So on behalf of the sand and School of International Affairs and its policy research arm the Center for International Strategy technology and policy let me welcome you all today to our panel discussion on the contemporary situation in the Middle East which arguably is at a pivotal moment in the history of the modern Middle East and across the region and really only about three and a half years after the onset of the Arab Spring it appears that most of the movements that began as peaceful protests against authoritarian regimes have either fizzled or devolved into violent uprisings take Egypt right the keystone state in the region traditionally has gone from toppling the Mubarak regime to overthrowing the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood government marking a three hundred sixty degree turn in just a matter of a few years Israel and Palestine as you know just in gay and the Palestinian Authority Mohsin gauged in recent conflict India now they're faced with even bigger questions of what to do next after the fatigue runs its course in Syria and Libya in Libya the protest movements morphed into becoming very complex violent and. And very intractable and protected civil conflicts civil and armed conflicts and in Syria the civil war has been so vicious that about half of the twenty two million people have been displaced or are left homeless. And not only is there political instability in the regimes and on the streets but any semblance of the meaning of borders geographically speaking psychologically politically normatively seem thrown up been thrown torn asunder and the very legitimacy of borders and sovereignty seems that. In question. In the political vacuums that have stepped into this challenge and the growing sectarianism and the ambivalence of the West have together created the fodder if you will for the most violent forms of Islamic fundamentalism to take root. And as evidenced by President Obama's speech last week this actually means something to the United States now we can debate and discuss how and what that actually means but there's no question these days that what's going on there involves more than just protecting U.S. personnel on the ground and it is against this dramatically changing and volatile regional landscape that some basic questions are being raised here as those of us as far as far away from the region here in the United States are left scratching our heads how did we get here where are we headed Do we have a strategy to get where we want to go. What are the implications associated with the crisis of state in the absence of borders in the region these days who are the regional intrastate groups influencing the environment the events on the ground what are the sources and limitations of their influence and most specifically in light of President Obama's recent speech and articulated strategy for refocusing on the region who are U.S. partners on the ground in Syria and Iraq in particular and how can we engage others our allies in particular in the region in a strategy of degrading if not an islet NG ISIS these and other questions are really at the crux of the debate not only here in the halls of the campus but across the country these days and President Obama I gather was in Atlanta but decided not to engage with you tonight but we will sit with you in his stead and in that spirit of advancing public discourse. Reflection on these very heady issues I've invited a number of my colleagues in the same one school to share some of their expertise not so much to provide answers to many of those questions but to help tee up a a serious and systematic discussion that I hope will help you in sorting through how you can should be thinking about it and acting accordingly so for so I've asked each of my colleagues to speak about ten minutes to give you a sort of a primer from their respective perspectives and then that will lead us into a broader Q. and A So without further ado let me introduce all three of them the first to speak is Dr Larry Rubin and Larry is our resident Middle East specialist in the Sam Nunn school in fact he has a recent book that has hit the streets at Stanford University Press that looks at intra Arab security dilemmas and specifically his research examines the hows and whys and when does idiology especially revolutionary Islam affect the threat perception and foreign policies of the different Arab states and I've asked area Larry to give us an overview of what's going on in the region these days and particular some of the perspectives from different regional state actors and after Larry Speaks our next. Colleague is Dr Jenna Jordan and Jenna as many of you know studies terrorism and migration but she brings a specific expertise to the table tonight that I think is especially out proposed and that is her understanding of the organizational structure the capabilities the tactics the the. The strengths and weaknesses of groups like Hamas and I.S.I. Al and how they are similar and different from each other and from al Qaeda and other regional terrorist group or work has also been featured recently in a very prominent international security. Journal where she's taken on the issue of specific the strengths and weaknesses of different counterterrorism strategy and specifically some of the limitations of decapitation