Well good afternoon everyone and
thank you so much Larry.

For that very kind introduction and thanks
to Georgia Tech for bringing me down.

It's really a treat to be with
you this afternoon and and

as I think that that brief bio made clear.

I've spent the last ten years or so
of my career focused on questions

of political and
economic change in the Arab world and

and I found myself sitting
in the catbird seat in

a way when I came to work at
the State Department in November and

as a deputy assistant ability

in the Nereus bureau was to coordinate
our democracy and human rights policy in

the Middle East and lo and behold a little
over a year after I got into the job.

The people of the region
decided to take me up on that.

So it was a fascinating experience and

also a fascinating opportunity
to test a lot of the ideas

that scholars have developed about
political change in the Arab

world on why it might come about what
it might mean for the United States and

here we are years after
the Arab awakening began and

I don't like to say the Arab Spring
because I think in many

ways we're two years into something
that is by new means over.

But I thought what I could do in
the next little while is talk to you

a little bit about the implications of
these changes for the United States and

I think it's important that we
take the opportunity to do this.

I think it's an opportune moment to do so
for a couple of reasons.

I'll explain how many of
you watched the State

of the Union address a few weeks ago.

That's.

So heartening to

see in Washington you know it's comes
week after the Super Bowl and for

us it's kind of like the Super Bowl
because we're a company town so you know

you Pop your popcorn and settle down on
the couch to watch the political theater.

Of the STATE OF THE UNION.

But of course if you're a foreign policy
expert the state of the Union is often

very disappointing because there isn't
much foreign policy content in most state

of the Union addresses and this year
was no real exception in that regard.

But President Obama did have a couple
of really significant are I would think

notable things to say about foreign
policy in the STATE OF THE UNION.

You know it's first that he'd be bringing

thirty four thousand troops home from
Afghanistan before the end of this year.

I noticed both on election night and
in President Obama's second

inaugural address the line that got the
loudest applause from the assembled crowd

was the one where he talked about closing
the door on a decade defined by two wars.

In the Muslim world.

And so the announcement about bringing
thirty four thousand troops home from

Afghanistan I think was quite significant
in response to what is the clear

sentiment of the American people that
they want to put these wars behind us.

In the state of
the Union President Obama did

another salient fact which
is that America's new and

growing production domestically of oil and

natural gas means that at long
last we may approach the goal.

We want to thought was impossible which is
becoming an energy self-sufficient nation.

And it seems to me these two things
the drawdown of American troops from

Iraq first and now Afghanistan and
the prospect of energy independence.

In theory have the potential to
fundamentally reshape America's

approach to the world and
especially to the Middle East.

Since the one nine hundred fifty
six crisis over the Suez and

especially since the Iran Iraq war
in the one nine hundred eighty S.

the United States has been the predominant
military political and economic power.

Operating in the Middle East.

To ensure the free flow of energy to
western markets to protect our friends and

allies for a long time to contain
the Soviet Union and more recently

to push back to terrorists who want to
target Americans the United States has

invested a great deal of blood and
treasure in the Middle East.

We've built military bases we've
brokered peace agreements.

We've gotten deeply involved
in regional politics.

So we're at a moment today
where we can ask ourselves and

I think implicitly the president
was asking the other week.

Are we now at a point in our own
national development where we can begin

to set that burden down.

Can we undertake what's called
a pivot to East Asia and

focus on innovation and
investment here at home.

Does the Middle East still matter
to the United States in ways

that will continue to
demand our attention.

And that's the question I want to try and
explore with you.

When we look at the daily
newspapers the Middle East

looks more unstable more
troubling than ever.

How much of what's happening right now.

Was avoidable.

How much of it is the result of
things the United States to.

And how much does this instability
this turmoil matter to America and

to the rest of the world.

So hopefully we'll get a little bit

of insight to bear on those
questions in the next.

Few minutes and then I'll look
forward to discussion with all of you.

Just a little more than two years ago
on January fourteenth two thousand and

eleven I was flying back from
Doha Qatar to Washington after

organizing a visit to Doha for Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton who was my boss.

I had been the State Department's point
person for something called the forum for

the future.

A summit between the G. eight countries
and the Arab countries to talk

about political and economic reform and
Secretary Clinton gave the keynote speech

at this forum for the future on January
thirteenth two thousand and eleven.

She talked about unemployment.

She talked about corruption she talked
about depleted natural resources and

she said in too many
places in too many ways

the regions foundations
are sinking into the sea and.

Now the leaders of the Arab countries
who were gathered around this large

conference table at the forum for
the future were surprised by the fierce

urgency of her tone but
they all knew what she was talking about.

For three weeks already protesters had
been marching in the streets of Tunisia

calling for their dictator to leave.

Now Tunisia had always seems to all
of us Middle East specialists as

the most stable and
successful of police states.

It was repressive but it was quiet.

It had a growth rate of nine percent.

In G.D.P. over the few years leading up
to the revolution it had close trade and

tourism ties to Europe and yet
the very day after Secretary Clinton

spoke those words in Doha the Tunisian
army refused to put down the protests and

Tunisia's dictator Ben Ali got
on a plane and fled the country.

The trends that Secretary Clinton was
describing or a day in Doha two years ago

the trends that produced what we now call
the Arab awakening were not new phenomena.

They have been building all across
the Arab world for a decade or more.

And since Ben Ali fled Tunisia of
course we've seen revolution in Egypt.

We've seen another revolution in Libya
a negotiated transition in Yemen.

