My name is Adam Stolberg and I'm the.

Co-director of the Center for
International Strategy technology and

policy an associate professor here at the
salmon School of International Affairs at

Georgia Tech and on behalf of both the
school in the center let me welcome you to

our event today which we are very thrilled
to be able to host the undersecretary of

state for arms control and international
security and let me note before I

do the introductions that these
are quite happy times for her portfolio.

On the one hand all three
strains on the nuclear Ledger

those reading related to arms
control nonproliferation and

global nuclear security a sit at top the
international security agenda is not here

not only here in the United States but
worldwide so these issues are no longer

the stepchild of nuclear modernization
nuclear strategy that really the hallmarks

of the of the Cold War era and as you
well know specially the students in our

program know that we've made tremendous
progress in reducing a lot of the hangover

from the Cold War with eighty five percent
of the stockpiles reduced since the height

of the Cold War period and of course
the signing of the new START Treaty and

the commitment to push those boundaries a
little bit further with an additional one

third reduction in standing
a strategic arsenals and

even some talk again of
proceeding with ratification of

the C T B T O In other words making
progress on that future vision

of the road to zero which is a topic
that is near and dear to many of us who

work in the field not to mention
the namesake of our school on

the other hand as I mentioned these
are very complicated times for

those areas of nuclear
nonproliferation arms control and

security it seems that
even before the outbreak

of the crisis in Ukraine that
the bilateral arms control agenda.

With Russia had stalled it and

there's been you've been reading the
newspapers some acrimony over compliance

issues of an age old agreement that in
one thousand nine hundred seven I.N.F.

agreement that our speaker actually is the
point and trying to get to the bottom of

what other challenges persist this is not
a particularly financially auspicious

moment to be thinking about more spending
in this area even if that spending require

is related to reductions so there are a
lot of challenges both here at home and

abroad in trying to advance
the nuclear agenda so

needless to say there are rocky shoals
in the sea of arms control the confront

the global community on these issues but
I dare say that I'm delighted that our

speaker is really the point person for
navigating the shoals the honorable

Rose Gottemoeller who is the current Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and

international security who is actually
charged with advising the secretary of

state on these issues really brings
a wealth of knowledge experience and

integrity to this challenge previously she
served as assistant secretary of state for

the Bureau of arms
control verification and

compliance she was also the chief
negotiator of the new START Treaty with

Russia she is a Russia and

slash Soviet hand can has
the scars to show it and

is really brings Like I said
a tremendous amount of integrity and

on a personal note I feel like my
career is really been in her you know

her shadows ever since I entered graduate
school because at the same time I worked

at a place called the Rand Corporation
where she also was working there and so

throughout my career she has been able
to provide practical insights into and

correctives to my theoretical musings So
I appreciate that along the way and

also I must say and I must note that
as and I was sort of tongue in cheek a.

About the challenges that we face
in arms control today but there

are real challenges and one has to do
with this compliance issue of the I.N.F.

treaty with Russia and Rose Gottemoeller
is really as I mentioned the point person

in doing that and I can really think of no
better person at this moment to deal with

such a difficult issue because not
only does she bring integrity and

respect here and across the aisle in the
United States but she is really respected

widely in those increasingly narrow
circles of the strategic community and

Russia so we're very fortunate not only
to be able to host her talk today but

to have her at the point in
these very heady times so

please without further ado let
me turn it over THANK YOU THANK.

You know it's it's really great to
be here at Georgia Tech today and

I've already had a fantastic
morning talking with with so

many of both the students but also the
professors here and learning a lot about

the work that you are doing in precisely
the areas that interest me so much so

I'd say Adam throughout our careers
it's actually been not so much you in my

shadow but I think it's been a mutual
admiration society of the practitioner for

what is going on on the academic side and
I well I hope vice versa but

anyway I'm going to speak to you
today very much as a practitioner and

hope to highlight for you some of
the thinking I have about how our

practice of arms control and
diplomacy can improve over time and

policymaking in this important arena and
I'm hoping very much with your help so

I am going to talk about arms control
as I see it in the information age but

I want to start out by setting
the stage a little bit.

Because of the work of people in this
field at a very senior level including

Senator Nunn who is here with us today but
also of course President Reagan and

Secretary Shultz Perry and
Kissinger President Obama and the said.