approach something that is again being implicated in in the strategy that we're considering and in the region these days and after Jenna speaks will be Professor Nicholas Fabry and Mickey is an associate professor in the school and he's not so much a regional expert as he is a scholar of the norms of sovereignty and in particular the relationship between borders and territorial integrity and political development and he's going to talk a little bit about the crisis of the state in the region and some of the strategies for contending with that So without further ado let me flip it over to Larry to give us a overview from the regional perspective. Thank you very much Dr Silver and everyone else and everyone who's attending there inside or outside the room at this time so when I handed out my syllabus in the first my first class attack on the Middle East and Middle East politics in January two thousand and eleven I really had little idea what was in store for me those next few weeks are definitely next few years until now those protests in Tunisia been increasing the time we were in class and then by the third week of class millions of Egyptians were calling were in the streets protesting not not trying to get into my class but calling for Mubarak's downfall. The uprising produced many regime changes Islamists were elected and in some cases overthrown such as the case Egypt. One of the results was also civil of Syrian civil war which is killed more people than the Algerian. Civil war in the one nine hundred ninety S. Also Yemen today still struggles with this Libya today is on the verge of again spiraling into civil war and regional regional divisions has been for a while and why Tunisia was the first to spark it seems to be the most stable and best off from this change. Well these conflicts are very serious questions of the future and and the State of the state not just of the state but the region but also the state itself as we'll talk about in a second and perhaps as a result of both the Syrian civil war and the Iraq Rocky civil war I will say the mid ninety's the mid two thousand historic borders are being contested in ways unseen unseen for quite some time with the rise of ISIS or Islamic state or I'm not going to go through all the different acronyms right now or I still if you would have thought that this that the famed sites become agreement from one nine hundred sixteen that divided the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence would be such a trending topic today among and not just among anti colonial Arab nationalists saying they divide the region but basically among everyone talking about this because because the because ISIS is talking about and say we proclaim the death of this these and of these borders between Syria and Iraq and this past summer we saw the latest salvo in the in the Israeli Palestinian or will say Israeli Hamas conflict resolution seems to be far away from as far away from us as ever Abbas remains weak mass remains empowered in the Gaza Strip even though the Gaza Strip is not all that devastated and that Netanyahu was attacked from the left and the right and still there's no clear winner from this conflict sucks except perhaps Egypt which has managed to avoid this any of this damage but it same time avoid having having one of its main enemies on its border amassed somewhat weakened. Militarily So while the Arabs seem see their spring seems to be this major Storch a marker transform the Middle East in ways that we probably are unimaginable now and probably won't see until quite sometime we need remember there was actually the Iraq war that of the least many of these many of these these dynamics that we see today and having to do specifically with some of the sectarian balance of imbalances of power we see throughout the region and as well as just the plain balance of military power. In the in the Gulf in particular led to in part and and condition Iran's arise in in the Gulf while it's pursuing nuclear technologies that it may give it the capability to acquire nuclear weapons and. Also made it merging basically with its rise two major pivot points of the Middle East the Israeli Arab conflict which it took advantage of and of course Gulf security toward the end of the last decade in particular we saw Iran's rise of course though with Also Turkey's rise which is somewhat stunted by the recent events in Syria now so we'll be able to cover everything that's happened I'd like to highlight a few things that will hopefully give some perspective and maybe we'll take up a little bit more in the Q. and A session the first is the first point is the regional politics must be viewed from the region not just from Washington or through the lens of American interests so there's a tendency both outside the region and sometimes even within it to overestimate American power and its ability to influence events on the ground this goes in particular what I had seen through the Arab uprisings about the United States could have done more could have done this are Khurshid events in this way and in fact throughout the Cold War This is often the view of the Cold War of the Middle East is kind of the this is basically the of just a reflection of what's going on in this really isn't the case if you look closely at the history very often