We've seen popular protests in Bahrain
crushed by government forces backed

by Saudi Arabia and we've seen what
began as a peaceful uprising in Syria

transformed by the brutality of
Bashar Assad into a bloody rebellion.

Now as I see it there were three deep
pool long building trends in the Arab

world that helped lead to the stunning
changes that we've witnessed over the last

two years and that I believe will continue
to shape this region for the long term.

The first trend is demographic.

Jhon more is under thirty.

One third of Egypt's eighty two

million people are between the ages
of fifteen and twenty nine.

That's one generation one
third of the population.

Now these whole are healthier and

better educated than any generation
of Arabs that came before them.

But despite these advantages they
have faced a massive gap between

their aspirations for themselves and
their communities and

the realities that they
faced all around them.

Youth unemployment across
the region is staggering.

And it's a problem even in wealthy
countries like Saudi Arabia.

But unemployment when
you're a young person

in the Arab world doesn't just
mean that you can't get a job.

It also means you can't move
out of your parents' house.

In a.

Next where the average family has to
save up two years' worth of income

to afford the costs of marriage no
job means you can't get married.

And if you're from a conservative
family or conservative community.

You're not dating either.

So you're basically stuck in adolescence.

You can't begin to live like
an adult your whole life is on hold.

And if as a society because
a government you don't succeed in

integrating the those young people into
the adult world then you are in trouble.

Anywhere around the world where
you have a lot of unemployed or

underemployed young men in a society
it is an indicator of instability.

Sometimes it manifests
as drug addiction and

addiction sometimes it manifests
as rising crime rates.

Sometimes it manifests as revolution.

China specialist wrote a book on this
phenomenon and China a few years ago

called bare branches about
the disproportionate number of

young single men in China and
the implications in society.

So for too many young people
across the Middle East.

There were no real opportunities for
work for marriage for a better future.

No chance of having a voice
in shaping that future.

Too many people not only young
people were alienated frustrated

by the disconnect that existed
between government and citizens and

across the region people began to
voice their demands for change.

So the for that first trend
demography the second long

term trend that combined with that
rising youth demographic is economic

stagnation across the region
in rich states and

poor people were seeing their
economic opportunities limited.

By nepotism by bloated government
bureaucracies in which you had

to pay bribe after bribe to get
very simple things done and

by large scale corruption
in which contracts and

deals went to the well connected and the
money that governments put into projects

that were meant to benefit people did not
always translate into actual benefit.

Opportunities for young people in
many places in the Middle East

still today are defined not so
much by what they know.

But by who they know or more often by who
their dad news or who their uncle knows.

And in rich states and poor over the last
few years even in countries with strong

macro economic growth like
Tunisia inequality was growing.

Corruption and
state control meant that some

were benefiting disproportionately from
that growth and others were held back.

And so
across the region corruption has become

an issue with tremendous resonance
in the events of the Arab Awakening.

Now if you know anything about
the Middle East then you know that for

the most part the governments in this
region don't get their income from taxes

they get it from rent.

What we call rent and political science or
oil resources foreign aid

remittances from citizens
who are working abroad and

governments are the source of most
social goods health care education jobs.

The largest employers are governments
the ones who offer the most job security.

The most benefits.

In the past.

This was a system that
worked very well for

these autocratic governments in
ensuring people's loyalty and

binding citizens to the state by
making a kind of social contract

you keep quiet and
we will provide the services you need.

But as populations grew and
as corruption grew and as.

He grew governments became less and
less efficient at distributing those

resources in ways that kept people
loyal and bound to the state.

And that became an additional
source of instability.

Now the third trend that
contributed to the Arab Awakening.

Was the rise of new media and
by this I don't just mean Twitter and

Facebook although there's
been reams of paper produced

on the effects of Twitter and Facebook and
social media and the Arab revolutions.

Clearly they played an important role in
helping people organize protests and share

information despite government repression
but I'm actually even talking about.

Old new media.

Things like satellite television and
the good old world wide web.

The expanded access to information that
these old new media made available over

the last decade or so
meant that young Arabs today are more

globally aware than the generations
that came before them just as young

Americans today are more globally aware
and the generations that came before them.

And young Arabs became more aware
of what separated them from

others like them around the world.

So if you were a young Egyptian and

you were educated to believe that
you are a nation alongside India and

Indonesia was one of the great leaders
of the Nonaligned Movement one of

the great leaders of the developing
world you could see how India and

Indonesia were progressing
economically and Egypt was not.

Now as I said it trends demographic
economic technological over years.

There are deep seated phenomena.

And what that means is
that the pressures of for

change that they produced
are likewise deep seated.

They're not going away any.

Time soon.

So that pressure for change might be
able to hold it back for a while.

But in the end I don't
think they will exceed.

The other important thing to recognize
that these trends are evident to different

degrees and in different ways all across
the Arab world in small states and

large in rich states and poor in states
with homogenous populations in states that

contain diverse populations what that
means is that there is no country

in the Arab world today that I would argue
is free from these pressures for change.

The pressures may manifest in different
ways leaders may respond in different ways

over different timelines.

But there is no immunity.

So while we have seen major change
already in Tunisia in Egypt Libya Yemen

ongoing conflict in Syria.

I would argue that there
are still eggs left to crack.

If you will in the region and the
political leaders who are still standing

around trying to figure out how to
ride this tiger if they try to reform.

Can they get ahead of popular demand.

Or will they just unleash pent
up public frustrations and

get swept away themselves.

How do they know two years ago the story

of the Arab awakening seemed like
a very simple clear hopeful narrative

taters toppled by peaceful
people power revolutions.

When you look at what's happening
across the Middle East today

is a much more complicated picture.