Astray ssion we have
actually come a long way in

achieving nuclear disarmament at its peak
in one nine hundred sixty seven the U.S.

arsenal was comprised of thirty one
thousand two hundred fifty five nuclear

weapons I like the phrase that
Carl Sagan used when he said we and

the Soviets were waist deep in gasoline
with some sixty thousand matches

between us it was a very very dangerous
era in the late one nine hundred sixty S.

But three years later the N.P.T. the
Nonproliferation Treaty came into force

the N P T plays a central role in our
pursuit of a nuclear weapons free world

and it does so today before the treaty
was created President Kennedy feared and

he was very articulate about this but many
others as well around the world feared

that the number of states with nuclear
weapons put grow at an exponential rate

with incalculable risks of
catastrophic nuclear confrontation.

The nonproliferation treaty stemmed
the tide of proliferation and

today the complementary and reinforcing
pillars of the treaty nuclear disarmament

nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful
nuclear uses they bring important benefits

to all of the parties of the N.P.T. system
now as of September two thousand and

thirteen the number of nuclear
weapons in the active U.S.

arsenal has fallen to four
thousand eight hundred and four so

that's from thirty one thousand down to
just under five thousand it's a big drop

over the last fifty years this newly
declassified number represents an eighty

five percent reduction in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile since one thousand nine hundred

sixty seven it is indisputable
that progress is being made toward

accomplishing the N.P.T.'s
disarmament goals.

However I like to say that in some
ways we've done the easy part

we've tackled the nuclear
overhang of the Cold War and

begun to you know bring that down and
accomplish quite a bit Inter.

Of bringing down the big overbuilding
that took place during the years of

the Cold War but at lower numbers the job
will be tougher both in policy and

also in technical terms and that's
where your help I think really comes in

at on the technical side that is because
the lower the number of nuclear weapons

the harder it will be to
verify further reductions.

For example in the past we focused
on a limited nuclear weapons on big

delivery vehicle systems big missiles or

bombers things that you could
even see from outer space.

The idea was eliminate the missile and you
eliminate the threat of the warhead Who

cares if it goes off into a storage
facility somewhere that's fine we'll just

focus on getting the number of delivery
vehicles down but in today's world we

are worried that terrorists will get their
hands on nuclear weapons so we have to

reduce and eliminate those weapons even
if they're hidden away in storage that is

a big challenge for a nuclear arms control
or how can we monitor the warheads know

where they are and that the other guys
don't have hidden stashes somewhere and

how can we monitor the warheads at
these most sensitive of facilities

the Russians don't like the thought of
us coming into their nuclear storage

facilities even more any more than we like
the thought of them coming into ours and

then when you add in the other
nuclear weapon states.

China U.K. France and

you think about the nuclear weapons states
that are not signatories of the N.P.T.

particularly I'm wrestling quite
a bit these days with India and

Pakistan Prime Minister Modi has just been
in Washington the last couple of days so

again our business very much on the agenda
in these high level meetings but

how do you wrestle with these issues among
community of nuclear weapons states who

are concerned about preserving and
protecting sensitive information.

So the challenges are very great but
at the same time

we need to be focused on the core of the
problem and this is the one the president.

Obama pointed to in his famous Prague
speech in April of two thousand and

nine that is if terrorists get
their hands on nuclear weapons or

fizzle material all bets are off it's
a terrible threat because we do not have

the protective covering that
the tournaments policy provided us

during the Cold War How do we deter
the unpredictable terrorist threat.

So when you turn them to physical
material to bomb making material

the challenges only increase
the stuff as portable easy to hide

major ports now have radiation detectors
but these systems are very sensitive and

can pick up radioactivity coming from a
number of different types of products you

know that toilets give off a lot
of radiation as do bananas so

you don't know unless you go and
look what is inside these containers and

where of course looking at ports that
are handling millions of containers

every week for biological and

chemical agents the main problem comes
from the dual use nature of the work and

the technologies how can we tell if work
being done as good or bad or if we cannot

How do we build in activities to reassure
people to safeguard the activity and to

reassure the international community that
the work being done is safe and peaceful.

So our goal is to devise an enhanced
systems for tracking and monitoring

as well as devise new ways to verify
compliance with future agreements and

treaties of course as you who
work in technology know no system

is ever one hundred percent foolproof
to a fair paraphrase Douglas Adams

foolproof systems tend to underestimate
the ingenuity of complete fools and

for that matter highly motivated cheaters.

So I like to turn to
Paul Nitze one of the greatest

experts in the nonproliferation
arena a brilliant and

esteem national security expert
who also turned his talents to do.

