

the public does not give our
leaders credit for them where.

But if things go bad.

If there is a like a total disaster
where in the case of Somalia we have

Blackhawk Down and
then what's happening is it's not

a low cost intervention plan it
looks like an utter disaster for

the military in the military then looks
like it's being sucked into an area where

it's not going to be able fulfill
its other commitments to protect us.

In other ways.

Now all of a sudden that's
a that's a pretty big disaster so

what I would what I would tell you is that
I think the moral case for humanitarian

intervention that I put forward is
pretty similar to the political case for

it is just that if we're expecting.

Politicians to do it because
they'll get political credit.

I think that's a mistake and.

And the Samantha Powers book.

She says we have to find a way to get
politicians democratically elected

politicians political credit for
doing humanitarian intervention.

I just think that's not going to happen
and I don't think that's what happened in

the cases where we succeeded Obama
administration went into Libya.

They knew it was a political loser.

They decided to me and age.

The costs of this with the public and
Obama got reelected.

OK that's what I see with
humanitarian intervention

it's not actually going to
help him get reelected.

It's just the question is can he do it in
a way that doesn't cost him an election.

Yes where.

It's pretty messy.

Actually.

Yeah.

The number one.

Yeah the number one issue
the reason I'm I'm talking more

about this plan now than I did a piece in
The New York Times about a year ago and

I said that it wasn't time to intervene
then the reason I'm is because

one of the downsides here is much
less which is Russia in particular.

So one of the absolute
big issues here with any

intervention plan whatsoever including
the one I'm putting forward where you say

the downside is that if an intervention
plan like this were to trigger even

more massive Russian intervention
especially direct military intervention

on the part on the side of Assad and

what I think now is if we were going to
actually in I think now we have at least

a possible environment to implement this
plan because as I said I think we've

driven a wedge between somewhat of a wedge
I want to be careful between Assad and

Russia and I think that it may
well be possible to get a serious

discussion with with the Russians
about building on claves of stability

inside the country because I think that
we could really make a pretty good case.

That this would help contain
the internationalization or

spread of the conflict
outside the borders.

Now that maybe that may be a bigger
problem than I'm that I'm crediting right

now but you're right there are potential
downsides red flags that I already see and

the one that I want to focus on the most
actually here would be with the Russians.

My God please you can read no please
respond I mean if you see others I'm

glad to hear it.

Yeah you just need to let me hear

you carry

on like crazy.

There's still something.

There's perception featured
maybe something very

well so I guess I would say yeah so
so with with Libya.

I was really in the case
of the Libya issue

Turkey had the role that Russia does for
me with Syria and the reason is this.

In in the in saving Benghazi it wasn't

just simply the use of air power
we also it was really important to

open up economic lifelines from
Europe to the eastern part of Libya.

That would be opened up.

The ability to have the economic where
with all the Libyan rebels to sustain

themselves independently for
a long period of time

those economic lifelines
between Europe and

Libya had already preexisted and so
we already knew a fair bit about how those

trade routes and so forth were in
Turkey was a central piece of that.

So that's where in the earlier one I
was really focused a lot on Turkey.

Here I do think Turkey is an issue.

Which is why I wasn't really pushing for
a Kurdish autonomous zone inside of.

Inside of Syria and my thought here is
that they'll be always some issue with

any autonomous zone anywhere for Turkey
but if you if the choice is where you have

refugees could be flooding into Turkey
versus into a Sunni autonomous zone

I would think that it's pretty it should
be pretty clear that the choice for to.

For Aragon should be closer should should
be the point I'm I'm I'm suggesting here

because the an alternative
where you still have more

problems directly inside your own country
of Turkey I don't think it is good

but it's.

Yeah that much.

That's what that's what I'm think yes so
I'm I'm really trying to to to start this

idea of a stable on clay with
what is most likely to work and

then see if over time it could spread but

I'm not trying to tell you that I'm not
I'm not trying to paint for you this like

perfect solution that's going to lie
clean least stop this war altogether.

I'm just trying I'm sort of like trying
to come in with what I think is a way to

sort of.

To minimize the growth of
the problem as it goes on.

Just me.

Yeah it's not like crazy.

It's.

You know it's not crazy.

It's not crazy.

I'm I'm not.

Yeah there are definitely some other
possible areas here that we could pick.

And it may well be that if
we could establish this once

we might be able to establish
establish it successfully elsewhere.

So I don't literally mean to
tell you that it's the one and

only one place but I guess I'm too.

In the position ma'am
that right now we have

I think really no real good
idea about how to do anything.

I'm just trying to find I'm trying to
find a limited plan that would that I

think we could.

Really quite plausibly end up saving
lives it would be if it would

make a positive contribution and I don't
want to go painted as so in bishops and so

many different parts of the country that
we couldn't get to even stage one of

this plan that might be a good thing to
consider for like stage two or Stage three

if we could create a serious
sanctuary area at all.

If everyone actually I touch of you.

No no no no no I don't think so.

I think that first of all it
is it is definitely the case.

That even if you had to
airdrop the supplies.

You could do this.

I mean this is what we mean this is this
is this would be the preferred option

the the obvious option would be to would
be to try to work with some of the Kurdish

groups to basically allow passage and
you have to give some supplies to them or

bribe them as well but certainly not
ground troops but even if you told me that

that political option the my preferred
option to do it was off the table.

This is the type of mission that is
small enough well collides enough

that we would be able to do
it basically from a distance.