some of these actors play off the major superpowers in this also goes the case you look at many of the conflicts in the region playing off one one even regional powers sometimes versus another there's also a slew of regional dynamics that sometimes get too much or too little play Now not every conflict or alliances about religious or ethnic identity but and domestic and regional politics are often are twined but it's kind of you know you need to try to understand these within the context and across and within each issue in a sense that one side you know no one size fits all in this way that you have to look at the context by trying to understand these these relationships and that it wouldn't be a predictor of who's going to. Aligned with who and who's an enemy of whom by the by one conflict itself but by one issue itself so let's take the most crucial the most one of the most confusing at crucial aspects determining security architecture the Middle East and that's the Iranian basically Iranian Saudi relations are almost in a sense as part of the poll that during the two thousand was talked about as being the crux one of the cruxes of the Arab the Arab the new Arab Cold War So this rivalry is often described as some is a Shia as as with Iran being a Shia Persian power against a Sunni Arab one and and then this is basically a lead moderate verses or a radical access axis and fighting its proxy wars outside this mean arena of Gulf security but if you look again at some of these of these actors and Procter proxies they don't always align Iran had supported Sunni Arab Hamas and as well as as Arab Hezbollah in southern Lebanon where is Saudi Saudi Arabia was against this and had seen it and we've seen it in many recent conflicts Iran supports. Supports the Syrian pan Arab. Assad regime in Syria and the Saudis support the opposition against it many of these variants also are seen in other conflicts let's throw Qatar into the mix again Qatar a gulf Arab monarchy on the not on the side of the Assad regime and against and some in certain conflicts against what the Saudi interests are in particular with with Egypt but on this issue in particular this is the Syrian civil war it's on the side the same side as Saudi Arabia this is confusing I bet let's go again to the recent Gaza conflict it's not a much easier for me either this one really brought a lot of these relationships to bear of what might be forming and and this basically you had the Israeli with the Israeli war in Gaza against Hamas you had Saudi and the Gyptian tacit support for. For this operation and addition of quiet will say my simple statements from the Jordanians. And this remember we're looking at the Saudi and we can't lens or look at this in sectarian or ethnic conflict terms we have to look at this in terms of what types of interests are are there and what the biggest fears of these regimes are and that in particular is the rise of an Islamist regime that might come to power and this is more of an ideological in threat than anything else so moving on to my second point. What happens in Cairo or Baghdad by dad doesn't really doesn't every doesn't stay in Cairo Baghdad as a result of this complex mac map of overlapping ethnic and sectarian identities while the state's being increasingly challenged it's often very very difficult contain these ethnic and religious conflicts especially when these political actors use them to their advantage. For example Palestinian Israeli clashes can be destabilizing at the at the local level not just say in Jordan where you have where you have a sizable Palestinian. But Palestinian will say a sizeable thousand population that may constitute in fact fact half of the their Jordanian citizen population there but also in other places where it's used to mobilize domestic populations there and is often seen as a liability and sometimes a flashpoint for trying to forge a number of different alliances crises like these like these like this violence sometimes heighten these these tensions another example of where of how and work conflicts spreads as with the Kurdish example you know the I want to show too much on the map here Kurds concert as a will say as a people spread are spread across four states Iraq Iran Syria and. And Turkey and and over the past period over the period last period of time you can see before nine hundred ninety there was always this playing among the of realizing that you can't really push one population too far and there's almost an equilibrium that took place for over a period of time. These are some of the considerations that many of the players have today when it comes to this into. Especially the Syrian civil war and some of the enclaves that we made that will probably discuss a little later and and it into Q. and A period of time but when you affect one of the populations you can easily affect another and also the national security of various population especially that have significant demographic presence in those other states. Finally the interplay between Syria the Syrian civil war and Iraqi politics is crucial here one of the factors and I want and Dr Jordan will talk about this more that has led to the success of ISIS is is the resentment of the Sunni population in Iraq towards the Maliki government was which was seen to be favoring Shia population