Here today Professor Moore is an assistant professor of international researchers for research on all intersect areas. The first being reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction and the second understanding the role of the merging you're working at that intersection of science that's where it's all yours one of the we're most for weapons of mass destruction and the national security person in your use technology because all three are mystery University Illinois previously in the office of the secretary of defense as well we don't see him as an advisor or cheap of us on the part of the very last one so that the four of us are thank you for the kind of back and thank you. Marla for your leadership role in a number of these endeavors. So I'm going to talk a little bit broadly in terms of a number of these issues that I've seen. And my experiences serving in a policy advising a policy making a policy implementing a policy executing role and then how that intersects with some of the work I do here as a scholar. So the first thing I like to highlight especially for students but sometimes this can be quite sort of illustrated of a whole number of different things is that I started out. As a hard core physical experimental scientist. And the sort of scope and path that I took to where I am now in these other positions that I've held there was no linear path. You know this was something that was very much exploratory and entrepreneurial. As was mentioned my undergrad and my Ph D. are both in chemistry. Although both of those. Degrees in the work I did was very much at intersection particularly the intersection between chemistry and biomedical sciences as well as some work with me at the intersection of chemistry with physics and material sciences and Charles engineering. Before Christmas Ph D. I actually started was co-founder of the sensing company sort of have this entrepreneur spirit which I like to see and what it was one of the things that attracted me to attack was that Georgia Tech. Very much has an entrepreneurial spirit about it encouraging to a young faculty. As I was finishing up my third year at the company that was started by my research advisors a Ph D. and three other of his students. We've been running it largely like a research group. Which is an effective method to run an academic research program but is not an effective method to run a company. Part of that was we had to make a shift to focus on one single product and the focus was not the one that I wanted so I separated twenty nine separate things got bought out of the company and very much made an intentional choice to shift from being an experimental scientist whether it be in a academic lab or a. Entrepreneurial some sort of done. Two technical security studies. Did that through a number of different places highlighted by my time at c sec. It's given us. So as was mentioned. I've served twice in the Department of Defense in what ended up being very different worlds two thousand and five two thousand and seven formally I was science and technology advisor to the assistant to the secretary of defense for new Cambaia to the nuclear chemical biological defense try to put that on a business card that becomes S. and T. advisor to the D.N.C. be. The reality is I ended up working a lot mostly with the chemical biological defense program. And in that role there were two sort of main thrust to my work. One of them is reflected in this first piece which is drafting program strategy guidance P.S.G.. The program strategy guidance is in the Department of Defense is the policy that drives the palm process the. Program operational memorandum palm or other words the budget. So it was I wrote the strategy this was kind of funny as I get there in August about three weeks in and I'm told. Hey when you write the P S G For emerging technologies for Ken biodefense program. And so this is the first of things like Wow you get put in these positions and it is you hit the ground running. There is very little sort of let me understand this program I've never served in the department of defense before it was here right. The P.S.G. with respect to emerging technologies particularly nanotechnology as applied for development of countermeasures for chemical and biological agents. That then a fax. The Palm which is the budget. And one of the pieces that one realizes quite quickly is that budget drives a whole number of things very important driving the budget. So that was one sort of part of my role was injecting bringing really emerging cutting edge science a broad swath of science into these programs and the other piece that I did was I interacted with a lot of external groups. External to our office that were also within the Department of Defense. I represented the D.O.D. in the inner agency and then I also went out and represented the D.O.D. internationally. You know so this ability to communicate highly technical concepts doesn't matter whether scientific or programatic to a wide swath of people including internationally was sort of the skill set that that required there. Can I talk about what we're doing in the C.B.D. P. biodefense program. Cross the Potomac. You know with people who are in Health and Human Services people who are in dark armor state. People or in Department of Energy in the intelligence community and then internationally. Someone highlight two programs that I was part of it. Different levels just to illustrate some of the kind of work that I did when I was serving in the office of the secretary of defense. So transformational medical technology is an issue to have the T.M.T. I I'm originally this was called the Green Line and the way we came up with the name for the green line was they listed the different projects and there was a budget calculation and they literally put a line that was green in the M.S. excel sheet. And it was that was the green law and it just happened. Somebody chose it to be green. So this