Policy in this particular Rina he
explained the notion of affective

verification which is really the kind
of policy approach we work under

Nitze said and I quote If the other side
moves beyond the limits of the treaty

in any militarily significant
way we should be able to detect

such militarily significant violations
in time to respond effectively and

thereby deny the other side the benefit
of the violation this definition has been

much on my mind as you can imagine as
we've grappled with the issue of Russian

compliance with the Intermediate Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty in recent months so

this idea of affective verification
Nazis definition has been and

continues to be the benchmark for
verifying arms control treaties but

the world is changing and as I've
described with it come new technologies

that will I believe help us to monitor and
verify arms control treaties and

agreements new information tools
are popping up everywhere and

their potential impact is magnified by
the global connectivity of the Internet

our new reality is a smaller increasingly
networked world where the average citizen

connects to other citizens in
cyberspace hundreds of times each day

today any event anywhere on the planet

could be broadcast globally in a matter
of seconds that means it's harder to

hide things when it's harder to hide
things it's easier to be caught.

As I like to say the neighborhood
gaze is a powerful tool and

they can help us to verify the treaties
and agreements that we have created and

that we will create in the future.

The way that we at the State Department
see it so far there are perhaps

three ways to go about using the advances
of the information revolution and

knowing already what I've learned
the small inning from talking to

experts here at Georgia Tech I figured you
might come up with some more categories so

I hope our discussion can
tease some of this out.

But first of all I look at
the potential of having tools for

inspectors it's already apparent that
digital tools are revolutionizing

the way diplomacy is conducted much like
the Telegraph did in the one nine hundred

centuries email is a good example when
I worked on the start negotiations in

one nine hundred ninety in Geneva email
did not exist everything was sent back to

Washington in a very slow moving
way via Wow remember fax machines

some of you probably never had to operate
one but that was an important innovation

in one nine hundred ninety believe it or
not the fax machine but

today we have e-mail and
it speeds up the process of conducting

diplomacy in this area information
technologies however could also be useful

in the hands of inspectors smartphone and
tablet that could be created for

the express purpose of aiding in the
verification and monitoring process for

example by having all the safeguards and
verification sensors in an inspector

facility wirelessly connected through
the cloud to an inspector's tablet he or

she could note anomalies and
flag specific items for

closer inspection as well as
compare readings in real time and

then interpret them in context this is
really important because inspections

are time limited an inspector doesn't have
all day sometimes to cover a vast facility

and so to have some sensor readings as he
or she goes in and be able to prioritize

where he goes or she goes in conducting
the inspection could be extraordinarily

useful so tools for inspectors that's
category number one category number two

ubiquitous sensing the use of big data the
second way we could incorporate new tools

in the information of the Information Age
include weapons of mass destruction.

In weapons of mass
destruction verification and

monitoring as by harnessing the power
of crowd generated data and

then analyzing it already critical
information generated through social

networking is being incorporated into
local safety systems in the United States.

Sound far fetched to extend such an idea
to arms control I don't think so

I don't think so at all there are apps
that can convert your smart phone camera

into a radiation detector and you know
that Japanese young people are already

mapping the radiation around
the Fukushima power plant area and

feeding it into a national system in
order to help their government understand

the aftermath of that disaster so I think
that there are many ways that we can be

thinking about using the products of
the information revolution in this way

and the other area that I like to talk
about is the use of the accelerometers

that are already in your tablet
devices they tell which way is up for

the tablet but if you could network
all the signals coming from those

accelerometers together it would
give you a sense of seismic activity

now in some cases in most cases
the vast majority of cases that seismic

activity would be of course a naturally
occurring event of earthquake but

in some cases it could be
an illicit nuclear test and

therefore it could give some
early warning to be looking

at particular places in the world we're
in a list nuclear test is taking place

of course then you have to use other

sources of information to analyze the data
and to come to your conclusions but

that's a point I want to make nothing I
think that emerges from the information.

Revolution can be used on its
own it must be put together with

other sources of information
other sources of.

Of data and of course really good
experienced analysis to make

sense finally I want to turn to the notion
of societal verification I know there's

been a lot of folks working on that
here at Georgia Tech I think it's a very

exciting area that is the notion of
partnership between government and

citizens in order to help to verify and
monitor treaties and green.

