My neighbor says Adams told her you know
my back will be here the one school or

the soccer that I put director of
the policy research arm of the school and

the Center for International Strategy
acknowledging policy.

And behalf of the center we posed a number
of these different public events I'm very

pleased to be able to host the ones today
let me also know that our band today and

the fine cuisine that you have from
you out is really good the result of

a very generous give that
honors General Ray Davis.

As many of you know general there's a sort
of text of Medal of Honor recipient for

his valor now in the battlefield but
also campus and the legacy

that he left is we're very
pleased to be able to host far.

In that spirit.

I'm very proud to be able to introduce
our speaker today I've known map now for

a number of years because Dr Besser
not painting I've known him for

a number of years and
watched his career really blossom and

in many ways as I said to some of the
students really are today my colleagues

last night he's really a model
scholar in the way that he

brings his research to life
because not only holds a position

tenured position associate
professor at Georgetown University.

He's also spent time on
government doing to Stansted

part of the fence in the office of
the secretary of defense for a for

vanishes relating to determine
terrorist Middle East issues

his own research is really a leading
light can do to strategy and

nonproliferation are related issues and
again what really distinguishes.

It is the news first rate scholarship is
that he also means that excess of all

odds at many different audiences first and
foremost the U.S. national security.

As we've been able to really
not just bridge the gap but

be able to relieve with ease and on.

Go between those two
different communities so

I'm very pleased to be able to have
him here speak to us today and

that as I mentioned is in addition to his
academic position and the decision he held

that O.S.D. he's a nonresident fellow at
The Atlantic Council which again sort of

shows you how he's bringing his
scholarship into the public domain and he.

Is here today to talk about
his most recent publication or

I should say that is was the book.

Which is the time to attack
now this book industry I would

have to say with a slash on the explosion
of the growth of design to it but

he's here today to talk
about Iranian challenge and

what is presented to the US in
terms of our times response so

today I'm very pleased to be able
to invite him to present his book.

And not only will he be presented and
we'll talk about Sky's it but

you can even buy.

There's a there are copies available
on the outside of our room and

I think that we haven't worn out too much
so I think it's right this still works if

you're going to sign these costs well so
without further ado let me invite.

You.

To.

Come on he's got a minute
yes I think I asked next

well thank you very much for that
introduction professor still very that was

very generous I hope I can be half as
impressive as the person he described.

It's a pleasure to be here at
the Sam Nunn school at Georgia Tech and

to be here in Atlanta and thanks up
to all of you for coming out today.

As Adam mentioned I'm here today to
talk about my my new book A Time to

attack the looming Iranian nuclear threat.

Now before I talk about what the book is
about about to take a minute to talk about

what the book is not about because I
think some people see the title and

understandably jump to
the wrong conclusion so

the book doesn't argue that the military
option for Iran is our best option it

doesn't argue it should be our
first option rather I argue that we

should solve the Iranian nuclear challenge
through diplomacy if at all possible.

But everybody agrees that we should solve
the Iranian nuclear challenge through

diplomacy if at all possible so

it's not even really an interesting
question the interesting question and

I think the more important question from
a foreign policy point of view is what

happens if diplomacy fails what happens if
the ongoing negotiations fail to produce

a breakthrough and
Iran advances its nuclear program and

United States is faced with a choice
between accepting a nuclear armed Iran and

living with the threats posed by a nuclear
armed Iran for decades to come or

taking military action to stop Iran
from building nuclear weapons so

the argument of the book is that
we should pursue diplomacy but

that if diplomacy fails a limited strike
on Iran's nuclear facilities is less

bad than living with the threats posed by
a nuclear armed Iran for decades to come

over to name the book if diplomacy
fails there will come a time to attack.

Now the second thing that the book
is not is it's not controversial.

Now so that's somewhat jokingly because
of course anytime you're talking about

issues of war and
peace it's controversial.

But I say it's not controversial
because essentially this is

America's stated approach the problem
since March two thousand and twelve

President Obama has said that containment
of a nuclear Iran is not an option

he said it's not only is it not only
an option he said it's not even possible

that a nuclear Iran is quote a challenge
that cannot be contained in quote and

that he's willing to do whatever it takes
include use military force if necessary

to stop Iran from building nuclear weapons
now there was a time when this argument

was more controversial so take you
back to two thousand and ten or so.

Many people the kind of conventional
wisdom in the public debate was that

negotiations probably
weren't going to worry.

United States was going to face this
terrible choice and when it got to this

point it would be better to turn contain
a nuclear armed Iran after all we deterred

and contained a nuclear armed Soviet Union
and we could do the same thing with Iran.

For example has his show on C.N.N.
on Sunday spread Zakaria G.P.S.

I remember he did kind of a little op at
the beginning of the show where he said

you know we don't even know where Iran's
nuclear facilities are we can't destroy

them a strike on Iran would lead to a war
in the Middle East and deterring and

containing a nuclear armed Iran
while not a great option is better.

But at that time I had left
Georgetown University and

went into government was working
as an advisor on Iran policy in

the office of the secretary of defense and
I was coming to a different conclusion and

realized that much of the public debate
was was misinformed about basic facts and

that many of the judgments I think were
way out of line and so looking at the same

issue I came to it to a different
conclusion that these were bad options but

that a limited strike was a much better
option than people talking about this on

the outside understood and that
deterring and containing a nuclear Iran

would be much more dangerous and much more
difficult than many people seem to assume

so I made this argument in government and
then I left government I

published an article in Foreign Affairs
magazine in January two thousand and

twelve with another kind of
aggressive title Time to attack Iran.

And this led to much debate and
controversy for

about six weeks many of my colleagues
disagreed with me strongly and debates and

opinion pieces but then in March two
thousand and twelve about six weeks later

President Obama came out on my side of
the debate said a nuclear armed Iran

cannot be contained I will do whatever
it takes include use force if necessary.

So.

That's what the book is not that
controversial and not about military

option first but that's enough about what
the book is not what is the book about

well in the back of the book Eric Edelman
former undersecretary of defense for

policy says this is quote the most
thorough book length examination of

the issues involved in assessing
the Iranian nuclear challenge and

that endorsement means a lot.

To me one because I have a lot of
respect for Ambassador Adelman.

Because that's really what I set out to do
when I sat down to write this book I've

been thinking about the Iranian nuclear
issue all day every day for essentially

several years had a lot of information
that I wanted to share and wanted to

present it in the book so I think
regardless of what your interest might be

in the Iranian nuclear issue regardless
of what you think the best policy options

are you'll find it in this book I try to
present all the options the history in

in a complete way from all angles so the
book goes through the history of Iran's

nuclear program talks about the options
for addressing Iran's nuclear program and

then reflects on what the resolution
of this crisis will mean for

the future of international order so my
remaining time today I think I'd like to

do each of those three things talk
a little bit about the history

talk a little bit about policy options and
talk a little bit about the future.