There's no simple narrative.

In those countries that
have ousted presidents and

tried to elect new ones we're seeing some
of the initial victors of those elections.

Parties.

That may not themselves be.

Really that committed to democracy or
even to basically equality in Libya.

Western intervention helped to save
Libyan citizens from a brutal dictator.

But the loose weapons a mercenary and.

The other spillover effects
from that conflict.

And from cut off its
collapse helped contribute

to the instability in Mali the coup in
Mali the rise of jihadi groups there.

In Syria.

What began as a peaceful
protest as I said was met with

astonishingly brutal
violence by the regime.

And is now increasingly in transforming
into a festering civil conflict

with sectarian overtones that could
get more and more to look like

Bosnia did in the one nine hundred ninety
S. It's a complex and a worrisome picture.

And yet.

The fundamental lesson that Secretary
Clinton drew in January two thousand and

eleven as the Arab Awakening was
getting underway was correct.

And understanding that the old foundations
of stability in the Middle East

had crumbled out from
under their feet our feet.

They were gone and
they were not coming back.

The new the Middle East is not going to
find a new equilibrium without reforms

that build a new kind of relationship
between the governments in the region and

their citizens.

Now for
the United States this presents a dilemma.

We've long favored stability in this
part of the world stability that would

allow the free flow of energy gets the
free flow of commerce through the Suez and

of our Navy through the Suez the stability
of peace between Egypt and Israel and

Israel and Jordan that has spared those
countries from another of the bloody wars.

They fought every decade between
nine hundred forty eight and

one nine hundred seventy nine.

Our fundamental interests in
this region have not changed but

the environment within
which we have to try and

pursue those interests has
clearly changed radically.

And so on May nineteenth two thousand and
eleven.

President Obama gave a speech
about these changes.

We have a stake not just in
the stability of nations but

in the self-determination of individuals.

The status quo is not sustainable.

He said societies held
together by fear and

repression may offer the illusion
of stability for a time but

they are built upon fault lines that
will eventually terrorists under.

It will be the policy
of the United States.

He said to promote reform
across the region and

to support transitions to democracy.

So.

If we want stability to allow us to pursue

our interests while closing the door
on a decade defined by two wars.

Then we need to support change
that sounds a little paradoxical.

But in today's Middle East.

That is the reality we face.

How do we do this.

Well the United States
can't control what happens.

But that doesn't mean that we
don't have a stake in the outcome.

We need to recognize that change is messy.

Transitions are uncertain many
democratic transitions fail.

So we have to act for
the long term not the short term.

And we need to hold to what we've learned
and what other societies have learned

about what makes for
stable successful democratization.

Guaranteed individual rights neutral
courts of law that treat all

citizens equally.

Gov.

In institutions that are transparent
in the way they do business and

thriving political parties and

civil society that gives citizens real
choices and real ways to participate.

Now in those places where
revolutions of already happened.

Reform is not the question
the question is how to build

stable successful democracies.

There are very different forces competing
to define the future of these new states.

They're competing through elections but
they're competing in other ways too.

Some of these forces are democratic some
are not some we really can't tell yet.

And there are also those actors in and

around the region who don't want to see
stable democracies succeed in Egypt and

Tunisia because that would
threaten their interests.

What role is there for
the United States in places like Egypt and

Tunisia and
Libya that have undergone revolutions and

are seeking now to write new rules for
new democratic societies.

Well the U.S.

needs long term cooperation with these
countries especially with Egypt.

Egypt is a geo strategically located
it is the largest Arab country

by far in terms of population.

It's a powerful political and cultural and
potentially economic force in the region.

So the U.S.

needs to build broad relationships
across Egyptian society across.

Egyptian political spectrum.

And create a coalition for
cooperative ties with the United States.

In much the way that the U.S.
had to do in Western Europe after

World War two when in
the ashes of that conflict

very different visions for
the future were being set out by.

Communists and socialists and
conservative Christian Democrats.

And there were those who want to a tight
connection to the United States and

those who want to France
to go its own way.

And those who wanted to
ensure that they had.

Peaceful relations with
the Soviet Union looming at store.

And the United States had to
work across societies and

build coalitions of support for
transatlantic ties.

That's the kind of moment we're
in in the Arab world today.

Now in other parts of the region
places like Jordan or

Morocco there are kings who
are trying to get ahead of the curve

of popular demand by making
reforms from the top down.

In both Jordan and

Morocco those kings have revised their
constitutions they've given more power to

Parliament they've held new elections with
international monitors observing them.

The question is whether they've done
enough to address the challenges they face

not just the demand for participation but
also the economic challenges.

It's a lot easier.

Actually as a monarch to revise
the constitution than to throw

your corrupt friends and
relatives in jail.

And to make your courts work
fairly to enforce contracts and

the danger is that if citizens are given
more democratic institutions and

more ways to participate by their
modern monarchical rulers but

these new democratic institutions can't
deliver because the monarchs don't do

the other things they need to do.

Then people start to lose
faith in politics as a way of

getting what they need and
solving their problems and

of course there are always
those waiting in the wings.

When people start.

Lose faith and politics and whispering
about other ways to get things done.

Those radical voices are out there.

Hoping to see these
experiments in reform fail.

Places like Saudi Arabia.

Or tinkering around the edges but

really don't want to have to
change the way they do business.

Since the Arab Spring began Saudi Arabia
has spent billions billions of dollars.

This is a population of about twenty two
million people in domestic subsidies.

To try and address people's grievances
housing subsidies thousands of

new government jobs and so on.