Once people throw up their hands and
say how could this ever be possible in

the arms control room I always argue
it's already very well accepted very

well accepted in the environmental
arena where a lot of work goes on

both local and regional levels but also up
to the national level in terms of sharing

information I think the example of the
Gulf oil spill of a couple years ago where

local environmental groups were able to
enlist citizens to be feeding data from

the beaches in the Gulf back into
centralized systems to help to map where

the pollution was occurring all of this
very well established at this point so

how do we think about using some of these
same approaches in the Arms Control and

Nonproliferation safeguards arenas so

those are some of the exciting ideas
I think that we have to pursue and

I know again a lot of you have already
been thinking about this stuff but

what are the hitches that we have to
address the hit we have to address

are significant and
they have to do with technical legal and

political issues even diplomatic
barriers I wonder about how some

of these things can be negotiable and

thinking about this reminds me of a trip
I took to Moscow a couple years ago to

present some of these same ideas at a much
earlier phase in my own thinking and

I talked to a group of students
at the Moscow State Institute of

International Relations and after I
went through and talked about this issue

the set of issues I hand shot up very
intelligent young man got up and

he said well this is all very well and
good but I can tell you one thing for

sure my government will never
ever accept the authority and

legitimacy of data coming off of somebody
as i Phone or i Pad They will want to

control total control of the source of
information the national technical means

for example overhead satellites fine but
somebody is i Pad.

So that's I think a big.

Question for this community and it is one
that I would welcome the chance to pursue

with you further how do you take
information coming off from these

dispersed platforms and make it into
a source of authority of information for

use in policymaking by governments
the flipside of that of course

is how do you protect
the individuals in societies where.

The information revolution
isn't embraced with so

much enthusiasm as it is here in the
United States we see it as a general good

but for many people around the world
in places like China and Russia and

elsewhere there's a whole high degree of
suspicion in the national governments and

attempts to crack down and
clamp down on this kind of information so

there are many questions as I say
about how you would generalize the use

of this kind of technology and
these kinds of data sources but

I welcome the chance to pursue
these ideas with you further and

to wrestle them to the ground because I
am convinced it can help us with the big

problems we have today smaller and smaller
items like of account like warheads and

the necessity of pursuing process
monitoring as we go forward we are going

to need to understand when physical
material is being produced illegally for

example we are going to need to understand
when and how chemical weapons are being

produced illicitly So these are some of
the challenges that have been with us for

a while but now I think we have
some of the technology that can

help us to resolve them so with that
I will turn the floor over to you and

perhaps Senator Nunn are you willing to
make a few comments or no not all right.

Sir thank you very much again for being
here it's a real pleasure to see you so

in that case I'll just throw
the floor open to questions and

do my best to answer them but thank
you very much for this opportunity to.

Thank you thank you yes I saw that

they're.

Not on.

Nonproliferation approach and
I think Mike's.

Point.

About the approach to
the nonproliferation So part.

Has that approach that nobody
should have it no more while

those who have it they're taking
their own sweet time to reduce it and

the unfortunate thing is it
is against the human nature

part of those who don't have it they
want to get in to for their safety so

have you ever considered reversing
the course that means first

having the agreement and inspection and
monitoring mechanism and

then starting top down that means
the one who has the maximum

starch loading to the next level
then those two start going down

to the third level like that so
that everybody here.

At the same time but
maybe mother in line with human nature.

Well thank you.

The structure of the phrase.

Which actually flowed out missile crisis.

Early one nine hundred sixty S.
It produced a reaction I mean honestly

when you look at what I talk about
the overbuilding that went on during

the Cold War where we produced thirty one
thousand nuclear weapons on the Soviets

produced according to some accounts anyway
coming out of Russia forty five thousand

nuclear weapons so we at the outset
had to do a great deal between the two

of us of reduction and limitation and
that process started immediately after.

The N.P.T. was signed in one thousand nine
hundred sixty eight with the negotiation

of the first Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks agreement however I have to

say that that first series of agreements
they were pretty much a rank failure

because of the modernization of
technology that was going on and

particularly the ability to
deliver multiple warheads

from a single missile the so-called
murder of technology and that burst on

the scene in the one nine hundred seventy
S. into the one nine hundred eighty S. and

resulted in this vast deployment of
nuclear warheads on very powerful missiles

but luckily I think over the last really
twenty years we've had great success in

bringing those numbers down and
the other area we've had great success is

actually eliminating warheads because
that's the other piece of the problem you

know if you've gotten rid of the missiles
fine but somebody could decide to build

more missiles once again if you've got the
warheads stashed somewhere waiting to be

put on missiles again so one of the great
I think unsung victories of these

years since the end of the Cold War was
the way we engaged in a highly enriched

uranium purchase agreement with
the Russian Federation under which we've

eliminated the equivalent of twenty
thousand warheads from the former Soviet

arsenal so the numbers have been coming
down steadily I know there's a lot of

disenchantment in some quarters saying why
can't you move even faster why can't you

get down to zero even faster
than you have been doing and

my argument in that case is.