there which constitutes the majority it's also one of the reasons why people are talking so much at the end of the end of six Pico and beyond just the Islamic state which claims to have abolished it so these ethnic and sectarian sectarian challenges also challenge the borders that we have today and the ability to maneuver in domestic politics. So the third point I want to make is is basically fear not when all is said and done many of the same issues will still be around for you after after this presentation is done and maybe by the time your kids go to school no. These sectarian issues won't go away and neither of these balances an imbalance of power. Even if most of the sectarian or religious enclaves receive their own state in that way there are always going to be these identity categories that the various actors can take and can take advantage of and potentially manipulate across across state lines the different conflicts and systems might also be organized then still in the same way around what we have today a goal of security as is one and around this system that goes around with the Arab Israeli conflict but I think we're seeing a growing signs of that the former is beginning to change the latter a resolution the Palestinian issue or some progress toward it would certainly have a large effect and longstanding issues at least. Longstanding at least tacit cooperation may bring the States a bit closer and as Iran its continued push toward nuclear weapons acquisition may also change these dynamics especially a balance of power in the Gulf and may affect how partition or potential the potential for partition is viewed among some of these states and Syria and both Iraq so is there some hope well let me throw out two quick points there may be some new opportunities at the regional level because of the recent changes in the regional politics ISIS is surprising and shocking in the sense that all these actors can agree that they all oppose it and that's rare in the Middle East when it comes to actually cooperation that's going to be a different question and it has been but it could be an opportunity. There's also an alignment against and it's been this way against Islamist coming to power in some of these states and we've seen this but the second or third year of the Arab Arab Spring or uprisings among some of these counterrevolutionary forces and lastly although the Palestinian issue will remain a liability for some of the these these more status quo States from the domestic perspective the risk of recent Gaza conflict has shown that it can bring actors closer together cooperate on strategic interests Saudi Arabia in Jordan the same alignment Mind you that is formed around the Iranian nuclear issue I'm going to leave and right here and turn it over to my colleague Dr Gordon. Yeah thank you all for being here this is great so I'm going to talk a little bit about wanting to focus my comments on ISIS but I think if we can talk about the other groups in the Q. and A and I'm going to talk a little bit about history and I think you and I talked several of the history find it really fascinating and really interesting and important to understand how Isis became or I solar or Islamic state or whatever you want to call it I'm going to say I say this because that this kind of thing. So I want to start by talking about. I've been with Savas of Holly who was the sort of original mobile will get there so basically he was a militant who came to Afghanistan in one thousand eight. Nine sort of just a bit late to fight the Soviets he went back to Jordan the Jordanian went back to Afghanistan in one nine hundred ninety nine where he became friends with the net then Laughton but he actually didn't join al Qaeda surprisingly after the Taliban fell he fled to Iraq and that's where we see the beginning of the movement after the two thousand and three US led invasion of Iraq he set up the forerunner to what is today ISIS or the Islamic State. And his rhetoric was actually quite similar to bin Laden's but his tactics were very different and not something that we see has become a big issue for the organization. Now from the outset we targeted other other Muslims other sheep and Shia particular So why was he targeting Shia and Shiite shrines at the time well some say well the Shia were just an easier target at that point they didn't have the strength to fight back this despite being a majority now after Saddam Hussein fell Shiite politicians replaced Sinise who had long dominated Iraqi politics and he was sort of anticipating that there would be considerable Sunni resentment to Shias that would help build up alliances and so he began carrying out lots of attacks and suicide attacks against Shia on the neighborhood now in two thousand and four Zahawi officially joined with Al Qaida and rebranded itself all Qaeda in Iraq or al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and at this time they actually began to see things that we're seeing now like beheadings and other just really brutal tactics and done in this very demonstrative way that were intended to have very public you know the kind of getting published city like getting you know watching it there was a quote by a very well known terrorism scholar Brian Jenkins who said ages ago that terrorists don't want to lot of people