Organizational Unit:

Scheller College of Business

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https://hdl.handle.net/1853/70690

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Organizational Unit

Office of the Provost and Executive Vice President for Academic Affairs

Includes Organization(s)

Organizational Unit

Institute for Leadership and Social Impact

ArchiveSpace Name Record

https://finding-aids.library.gatech.edu/agents/corporate_entities/255

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Publication Search Results

Now showing 1 - 10 of 11

Appendix to "Managing Slow Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry" (ed.3)

( 2007-05-02) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

An on-line appendix to "Managing Slow Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry" by Michael E. Ketzenberg and Mark E. Ferguson
Appendix to "Managing Slow Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry" (ed.2)

( 2007-05-01) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

An on-line appendix to "Managing Slow Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry" by Michael E. Ketzenberg and Mark E. Ferguson
Managing Slow Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry

( 2007-02-14) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

We address the value of information (VOI) and value of centralized control (VCC) in the context of a two–echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provides a single perishable product to consumers. Our analysis is relevant for managing slow moving perishable products with fixed lot sizes and expiration dates of a week or less. We evaluate two supply chain structures. In the first structure, referred to as Decentralized Information Sharing, the retailer shares its demand, inventory, and ordering policy with the supplier, yet both facilities make their own profit-maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, referred to as Centralized Control, incentives are aligned and the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company owned stores or vendor–managed inventory. We measure the VOI and VCC as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared and decision making is decentralized. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing and centralized control in the supply chain and identify conditions under which benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the VOI, the major benefit in our setting is driven by the supplier’s ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.
Appendix to "Managing Slow Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry"

( 2007-02-14) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

An appendix to the paper "Managing Slow Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry"
Purchasing Speculative Inventory for Price Sensitive Demand

( 2006-09-16) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E. ; Kuik, Roelof

The problem studied is one of buying and selling products cost eficiently over a number of periods in a finite horizon setting. Unit purchase costs vary across periods acording to some known distribution and demand is deterministic but dependent on the price charged for the product. Thus, the problem becomes one of exploiting opportunities to “forward buy” and sell profitably in the face of costs for carrying product.
Managing Slow Moving Perishables in the Grocery Industry

(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006-06-30) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

We address the value of information (VOI) and value of centralized control (VCC) in the context of a two–echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provides a single perishable product to consumers. Our analysis is relevant for managing slower moving perishable products with fixed lot sizes and expiration dates of a week or less. We evaluate two supply chain structures. In the first structure, referred to as Decentralized Information Sharing, the retailer shares its demand, inventory, and ordering policy with the supplier, yet both facilities make their own profit-maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, referred to as Centralized Control, incentives are aligned and the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company owned stores or vendor–managed inventory. We measure the VOI and VCC as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared and decision making is decentralized. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing and centralized control in the supply chain and identify conditions under which benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the VOI, the major benefit in our setting is driven by the supplier’s ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.
Information Sharing to Improve Retail Product Freshness of Perishables (ed.3)

(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005-11) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

We explore the value of information (VOI) in the context of a retailer that provides a perishable product to consumers and receives replenishment from a single supplier. We assume a periodic review model with stochastic demand, lost sales, and order quantity restrictions. The product lifetime is fixed and deterministic once received by the retailer, although the age of replenished items provided by the supplier varies stochastically over time. Since the product is perishable, any unsold inventory remaining after the lifetime elapses must be discarded (outdated). Without the supplier explicitly informing the retailer of the product age, the age remains unknown until receipt. With information sharing, the retailer is informed of the product age prior to placing an order and hence can utilize this information in its decision–making. We formulate the retailer’s replenishment policies, with and without knowing the age of the product upon receipt, and measure the VOI as the marginal improvement in profit that the retailer achieves with information sharing, relative to the case when no information is shared. We establish the importance of information sharing and identify the conditions under which substantial benefits can be realized.
Sharing Information to Manage Perishables (ed.2)

(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005-08) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

We address the value of information (VOI) sharing in the context of a two echelon, serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provides a single perishable product to consumers. We evaluate information sharing under two supply chain structures where the retailer shares it inventory level and replenishment policy with the supplier. In the first structure, referred to as Decentralized Information Sharing, both facilities make their own profit-maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, referred to as Centralized Control, the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practices of company owned stores or vendor managed inventory. We measure the VOI as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and fixed order quantities. We establish the importance of information sharing in the supply chain and identify conditions under which relatively substantial benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the VOI, the major benefit of information sharing in our setting is driven by the suppliers ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto improving for both supply chain partners in the decentralized setting.
Information Sharing to Improve Retail Product Freshness of Perishables (ed.2)

(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2005-05-30) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

We explore the value of information (VOI) in the context of a retailer that provides a perishable product to consumers and receives replenishment from a single supplier. We assume a periodic review model with stochastic demand, lost sales, and order quantity restrictions. The product lifetime is fixed and deterministic once received by the retailer, although the age of replenished items provided by the supplier varies stochastically over time. Since the product is perishable, any unsold inventory remaining after the lifetime elapses must be discarded outdated). Without the supplier explicitly informing the retailer of the product age, the age remains unknown until receipt. With information sharing, the retailer is informed of the product age prior to placing an order and hence can utilize this information in its decision making. We formulate the retailer's replenishment policies, with and without knowing the age of the product upon receipt, and measure the VOI as the marginal improvement in profit that the retailer achieves with information sharing, relative to the case when no information is shared. We establish the importance of information sharing and identify the conditions under which substantial benefits can be realized.
Sharing Information to Manage Perishables (ed.1)

(Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004-09-14) Ferguson, Mark E. ; Ketzenberg, Michael E.

We address the value of information (VOI) sharing in the context of a two-echelon,serial supply chain with one retailer and one supplier that provides a single perishable product to consumers. We evaluate information sharing under two supply chain structures where both supply chain members share their inventory levels and replenishment policies with the other. In the first structure, referred to as Decentralized Information Sharing, the retailer and the supplier make their own profit-maximizing replenishment decisions. In the second structure, referred to as Centralized Information Sharing, the replenishment decisions are coordinated. The latter supply chain structure corresponds to the industry practice of vendor-managed inventory. We measure the VOI as the marginal improvement in expected profits that a supply chain achieves relative to the case when no information is shared. Key assumptions of our model include stochastic demand, lost sales, and order quantity restrictions. We establish the importance of information sharing in the supply chain and identify conditions under which relatively substantial benefits are realized. As opposed to previous work on the VOI, the major benefit of information sharing in our setting is driven by the supplier's ability to provide the retailer with fresher product. By isolating the benefit by firm, we show that sharing information is not always Pareto improving for both supply chain partners.