That we need now to move on
to the next phase two and

Mabel moving to lower levels and
I'm not saying we're halting and

sitting on our on our hands waiting for
that to happen we're trying to push

forward with the Russians the Russians
are meant to enthusiastic lately but

our offer that was made in Berlin
last summer by President Obama.

To undertake an up to one
third further reduction

in operationally deployed warheads
would bring the number of U.S. and

Russian deployed nuclear warheads
down to approximately one thousand so

that's again a big drop from where
we were during the Cold War But

we need some enablers technologically to
get down closer and closer to zero and

of course as always we need
progress on the regional front

to create the conditions politically for
that kind of leap of faith so

the say to get rid of nuclear
weapons completely and

nowhere is that more in evidence I
think than in South Asia today so

it's a very good point that a lot
of work has to be done on the peace

building front too before we can imagine
getting to zero nuclear weapons.

So I guess I'm sorry go ahead I was going
to ask you please introduce yourself so

your name your affiliation
when you ask the question

OK.

William Foster from the Mellon Institute
in New York City as you may be aware for

the past ten years the Chinese Academy
of Science has its allies hundreds of

millions of posts a day in real time
to track things to and everything

from epidemics to demonstrations
to every behavior in the society.

Where do you see the level where do you
see the best place to coordinate with

China on using cyber is it best at
a sort of level one government to

government relationship and I guess
my concern is most people in the U.S.

government are concerned of losing their
top secret clearances if they cooperate

at a very deep level with China or

is it more than a one point five level
of former government officials or

is it an academic level thanks
Well I think we have to do all.

And frankly of course you know
no government official can

cooperate with any other government
around the world unless.

It's specifically agreed to and
authorized by his own his or

her own government so that's just
the reality and situation in which case of

it's fully authorized there should be no
danger to any top secret clearances but

anyway that's Yes exactly so the questions
then get to how can we effect

of lead make progress and my view is it's
across all three fronts so it's important

to have good official contacts government
to government it's important for

the academic communities to get together
at the so-called track two level.

You know you have important
opportunities in my view to make some

real advances where governments in
either Washington or Beijing or

any other capital around the world
may not be quite ready to step out on

a particular direction of policy but
Track two can help to identify.

New ideas can help to identify
new possibilities and

where there may be doors starting to be
pushed open in a particular capital so

I really have a big supporter of track
two and then I think track one and

a half is a very important middle
ground where we have academic

experts coming together with some official
representatives working together in this

kind of of setting I think that
can be very valuable as well so

I'm a big supporter across
the board I know sometimes

you hear government officials saying no
don't bring me those track to experts I

don't want to talk to him but you know
I've spent my career in and out of

government I'm a political appointee I'm
not you know a career government person so

I really think it's valuable to have
to really do all three whether it's

official track to track.

Things.

As our I mean.

And with my universe may
I said Madison I'm not

maybe making back Hollywood.

But I report on an.

At the university called a global
humanitarian summit or however when

anybody could come and when stealing
things to make the world a better place

shouter health care piece the richest
man from Kuwait who built the.

Past with Katrina sitting next to a drug
dealers out of jail working with kids with

drug problems and I wonder whether And
neither peace movement.

Could bring to set up I would website and
what you'd pack is an ideal price

where over the road can connect based and

cluster based on the use things
close to people in every country.

Things like this and our humanitarian but
we cluster together by country and

then kill strangers and I wonder
whether there would be any hope if we

began to try to get the cluster together
by these so either humanitarian efforts.

Well that actually is a very
important other aspect of

the work that I am trying to do in my
position as the undersecretary for

arms control and really the only senior
government official who has you know arms

control in her name that's what I
do full time my colleagues hugely

respected very good very good partners
in the work we're trying to do but

they've got a wide spectrum of
issues that they have to tackle so

I have to think broadly about where we
need to go with arms control policy and

one area is precisely that that we need to
enrich and in live in the communities that

have been working these issues for so
many years all extremely dedicated but

sometimes not perhaps forming the links
to the new generation forming

the links to younger people that we
need to see and sometimes needing to

reach out beyond their kind of traditional
community to a broader community.