So Iran's nuclear program began
in the one nine hundred fifty S.

with help from the United States
as you might know under the U.S.

Adams for Peace program
the United States helped Iran build

the Tehran Research Reactor still
in operation today in Tehran and

the nuclear cooperation between the United
States and the Shah of Iran this is

before the revolution obviously continued
through the one nine hundred seventy S..

So many people look at this history and

say well the United States is
hypocritical at least inconsistent but

maybe hypocritical in its approach to
nonproliferation in its approach to Iran

because we're willing to help Iran with
nuclear energy some people go further and

say we were even willing to help the run
help the Shah build nuclear weapons if you

wanted them but
that today against the mullahs in

the Islamic Republic were against nuclear
technology and this is hypocritical and

argue in the book I think the wrong way
to look at it I think the United States

has actually been remarkably consistent in
its nonproliferation policy broadly and

in route with respect to Iran and so
basically the tightrope walk that we've

always tried to walk is to
promote nuclear technology for

peaceful purposes but to resist its
military applications and that was our

approach to the Shah we are willing to
help with peaceful nuclear technology but

we are very explicit that that
technology should be weaponized and

that's our approach today
with the Islamic group.

We've said time and time again that Iran
can have a peaceful nuclear energy program

and we're just concerned about
the military application.

So this nuclear cooperation continued
until the one nine hundred seventy S.

until the revolution so

one thousand nine hundred nine the Shah's
out the new Islamic Republic is set up and

Iran's new new leader the first
Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei

wasn't interested really in nuclear
energy or nuclear weapons and

explicitly said that nuclear weapons
are against the tenets of Islam.

But this would change over the course
of the one nine hundred eighty S.

over the course of the one nine hundred
eighty S. Iran fought a brutal decade long

war with their neighbor and
bitter enemy Iraq.

And during the war Iraq used chemical
weapons against Iranian forces and so

this would help to change
the supreme leader's mind and

in fact in one thousand nine hundred seven
he decided he had to to end the conflict

and he wrote a letter to his supporters
and said called signing a cease fire with

his bitter enemy with Saddam Hussein like
quote drinking from a poisoned chalice

that was so
difficult was like drinking poison.

And explain to his supporters that.

You know he really had no choice that
Iran's military position was hopeless but

that he looked quote look
forward to resuming the conflict

with nuclear weapons which will be
the necessity of war at that time so

this is one thousand nine hundred
seven really the first indication from

top Iranian leader of a clear interest in
nuclear weapons so it's later that year

one thousand nine hundred seven that
Iranian representatives met with A.Q.

Khan some of you might remember A.Q. Khan
he was in the news a lot about ten years

ago this is a Pakistani nuclear scientist
who basically sold Do-It Yourself atomic

bomb making kits to Iran Libya and North
Korea so nine hundred eighty seven Iranian

representatives meet with Con Con provides
them with uranium enrichment designs

component parts and we think possibly
nuclear weapons designs as well so this is

really the beginning of Iran's current
program one thousand nine hundred seventy

now throughout the one nine hundred ninety
S. the United States suspected that Iran

might have nuclear program because
of suspicious purchases and

other things but it wasn't until two
thousand and three that all that was.

Moved when a resistance group in Iran
released announced that Iran was building

two secret nuclear facilities this
underground uranium enrichment facility at

Natanz and
a plutonium producing reactor at Iraq K.

so that was really the beginning of
the current crisis two thousand and

three so my book brings us up to that
point and then I take a step back and

say well how big of a problem is this
doesn't even want nuclear weapons how

close is it to having nuclear weapons with
nuclear weapons in Iran even be a problem.

And I teach a course at
Georgetown University called the politics

of nuclear weapons and one of things I
tell my students is that in order for

nuclear weapons to spread others
the supply side and the demand side

on the supply side the country must have
the ability to to make nuclear weapons and

on the demand side the country
must want nuclear weapons so

there are some countries in the world
today who might want nuclear weapons but

can't build them and there are other
countries that probably could build them

but I have refrained from doing so.

So to do in the book is say OK
let's look at the supply and

the demand side in Iran so
let's begin with the supply side how close

is Iran to having nuclear weapons how good
is its nuclear infrastructure today so

as many of you not might know in order to
build nuclear weapons Iran would have to

do three things First it would have to get
enough fissile material to form the fuel

of the core of the nuclear device so that
can either be highly enriched uranium or

plutonium second it would need to form
that material into a nuclear warhead and

then third it would need some means to
get that warhead to its opponents so

ballistic missile submarine
launch ballistic missiles and

aircraft are the delivery vehicles that
the advanced nuclear powers use so

let's look at each of those
things that are wrong

first fissile material how close
is Iran Well according to U.S.

Secretary of State John Kerry if
the supreme leader made the decision today

to dash to a nuclear weapons capability to
basically produce as much enrich uranium

enriched to as high level as
possible it would take a run

roughly two to three months to get enough
material for its first nuclear weapon so

two to three months for
the fissile material how.

To form a warhead Well there
are two basic warhead designs

one is a kind of a simple gun type design
experts estimate it would take a run about

a month to make that simple design once
they had the uranium and then in order to

build a more sophisticated implosion type
warhead experts estimate it might take

Iran to a year or so and then Iran would
have to marry that warhead to its delivery

vehicles now Iran already has an advanced
stockpile ballistic missiles probably

the most advanced stockpile in the
Middle East so those are ready to go but

it would take some time to marry
the warhead to the ballistic missiles so

some people look at this timeline and

say well we've got at least a year maybe
even years to solve this problem what's

what's the worry Well the worry is
the first stage is really all that matters

the timeline for the second two stages
don't matter because if the United States

wants to be able to physically prevent
Iran from building nuclear weapons

if we want to keep all options on
the table as we've said many times.

The game's over after the first stage
because right now the United States

can strike Iran's nuclear facilities
to prevent Iran from producing

this all material but once it has
the fissile material the game's over

it could move that material anywhere we
wouldn't necessarily know where it is

it could move it beyond the reach
of our best bunker busting bombs.

So again if we're going to keep
all options on the table and

do whatever it takes to prevent Iran from
building nuclear weapons the real red line

is one bomb's worth of material and so
that's why when people talk about how much

time do we have what surrounds breakout
time this two to three month estimate that

Secretary Kerry and others give is to this
all material and the goal of the ongoing

negotiations again according to Secretary
Kerry is to extend that breakout time so

a successful comprehensive deal would
extend that breakout time to somewhere

between six months and twelve months so
still a little bit too close for

comfort in my view but gives us a little
more breathing space than we have now.

So that's the supply side what about the
demand side doesn't run even want nuclear

weapons you often hear reported in the
media that the international community in

the United States fear that Iran
might build nuclear weapons but

that Iran insists.