But it's still facing protests every week

from women who want to be able
to work outside the home.

Or just drive their kids to school from
parents whose children were arrested years

ago on suspicion of radical sympathies and
have never been released from

locals who know that official corruption
is what's caused their problems but

they can't get anyone in the royal
family and to address it.

Saudi Arabia is sitting on twenty five
percent of the world's proven oil reserves

and young Saudis are not going
to sit there and wait forever.

So the United States needs
to keep pressing for

meaningful reforms because we believe
that given the changes that have taken

place already reform is the only
path to lasting stability.

But the problem is that seeing
what's happened all around them.

The region's remaining autocrats
increasingly worry that reform just

upsets the apple cart.

And so at a moment of profound
uncertainty there is a real dive.

And interests between
the United States and

some of our most important Arab partners.

Let me in my last few minutes
talk a little bit about.

Out a part of the region that I know
is on a lot of people's mind these days

which is Syria.

Syria has sadly become the focus from for
all of her.

Says around the region.

They are all trying to influence
outcomes to their own advantage.

The radical jihadists who reject democracy
and reject the West are offering

desperate Syrians extra soldiers for the
cause in hopes that they can make Syria.

The new cause celeb of
the jihadi movement and

get recruits and
money from all around the Muslim world.

And since the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq
since the announcement of the planned U.S.

withdrawal from Afghanistan and since the.

Relatively successful degreed ation of al
Qaeda has capabilities in Afghanistan and

Pakistan the Jihadi is need a new cause.

Syria is a great target for them.

And it's partly a great cause.

Because in C. you get to recur for

their ideology but
they also get to fight against Shia.

The minority leadership of Syria are all
away which is say a sect of Shia Islam.

Although not all Shia see
them as a part of Shia slum.

But they get to fight against Shia
they get to fight against Iran.

Now the Iranians of course are lined up
behind Bashar al Assad their longtime ally

because Syria is their link to
the heart of the Middle East.

It's their link to the border with
Israel and the Arab Israeli conflict.

It's a key way to get weapons
to Hizbollah in Lebanon.

So losing Syria would be a big blow
to Iran at a moment when there

are the feeling very squeezed.

So they are very dug in in
support of this terrible regime.

The Russians and the Chinese don't
love Bashar al Assad and at bottom.

They understand that this guy
is not going to survive but

they really hate the idea of approving or
allow.

Knowing another international
intervention into a country's

sovereign affairs after all they
have their own restive populations

that they sometimes repress force and
to them this whole Arab

awakening shows the danger of letting
people have their say look at the chaos

that's been unleashed all across
the region order to freedom.

That's one of their core
principles in foreign affairs and

they don't agree with the U.S. view that
without more freedom in the Arab world.

There won't be any order
over the long term and

then you have the Gulf Arab states that
want to hurt Iran by toppling Bashar but

they also don't really want to deal with
another emerging democracy in the region.

So they're funding the opposition.

But the most conservative Islamist part of
it including some of these jihadi groups.

European people and
their political football in this regional

as in people have been placed.

I did States.

Wade into this conflict.

But that would have in Syria and
how it happens.

Will have of course an impact on
the regional balance of power as

the United States is confronting
its nuclear program.

It could weaken Iran.

That could make them more
amenable to negotiations.

It could also make them more likely
to lash out using terrorism and

other asymmetric means.

It does matter.

Now there that the most important
principle the United States

can bring to the issue of Syria
is the Hippocratic principle.

First do no harm.

The problem for the United States is that.

Doing nothing is also a choice
that carries consequences.

The longer this conflict goes
on the worse it could get and

it's gone on already long enough and

in ways that are producing negative
impacts on American interests.

If the Syrian state collapses into
ungovernability we have to worry about

the danger of parts of this territory
becoming a haven for jihadi activity.

We have to worry about the security
of Syria's stocks of chemical and

biological weapons.

The longer the conflict goes on
the more refugees flow into Lebanon

into Jordan into Iraq into Turkey we have
to worry about the impact on the stability

of those countries and should the Syrian
conflict truly become entrenched

as a sectarian Sunny's Shia conflict
that also will have implications for

the very fragile stability in Iraq
where the United States invested so

much blood and treasure to tamp
down an incipient civil war.

So the bottom line is that even
if the Obama admin wants to

avoid doing harm that doesn't mean
it should avoid doing anything.

And the longer the conflict
goes on the more.

The costs of doing nothing to
the United States and its interests.

That's a lot to cover.

I haven't even mentioned another issue
in the Middle East that has often caught

the United States up intensely that's
the Arab Israeli conflict of course and

the efforts to resolve it.

I'd be happy to talk to you
about that in the discussion.

Let me just and

with what I think is the lesson I
take away from this little overview.

Which is.
That while the American public and

President Obama may very
much wish to close the door.

On a decade of entanglements in the
Middle East and the broader Muslim world.

While we may wish to focus on issues

here at home we may wish to pivot
to economic opportunities in Asia.

I think you see that there
are a lot of reasons why

the United States will
continue to be drawn in.

To engagement with a set of Middle Eastern
problems that will have a profound impact

on American interests on the global
economy and on global security.

And so with that let me stop and
look forward to our discussion.

Thank you thank you.

I am.

My

God My goodness.

Did you use that term
you know the lives in

the civil war civil war.

It's amazing.

Although we don't hear anything more

about what's going on but
of course there is still violence in Iraq.

So yeah it's a.

We we are they.

So.

Relationship.

You know that was kind of you to that.

Part.

So that's a good place to start.