program initially. It's called the Green Line that because you know sort of names of thing sometimes have a knish internationally have sort of disconnects that you only know if you are there. But I also share that anecdote to illustrate how important all these things with regard to budget are. So this medical countermeasures initiative was an effort. In major effort to redirect the Ken bio defense program. From approaching development to biological agents in the same way that they've been doing it since basically the eight hundred eighty S. to a new approach. And this sort of represents in some ways this first column is a list of biological bio terrorism bio weapons the way we approach that traditionally is you have one agent you develop a vaccine for you have another agent you develop another vaccine for it. Well if one if you don't know what the agent. That's potentially leaves a lot of individuals who are going to be have to be vaccinated and the other reality is the bio engineered aspect that is how does new technology is changing the way agents might be developed that vaccines would not be able to be effective against. So instead of this approach the underlying idea of the concept here was to shift the so instead of focusing on the bug. Let's focus on the human body. Increases in the understanding's of the way the human immune system works. Leveraging those. So instead of having to get twelve vaccinations. It's a you've been exposed to something. OK We've got a therapeutic that addresses all hemorrhagic fevers. We've got a third. Reputed that addresses all gram positive bacteria. So leveraging the human body and understandings advancements in technology. As a fundamentally different approach. So there's a great deal of underlying science behind this underlying technology and this indeed up being the only science and technology program basic research called out in the two thousand and six quadrennial defense review the Q.T.R.. So that's major in and of itself was a five billion dollar effort in the cute two thousand and six cutie artificially launched in two thousand and seven. So first of all you have five billion dollars You've got to get from someplace else. Meaning what it's called reprogramming where we get this money from to put into this. So there's a whole lot of effort had to be put in to figuring out which programs was this going to be pulled from. Because you can't make money out of nowhere. Even in the Department of Defense or convincing Congress and the other members of the executive branch who will convince him there's executive branch particularly O.M.B. to increase the budget and then Congress to fund it. So you come up with a great idea. You've got to go through just to get it implemented there's a whole lot of work that goes through it and then there's the next part so you get this passed. You get money. Then you have to execute it and implemented on the side of doing the program Maddux. This was largely done at the office of the secretary of defense level the implementation level then went down to the program managers. And the programs were not the people came up with this. So that they necessarily have the same level of buy in as the people who initially came up with it. You also have program managers all the program managers who I encountered with a couple exceptions were all. Really smart people. Frequently they were engineers. They were mechanical engineers electrical engineers folks have been doing and people have been doing this for a long period of time. And so now you're going to bring in some engineers. There's nothing wrong engineers engineers are wonderful. To manage a program that is cutting edge molecular biology. Do you think that they were the ones who are going to be able to have the insight to have the poll the knowledge to be able to make the selections. Well there are mechanisms by which you try to deal with but you've got this fundamental disconnect between the ideas here who's driving this and then how it's being implemented. What turned out this T.M.T. eye of the course of the last five years has no not been very successful. And if you read any of the news reports any of the reviews always blames the science. So I suppose they were to they were they were looking out to far in the science. Well you know it really wasn't the science I would argue if you go through and look at it actually had a lot more to do with the program Maddux and the. Implementation there whole bunch of different factors that one can highlight I'm just pulling out one piece here to sort of illustrate. That blaming the science we see this in a whole number of different programs once familiar with the Future Combat System F.C.S. blame the science. Well actually it's a lot more to do with how things are organized the people. So it's less the science. It's more the people. It's more the structure it's all the social science aspects and the implementation of the science usually. Real quick just another program which we tried to get launched this one was on six was not successful in getting funded. The one piece. I want to pull out is this was done in two thousand. Thousand and six two thousand and seven we have met a data information interface the sort of basic science advances. If you were writing this to day you would call a Big Data. You know big data has become the buzz word. And that's another thing to be cognizant of buzz words can become very important in policy because they have prestigious because people sort of associate things with them and often so like Pull pull that back. What does that mean. There's a home people have been talking about big data for a whole number of years just didn't have this cute little jargon to it. Couple other fun things. So the Pentagon has a library of Pentagon library card very proud of that. And then this picture is a little hard to see and I like to say that the so this was two thousand and five two thousand and seven when I was in O.S.D. it