That it's only interested
in nuclear energy.

And it's a little frustrating to me
because it's often reported as kind of

a he said she said story like there are
these two claims who knows what's right

but I'm a social scientist by
training a political scientist and

so what I do in the book is say well we've
essentially got to have prophecies here

let's look at the evidence and
see which of these two hypotheses is

better supported by the evidence and what
I go through and show is there are about

eight different things that Iran is doing
that make absolutely no sense ever on

just interested in nuclear energy that
only makes sense if Iran is interested in

building nuclear weapons so the fact that
it's enriching at all the fact that it has

this plutonium producing reactor in
Iraq and the fact that it's worked on

nuclear weapons designs the fact that it's
building I.C.B.M.'s all of these things

suggest a strong interest in
a nuclear weapons capability and

again are really irrelevant if Iran
just wants peaceful nuclear energy.

So in short.

Now well let me back up so I don't think
this means that Iran is dead set on

building nuclear weapons and is going to
push forward regardless of the cost I

think we've seen over the past year or so
that Iran is sensitive to the cost that it

will moderate its nuclear development in
response to international pressure but I

think all else being equal Iran's leaders
would prefer to have nuclear weapons than

not to have nuclear weapons so in some
a strong interest in nuclear weapons and

they're pretty close so we have a problem
so what is the best way to to address this

problem now the second part of the book
goes through the various policy options

and as I see it there are really only
three serious policy options the first is

diplomacy basically the current
approach and second would be kind of

giving up acquiescing to a nuclear
armed Iran and attempting to deter and

contain a nuclear armed Iran and
third would be military action.

Now some people look at those options and
say well that doesn't seem very promising

diplomacy is probably not going to work in
this choice between bombing Iran or Iran

with the bomb seems really unpalatable
there's got to be some other way so

the next chapter in the book is what
I call the nonstarters and these

are the options that sometimes people put
forward I think in the attempt to avoid.

These are bad three options but what
are really only the serious options so

one of these nonstarters that
sometimes people put forward is

what about just covert action and
there's been these reports about cyber

attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities
there's been these reports about Iranian

nuclear scientist mysteriously
disappearing some speculate

it's the Israeli Mossad assassinating
Israeli or Iranian scientist.

And there's been reports about sabotage
of Iran's nuclear capabilities so

maybe we can just do a lot more of that
stuff more cyber attacks more sabotage and

maybe this will slow down Iran enough and
stop the program.

But what I point out in the book is that
this kind of stuff according to reports

has been going on against Iran for years
yet if we just look at Iran's nuclear

development look at objective
measures numbers of centrifuges types

of centrifuges amounts of low
enriched uranium every three months

in the International Atomic Energy Agency
reports Iran's nuclear program continues

to advance despite this stuff so I think
it's possible that Iran's nuclear program

would've advanced even more precipitously
if it hadn't been for covert action but

I think what that pattern shows is that
covert action on its own is not going

to be enough to stop Iran they continue
to make progress despite that.

So Second some people say well
what about the Japan model for

Iran Japan's a country as a country
with an advanced nuclear capability

advanced Iran Japan could probably
produce nuclear weapons on short order

if it decided to do so and some people say
well maybe we could do something similar

with Iran we could get a run but Iran
get really close you know kind of one or

two screwdriver turns away from
having nuclear weapons but

they'll stop short of turning the screw
driver and we'll just both live with that.

And so
that in theory that might sound good and

practice I think that's also a nonstarter
because again if the United States is

serious about doing what it takes to
stop or on if we let them get one or

two screwdriver turns away then it's out
of our hands are nonproliferation policies

reduced to praying that Iran doesn't turn
the final screwdriver and I think there's

no reason to believe that Iran would
go through so much trouble get to him.

Addition where the international community
was no longer in a position to stop it

there's no reason to believe that
Iran would voluntarily stop short so

I think this Japan option for
Iran is also not a good option.

Third sometimes people say well
what about regime change and

usually they don't mean George W. Bush
regime change where we invade the country

overthrow the government put in one
hundred thousand troops and stay for

ten years but rather they mean a kind
of a peaceful regime change you know

they point out that this government's not
terribly popular among certain segments of

the population they point out that there
were protests in the two thousand and

nine elections and historically opposition
movements so maybe if we wait long enough

the current government will fall some
new government will come to power and

maybe this new government would be
willing to deal on the nuclear program.

So again in theory that would be great but

I think that's also a nonstarter because
there's no reason to believe that's going

to happen anytime soon the current
government has a firm grip on power

this opposition Green Movement was really
demoralized after two thousand and

nine many of their leaders are in jail or
overseas.

And I think the election of
President Rouhani last year actually shows

the strength of the government So Rouhani
certainly more reasonable than Ahmadinejad

but he still regime insider power was
passed to him peacefully without protest

and so I think the clerics
are firmly in power and

even if the clerics fell there's no
reason to believe a new government would

necessarily give up the nuclear program of
the nuclear program is popular in Iran.

The new government would still be in the
same strategic situation that the current

government is in so in short I think we're
going to have to make difficult decisions

on the nuclear program before any new
government comes to power in Iran and

solve the problem for us.

So those are the nonstarters What
about the serious options so

the longest chapter in the book
is actually about diplomacy So

again kind of contrary to this
assumption that some people jump to

maybe based on the aggressive title.

And I argue that diplomacy
would be by far the best

diplomatic solution is by far the.

Outcome here and so the chapter on
diplomacy talks about the history of

negotiations with Iran talks about
possible comprehensive agreements

what that might look
like what the cost and

benefits of different
arrangements might be.

But I also point out that we have to
be realistic so President Obama himself

has said that there is no better than
a fifty fifty chance that we'll get a deal

with Iran some of his former top
advisers are even more pessimistic

Gary say more who is his top adviser for
the first term of his administration

has basically said there's zero chance
of a comprehensive deal with Iran and

thinks that they are not negotiating in
good faith not interested in an deal.

So significant chance that we're not going
to get a deal that solves this problem and

even if we get a deal it doesn't
necessarily solve the problem so

this kind of comprehensive deal which
is what is termed is really kind

of a misnomer because I pointed out
all it would do is extend Iran's

breakout time from the current two to
three months to six to twelve months so

again that's more breathing space but.

In six months around could still have
a nuclear weapon even with a comprehensive

deal in place so it's possible that deal
would break down it's possible Iran which

cheat on the deal and
we'd be right back here and.

You know a couple of years talking about
this what is worst question again.

So again hope that the the promise to
solve the problem but we have to be

realistic it's more likely than not
that it won't so if that's the case.

Then it's feasible that at
some point perhaps soon a U.S.

president is going to face this terrible
choice between Iran with a bomb or

bombing Iran so
how do we think about that option.