To make a difference
on a particular policy

one area that I've been working on very
actively in trying to think about this and

trying to think about how to broaden and
enrich the networks is the area of

ratification of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty this treaty Senator Nunn

will remember this perhaps painfully but
it came up for a vote in the Senate in one

nine hundred ninety nine at that point
the Senate refused to give its advice and

consent for ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the time

the senators gave two reasons they
said first of all we are not convinced

of the verifiability of the treaty you say
you're going to build an international

system to monitor the treaty we have no
idea if it's going to work or not and

the second issue they brought up has had
to do with whether we could set aside

explosive nuclear testing for ever and

depend upon so-called science based
talk while stewardship also at that

point back in one thousand nine hundred
ninety the whole concept of science based

talk pile stewardship was brand new so
now fifteen years have gone by and

we have answered those questions we have
a very capable international monitoring

system based at the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty Organization in in Vienna and

it is already doing very important work
for example long tsunami warning or

after the Fukushima power plant accident
it tracked the movement of the radio

radiation around the globe so
it's already doing important work and

feeding data into important
scientific projects the second

area though science based stockpile
stewardship also has proven its mettle in

the past fifteen years and I think we have
a very good story to tell about how we

are in a better place depending on
science based talk while stewardship

than we would be if we depended
on nuclear explosive testing but

now comes the big heavy
lift the heaviest lift.

Of all is how do you
reignite public interest

in this important treaty back when
the treaty came up for the advice and

consent of the Senate eighty five percent
of the American public said let's go for

it let's ratify this treaty so there was
strong public support for the treaty at

the time but there were I think important
questions that needed to be answered so

I'm glad we've been able to answer
them in the past fifteen years but

now we need to develop again that
level of grassroots interest and

support at a time when nuclear weapons now
not for you folks here at Georgia Tech

weapons of mass destruction or your
daily diet for good or for ill but for

you know I would say the vast population
of the United States they never think

about these things so how do we spark
peoples of trust get them engaged and

involved and wanting to help you know
push the issue so that it can be

I think brought to a level of attention in
Washington as well so it's an important

challenge and I absolutely agree that
some of the tools we now have available

could be very very helpful and they have
burst on the scene since one nine hundred

ninety nine so we need to figure out how
best how best to use them thank you.

Peter brekky Sam Nunn School of
International Affairs the question I have

for you is somewhat based off of
the one role better earlier and

with respect to the three hundred of the
three legs that you mentioned earlier from

moving forward the timing and
the public to the verification

efforts you know through our
smartphones and stuff like that.

What are your thoughts or preferences
when advice that you have been given

by others with respect to who
should do that would it be like

someone averse to a group that develops
the apps that then get distributed through

you know the app stores of the different
smartphones should it be some

non-governmental organization that maybe
takes over from a university team where.

To be some international organization
like you know the man or

some umbrella thing under it.

I'm open to all comers.

Frankly whatever works best and
I have been working also with

people in Silicon Valley directly with the
industry to try to get them interested we

just had a really good
meeting out of Stanford.

Let's see it's now two and
a half weeks ago where we had parted good

participation from across Silicon Valley.

Companies and innovators there and they
were kind of more of this nuclear stuff so

it was something new for them but at
the same time they were interested in how

what they're doing can apply to this area
of policy I'll tell you a very funny

vignette though which was a lot of
them do think in terms of dollars and

cents so their media question was well how
are we going to monetize this and I said

Are you kidding me you can't monetize what
you work at all the diplomatic problem of

the kind you do it for the larger
the greater good the greater good and

I have to say To be fair we had quite
a lively discussion of that and

there were many many around the room who
understood the notion of the you know this

this greater good and that we need to be
willing to work sometimes on projects that

that support that but in answer to your
question I'm open to any approach and

I welcome the chance as I said earlier
work with the academic community on trying

to make some of these ideas
become a practical reality.

My name is Ryan Hansen I'm a student
here at the graduate program.

I have a question regarding South Korea
as they kind of develop into a major

player in the civil nuclear energy
market and start to really distribute

these technologies around the world
they also lack the Richmond

programs that can be used to produce fuel
a couple with these sales I'm going to.

This is they ramp the program up and
sales is the U.S. position on domestic

enrichment in Seoul is that evolving at
all that position changing within the U.S.

government you know our position
has always been that there is.