dead they want a lot of people watching while I think we can safely say that these organizations want a lot of people dead with. They also want a lot of people watching and that's a lot of the headings and really brutal tactics have the effect of doing that now in two thousand and five a lottery who was. So the number two al Qaeda actually was very vocal very quick vocally critical of their colleagues tactics of killing civilians and we see this now happening with Baghdadi today Zawahiri is coming out very vocally in opposition to their tactics now by two thousand and six are probably song self the sort of the emir or spiritual leader and he insisted that Iraqis Sinise and here to adhere to their very very strict interpretation of Sharia law and those who resisted were killed so as lots of coercion involved in this you know in two thousand and six he was killed in a U.S. airstrike north of Baghdad I think about twenty miles north of Baghdad and as a death occurred during this time of the Sunni awakening when many Sunni tribes who were very started to be very unhappy with this harsh imposition of Sharia law were fighting that now the U.S. military took sort of advantage of this of this sentiment and supported insurgency known as the awakening the Sunni awakening where tribesmen and even those who actually had fought the Americans were supported now to fight al Qaeda in Iraq they were called the Sons of Iraq and it's really highlighted actually how many. A.Q. I commanded. The search. For its mine. Q I was seriously degraded and it was seen as a victory right we defeated al Qaeda in Iraq now this victory didn't deal with the underlying Sunni Shia issues in Iraq that's still going on and so that piece was ultimately left to Maliki who really worsened this she is city relations in Iraq Maliki denied the Sons of Iraq those participating in the press participated in defeating A.Q. why their salaries the tribal leaders never got what was promised to them and Sunni politicians were ignored they were prosecuted and many Sunnis. Maliki's role were killed they were persecuted they were treated very badly he filled the police and military with Shias and some of them from the militias that had killed lots of Sunnis so this really sets the stage for sort of where we are now now by two thousand a lot of been when the US withdrawal was complete A.Q. I was now run by doddy who is now the leader of ISIS and it was largely actually a local force and it was known as the Islamic State of Iraq or I aside you know that daddy was very much in sync with our colleagues tactics he sent suicide attackers to attack police to attack military offices checkpoints recruiting stations and lots of civilian targets and I aside ranks included lots of these former Sons of Iraq who participated in their way getting so it's so we now see this unlikely alliance and there is you know which is something very typical of what's going on as Dr Rubens comments made Clare and he had thousands of fighters at this point so then he opens a second branch in Syria to participate in the uprising against Assad and he was so in an Alawite Is she a subset of a leader so they're actually more they ended up being more effective a more effective fighting force than many of the secular groups fighting Assad and this is when he renamed the group ISIS or by solar or whatever now at the time there was also another there was no there was lots and lots of rebel groups fighting here and I'm not going to go into all the details of of all of them but a very notable. Other militant group was the all Nusra Front which also grew out of I aside now in two thousand and eleven right about the same time Baghdadi tried to merge the all Nusra Front with ISIS to make them all one organization under his rule now Jelani the leaders said no he refused and so then we see a competition between these groups and ISIS. Honeybee emerged as the most effective of the forces now just like our colleague Baghdad he began to impose very strict rule over the Syrian towns and villages that were now under their control. And and in early you know two thousand and fourteen Assad fighting back and re truck in the area called Homs a sort of symbolic part of the uprising. But at this time Baghdad he was planning on going back to. Iraq taking plan to go into Iraq so then you know the events of the summer happened where we see ISIS going into Iraq and taking lots of territory in the northwest in just a remarkably quick process that surprised lots of people he then named himself the Caliphate and her name and renamed the group Islamic state that we know now so what areas do they control so this map is kind of gets a sense so that the red dots are the ISIS controlled area places and the pink sort of areas under full control the yellow are sort of recurring attacks and then so that sort of gives you a sense now they've seized obviously lots of cities and towns near major supply routes your critical infrastructure and your border crossings and that's really important at this border now between Iraq and Syria has just become so fluid. Now the self-proclaimed caliphate sort of stretches from these new look newly conquered towns along the Syrian Turkish border through it's sort of de facto capital in Iraq of northern Syria across the you know a rocky border. Obliterated