So first option would be well we could
just give up acquiesce to a nuclear armed

Iran allow Iran to have nuclear
weapons put in place a deterrence and

containment regime to deal with it but
that's not a good option

nuclear Iran would pose a grave threat
to international peace and security and

I think a nuclear Iran would lead to
further proliferation in the region

as other countries in
the region wanted to.

Be interested in getting nuclear
weapons as a counter to Iran I

think it's likely that.

Ron would it export sensitive nuclear
technology potentially exporting uranium

enrichment technology causing potential
nuclear crises in other regions of

the world and I think it would also
weaken the global nonproliferation regime

when Iran as a member of the N.P.T. was
able to pursue a nuclear capability and

at the end of the day the great powers
were unable or unwilling to stop it so

there's a risk to proliferation a second
I think Iran would be more aggressive so

Iran's leaders explicitly say that their
goal is to become the most dominant state

in the Middle East and right now we know
that they restrain their foreign policy

because they fear that if they go too
far it might provoke an Israeli or

US military reaction but if they had
nuclear weapons they would be confident

that they could deter the most extreme
forms of retaliation that would provide

them a shield to be become more aggressive
in the region to step up their support to

terrorist and proxy groups and gauge
a more aggressive course of a pharmacy

basically taking steps toward becoming
the most dominant state the Middle East

which is what they say their goals are so

this could lead to an even more aggressive
Middle East if you can imagine that or

a more crisis prone Middle East excuse me
and in a more crisis prone Middle East

with more widespread proliferation you
have a nuclear Iran nuclear armed Israel

nuclear armed United States potential
in the future other nuclear arms States

you would have nuclear
scares every few years and

any one of these nuclear crises could
result in a nuclear exchange No I don't

think Iran's leaders are suicidal I don't
think they're going to wake up one day and

say you know what today is a great day for
a nuclear war but

any time you have high stakes crises
between nuclear powers there is a danger

of things spinning out of control and
I just think about the high stakes

crises between the United States and the
Soviet Union India and Pakistan you know

looking back over the history of the Cold
War Some people say nothing to worry about

deterrence look works I look at that same
history and say wow we came really close

to nuclear war a number of times
we are lucky lucky to avoid it.

So a nuclear armed Iran presents
a number of serious threats

now the United States would just kind of
accept these threats we have put into

place a strategy to deter and
contain a nuclear armed Iran.

But a strategy to deter and contain
a nuclear armed Iran would mean a major

increase of U.S. political and military
commitments to the Middle East you know if

we think about how we've deterred and
contained nuclear armed Iran states in

the past you can't just say deterrence and
containment and be done with it it

requires a number of changes to policy and
posture United States would likely make

more formal defense agreements with Gulf
States with Israel in order to make those.

Commitments credible we'd likely for
deploy U.S. forces maybe for deploy U.S.

nuclear forces on the territory of
those states so this would mean a major

increase of U.S. military and
political commitments to the Middle East.

And then in addition to deterrence and

containment regime could deal with some
of the threats posed by a nuclear armed

Iran I think we could deter them from
intentionally launching a nuclear war

I think we could deter them from
intentionally launching a large scale

attack on one of our allies or against
the United States but many of these

other threats we couldn't deal with in a
deterrence and containment regime you know

I don't think we could deter Iran from
from being more aggressive I don't think

we could deter Iran from transferring
nuclear technology I don't think we could

completely reassure all states in the
region not to build nuclear weapons and

by definition we couldn't deter accidental
or invertor nuclear war in a crisis so

I think it's pretty clear that just
allowing Iran to have nuclear weapons and

living in that world is not very
attractive President Bush and

President Obama didn't agree
on a lot in foreign policy but

they do agree that a nuclear
Iran is quote unacceptable.

So if that's the case if diplomacy.

Might not work better than
even chance it won't work

if a nuclear Iran is unacceptable then
that leaves one option the military option

now the military option is
not a good option either.

So let's just talk about that for
a few moments now the first thing

to point out is I think many people
conflate the Israeli and the U.S.

military option when they talk
about the military option but

they're very different so the Israeli
option is is even worse than the U.S.

option Israel simply lacks
the ability to destroy some of Iran's

deeply buried hardened targets but an
Israeli strike would still on the shelves.

Downside consequences of war.

The US option on the other hand is much
better the United States does have

the ability to destroy Iran's nuclear
facilities even the deeply buried and

hardened facilities of this would set
Iran's nuclear program back difficult to

estimate with any certainty but the best
estimates are that in the worst case

scenario that Iran is attacked and
Iran decides to immediately rebuild and

Iran doesn't encounter any difficulties
the best estimates are that a U.S.

strike would by at least
three to five years.

But how often.

Are there no difficulties in international
politics if you assume Iran has domestic

political issues if you use him that
there are other international issues

that timeline becomes longer and the hope
of course would be that it buys enough

time to put on a trajectory
where it is at least for

a politically meaningful time frame maybe
forever a non-nuclear weapon state.

But there are serious
risks to strike as well.

Military strike would unleash Iranian
military retaliation potential conflict

would lead to spike and spikes in global
oil prices which would be bad for

the global economy.

To ensure we unleash
anti-American sentiment.

But I think it's important to not to
exaggerate those consequences I think many

people do you know they say things like
well if you like a rock in Afghanistan you

love Iran but nobody's talking about again
nobody's talking about occupation and

regime change about a limited strike so
it's important to carefully analyze those

those threats and I do so in the book and
it's also important to point out that

the United States just wouldn't accept
the threats posed from a military strike

just like in the deterrence and
containment scenario we put in place

a strategy to try to manage those threats
and I propose such a strategy in the book

about how we could deter Iranian follow on
retaliation how we could have a diplomatic

process that helped to promote to
garner international support for

a strike things we could do to to mitigate
the risks of spikes in oil prices

to protect the global economy but
on balance it's still a bad option.

You know there's no guarantee that a
strike prevents Iran from building nuclear

weapons and it only says all
these downside consequences so

the key question then is what is worse if
we get to this point Iran with the bomb or

bombing Iran.

So the final chapter in the book
is called What is worse.

And so I tell a story in the book
about when I was working on this issue

as an advisor in the office of
the secretary of defense and

I was doing a major briefing on this
exact subject to senior military and

civilian officials and officials at
the Pentagon Love Power Point slides so

the you always have to you can't talk
without Powerpoint I'd be in trouble for

not having a point slide behind me so
the final slide in the presentation

was the what is worse slide where I
compared these options side by side and so

there are number of different ways to do
it for my analysis what I did was to try

to identify the most important US national
security interests so United States

would like to prevent attacks on the U.S.
homeland against our allies we'd like to

counter nuclear proliferation we don't
want to counter international terrorism

we'd like to see regional stability in
the Middle East we've got to protect our

allies and partners in the Middle East
we've got to secure the free flow of

energy resources out of the region
to help the global economy so

we have a number of interest and

so what I did is say well how would a
military strike affect these interests and

how would a trying to turn
contain a nuclear armed Iran

affect all these various interests so the
final slide in the presentation presented

these two options side by side of the
these two options where the columns and

these national security interest
interest were the rows and

then each box was kind of color coded so
national security interests that were

improved in a particular scenario
were coded green interest that

didn't really change very much were
kind of neutral were colored yellow.