was Rumsfeld's two gates as the secretary of defense. So we had a lot dealing with Iraq at that time I like to say I did find the W M D's they were in central Missouri. So this is at Fort Leonard Wood which is in central Missouri doing live agent training. So this is me. This is a room I'm running around with some of this. Detection paper looking for Sarah and. Looking for V.X. which uses how you were trained in your personal protective gear to deal with these agents there also was anthrax in there. Interesting land if there is not small for mustard. So for mustard it's much more difficult to deal with in the United States because sulfur musters a carcinogen. Otherwise known as mustard gas and appropriately. But V.X. and sarin and you get that written there that we were interacting with so an opportunity that not very very very few people who are not in these programs get to have. No other piece that I learned quite well when I was in O.S.D. and it was further emphasized more recently is that one really should get foreign language credit when you're dealing with the. Defense. You just even notice so far I'm trying to be cognizant of the acronyms. But everything gets set in acronyms and it is it's foreign language and that's part of how you show that you are part of the culture. At the same time as I frequently tried to convince a six a colonel who I worked with when you talk about the G three five seven outside of department of the army. You either communicate one of two things you get people who just give you blank stares. Or if you talk about the G three five seven to most people. What you are affectively communicating is that you cannot communicate to them. You cannot speak outside of your language your little jargon three five seven is the plan strategies and operations that's part of the headquarters the department of defense headquarters is part of Army and it's really really important. If you're in the Army. Anyone else that isn't. On the other hand of course always D.-D. often suffers from things where they don't communicate one. Well don't communicate well for example. Looking at the new combating W M D strategy. There's a graphic in it that one of my guys uniformed guys described this. It looks like a unicorn on the page. If you're trying to get some buy in from the guys who are going to be executing your strategy. You might not want to make it look like a unicorn barfed on the page in bright colors but I'm not the one who's going to be executing this. So are thinking about how things go forward in communications very very important. So more recently two thousand and twelve twenty thirteen. I served on. Chief of Staff of the army Spence General Ray Odierno most people know him he was serving. As in Iraq as the commander. He is now the chief of staff the army who is the highest ranking Army officer except for General Martin Dempsey who right now is the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was also comes from the Army. So he is. The head of the army with respect to recruiting training doctrine equipping Manning. Chiefs the chiefs of each of the services. Are not the ones who do the war fighting that's done through the combatant commanders So CENTCOM commander or the pay comes to the Central Command Steel's of the Middle East consciousness with the Pacific is a summit came out of Goldwater Nichols a reorganization Cold War nickers Nichols on one thousand eight hundred six that reorganized the Defense Department such that the service chiefs like General Odierno are not the ones who are in charge of the actual war fighting it's done under the combatant commanders and commanders can combine command joint forces. Those S.S.G.. Was inspired by the chief of naval operations S.S.G. which is now I believe it's thirty second year. This is the inaugural year lashed year so took the Army a little bit longer to initiate this program. We were thirty individuals we started out being thirty individuals. Ten military officers captains through colonels one get promoted to Brigadier General while we were there. The majority were from the army but we also had two from the Navy and two from the Air Force then there were. Well there were two there were twenty military officers ten of whom were. So colonel level and then ten were junior officers is the only place if you're a lieutenant colonel you're considered a junior officer. And then there were ten civilians. I was the only academic and in many ways I was the only one who I would consider to be sort of a real civilian in the sense of the other civilians were from the Department of Army Department the army or from the DIA we were from the intelligence community. So I was going to sort of coming from the external side. So you got this mix of people most important part of this is we were poured exclusively to General Odierno. We did not report to anyone else in order to him so that gives you an incredible amount of independence. It gives you autonomy. It also gives you access. If I approach someone and said I'm calling from the chief of staff of the Army's S S G. They were going to talk to me. You know so it's this procedure and access that came with this we were able to leverage the resources in in intellectual capacity of external and internal organizations meaning we were actively encouraged we were expected and that was part of we were Jews to go outside of the army. In this their number of different ways that this became important particularly some of the work that I ended up leaving which had to do with counter weapons of mass destruction. I was able to because of personal contacts make an appointment with one of the National Security staff members. And then assess. To me it's no you know I just email off you know we all do you know we've sort of in my office on hey you know haven't seen you for a while I'm now working for the General Odierno like to come over and called my team members. Now the guys who are my team. For example