It's true that there is still
sectarian violence in Iraq and

indeed we've seen a bit of
an uptick since the Syrian conflict

erupted now how much of that is
due to what's going on next door.

I don't know we do know that
there is a flow of jihad.

Adi's of Sunnis from Iraq who
fought in Iraq and conducted

bombings against the US and bombings
against Shia in Iraq going into Syria.

And that's a reverse.

So there's trouble of gee how do
you see from elsewhere in the world

so that's that's something
we need to worry about.

Prime Minister Maliki has successfully
kind of put a lock on national politics.

With his Iraqi up Party which is
a he's a political leader an Iraq he

has a Shia party and
is used to his lock on the executive.

In some troubling ways.

Including repressing media freedom.

Including arresting and
prosecuting political opposition and

one of the the vice premier
of who is a Sunni leader.

So that's all quite troubling in terms of
the longer term prospects for Iraq and

for Iraqi democracy.

The flip side is that some things we were
really worried about have not happened.

The Sunni Shia conflict
has not really erupted

in in some of the ways we feared although
as I said it's still the air under

the surface the big thing that
hasn't happened is an outright

confrontation between Iraqi Kurds and
the rest of the country.

The Kurds have not tried
to declare independence.

We have not seen a conflict
over the territorial dispute

around the city of Kirkuk.

And we have seen a lot of
willingness on both sides to bargain

to negotiate and
to find a way forward where they can vote.

Benefit from foreign investment
in the oil industry and

the other benefits of stability in Iraq.

So you know that I guess that's
hopeful piece that I would really

rather QUESTION Sir your

old Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov.

Or

former Powell.

Wife

that most likely

just recently have

done very well in the long run.

So maybe hour ago

I wonder what is the likelihood that.

What do you think.

Resolution.

Here and.

OK.

Well first on the on
the diplomatic initiative.

What you're referring to
was how I think a six or

seven point plan put forward by U.S.
special envoy for Syria.

Kofi.

And on when he held that position.

About resigned and
been replaced on a voyage Dr Brahimi

that seven point plan was
an effort to try and get a.

Phased agreement that would
first involve a cease fire.

And a separation of forces and
humanitarian access and so on and

then involved a political set of political
negotiations over the future of Syria.

Between the government and the opposition.

There were a couple of big problems
with this initiative which

all the members of the U.N.
Security Council signed onto initially.

The first big problem is that the cease
fire only lasts about three days.

Because Bashar Assad didn't keep it.

And even during that period of time.

He would not fully implement the terms.

As he had been laid out.

And so it never progressed to face to face
three they never got beyond phase one.

Deployed premised on the idea
that Assad would be willing

to engage Assad and
his government would be willing to engage

seriously with the political opposition
with with the Syrian opposition.

About real political change
real change to the system

in open elections and

the political opposition made clear
from the beginning their view that

Bashar al Assad given the way he had
behaved was not a credible into Lockett or

in this process and
that from their perspective.

One key conclusion had to be that.

He would no longer be president.

Assad.

I think this diplomatic initiative as it
was laid out by Kofi Anon is basically

irrelevant at this point Assad has
rejected an in a bunch of speeches where

he's put out his own proposals on
the political future of Syria that have no

overlap with the the proposals of of
the opposition the opposition for

a long time rejected after this failed
gambit negotiations with the regime.

Although just in recent weeks.

Some members of the opposition
have said they would be willing to

negotiate with the regime and
it was also premised on the idea

that Russia which had a good
relationship with Bashar al Assad.

Could get him to edge here to the demands
of the international community.

And what we've seen instead is that even
when the Russians have tried to exert

influence he has not responded.

And so if there's a sort of.

If there is a way for
the great powers to come in and

exert their influence on the two sides of
this conflict and force them to the table.

That probably would have
happened by now but but

nobody's been able to make that happen.

And so I think there are a lot of
us who watch the current diplomacy.

Secretary Kerry going
back to love Rauf and

saying Come on let's see if you and
I could find a way to work this out.

We look at that with a lot of skepticism
because personally I think even if

logger of and
Kerry could agree on an approach.

Neither of them would be able to enforce
that approach on the Syrian opposition or

on Bashar al Assad.

So so I do.

I doubt at this point that there would be

political negotiations over
Syria's future and to.

Point where the sides that
are fighting on the ground.

Get to what we call a herding
stalemate where they're exhausted and

they can't gain any more relative
to one another through violence

then they might be willing to talk.

And you know what happened in Bosnia

with you know with some interventions
from the outside to help it along.

But that's not where we
are in Syria right now.

Unfortunately could Syria break up
into many states ethnic enclaves.

It could then that
populations in Syria arse.

So intermingled and have been for so
long that it's by no it would be a very

messy business and
probably a very bloody business and

and I don't think we should look at that
as something that would end the fighting.

I think that as in.

The breakup of Yugoslavia.

You might just see more conflict along

the boundaries of those
ethnically defined areas.

Yes ma'am.

Or are you.

Why are we.

Well if it's in essence
a proxy war already.

You know why you know.

Why.

However what is the.

What is your what would your.

What.

So the question was about Hamas
which gets support from the Iranians

as does Hizbullah and
as does the Syrian regime and so.

So the question was essentially will Hamas
take advantage of the current situation

to try and win control of the West Bank.

Now this gets us into what's happening
in Palestinian politics these days.

And what's been the impact of all this
stuff going on in the rest of the Arab

world on Palestinians in the West Bank
in Gaza because of course Israel and

Palestine are not walled off from
the rest of the region and so

the mood of popular protest
has had implications.