And interests that were
harmed in a particular

scenario were colored in
various shades of orange and

red depending on their severity and two
things stood out to everybody in the room

first there wasn't a lot of green on these
slides these were bad options a lot.

Orange a lot of red the second thing that
stood out to everybody in the room though

is that the nuclear armed Iran side
of the chart was noticeably darker

than the military strike side of the chart
meaning in this case that the risk of

a military strike literally paled in
comparison to the risks of living with

a nuclear armed Iran and in fact at
the end of the briefing the senior most

official looked me in the eye and said
Well if you're right this is a no brainer.

So I think that's a little bit too strong
I don't think it's a no brainer I think

it's a difficult choice but I think that
is the right call that if we get to this

point it's a bad set of options but that
a limited strike is less bad than living

with a nuclear armed Iran and that
position has as I said become an reflected

in official policy with President Obama
since March two thousand and

twelve saying containment
is not not an option.

So I think I'll just finish with with
a brief story in two thousand and

six I was in Singapore for a scenario
planning conference this was a conference

with academics journalists policymakers
from Europe Asia the United States and

it was a scenario planning conference so
we were considering these various future

states of the world trying to think about
how the world might develop think about.

You know these different scenarios I think
rid of Lee and the idea was to kind of get

insights and intuitions that we could
bring back with us to our day jobs.

Now one of these scenarios deal with
the future of global financial crisis

now remember this is two thousand and six.

And this session was a complete bust
because we had all these smart people in

the room all these people who paid close
attention to the global economy all these

people who were brought there and told
the idea here is the think creatively.

But they said this scenario
is just implausible.

You know the global financial crisis
Yeah there was the Great Depression but

that was you know seventy years ago things
have changed we haven't lightened policies

in place the world is so much different
now because of globalization so

they're willing to stretch their minds but
this was just going too far a global

financial crisis couldn't happen and then
of course it did the very next year and so

I think sometimes that we both
the general public and also experts.

Sometimes similarly
Pollyannish about nuclear war

you often hear arguments Well nuclear
weapons haven't been used for

seventy years now we have policies in
place the world so much different now.

But as somebody who's spent a lot of
the past ten years thinking about nuclear

weapons thinking about proliferation
thinking about deterrence I for

one would be surprised if nuclear weapons
aren't used again sometime in my lifetime

and if Iran acquires nuclear weapons other
countries potentially acquire nuclear

weapons in response I think nuclear armed
Middle East would be a good candidate for

the next nuclear war the United States
often says that the spread of nuclear

weapons poses a grave threat to
international peace and security we often

say that preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons is the foremost objective of U.S.

foreign policy and national security
strategy so if that's the case we must be

willing in principle to use force to stop
the spread of nuclear weapons so then

I think the judgment comes down to a case
by case basis of doesn't make sense and I

think there are certain cases in the world
today like North Korea where a military

strike is not a viable option but as I've
explained I think Iran is different and

so if it gets to this point United States
needs to use force against Iran to stop

the spread of nuclear weapons I think
would really be consistent with the broad

thrust of U.S. foreign policy since
World War two as the most powerful state

on earth United States is often called
upon to take difficult action but

action that on balance I think
contributes to international peace and

security and to human prosperity.

So.

We should all hope it doesn't get to that
point we should all hope that we can solve

this issue diplomatically but if that's
not possible I don't think we should

shirk our responsibility of providing
to international peace and security so

with that I think all in my remarks and
I look forward to questions and

comments.

That's really.

Like.

You know.

Or.

So I just.

Think it's.

Just that.

Security.

Like yeah.

Yeah so for those of you could hear in
the back the question was What is the U.S.

relationship with the international
community with U.N.

Security Council with Iran
look like after a bombing.

I mean the short answer is on balance it's
a lot of those relationships would be

more difficult than they are now but
I think a lot of it would depend on

would depend on the details and depend on
how how we got to that point you know so

I think if it was clear to
the international community that

the United States that the P five plus
one this group of world powers currently

negotiating with Iran did everything in
its power to solve this issue peacefully

we negotiated till the bitter end that
we put forward reasonable proposals and

it was Iran that was the intransigent
party I think then that there would be

much more international support for taking
action and that the aftermath would be.

Easier to manage if on the other
hand it was perceived that Iran

was the reasonable party and it was
the United States that was itching for

a conflict I think that U.S.
reputation would suffer

much more that the aftermath would
be much more difficult to manage so

one place where I think this
affects current policy is.

On Capitol Hill today there are many
Republicans on Capitol Hill who say well

should Congress pass tough
sanctions against Iran now.

And I sometimes consult
with people there and

I say Well depends on what you're trying
to to achieve but I think you know if

you're trying to show to your constituents
back home that you're tough on Iran or

if you're trying to make President Obama's
life difficult maybe that makes sense but

I think from a national security interest
point of view it doesn't make sense

because again I think.

Important to show that the United States
is making every effort to solve this issue

diplomatically and make it very clear
that Iran if negotiations fail as it is I

hope they won't be suspect they will but
it was because Iran was intransigent but

if Congress passes tough new sanctions
Iran uses that as a pretext to withdraw

from the negotiation I think that does
give Iran and much of the international

community kind of a narrative that U.S.
Congress was was at fault here and

I think that's something we want to avoid.

Right.

You know.

It's a good question.

So Russia has provided support
to Iran over the years

the reactors light water reactors don't
pose much of a proliferation risk but

those were provided by by Russia Russia
has promised to provide fuel to Iran

there have been reports that
Russian scientists have

helped Iran with nuclear weapons
designs and other issues so

I think Iran has gotten help
from Russia over the years.

That said Russia has been over the past
few years a more cooperative partner in

the P five plus one negotiations they they
have been helpful maybe not as helpful and

cooperate as we would have liked but
I think they are they have been.

They have been helpful in terms of the
threat that Russia feels from Iran I think

on balance Russia would prefer that
Iran not develop nuclear weapons but

I think they care much less
than the United States does and

I think that's basically also the position
of China actually just got back from

Beijing yesterday when I was talking
about these among other issues and so

China feels the same way they would prefer
that Iran not build nuclear weapons but

they care about it less than we do and

I think it makes sense that they care
about it less than we do I mean for

the United States a nuclear armed
Iran poses more of a direct threat.