ten a colonel in the Army colonel in the army for them to go in. A male off to a national security staff member would be verboten. I mean they just skipped over all sorts of hierarchical levels. And it was interesting when we went and had this meeting. We're sitting at this table over in the are all Eisenhower Old Executive Building. And. The N.S.A.'s member who I'm not going to name because we're being recorded makes the comment. That. She was just sitting down with some guys from the Army recently sky mice my quest ball. That's the deputy secretary of the army. So to her the people who she's interacting with are the secretary of the army and you know the deputy secretary of the army. Here I'm bringing over two majors a lieutenant colonel and a colonel. Access these guys who frequently are the ones who are driving the army completely disconnected who have the operational responsibilities completely disconnected. So that was an important bridge in a piece that sometimes we don't think about. As I work through this one of the areas of research that I've brought back to tech. Is this issue of divide between scholarly work policy and strategy and sort of the operational tactical level. A great deal has been written are Jonah I will not join I from Harvard has written a lot on sort of the scholarly policy divide. You know how academics today physically in international relations and political science were divorced from the policy world. If you think if the if the gap between scholarly and policy is like this. Gap between policy and actual operations is about one hundred times that. And you know so this is been has not been well addressed in the literature. In particular I'm looking at it through the lens of looking at us through W M D issues in terms of how do you deal with us what these assumptions are at the strategic and policy level how frequently divorced who are lacking in context. They are to the operational in the tactical Now of course tactics and operations are supposed to be driven by strategy. But if your strategy has minimal relation to the tactical operation the people are actually going to execute that you end up having a problem. OK. So this is picture most everyone in the office so I say most everyone has their few people who are kind of the super secret black ops folks who didn't want their pictures taken lighting is a little bit difficult. So I'm back here and usually you can see me in the red hair. You see mostly military office this is General Odierno picture in front of the Pentagon. One of the other things that's kind of neat is. I ended up doing most of my work in partnership with this guy in my office mate. And I find it's an interesting sort of comparison to those of us who are in the Ivan Allen college interacting with folks across campus that we you know so here I was the academic. Scientists are scholar. I'm partnered with a hardcore infantry officer. It was so we're very very very different in our backgrounds and our experiences in our outlooks. For us. It looked it was was you know first of all we got along well. So you got to have that. Billeted to interact. But it was the fact that when no matter where we went. If we were talking about combating W M D. I had the bone Pheidias with regard to science side and the policy side and he had the bone a few days with respect to the army side and knowing the tactical and the operations. So in some ways like the I.A.C. college of engineering that we frequently encounter here on Georgia Tech. It was the strength of us being so different and we built this partnership that enabled us to be most effective particularly as we were dealing interagency and dealing with operational parts of the army and it was great fun because of the little things where I could ask questions and I could be so I could frankly could be the one who didn't know. And sometimes as you start asking these questions if I'm asking. And I'm down to the eighty second Airborne. And I start asking a question about something you know it's OK for me to say well I don't know that I don't understand the scope he expects me to understand infantry maneuvers that's not my role. So don't need will need to ask questions that then got us to pieces that were revealing sometimes of gaps. Revealing of assumptions were revealing a vulnerabilities that they looking at from the operational side that very tactical side in this disconnect with the strategy and the policy says turned out to be one of the neatest parts of the whole experience was you know this partnering with someone a very very different background. So what we are is I supposed to do this was the task or that we got last year and by then make recommendations to the chief General Odierno on what he can do today and over the ten year a C.S.A. chief serve for four years to prepare the Army for twenty thirty. So a fairly narrow. Arrow's scope as far as what we might do being hyperbolic there obviously. How did we approach this. So we approach it with some what we called research questions research. You know in quotes there because we knew we had different methodologies than you would be invoking in an academic or scholarly setting. Really what we're looking at was three different areas. To think about in terms of the design and the employment of the force. So sort of the pointy end we were and we weren't interested in training we weren't interested in education we weren't looking at recruiting. We were looking at if we're going to actually employ or deep ploy to force. What is it going to look like. So first was this trust question of content twenty thirty. What's the point of the military. What's the point of the army. Is the point of the army to be armed Peace Corps. In order that you go out and do advisory and assistance so counterinsurgency. But in you and even more focused that this is what the Army is for or is the point of the army to go out and seize and hold territory that sometimes might involve use