a Brocky border into Mosul to Crete down to farming town south of Baghdad it's actually roughly a third of the territory of both Iraq and Syria now as you can see though there's lots of holes right they don't control the entire area and lots of this territory is sparsely populated but they control some heavily populated areas some very. Key strategic areas and what they've shown is that they did what al Qaeda was unable to do to hold clear control over a defined territory that something all kind of was not able to do so how were they able to do this how were they able to gain so much territory control Well there's lots of things we can look out one is just their sheer size. The recent C.I.'s CIA estimates actually so it has had was estimated that there's about ten to fifteen thousand foreign fighters alone and thirty five thousand. Markable I mean that is here that much larger than many asked him and said Al Qaeda was at night that's a remarkably big organization. Differently the Iraqi army was broken and this allowed a lot of their you know ability to come in and take these clubs to take these towns the Iraqi army lacked equipment they had desertions they were in sort of a psychological collapse there was corruption there was poor leadership. And I says had seized you know military equipment lots of money and it just gave them a lot of capability and they also had as we saw the support of lots of diverse groups of Sonny's so they had support of Sunnis who were initially fighting radical groups like al Qaeda in Iraq poses participated in the Sunni awakening the former Saddam Hussein bought this regime loyalists were now fighting on behalf of ISIS now it's unclear sort of motivations why and that's what's always hard to get at an understanding why people participate in rubble on militant movements whether it's fear or coersion or not wanting to be seen as allied with the U.S. or you know there's a host of different factors. But they also just have a lot of money which allows an insurgent group to take territory they've stolen it's been when they were in Syria. That there. Actually selling back to the Assad regime and some estimates are that they are they actually are bringing in from this oil fields and refineries close to one to two million dollars per day that's this that's major for a terrorist organization in July they actually got control of the country's largest oil fields which is producing about thirty thousand barrels per day they've engaged in looting extortion robbing. They have control of grains and cotton productions in eastern part of Syria and access to weapons from the sort of anti Assad forces. In Iraq after taking control of Mosul they seized the central bank they seized gold they have like in having weaponry that they seized from Iraqi security forces and just having territorial control you know. Now. Would see a kind of want to wrap it up I'll just say a couple of couple a couple final points you know it's important also to think about support for organizations and that's something that's critical for militant groups to be able to function they need support just to be able to operate in life by they need resources just at a very basic level. And what ISIS has done and or is beginning to do and this is something that Hamas has done very effectively is that they've been able to provide services in places where the government hasn't been able to and this is a way to sort of generate support for groups on the ground in the communities in which they are in the towns of the seas in the cities where they're operating. And ISIS has done this you know they've gone into towns but they've allowed certain services to continue they are providing food supplies for areas that have been decimated by war and in the final point I want to make what two final points of that I promise I'll wrap it up is social media they've used social media very effectively and I don't know if any of you have seen any of the. ISIS P.T.O.'s But there's kind of two clients right there's the obvious really horrible ones of the headings which we've all seen which have very demonstrative of facts but there's also these kind of very positive videos that they've made recently I saw one of where it showed very happy she had like pushing their kids on swings in pretty park saying you know come to the Islamic state you can come here you can be free you can practice you know Islam without being persecuted women are comfortable here and it really appeals to people who feel that a lot of injustice is are being done to Muslims around the world and it's a very effective tool in their glossy in their soft music it's kind of shocking and then the final point I want to make is just about the organizational structure this is a group that has a clear structure you know they have a you know they have a leadership council they have deputies they have local leaders that report to the deputies they have Cabinet members that oversee finance security media prisoners recruitment right all different divisions of the organization and that's what groups need in order to function effectively now my research looks at whether or not targeting the leaders of militant organizations is likely to be an effective kind of strategy and what I find is that against groups that have this kind of infrastructure that