If we make this too ambitious than
the answer is going to be now.

Yeah.

The second.

Yeah yeah well I do
the book that's yeah we

all know actually I think it's
more the other way around.

So if I do so I may do a.

Book on this.

I'm very interested in doing a book and
what I would.

Try to show is the Rwanda could have met
all three pillars know the opposite.

It's not that we were right to stay out of
and it's that we were actually wrong and

it's again the failure to consider
the pragmatic pragmatic middle and

the true pillars that really matter
as opposed to the liberal model.

So I actually think there's
a there's there's a strong case.

That actually fits Yeah it's until having

actually done the analysis I want
to be a little bit careful but

having done some policeman every work on
this analysis and a good shorthand way to

think about this is that if you look
at Kuperman book which is the biggest.

The book that's most against the idea
of intervening in Rwanda and

you look carefully at the details.

You'll see that if you just take
his analysis of what we could have

done just with the air option and not
wait until it's defined as a genocide but

start at the point on April tenth when
it's clearly a mass homicide and you just

take his timeline and you just you just
take that his his analysis and you just

stand it behind on April tenth you end
up saving two hundred thousand more

people and that's even you know that's and
that's with Kuperman who may not be

giving the most credit because he doesn't
even allow for the R.P. so in his models.

He does not even allow for
a local ground our I like the R.P. Yeah.

And so there's a that I would define
that I would suggest is a lower bound on

what could probably have
happened in Rwanda.

It may have been the case that we could
have done actually substantially better

than that but I'm just giving you.

You know so so
I think Rwanda is more on the other side.

I think that you're looking at the best
analysis at the moment that's the critical

analysis Kuperman all you have to do is
just start change the start point and

everything has a lot better and
I think if you would also allow for

the use of the R. P.F. which would be
a ground ally to say because it's.

Ground out why you would have possibility
of even doing better than that.

So I think that the issue
with the pragmatic standard

is that there are going to be cases
where focusing on the pragmatic standard

you would do you would have done more
intervention than we currently did so

I actually think the liberal
the liberal model is just simply

standing in the way of saving lives.

I think it's just simply a fundamental
it's a theory and the theory doesn't work.

Or do you mean with living things or
value for you.

People like drugs.

What both yet are good right.

Establish there's something.

Yeah.
The biggest debate well at

the moment there is no there
are no signs that there's

a strong reason to believe that the Alto
we brigade would be able to defend and

with with additional support would be able
to defend a lot of the perimeters of what

I'm talking about but let's say that
that those calculations aren't true.

If if we have a perimeter defense that's
not in the center of a weapon but

around the suburbs of Aleppo.

Now we're talking about a perimeter
defense that airpower could support.

That airpower that is American air power
could support the problem at the moment

is that what people are thinking about an
air option it's an aggressive air option

is an air option that would allow
us to somehow support the taking of

urban areas inside the urban areas
that snotter winner with air power.

That's the lines of sight.

There's like a lot of technical reasons
why that is we are right to resist that.

And that would be a bad idea that
doesn't mean that perimeter.

Establishing perimeter defenses
broader can't be defended.

They certainly can.

And they're just simply
a different type of.

Air problem.

So that's what I'm trying to do.

I'm trying to extend.

What I'm trying to do is not just
create a tiny little pocket.

I'm trying to extend a rather large
area here you see what I mean it's not

a teeny tiny little area.

It's not just a neighborhood in
helping one neighborhood take

another neighborhood.

I'm really trying to you know
help establish a reasonably

significant on clay with a real
with a real sanctuary which

would have a perimeter which
the rebels that we do have in that

area some sizable number of rebels
they'll tell we brigade is one and.

And then if necessary and.

And it may be necessary then
airpower could support that permit.

And

yes you know I know

the mascot's is that
you're right you're right.

So as in the case of.

I'm calling for stabilizing the most
stable part of the country first.

And I realize that there would appear
to be simply more urgent need but

it's simply more difficult to do so.

And I just would point out that
in the case of Libya it looked

like on February twenty eighth.

The problem was Tripoli.

And then it became Benghazi
three weeks later.

So I would just simply say that the I

think the best approach here
would be to focus on your right.

The most stable part of the country.

And.

Let's do that first.

And it has its own problems.

Well you know people already
put them up in arms.

I'm not going to get
the Russians I'm sure.

What we're going to do about
the defenses and you know let's actually

see if this can work and then we
can become more ambitious and I and

I hear you that there are there
are there are people dying but

my point is if we were going
to come in we have to come in.

In a way that's actually going to lead
to the savings of lives as opposed to

a case where we come in we make a further
mass and then we just throw our hands up.

What have the final work.

Good for

care.
Good for care.

OK.

Yeah you got it.

OK.

I want to see.

What it was yeah.

Yeah yeah the enduring security
is the biggest problem just in

a simple term if you go to my.

If you go to the table in the I.A.S.
piece you'll see

I try to apply the standard and if you
really get interested I can send you.

There's there's like a fifty page appendix
where I go through those three pillars and

apply them to those cases and if you want
to see how I've really done that and you.

You know you can you can see that but.

Often actually the enduring
security is often more

difficult than you and
then we often take for granted here and

that was that was one of the big problems
by the way in Bosnia is that we had

to have the structure that the enduring
security but let me just just stop there.

OK so yeah thank you Jen I thank you for
inviting.

THANK YOU THANK YOU THANK YOU.

Really good really enjoy.

Thank you so much.