of lethal force. And here's a genuine question that needs to be addressed. Design structure how we can design the army. Right now the Army is designed around a concept called the great combat teams P.C.T.'s. And the one recommendation that I keep saying over and over again is that the army could do one thing it stop using the the phrase B C T. So like the G three five seven. Unless you're in the Army. Nobody knows what P.C.T. is. This has implications for the army particularly at the higher level in terms of communicating its narrative to folks like Congress. When the Air Force comes and says we need more planes. Well we need a fighter group even if the congressional staffers really don't know what a fight or group consists of the way the ones who are on the Haskin the SAS Senate Armed Service and the House Armed Service Committee. Do they tend to be very very knowledgeable but if you can go to the actual congressional members frequently and say me to fight a rip game I know what a fighter group is but they have some idea. You say you know we need a carrier group bunch of ships they have some idea. For you if you go and say we need you know forty five B. C T's. What's A B C T. A B C T is a is approximately thirty five hundred soldiers. Sort of the unit which the army is built on. Well it's how do you communicate what are the needs of your organization particularly to the people who make the decisions. This force structure right now the Army is dealing with you know how big is the army going to be is a major issue yesterday or the day before I forget secretary of defense Haykel made an announcement about how much smaller the army is going to get well in these these numbers although you know sperm an external perspective. It almost seems like they're pulling numbers out of a hat. Sometimes they just put the numbers out that these numbers are supposed to be based on decisions regarding what are likely threats and what are the needed capabilities. Well if the army can't communicate. You know sort of the capabilities and that is the people it needs. It ins of effectively losing. This past summer something called the skimmer DZIEDZIC choices Management Review and the army did not do well in the scam or. It lost and I would argue a large part of that was because they did not communicate they did not have a coherent narrative to communicate. Why they needed their numbers and their capabilities. Now there are other reasons too. To be honest but you know that is a is one significant piece of the puzzle. Capabilities capabilities is essentially the jargon. For technology. This is everything from your vehicles or ground combat vehicle to guns to personal protective equipment. So all of one of the capabilities underlying that how what are you going to invest in what's the sort of theoretical construct although they wouldn't call it that what's the theory driving how you appropriate your investments in order to start attacking this problem. We used a scenario in methodology. We looked at two very different scenarios that came from. Defense planning guidance scenarios looking at what we call the large scenario in the small scenario large scenario has to do with seizing and securing chemical biological radiological and or nuclear and then you're doing direct action or wide area security so that means you see that you secure these sites in the presence of anime forces. So you've got it's not it's a non permissive environment in a large non-permissive environment kind of looks like something that's going on in the Middle East now or you know was was proposed potentially in last August and we have the small just counterterrorism in the Neo is a noncombatant evacuation operation that is getting individuals like state department member. Like USA ID folks or other American citizens out of a situation in which there is conflict. In ways this looks a little bit like what's going on in there. What has been going on in either. The Central African Republic or South Sudan. So as we rework through these different scenarios. What we did found was that there were a number of sort of key pieces that we could identify that were problems. The current implant solutions were not were not adequate to Saul non-discretionary those things that the army can't say no. That becomes very important. So these are nondiscretionary. And then time sensitive. Because if you have a very long period of time to build up to something. It's a lot easier to do a lot of things. You know. And March of two thousand and thirteen or two thousand and three. When the United States went into Iraq. There was a long buildup that did not have to happen within two weeks and whether or not want to agrees with that action. The reality is looking at it from an operational perspective we had a long buildup to be able to pretty persistent troops to prove resistance stocks to do a little adjusting. If you don't have that time. If you have to get there in a short time. Say for example a nation state in Northeast Asia suddenly collapses and we want to secure their nuclear sites so they're not transferred to non-state actors or terrorist groups something you might have to do very quickly. So as we're working through these way identify five different focus areas and these were the areas that we emphasized into a great deal of research different members of my group my group was five of us were looking at this for sizing so I already highlighted this idea for sizing us how big is the force to do the required probably. So I ended up doing a lot of work in this area this area and this one. I didn't do as much in here. So the soft C.F. integration so that special operations forces and conventional forces. How do they integrate right now seventy percent of your special operations forces come from the Army. That's your army rangers your state your state. Special forces the Green Berets and under one twenty a sore those Special Operations Aviation aka the guys who flew