In both Israel and Palestine as
well in Israel of course we saw as

the social protest movement in
the summer of two thousand and

eleven the sort of occupy Tel Aviv
which resulted in the emergence

of a new party that is the second largest
party in the Israeli parliament now.

And on the Palestinian side you
saw a renewal of mass mobilization

in support of unity in support of
reconciliation between Fatah and

Hamas between the West Bank and Gaza and a
lot of frustration especially among young

Palestinians who felt that their political
leadership is disconnected from them.

It got elected but
it was a long time ago and

it hasn't faced another election since.

And so they feel that their political
leadership is in many ways as

unaccountable and unresponsive to
them as those of the Arab autocrats

to citizens in Egypt in Tunisia and
so it has produced an upsurge in.

In mobilisation in the West Bank and
in Gaza.

Now what will be the outcome
of that I don't think that

a Hamas takeover of the West Bank
is by any means a given.

I think that Hamas has done itself a lot
of damage in terms of credibility in

Palestinian eyes because of the way
it's governed Gaza because it broke

its promise to the Palestinian people as
Hizbollah broke its promise to live in.

People that it would never turn its
arms on the Palestinian people and

it did it took over Gaza by force it
persecuted its political opposition.

It pushed people off buildings and
it's ruled Gaza with a lot of repression.

And Palestinians know that.

So as much as they don't blame Hamas for
everything that's going wrong in Gaza and

they know that the economic devastation
there is much more due to the isolation.

By Israel and the fact that they don't get
international assistance at the same way

as the West Bank and so
on they do know what Gaza.

What Hamas is sins are they are not blind.

But of course the past the P.L.O.

is not covered itself in glory
in the West Bank either.

So it's a bit of a pox
on both your houses but

will you guys both grow up get over
yourselves and get your act together.

I think is how I would summarize
the sentiment of a lot of

younger Palestinians right now.

Now the question is whether
they see any prospect.

Of positive political change.

In the situation they face today and
positive PL I think you know most

of them believe with good reason that it's
unlikely the reconciliation would proceed.

Unless Fatah and Hamas thought they had
something to gain from the process and

what would they have to gain progress
toward Palestinian statehood and

Palestinian sovereignty a state to govern.

That's the ultimate political prize.

Hamas and
Fatah are not competing to become the.

Mediators of the Israeli
occupation in the West Bank.

That's not what they're aspiring to so
there's a very organic

link between the diplomatic process
which is essentially stagnant.

And domestic.

Politics in Palestinian society and
I think we ignore that link at our peril

the United States and others in
the international community have invested

millions of dollars hundreds of millions
of dollars over the last several years

in helping improve governance
in the Palestinian Authority and

building the institutions of
the Palestinian Authority and

a lot of things have gotten better.

They have done work on anti-corruption
they've improved rule of law.

They've they've improved the delivery
of health care and education and

other social services.

But without a political horizon without a
prospect of independent state hood all of

that institution building only gets you so
far and it doesn't remove the underlying

source of instability and grievance
which is the lack of sovereignty.

So the the the diplomatic process

the ostler process as we knew it the peace
process of the one nine hundred ninety S.

may not work anymore for
the Palestinian leadership and the Israeli

leadership given where who they are given
who their constituents are in their

domestic politics and so on but that
doesn't mean that we can just let it sit.

We need to build a new diplomatic process

that will meet these guys
where they are today.

And help create a horizon that can
ensure continued stability and

hopefully ideally conflict resolution
between Israel and the Palestinians.

Can you.

Not be over.

Maybe the middle when we can do
something about overtime pay.

Well you

know you know you really don't.

I think that's a very
good point which is that

Tunisia I think is a little bit different.

I would distinguish between the two cases.

I think one of the biggest problems
in the Egyptian transition

is that the transition roadmap itself
has had a very little clarity.

So there isn't really a political horizon
and people have it has not been clear to

individuals to organizations to
political movements how you plug in and

how and when to invest to get
what you want out of the process.

So it's very hard to organise But
actually if if you're playing a game of

what my colleague Marc Lynch calls Calvin
ball you guys read Calvin and Hobbes or

do you know how Calvin and
Hobbes used to play this wacky game where

they would start playing football but then
one of them would change the rules and

then the other one would change the rules
back that that's what the Egyptian

transition has been like let's
have parliamentary elections but

the Supreme Constitutional Court
says Parliament has to be dissolved.

OK let's have this eventually actions but

the day before the presidential
election the military council

will change the powers that accrue to
the presidency so it will be weak.

This is this is the Egyptian transition.

So you're right it's
been very difficult for

the actors to figure out how to engage
internal actors an extra monitors given.

Tunisia I think has been different
because there has been a roadmap.

They started out with a sort of
technocratic government in the immediate

wake of the transition that government
was seen as not credible not safe fell.

It took them three tries before they
put together a transitional government

that had enough credibility amongst all
the political elites that they could

fashion a road map those elites could
agree on but in Tunisia they understood

that they needed to fashion a road map
that the elites would all buy into.

So they did that they said OK we're
going to elect a constituent assembly.

It's going to write a constitution and
then we're going to have new elections for

everything and that's the process
they're going along with and

because of the precedent that was set
there and the rules that they created for

writing the constitution
also reflected the need for

consensus not just majority
here in ism but consensus.

They have a two thirds rule for
provisions in

their new constitution within the assembly
house have two thirds support.

The government that emerged out of
the Constituent Assembly elections

just fell but it's managed to place for
quite a while was a coalition government

of three parties one Islamist and two
secular parties so I think the two knew

the Tunisian process from the beginning
has been a quite different process.