An international and should be an
international aspect to this marketplace

that no individual country or or player
participant in the marketplace has to or

should necessarily control all of
the pieces of it so I would just say our

longstanding policy has been to depend
on the international marketplace for

enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities I'm actually very glad and

many American companies are participating
with the South Koreans in

their reactor sales activities and
will continue to do so but

I don't kind of buy the basic premise
that an individual country whether

it's South Korea or any other country
has to control the entire fuel cycle so

I think we should and
we must actually for economic reasons for

nonproliferation policy reasons and.

Perhaps just for
some common sense reasons we need

to depend on the marketplace
in this regard.

You look puzzled.

You want to come back.

You can have one of what.

I've just always seen the U.S. position
is kind of president with South Korea

reaching just because of the geo political
relationship with their neighbors so

I was wondering if you
could address that I

know.

There are four.

Hundred or.

Missiles or.

As.
Mr Morehead already satchel I can't

imagine one hundred
percent declassification.

The other is.

How many more are necessary to be
declassified at the moment because I'm

sure there would be more than that four
thousand or five thousand the other is

worth the improvements in technology.

And refinement and sophistication I assume
that the just out to capacity is maybe

a thousand times what you started with but
was started with in terms of T.N.T..

Maybe there were that was.

You may have reduced the warheads but

the destructor capacity may have
increased about a thousand times.

The other thing is to because of the.

Dissemination of the research and
development to private corporations

colleges universities you know how
do you monitor that when it's are so

far out of your ads.

Yes those are all very good questions
I wouldn't stress that the number

that has been declassified so far is this

forty eight number is
the number of operationally

deployed warheads warheads that
are in so-called active stockpiles so

you're quite right that there are other
warheads that are held in reserve and

most many of those are you know
essentially going into a queue for

elimination and it does take time to
take part warheads people get so we had

an earlier question your neighbor had an
earlier question about why it's taking so

long takes a long time because it
takes a long time to take apart

warheads safely and securely and
to ensure that all of

the components are properly disposed of I
was just out in Los Alamos last week and.

Looking at how they you
know basically it's a hand

by hand process you can't just take
a big take a big sledge hammer and

bring it down I'm you have to
take them apart bit by bit so.

It is a long process but
I can assure you that it is a process that

will continue to go forward and so
this number will be a rolling number and

as time goes by I will expect to
continue to see that that number

to go to go lower and we will see what
other countries are willing to do so

far we have been the most transparent and
open of any of the nuclear weapon states

about how many warheads that we
have in our active stockpile and

we'll see we continue pressing the other
states to be more open themselves but

that's that's a goal going forward.

In terms of you know how
how we move this process

forward with other nuclear
weapons states again it is

a very slow process we put in
place back in two thousand and

ten during the Nonproliferation Treaty
review conference in two thousand and

ten we put in place a so-called P five
process which is supposed to slowly but

surely bring all of the P
five around the table

not necessarily for the purpose of
disarmament negotiations to begin with but

to make sure that everyone is
acquainted with the basic issues and

concepts of strategic stability
acquainted with the history and

the progress of arms control and
reduction so far and

acquainted with some of the technical
challenges of verifiably reducing and

eliminating nuclear weapons and
frankly I think it has

done a lot over the past five years
to develop good working relationship

among the P five again that's U.K.
France United States China and Russia.

But there are big barriers today and

one of the biggest barriers in my mind as
the person responsible for working this

policy day in day out is right now the
attitude of the Russian Federation because

the Russian Federation have announced
publicly that they are done with bilateral

nuclear arms reduction they have said
it is time to move on to multilateral

reductions we are not coming back to the
negotiating table with the United States

of America we need China U.K.
and France at the table with us and

to my mind that is really premature
because we and the Russian Federation

still have about ninety percent of
the nuclear weapons in the world and

so there is still more work that we can do
between the two of us to bring our numbers

down as I said the Berlin proposal would
bring our numbers of deployed weapons down

to approximately a thousand on
each side and to my mind you know.

That's a period when we can
begin talking about more active

multilateral disarmament processes but
in the meantime we are trying to carry

out this P five activity to to get
the other countries used to the idea of

being involved in disarmament negotiations
more actively So that's the goal

we'll see how it is carried forward and
we'll see how it goes because the N.P.T.