the helicopters that carried the SEALs into Pakistan. So you get. Seventy percent of your operators who are in soft are coming from the army yet because they're part of SOCOM because they're part of soft they're seen as separate from the conventional forces invention army the infantry the the artillery and the armor the tank guys. So how are these better integrated particularly if I'm within the reality that when most of Congress. And a whole great deal of O S D looks at the solution to everything. You've got a problem. Send in saw. You have a problem. Send in saw SOCOM has done it. Xcept shuttle job of communicating its narrative. On the other hand the army perhaps has not done nearly as a good job of communicating its narrative. So the most recent Again the most recent announcement. So try to find table made there were two things that were going to get increases in the budget. Cyber Defense and. Soft special operations. You know so again it comes down to money because money enables you to do things. I'm capabilities development. So sense. Pretty much about the last thirty years. If you look at capabilities development in the. Army. It is described as a triad. So this is this is the theoretical construct that they use where you're doing a balance between lethality. Mobility and survivability survivability has been emphasized over the last thirty years above the other two in the Army and in the last twelve years. In the context of I E D's survivability has been the over arching. And assists and capability developments that is how do you ensure that the soldiers who are deployed come back alive are not killed by I E D's. The ground combat vehicle which was to be a replacement for. The infantry carrier vehicle. Let's replay a V. and new vehicle is needed as they were designing this ground combat vehicle going through and developing in the acquisition process it became a seventy ton vehicle. You can drive a seventy ton vehicle down our interstates without the interstates being destroyed much less try to imagine driving a seventy ton vehicle in Southeast Asia over wouldn't bridges. The reason it became seventy tons was because they were putting literally putting heavy metal plates on the bottom. Based on the assumption that we're going to be in the ground. And what's one of the best ways to deal fight is you just put more bulk on it. This was the approach. So there are two there are number of problems with that to our well articulate first of all I did just one of them and say you can't get these you just if you decrease your mobility to the point where you can only drive in a very short plate number of places and the other one is this is assuming that the major issue. I E D's in the ground is. It continued to be the major threat. As opposed to you know something that's coming through the air you know because your body you're putting all of your bulk on the bottom. So this emphasis on the survivability we made the recommendation of a shift from survivability to mobility or lethality the Air Force has actually their emphasis is on mobility. Stealth aircraft. This is something where you you. If a stealth. The air accident a stealth aircraft is not detected a stealth aircraft does not have armor. You know if you if a stealth aircraft is actually hit with a missile or with something a lot smaller. It's not going to function. So the approach is we're going to make something that can't you can't detect it. It's actually very weak structure with respect to resistance to threats. So their impulses has been in mobility many ways the Navy has also approach. Mobility the army has gone with survivability so they need to shift that construct. Strategic reach this becomes a issue that largely has to do with how does the army get places the army does not have any of its own ability. The Army has very little organic meaning its own resources to get it someplace the army depends on ships or planes and most of those planes belong to the Air Force and the ships belong to the Navy. So it's how do you interact with the these are joint problems. So carrier W M D operations is where I actually spent most of my time going to articulate a little bit more actually a sense of time are going to move forward. Kerry W M D issues. We love. It did them from the perspective of internal to the army and then also the army. So again this recognition of first of all you've got this major policy operations divide where what's coming out of O.S.D. in coming out of the White House the National Security Council national security staff. Is not coherent with what are the Army's capabilities what the Army thinks that's going to be able to do. And we also to focus internally and the major driver on this is we're. It's seen as an increasing threat to national security particularly as more states and more types of after you have access to these agents So the problem is not getting smaller. The problem is getting bigger both in terms of actual numbers and diversity. The potential adversaries do not all look like the former Soviet Union. They have completely different types of abs hers. So it's a increasing threat and it's increasing complex threat and we have these these disconnects. So our number one recommendation came out to be only the cam the counter W M D mission. Right now the counter W M D mission or I should say when I left in June of two thousand and thirteen. The counter W M D mission was dispersed throughout the army there was no seeing sort of belly button there was no one in charge of C W M D. In the army. So the recommendation that I made was the chief of staff of the Army up point someone in he can do that he can designate one of his three stars. He has that ability to be the. The centrally have oversight over the entire C W M D. Mish. And within the army. Other recommendations were things that might seem trivial but actually to me very important one that one of our recommendations it's a has already been acted upon was to