You know we've had an adversarial
relationship since one nine hundred

seventy nine the great Supreme Leader
refers to the United States is the great

Satan and we fought a major naval battle
in one thousand nine hundred eight

the U.S. Navy's largest naval battle since
the end of World War two the United States

has allies and partners in the region we
have bases and forces in the region so

a nuclear armed Iran I think is is more of
a direct threat to us where the Russians

and the Chinese don't have as adversarial
relationship they don't have bases and

forces in the region they don't have
allies and partners in the region so

I think on balance they're less concerned
so for now they're being cooperative but

I think you know one concern I have is.

If we don't get a deal by November
twenty fourth which is the deadline

that the negotiators have set for

themselves what I think the most likely
outcome is rather than immediately face

this difficult choice is we'll
just extend the negotiations.

But you know the only reason we got Iran
to this point the only reason Iran was

willing to agree to this
interim deal last year

the only reason well one of the reasons
that would help to convince them to

actually put real curbs on their nuclear
program would be the economic pressure

that we brought to bear through the
negotiations and through the sanctions.

But if we continue to extend the
negotiations out I think there's a risk

that the sanctions pressure
will erode over time and

I think we've already seen since the
interim deal last year that the sanctions

pressure has started to erode and the
Russians and the Chinese in particular.

Are eager to do more business with Iran
that's one of the things that the Chinese

were talking about when I was there last
week that this idea for a new great silk

road that would kind of connect China
through the Middle East to Europe and

Iran is a key node in that network
they're thinking about building so

the Chinese are very eager to start doing
business with Iran if that happens there

are sanctions pressure or
roads in Iran will have even less

incentive to stay at
the negotiating table.

So.

You know.

Right so again three to five years is
worst case scenario that Iran immediately

rebuilds and doesn't encounter any
significant difficulties so that's

the worst case scenario but you know there
are a lot of other possibilities as well

you know it's conceivable that Iran would
decide not to rebuild the program I don't

think likely but it's possible you know
they could make the calculation we've been

working on this program for thirty years
we spent billions of dollars on it and

all we've got to show for it is a damaged
economy and a pile of rubble you know do

we really want to replay this
tape again they might decide no.

Second you know it's conceivable that
other things could happen within

Iranian domestic politics you know
different coalitions come to power

with different views on how to weigh
the economy in the nuclear program.

It's also possible that there be other
international events international

conflict or things that would stop
Iran from continuing the program or

buy buy additional time and then there is
the possibility of if they do rebuild and

don't encounter problems that the United
States could could strike again so

the Israelis call this option mowing
the grass essentially is it when it gets

too high going back in and
cutting it down again.

But the hope of course I think would be
that we don't have to mow the grass that

other things would happen but there is no
guarantee that that a strike prevent Iran

from building nuclear weapons forever but
if we get to this point of no return and

stand by while Iran builds nuclear weapons
we will be guaranteed that Iran has

nuclear capability so I think keeping
the hope of a nuclear Iran alive

is better than immediately acquiescing and
and living with those threats.

For as long as Iran exists and has
nuclear weapons which could be decades or

longer.

If you.

Like these.

All of the early years of
your versus your were.

You know that's a good question
the other example like that the comes to

mind is Libya you know Colonel Gadhafi
in Libya was pursuing.

Programs including a nuclear program
made a deal in two thousand and

three to give up that program privately
the international community provided

him with security assurance and then we
see how that worked out you know with when

the Civil War broke out an international
community intervened and led to him being

murdered in the streets and that wasn't
that was a lesson that wasn't lost on

the Iranian supreme leader or Kim Jong Il
and North Korea they both said.

See this is why you don't give
up your W M D programs so

I think you know Iran I understand
how they believe that nuclear

weapons would contribute to their security
I mean they say they say they're for

most goals are to be able to deter foreign
attack and to become the most dominant

state in the Middle East well if those
are your goals having nuclear weapons

make sense having nuclear weapons helps
you to tear your enemies having nuclear

weapons helps you to become the most
dominant state in the Middle East but Iran

acquiring nuclear weapons while it might
benefit Iran is much more dangerous for

every other country in the Middle East
much more dangerous for the United States

so you know international relations
I think is often about kind of zero

zero sum outcomes where again for somebody
else is a loss for somebody is a loss for

everybody else and I think this is a
classic kind of zero sum game that what's

good for Iran is dangerous to the rest
of the international community.

Good.

Question or.

Top.

All.

In.

All.

This.

Yeah well I think there are two
aspects to that question one is.

What President Obama actually strike
if that was the only option left and

then second how do you make
the case to the American people.

So many people look at the president's
actions over the past few years and

say well you know he doesn't have any
credibility he said he was going to strike

Syria over the use of chemical weapons
when when Assad crossed his red line and

then he didn't say maybe the president's
just bluffing on Iran but I think for.

I think that's the wrong
way to look at it so.

You know one I think we have seen
that President Obama has been

willing to use force
sometimes reluctantly but but

has been willing to use force including
with not with the war on ISIS and

secondly I think the the nuclear
issue is very important for

the president the president has made
global nuclear reductions a key.

Agenda of his key item in his foreign
policy agenda apparently this is been

an issue that's been very close to him
ever since he was a student at Columbia

and I think he understands that Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons a nuclear arms

race in the Middle East is deeply and I
thought a call to this vision of worldwide

nuclear reductions and all of his top
policy advisers who have worked with

him on the White House say matter of fact
that they have no doubt that if it got to

that point he'd be willing to use force
if necessary so Gary say more his top

advisers said this Dennis Ross his top
Middle East adviser has said this so.

My own view is that the president would
be willing to use force if it got to that

point but many people don't believe that
I'm afraid the Iranians might not believe

it I'm afraid our partners the Israelis
might not believe it and so

as you know those of you who study
international politics know threats only

valuable to degree that other people
believe them and so I thought.

There is a credibility problem here and
in the book I actually lay out some

strategies and some things that the
United States can do I think to increase

the credibility of those threats so
I think if the current negotiations

break down the president could set clear
red lines about the development in Iran's

nuclear capabilities that would
trigger use of military action.

And I see you smiling
you might disagree but

I think I make a compelling
case in the book

but.

Yeah well I think it's you know I
think there are a lot of ways we could

communicate that message both in public
speeches by administration officials but

also in private channels and

talk in the book about what
specific red lines would be.

And I think there are other things we
could do as well Congress could pass to

pass an authorization for
the use of military force and

other things so this starts to get to
the domestic political calculation.

So in you opinion surveys when you ask
the American public what are the biggest

threats to the United States the standard
answers are China Iran used to be Iraq and

now Iraq's back up there so I think
the American public understands that Iran

is a problem if you ask how should
we solve the Iranian nuclear issue

the vast majority of Americans
say through diplomacy but

I've seen polls where it's asked if the
president decided to strike Iran would you

stop nuclear proliferation would you
support it and if it's framed in that way

that this is what the president wants to
do then you do get majority support so.