Review conferences coming up again every
five years that takes place this spring in

May two thousand and fifteen and
I hope I hope it will be successful but

with the Russians saying yep at the moment
and we're done and we're waiting for

China and U.K.
and France to come to the table

I think it is going to be a difficult
review conference so we'll see

those.

Yeah events.

Speaking to various
groups over some period.

Well some period of time regarding
societal verification as we

talked about earlier today.

Who else from the discussions you've
had Should we be talking to about

trying to move this forward for example
to have some you know university team

led development of these apps I mentioned
earlier and stuff like that you know

I I don't know and I would think that you
would probably know better than anyone.

Well I think continuing to talk to
me is a good idea for one thing.

But honestly I think that you know there's

a group in Washington now that's
the verification technology group

who works in the bureau of arms control
under my Aegis they have been the one so

the most actively involved in
thinking through how we you know

bring these ideas closer closer to
fruition I think there are also

opportunities to continue to engage
in projects of the kind that N.T.I.

did on societal verification that was
a very powerful project was some very very

powerful results and it's been widely
briefed now among government players and

so there are other pockets of interest in
this around the government it's Dio We

haven't a say in the group there there's
deter the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

and the group there so frankly we ought
to figure out how to maybe put together

a little bit of a consortium to have some
more active discussion of how to bring

these ideas to fruition because I've tried
some ideas over the last couple of years

we've had a couple of of competitions for
example to try to pull together idea and

to get people generating
some new ideas about how

to use the information
technology tools but

frankly it's the old conundrum which I
confronted many times in my career and

I know many around the room have how
do you get some bright idea the.

It's on the drawing boards into first
a prototype and then into the marketplace

and into the hand of the user and in the
first instance you have to entrust user

there we come back to the questions I
raised in my remarks about negotiable ety

and about ensuring that we've been able
to answer some of these questions about

the authority and legitimacy of the
information and on the flip side of that

legalities of using information
that's generated off of of

private sources like i Phones or i Pads So
a lot of issues still to be confronted but

I would welcome an opportunity to
accelerate some of these discussions so

we can get to the practical point
of putting some tools for example

into the hands of inspectors I think that
would be a great great way forward so

thank you please.

On the question of societal verification
Rose mentioned that we had in two Yah I've

had three different panels and one of them
has been on societal verification and

what we've done is we've had groups
this is all truck I'd say what one

in three quarters with a lot of government
people involved in it around the world but

what we have tried to do is get
an international group of people working

on that and we have published several
reports on that Cory Hindustani

is headed that up she's now about to go
over two years with department defense but

one of the things we've also in
was emphasized not just in society

verification but other verification.

Of subjects and that is trying to get
countries who do not have nuclear

weapons to also be part of the process
because those countries are they have not

going to trees as they see it and they've
never been part of the process so that has

to disadvantages one is they don't trust
the process and number two they don't

understand how hard it is and they don't
understand if they don't understand it

is very hard to really have success in
things like the renewal of non-plussed.

Aeration treated all those things so we're
trying to get a much broader group of

actors together and have done extensive
work which is all available and

been publicized old sod all those where
there's several of the of the components

of verification Let me finally say one
of the words the Rose Garden was one of

the finest public servants I've ever known
and she was absolutely terrific thank you.

Thank you our country music
very fortunate to have her

she not only did all the things out
I'm certain an introduction but

she also headed up Carnegie Endowment in
Moscow for how many years three years so

she knows the Russians very very well and
that's one of the values of the whole arms

control process that people don't think
about particularly those who dismiss arms

control and say forget it they're all
relationships and are developed and

trust that is developed between
individuals from the United States and

Russia that have an enormous
effect over the years and

when you dismiss it altogether you have
taken away one of the most powerful

builders of trust that we've ever had and
of course right now we're at a very

low ebb of trust between our governments
but there still are relationships there

are people that Rose deals with and
Russia she wouldn't say this

might get in trouble on Capitol Hill that
some quartos but they would trust her and

when she says something they would know
that she's telling them what she really

thinks of what she believes and I'm sure
there are probably a few unnamed Russians

you put in that category too so that's
a very valuable part of the process so

Rose just let me thank you for
being here and Adam for

putting together a great
program all of you thank you.

Before we close let me Herald some of
the unsung heroes that made this event

possible one of them is Jeremiah Grandin
who really helped it so

that all of you could be here as
the case of Marilyn Suarez but

I also want to thank Alex bell for making
sure his secretary got Miller's here so

with that please join me in thanking
under the undersecretary for

joining us today thank you.