are highly bureaucratized or groups like Hamas it's really unlikely to be effective that they have these kinds of mechanisms in place to be able to be resilient to attacks against this sort of organization itself so we can talk more about this if people are interested thank you. As you've heard them talk of the condition. Of the need for. You know. The wrong. People. From. My. Point. Of proper function. There. Are. Probably. Very. Much. They. Are. Far from. Prague. I. Think. Part. Of. The. Problem. Up. Top. Thanks OK with the comments as a springboard let me turn it to you guys to you Mike over to you to to query our steam panelist with any questions that you may have let me just ask for a one ground rule which is just ask one question we as you can see there's standing room only here and we want to get in as many. Participants as possible so we have a mike that will circulate thank. You just. Is Zach Taylor from the from the UN school. Social scientists a particular feature that much rather predict the past probably gun to your head so if you had a gun to your head and anyone or all be allowed to hear the answer what do you predict are the main the most likely for ISIS. Just don't all jump at once. I'm like. You know I. Think. I'm going to get you know I hope that they're going to be OK for me he has. Zero zero zero. Zero. Zero zero. Zero. Zero. Zero. Zero support. My God I hope you're going to you know it goes. On. But why. Not. So many fires before they are. Ready so. They're like the jury. Right now I mean you know as a lot of people are saying I don't see a military solution. I think that there's really where they're. Part of the ideology. Of. Life. I. Think a lot. Of you think about getting leaders you know very right and you. Get. A lot more. I think. That yeah I know that. I like that. A little you know. You. Go. You know where you are. And. What are. You going to be. The. What what. Exactly is wrong. Here it is in fact if. You go here. Yes. Or at least the. World No. Zero. Point. Zero you very. Little. One coming was really what we get along with. Like an explosion is going to happen right. After. So stay. With us for the rest of the board. Of. Your. Money. Run. Right. Back. That my. Thinking about this country might be to get our seniors in all my. Heart that when you get. Your child. Filing your story. Trying to get market share Well it's easy to process I don't get it and it makes things more violent for. Certain when I go to the next one one of the things that makes me a little bit nervous any answers. And it strikes me that the latter seems very far fetched unlikely to run into all of these problems that my colleagues on the other hand if the objectives are more limited in terms of grading or more specifically mind space and time for other local actors be they the Sunni militias that we've mentioned or the Iraqi government or other jihad moderate. Moderate opposition forces in Syria to get some purchase it may be more possible to to stem this tide but a big part of it may in the future of ISIS made rest with the strategy that we choose to pursue which I would argue right now is not that clear but I don't know that's a problem right now because I think the objective is to try to buy some space and time. Yeah let's let me make two requests here one of the panel please shift the microphone as you answer questions and second as soon as you ask your questions could you please pass the microphone back to me yes I'm graduate in physics a lawyer in Tehran and then the experience in any of this stuff but. Like my goes to the video feed room so you just have to be glad to be climbing but with the mike you think the history of this region which is to be governed by very strong men dictated. By the guy. And the combination. For you lots of nine states all the players put the combat troops in their own people fighting. And the. Recognized hatred maybe millions of people in that region Yeah West foundries. Inability to express themselves. How do you think that will affect the course of ISIS. I'm sure of the I mean I think there are factors among the fact you raised or are some of the trends that we've seen throughout history. I think it is tougher still mentioned a lot will depend on the types of structures that are chosen So these are the factors that I think when looking at strategy I think you know it's not just. A difficult position of the way you have to weigh those effects of the measure that there's a there's a lot of time to clear answers looking a lot of times also you know these small strategies look versus the larger picture of the region. And whether you can tailor one to one policy and not get into a kind of paradox of having unintended consequence you know. I think also in terms of thinking about your play that reluctance to play that's the con that you're right I actually think that that it is a reasonable act on the part of the U.S. to kill a given you know just in my comments talking about the history in the emergence of this not so much of that really out there you know. You know I'm reluctant to put combat ships on the ground and go right there on any side that creating lots of sentiment lots of attacks. My gosh. You know. You're. Always your question would be more generally just so I said Very good question you know very difficult