I don't know I think with if there is
presidential leadership on this issue that

there would be public support for a strike
and I think we've seen that you know again

here with ISIS just a year or so ago
there was the public was unwilling to to

use force against Syria and things changed
beheading of a couple of journalists and

and the American public
was willing to support it.

Well.

You know well.

There so it's a question that often comes
up is how does the kind of theology of

the Islamic Republic a fact how
it how it views these things.

And so one thing that's sometimes been
brought up is well you know some people

say well the supreme leader issued a fatwa
against nuclear weapons and said that

nuclear weapons are against the tenets of
Islam but first thing I should say is I'm

not a Muslim theologian so I'm not the
best person to speak to these issues but

what I understand from talking to people
who understand the much better is there's

something of a debate as to whether it was
was actually a foul or not because I guess

the supreme leader said this in a sermon
but the context was about kind of

the political expediency of building
nuclear weapons he didn't really say that

this would be a sin is my understanding
but rather that it didn't make sense for

the Islamic Republic now given
everything that was going on.

And second people say that even if
he did issue a fatwa that those

that that could change that.

First of all that Muslim clerics and
Shia clerics do change their kind

of religious rulings from time to time and
that the supreme interest for the supreme

leader and for the Islamic Republic is the
survival of the Islamic Republic itself so

he could always justify anything in
terms of saying it's necessary for

the survival of the Islamic Republic so
even if it was a.

Why he could change it in the future and
saying this is what's in the best interest

of the Islamic Republic today so
personally I don't put much stock in this

religious supposed religious prohibition
against building nuclear weapons.

And you know I think in general in
international politics you know you should

listen to what others are saying but
I think more telling is what they're doing

and what they're doing is inconsistent
with the idea that nuclear weapons

are.

Real.

That's a good question so
it's really hard to know.

How much the the public of Iran
supports building nuclear weapons

in part because you know the government
explicitly says that they're not

interested in nuclear weapons they're
only interested in nuclear power so

all the opinion polling data that we
have is on the nuclear program and so

the nuclear program continuation of the
nuclear program the right to enrich all of

those things poll highly among the Iranian
public they're all very popular but

there aren't go to public opinion polls
about do you support building nuclear

weapons again because the government
says that's not even in the cards.

Now I think the the public has certainly
been the Iranian economy has been

devastated by the sanctions.

But it's the economy has been
improving over the past year in part

because of the center and
deal that was passed.

Now I think it's very unlikely that
Rouhani the president Rouhani.

Have been elected if it weren't for
the sanctions he campaigned explicitly on

improving the Iranian economy
of getting sanctions lifted and

was was elected through he was on the
narrow slate of pre-approved candidates

approved by the supreme leader but
he was the more moderate of the bunch and

I think the Iranian people voted for
him because they wanted the comic relief.

So I do think the Iranian public wants
wants to get out from under these

sanctions as you know though the what
the Iranian public wants isn't isn't that.

Isn't that central because they're not
the decision makers it's not democracy

the supreme leader is the key decision
maker on on these nuclear issues so

at the end of it it is so what the Iranian
public wants is not that relevant and

even what President Rouhani and his
foreign minister Zarif want is not that

relevant I mean I do think
that Rouhani and Zarif.

I might be wrong but my own view is
that they are willing to make some

serious concessions on the nuclear
program in order to revive the economy

My sense is that they really do
care about reviving the economy and

think that Iran's interests are better
served by reviving the economy than by

pursuing the nuclear program but they're
not the decision makers either it's

the supreme leader in my view is that
the supreme leader is incredibly

unwilling to to make any compromise
whatsoever on the nuclear program so

we'd like to have nuclear weapons and
sanctions relief too but if you have

to choose looks like he's going to choose
the nuclear program I think we're seeing

that now in the negotiations in a number
of statements this was supreme leader has

laid out red lines of things he's
not willing to compromise on and

it's basically all the things that we care
about and he's saying he's not willing

to dismantle a single centrifuge so
that's nonstarter for

us in the negotiations we need
a substantial rollback of their existing

enrichment capabilities for a deal and the
supreme leader says That's nonnegotiable.

That you know this is all.

Worth it for you having.

Just.

All this always.

But that is that.

Only the jurors will realize this.

You know there's like.

So right so you know it's not that
you say this is the rationals.

You know if you just close.

It was that I think it was literally
more of a sort of love without a reason

about why why you're here and

then you also mentioned that
you don't want to be in that.

Region please let me date back and be.

Well military capability.

Powerful see another way.

You can conventional wars so
you know so on so

the second question first so
I think it is.

Yeah so I think you know it's
conceivable that Iran could be

the most dominant state in the Middle East
without nuclear weapons but

I think having nuclear weapons would help
I mean who do we think of as the most

dominant state in East Asia Japan
earth China you know their economies

are roughly similar size although China
is a surpassed in this growing but

I think we think of China and part
because of its military capabilities and

because it's a nuclear power I think Japan
would be seen as more of a dominant power

in East Asia if it had nuclear
nuclear weapons so I think if what

Iran really wants to do is become the most
dominant state in the Middle East then

nuclear weapons would contribute to that
on deterrence so I mean I've written a lot

on deterrence and I go into it in
the book but I basically think that.

You know many people I think think
of deterrence very simplistically

I think they think of it as kind of on or

off you know can this country be
deterred or not and I think that.

It's the wrong way to think about it I
think I think of it more as kind of a case

of continuing I think the question
is what risk of nuclear war

is a particular state willing
to run in a particular crisis

because if this kind of deterrence on an
off thing were right we would expect that

countries would be willing to run any
risk of nuclear war whatsoever whenever

there was a conflict with a nuclear
state that immediately backed down but

we see historically that's not what
happens rather countries play these games

of nuclear brinkmanship you know nuclear
chain chicken time and time again and

they explicitly take steps to raise the
risk of nuclear war in an attempt to try

to force their adversary to back down so
they make nuclear threats put nuclear

weapons on high alert delegate nuclear
launch authority to low level commanders.

And so I think when that happens the there
is a real risk of things spinning out of

control indeed that's the logic that's
that's why deterrence works deterrence

wouldn't work unless there was a real risk
of things spinning out of control so.

Yeah exactly but but that means
there's a risk of nuclear war and so

I think you know when I when I look at
the all these crises we've been and

it's not this deterrence works idea it's
not the right way to think about it I

mean basically it's playing Russian
roulette over and over again and so

far there hasn't been a ball in
the chamber but eventually there will be.

A lot.

Of it wrong it's worse.

Than Words you know we.

People talk about.

We don't have a lot of.