It hasn't been perfect but it's been much
more stable in the way it's played out and

I still have relatively good hopes for
it in Egypt.

I think we're at a place where
all of the political actors

are treating this process
as a zero sum game.

The Muslim Brotherhood
believes firmly that if it

can get through these
parliamentary elections.

It will win.

And then it will have electoral legitimacy
and it doesn't need anything else.

It pushed through the Constitution
the way it wanted it.

It has a devil's bargain with
the military and it will be able to rule.

The opposition believes that.

If they participate in these elections.

That is indeed what will happen
they'll be pushed out of the game.

And but
if they boycott the elections they will

be able to deny the Brotherhood
electoral legitimacy.

And if they push hard enough they'll be
able to force either an new revolution or

the military to step in
a new military coup.

It was almost worse.

Or.

Well funny you should ask
on Tuesday I testified

before the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on this very subject.

So if you're interested in the details
of what I think we should be.

OK So you're saying what should we do
in eighteen months if it doesn't work.

OK.

Look I don't think the United States
can afford to walk away from Egypt.

I think it's too geo
strategically important.

I also think that at bottom the U.S. and

Egyptians have a lot in common in
terms of what we want from Egypt and

what we want from the region I think
there's a very strong foundation for

a lasting cooperative partnership.

But I don't think that we can build
that lasting cooperate of partnership

through a kind of transactional
relationship with whoever is on top.

I think we have to build it
by creating that coalition

I talked about within Egyptian society
by making the case for why U.S.

Egyptian relations are good for
both of us.

And that does mean talking about
the benefits of peace with Israel and

I think most Egyptians know that.

Peace Treaty has brought them thirty
years of stability and has protected

an entire generation of Egyptians from the
scourge of war and they value that even

though they don't like Israel and they
don't like American policy toward Israel.

They know the benefits of that treaty for
Egypt.

So I think there actually is
a good foundation there for

us to make that case I think we have to
stay engaged like I said earlier I think

we have to be in it for
the long term in a place like Egypt and

even though it's very tempting to look at
these developments and throw up our hands.

I think that's that's exactly
a dangerous thing to do right now.

Yes or no you know.

We have written

rain rain rain.

You did it right there were eight and.

I wonder why would

you marry me and here.

Or marry me one.

No.

And every day

on one yet you.

Get my book and I've really.

You know.

Yeah every right and
they all are all right.

Yeah every Yeah.

Just for my information Larry
how much time do we have.

OK good.

So we ending at one thirty more or
less OK I think it's a really

interesting point and I would actually
expand it beyond humanitarian concerns I

think that there are we have
a Brookings a project on U.S.

relations with the Islamic world that we
started in the wake of nine eleven and

we've used it over the years in
a lot of different ways to try and

explore the prospects for using it for for

bringing people together from a variety of
sectors and with a variety of of passions.

To work together on common endeavor and
we have done this

over the last ten years we've had
a an Arts and Culture Initiative.

We've had an initiative on science and

technology cooperation we've
had a face Leaders Initiative.

It's very unusual for

a public policy think tank to do
that kind of inter-cultural work but

it's been a fascinating spurious for
me and it's underscored I think that.

A lot of the times we as
Americans because we have such

a strong sense of our own civic culture.

The ideas and values that we
collectively cherish as a society and

uphold as a society we often assume
that we're more unique them.

We are if you'll forgive the modifier we
often assume that the things that define

us aren't in some sense universal but
it's not true.

You know our the way in which we
cherish the dignity of the individual

that's that's a universal does young
Arabs who are out in the street

two years ago and now they want to
government that treats them with dignity.

They can't just pick them up
out of an Internet cafe and

beat them to death on the sidewalk
which is what happened to young men.

Name Khalid sayed in Egypt in June two
thousand and ten that is universal.

Similarly we all want our families and
our communities to have reliable ask.

Reliable basic security reliable
access to the basic needs of life.

We all want our kids to do
better than we're doing.

And increasingly I think with
the growth of technological tools.

And with the change in the global
information environment and

the global economy.

As citizens we have more and

more awareness of the ways in which
we're interconnected and interdependent.

And we have more ability to act on that.

So you know I have a friend
to write was just for

Taishan on the emergence of civil society
in the development of international law.

He looked at the case of the international
landmine ban treaty which the U.S.

has not signed but never mind this
was a treaty that emerged from

the advocacy of civil society
organizations connected globally.

That was something that while not
impossible a generation ago but

the costs of doing that the transaction
costs were just much much

higher in a in a pretty new media age.

So I think as civil society
organizations are able

to connect more easily across borders.

There's more and more opportunity for
the kinds of things.

So you're talking about.

Yes or no matter how.

Yeah.

Thank you.
Actually for

minding me that I didn't talk about.

Turkey's role in Syria very much.

When I was talking about Syria.

Maybe you can.

I should ask you but.

When I said that the inaction on

the Syrian conflict implicated
American interests in the region

I was primarily referring to
the stability of the neighbors.

Of Syria's neighbors which include
of course our NATO ally Turkey and

not to say that their fish stability
the stability of the Turkish state is

threatened because Turkey is a large and
very competent state but

it is having an effect on Turkey that
your countries absorbing the costs of

what is it NOW hundred
thousand refugees and

more than once Syrian missiles
have come over the border and

struck Turkish villages and
killed Turkish civilians

citric is facing a direct threat
from this conflict already.

And that's why NATO sent Patriot missile
batteries to Turkey which are now

deployed there.

Along with some troops from other NATO
countries to man those batteries.

So we're already threats in certain ways.

