Securing Cyber-Physical Systems by Improving and Optimizing Measurement of the Electromagnetic Backscattering Side-Channel

Existing software-based security techniques are insufficient to protect against alterations made to hardware at the silicon level, and detection of such alterations is traditionally a time-intensive, destructive, and often fruitless effort. Through the electromagnetic (EM) side-channel, researchers have demonstrated a number of non-destructive hardware characterization and validation schemes. This research attempts to further those efforts by developing tools and techniques designed to improve the collection, analysis, monitoring, and ultimately, attack detection, based on circuit activity harmonics of the EM backscattering side-channel. Specifically, our first aim is to enable circuit activity harmonics measured with the EM backscattering side channel to be compared with circuit activity simulations, eliminating the need for golden reference measurements. The objective of our second aim is to analyze and improve upon existing near-field probe designs used to capture the EM backscattering side-channel, developing a novel probe with improved directivity and H-Field sensitivity. To evaluate the success of our second aim, our third aim is to use this novel probe to demonstrate detection of dormant hardware Trojans with extremely small trigger circuitry, made possible via new measurement acquisition and processing methodologies that optimally reduce our measurement space. Finally, our last aim recognizes that detection of physical or cyber attacks on electronic devices represents only half the attack surface of a cyber-physical system (CPS) with both cyber and physical components. The objective of our fourth aim is to demonstrate detection of cyber, physical, and cyber-physical attacks via joint side-channel monitoring of both the cyber and physical components of a CPS.

Date

2024-07-03

Resource Type

Text

Resource Subtype

Dissertation

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