Version in terms of just what's your I
don't know you've done a lot of work on.

A lot.

Of good.

Things.

You know well so I think some people
are skeptical about how nuclear weapons

contribute to coercion because they say
it's you know it's incredible that you

would say you know do what we want or
else we're going to start a global

thermonuclear war and I think that's right
that's not a not a credible threat but

I think that there are other ways you can
use nuclear weapons as a tool of course

and so one I think that you know as
I pointed out before Right now Iran.

We know Iran restrains its foreign policy
and you know and we know there and

internal debates they explicitly say if we
go too far this could lead to an attack

but if they had nuclear weapons and could
deter foreign attack that would give them

the freedom to step up some of these other
activities so that's one way they can to

contribute by providing a shield that
allows them to be more aggressive in other

ways more aggressive in conventional
use of conventional forces of aiding

proxies in terrorist groups and just in
their diplomatic strategy more broadly and

that's one way the second ways they can
play games of nuclear brinkmanship you

know something they can't do now but if
they get into a crisis future crisis with

Israel if they get into a future crisis
with United States they can raise the risk

of nuclear war they can put nuclear
weapons on alert threaten nuclear war and

so you know put yourself
in the shoes of the U.S.

president you know you have some objective
you want to achieve in the Middle East and

Iran threatens nuclear war in response
you know would you be deterred you

know maybe you would say this is
incredible so you go ahead but

then they put nuclear
weapons on high alert.

And you start to think twice but you know
I just don't believe I'm going to go ahead

and then they start to use force in
some other lower ways you know each time

the risk of nuclear war is raised so
I don't think that the United States or

the other countries would necessarily be
deterred in each and every instance but

I think it does become much harder for
other countries to act in

ways that are contrary to Ron's interest
once it has nuclear weapons and so

I think that's the way you can use
it as a course of tool as well.

Wow.

So I think there was a time where there
was a real risk of an Israeli strike

you know going back before two
thousand and twelve or so.

But for a long time Israel's leaders
were warning of this stone of the unity

basically a point where Iran's nuclear
program would be so well developed and so

well protected that Israel's military
option was no longer very good and

I think we're in that zone of immunity now
and I think the Israelis understand that

especially with the opening of this
facility at Qom which is buried in

the side of a mountain under two hundred
ninety five feet of rock Israel doesn't

really have good military capabilities
to go after that we have much better

capabilities to go after that so I think
there's very little risk of an Israeli

strike anytime soon that said I
think the Israelis are serious when

they say this is an existential threat and
they won't want that to happen so

I think if it becomes clear that diplomacy
doesn't work ever run continues to advance

its program if it becomes clear that the
United States isn't willing to use force

at the end of the day then at that point
I think Israel probably will go ahead and

just destroy what it can knowing full
well that it's only buying maybe

a year or two but but
something that that's

better than than simply giving up and
allowing Iran to have nuclear weapons so

I think right now Israel's best options
run through the White House they'd like to

see tougher sanctions they'd like to see
the United States take military action but

those are two things that only
the United States can can really do

effectively right now so I think right now
their strategy is to influence Washington

to get tougher on Iran and
the risk of a strike is low but but

that could change depending
on how things develop.

You know it's a good question and some my
friends remark that it seems like Iran

has been you know six months away from
a nuclear weapon for like twenty years and

so how do we know that they're
really two to three months away and

I talk about this in the book I think of
a lot of it is because most the people

making those estimates are predictions to
be frank didn't really know what they were

talking about so there's a lot of nonsense
out there but the estimates now are based

on their technical assessments based
on Iran's existing centrifuges based on

the capability of the centrifuges you know
it's basically a technical estimate of how

fast could they enrich the material they
have with the centrifuges they have and

there is remarkable consistency of these
technical assessments by experts based

in the United States and elsewhere so you
know they're you know could be off by a by

a few weeks or something but
it's roughly two to three months.

So how do we know know when to strike Well
they said before the the red line has to

be one bomb's worth of highly
enriched uranium to ninety percent

because once they have that the game's
over as I pointed out what I

say in the book I think the red lines that
would trigger a strike would be if Iran

at some point decided to
enrich to higher levels so

right now as part of the interim deal
it's agreed to enrich to no more than

five percent in the past it had been rich
to twenty percent but to build nuclear

weapons they would have to enrich to
ninety percent now that might sound like

a lot you know ninety seems like a lot
more than twenty but it's actually

technically quite simple I use the analogy
sometimes of riding a bike in Richmond is

kind of like riding a bike that the hard
part is learning how to do in the first.

Getting up and getting your balance but

once you're up it's you know pretty
easy to put a little bit faster

it's a case with enrichment you know
figuring out at all is the hard part but

once you're doing it going to ninety
percent is actually pretty pretty easy so

if they started reaching beyond
five twenty thirty forty percent

I think that would be a red line
force action second if they kicked

out international inspectors and
we no longer had to because we have

inspectors there now they're visiting
these nuclear facilities every day but

if the Iran kicked out the inspectors we'd
have to assume I think that they were up

to no good that there was a reason
they asked the inspectors to leave so

I think that would be a red line now those
would both be pretty blatant I think

on Iran's part it would basically signal
that they were building nuclear weapons so

they'll probably be smarter than that so
the third red line.

Is much more complicated but
what Iran could essentially do and

what I would do if I were on is if I
wanted to break out rather than doing it

blatantly like that I would slowly build
up my number of centrifuges Soli increase

the sophistication of the centrifuges
slowly increase the stockpiles of

stockpiled five percent or twenty percent
enriched uranium because as you do that

you can strength this dash time from two
to three months down to two shorter so

when we got the interim deal last year
the breakout time was about six weeks and

we extended it to three
months in the interim deal so

at some point they could get down below
six weeks and conceivably even today's And

so some people have called this the.

Bunch of silly names for
the undetectible breakout or

that you're reducible minimum is.

A term that some people have used but
basically they could get to a point where.

You know even if they don't blatantly
build nuclear weapons the program would be

so well developed that they could
dash before we could respond their

dash time would kind of be
shorter than our reaction time

because again you know our reaction time
is not just how quickly we could carry out

a strike which is probably is something we
could organize and a matter of days but we

also want to build international support
we want to build domestic support and

so you have to think about how
long that kind of diplomat.

The campaign before hand would take so if
Iran's dash time ever got to narrower than

our response time I think that
that would force action as well.

But if they don't do those things in
my view we aren't going to be forced

into that into that choice.

Let me intervene here time
in cheek we were joking and

that was going to be following
the undersecretary of state

life chairman former vice chairman
the joint chiefs of staff so

we didn't think that you know you have
much left to say the measure up but

I think we can honestly say he really
stimulated a lot of good questions and

a lot of good discussion and
obviously the book is is a sensation and

we should the best and thank you very
much for coming thanks for having.