Of strategic relations that we cherish and

that serve our both our interests
this security and stability of

Israel is along interests of the United
States the the Israeli Syrian border.

Ironically has been the most
stable border Israel has had for

many years and
when I was in Israel last May

talking to national security officials
there about the Syrian conflict.

They were very ambivalent.

On the one hand you know they have no love
lost for Bashar al Assad on the other

hand on the other hand they
they didn't want to see.

We.

Instability on their northern border.

When I talk to them now and
I'm going out again in about a week but

when I talk to them.

Now they're much more anxious
about the impact of this conflict

on their own security.

They're worried about jihadi S.
who might use Syria as a base.

They're worried about border infiltration
by Palestinian terrorist groups they're

worried about loose weapons they're
worried about weapons transfers to

Hizbollah we've already seen an Israeli
strike on a convoy of weapons that were

supposedly going from Syria to Hezbollah
in Lebanon and if Israel feels the need

to protect its own security interests
through direct military intervention.

Then we could see Israel getting
pulled into this conflict so

those Iraq era he talked about I think
those are the kinds of American interests.

I had in mind.

Now as far as the Turkish role in Syria.

I think that this is
been very difficult for

the Turkish government because
the Turkish government had a strong and

growing relationship with Bashar al
Assad this Turkish government when it

came into office said it wanted to have
a no problems policy with its neighborhood

which hasn't worked out very well with
any of the neighbors actually but but

it's worked out particularly badly with
Syria so at the outset of the conflict.

The Turkish government tried to
use its influence with Bashar

al Assad to get him to
stay to moderate and

engage with the opposition and
failed to move him a millimeter.

So it was embarrassing.

And it also left them with no leverage
because they essentially had to declare

him persona non grata and and
and break off their relationship.

So I think Turkey finds itself in
a position today where it's carrying

a lot of risk.

But it doesn't have many tools to manage
that risk and that's very unsettling.

In the back.

Well let's hope not because I
think Lebanon suffered enough.

But it's possible it is possible and
it's worrisome.

I mean the first thing I would say I think
is that the Syrian opposition while still

not a model of a unitary decision
making is in a much better place.

Organizationally.

Than it was even six months ago.

It managed to create a IT
leadership structure that

incorporates armed groups as
well as the exile opposition.

And that incorporates representatives
from all of Syria's ethnic and

sectarian communities and
that was very important.

I do not want to downplay it.

It was a huge struggle and
by the way this is not unusual for.

For opposition groups that are emerging

from decades of intense repression that
they're very factionalized and they're

very mistrustful and that's because of
the experience of intense repression.

So we can't blame them too much for
the troubles that they've had getting

getting themselves organized but
they have made a lot of progress.

I think that the real question.

We there are there are two
questions that I'm focused on right

now with respect to the Syrian opposition.

One is.

If indeed as it seemed like the reporting
around today's Friends of Syria

meeting was suggesting if indeed Western
governments are going to funnel more

humanitarian and other assistance directly
through the opposition to try and

get that to the population on the ground.

How effective is the opposition going to
be in actually delivering aid to people.

That will show how well
connected the leadership is

to to the communities inside Syria and

the other question is if we get
to a point where the Syrian

regime collapses or
gives up which I think is unlikely.

Is this opposition going to
be able to hold together.

A transitional government is it going to
be able to take over the basic functions

of statehood and fill that vacuum quickly.

Because without that I think we
really do risk state failure

in a way that could have spiraling.

Security consequences.

Maybe one more quick yes or.

Image.

Over.

All day.

That.

It's a really good question and
on and thank you for asking at.

Let me say two things The first
is that the fact that Islamist

parties have done well in
the first set of elections

in these newly opened politics
should not surprise any.

Buddy.

And you don't have to take my word
on this now because I wrote about it

in two thousand and eight and

a lot of other people did there was
a whole special issue of The Journal

on Islamist parties and there was
a lot of agreement among scholars that

Islamist parties would do really well
in open politics in the Arab world.

Why.

Mainly because under decades
of repression governments were

very well able to clamp down
all the public space for

secular parties to organize for laboring
instore Ghanaians for all the bases.

Couldn't fully clamp down on
religious institutions in society

because those are so
fundamental and so if we're going

is ational advantage over every other kind
of political party because they could use

religious institutions in society as
a basis from which to organize and

spread their message and they did that
throughout the decades of dictatorship and

they emerged in the wake of dictatorship
much better position than anybody else and

they used it and they won.

So we shouldn't be surprised question
is are they hijacking the revolutions.

Well number one if you look at
the Brotherhood in Egypt for

example they're acting
like a lot of parties with

questionable democratic credentials who
first post transitional elections they're

acting like the revolution party in
Mexico did after Mexican independence.

They're acting like
the party that ruled Japan.

For decades there that yes they and

their sudden inheritance of
the state institutions and

state resources to try and
entrenched themselves in power to try and

write the laws and rules in a way
that will keep them winning.

There's nothing particularly
Islamist about.

That it's not I would argue not driven
by ideology it's driven by the quest for

power.

It is not democratic in the way they're
not playing the game in a democratic way

they are violating basic expectations for
Democratic actors in

their prosecution of people for
insulting the president for example which

is undermining political pluralism saying
no you're not allowed to disagree with us.

So there's a lot about it that I find
really troubling that could throw

a transition to democracy off the rails or
into reverse and that's one of the reasons

why my answer to Ken was we have to
stay engaged and we have to push.

And we have to have make clear what
those basic democratic expectations are.

Thank you so much.

This is been a wonderful discussion.

Thank you thank you.