change the name of the twentieth Support Command twentieth cbs Support Command sub com It's the operational group that has the majority of the Army's counter WM D. expertise in terms of personnel. But when the rest of the army hears support command. They think these are people who are bringing logistics supplies. So there are a whole bunch of historical and organizational reasons why they got this name. But that name that it had conveyed mate created problems. So one of our recommendations was just change it to the twentieth C.B.R. any command. And this had been suggested before but it was sort of hadn't had that level and this is you news ing something that's going through the Chief. No we did not. We never spoke for the chief to be very explicit we did not speak for the chief. But we were coming from his office. So also working with other people all about how you build your coalition. Working with other people they are actually already changed the name. So there are some of the internal pieces extra only because counter W M D is an interagency it's a cross U.S.G. it's not a C. no single agency. This Mission Space. Our recommendation is that the army advocate for ownership of W M D A limitation. In the event of a Syria. Scenario is it going to be the air force of the Navy who is going to go in and actually secure those sites. If the United States was to. Try to secure sites in Syria. You know it's going to be overwhelmingly soldiers from the Army. The elimination the actual destruction of agents overwhelmingly would be overseen and also there is the security would be provided by the army wouldn't come from the Department of Energy other partners he always does have a role wouldn't come from Owens he wouldn't come from STAY wouldn't come from these other agencies and wouldn't come in the defense or Reduction Agency would come in the Army. Yet the Army has very little voice in the W M D. Elimination the policy and the strategy that's created. You can look at Strat com So one of the can combatant commander Strategic Command. Strategic Command grew out of in many ways Strategic Air Command former of the Air Force and sense strategic command has been in existence. The head of it has either the van Air Force or Navy. There's never been an Army four star head of Strategic Command. And there are some reasons for this it has to do with the nuclear. The nuclear mission being emphasized and having incredible strategic importance. As we're looking in a post Cold War era. Recognition of the fact that we're not just dealing with the Soviet Union as the major threat. One of our recommendations is that or was my recommendations was that the army advocates for or. Work its way towards a greater role and stretch. Now is the is the army likely to ever have the head of strat com Probably not. But it's how do you get they could you know it's how do you ensure that this piece where the operations is likely to be becomes a greater voice and has greater and put. OK With that I am almost out of time so I want to say thank you for all of your attention and I'd be happy to answer any questions. Thank you thank you. You have it really isn't really the story that is our own service. This is it. Yes this is kind of curious why it was so yes. That's a that's a great question. We did talk about this a fair bit with and they were there. So the strategic culture of the army. There's a excellent book it's now probably about ten years old massive war I don't know if you've read that which looked at the culture of each service. I think as you're actually giving me an opportunity to mention something else is that those of us who do sort of Strategic Studies research in academia. Look at Defense and all of the security work. We often treat defense as a monolithic entity. And each of the services as well as O.S.D. have very unique cultures and it's all been very neat as we're done with each of them have unique cultures. In particular the Army has a culture. The surface. And this culture of service is some of the THAT'S things about it. The selfless service. But it also it does impede them. Because it's a culture that says you will not go out advocate for yourself. They are the name. Many of them do genuinely see themselves as service to the nation. And that you know they're looking at it in a very sort of historical perspective as history as we've seen. The army in ways that I think we've different than many of the other services. That they won't go out and advocate. So a lot of this is a what's the narrative one of the recommendations particular with commanding W M D was actually that in the sound self-serving. But I couldn't do it was the chief of staff of the army should appoint a special assistant who is a civilian with technical Bona feeds and policy bona Pheidias who is empowered to act on the inner agency on his behalf. Because you need somebody who can go out and who can interact with all these different groups and is not going to have that same culture. And they do want to emphasize that this this culture which has negative and also has really good things about it. There and I say this. You know with the history history as a whole nother piece that you see in the culture of the army in this and this is on history and it's like everybody has their one favorite historical battle. That then that battle is extrapolated to every other situation. So it's like you know you're worn in battle. But guess what every battle goes not look like the Battle of the are dense forest. So there are if any. The thing. The Army needs fewer historians fewer criminal justice majors and fear M.B.A.'s the Army needs more philosophers more English majors more engineers more scientists a more economists the Army needs fewer historians particularly second rate historians they got a few good historians than if you're a second rate star and fewer criminal justice majors and fewer M.B.A.'s other questions. OK. Well thank you all for your attention.