question. To ask so it's sort of like. You know the question is you always this is what is this. We have seen in the last year with a lot. More government. And that has. Really made all kinds of. Terrible consequences. As well as you know global. Consequences such as ISIS. In Iraq or Libyan arms going. Other places. I mean my my my answer would be you know you can or should retreat government. Was accepted. That everybody really is. It's a problem usually. But I don't know what else there can be that's what you hope for is that the hospital with you know through. All the plates. Around the. Soldiers stationed here right now free. And I don't. Want to. Not. Feel. Like we're going to be. Let me just also mention something about the boots on the ground issue and there's been a lot of attention to that in my presence taking on. Why for that. I leave that to you to decide where you come down but a couple things to keep in mind about what the strategy years where boots on the ground. It's important to know that the strategy has been articulated as what is an office of strategies aimed at defeating an adversary in this case ISIS It's not about coercing us and a lot of times the whole issue about boots on the ground and a reluctance to commit beyond a certain level causes problems for coercive strategy because you're trying to get into the mind of your adversary and you want to convince them to back down without using force in this case that's not what the strategy is about the strategy is simply about. Degrading and destroying this sad story and as such I think the in my own budget judgment is the problem is there's an agreement with my colleague Dr Jordan that the president pursuing that type of strategy is signaling less to ISIS and more to me allies on the ground and elsewhere and most importantly into the American public which as you just heard is not very supportive of that type of commitment so I don't think there is going to be heavy cost to pay in terms of influencing ISIS fi havior by putting restrictions on what we're committing to I do think there are as I mentioned some real questions about what are we actually committing to and what are our objectives and you if those of you who have been watching the news today know that there were Senate hearings and already the military commanders are beginning to play. Different definitional games about what it means to have combat troops in the region not a practice all tailored to a particular military officer rather Gee about the victim defeating you creating a particular adversary not about getting in their heads and getting them to stand down with us using us. But a couple questions. Actually. MIKE And so my question actually kind of jumps on the bus on the ground issue. I think the person at the present I said is a critical player in terms of containing ISIS and. His army of course differ so then you coalition led by the U.S. as cooperating with us have in terms of containing I says. Well I think the first. U.S. based the last. One here it's got you know how to align actions with divergent interest among themselves to come together in combat. Here we're talking about the shoot down of the rock. We need to get down from this area differences come together. And we also need to get some of the International Year of Saudi Arabia our Russia we have them here. So one dilemma is how do you get these different flavors players out there really understand. The second of them is how do you maintain distinction between actors that maybe on a particular issue have converged. OK And how can you boys so we're doing those actors and they have long term detrimental consequences and here is where the issue of Assad comes because the challenge for the U.S. in this case and I think the Obama administration has been very clear about where position right now is that if this were it not only about you. Read Isis I suppose but they're also looking down the road which is historically been a part of the letter that's been dropped off or gave interventions as Rob said and I think this is where they're trying to search this out because no one. Here we do have commercial interest seemingly all of the stock in Valley nice but I thought it was conversion interest with ISIS here keeping some of the other more moderate opposition elements of base in Syria so there is a delicate balancing act or similar is the case with Iran and the United States the same kind of argument has been argued that maybe the United States and Iran can work together for ordinary combating this but it is Dr Who mentioned I'm some issues we're conversion on other issues we have very different positions on the challenge for the U.S. strategy is not only to bring parties to. The don't agree to gether against a common enemy but is to avoid empowering actors that have long term detrimental interests and I think that's quite a sign that they're very reluctant to to do anything formally. With the site or to be seen as more than eighty percent. Of. The replay again if you know if you were still a starter for the team. But I think unless you actually didn't really get commit serious ground it would get you that he's cooperated one. Hundred percent of the most that's the most effective fighting force that. The patients are willing. To go. Assume are. Going to be stable and. Doesn't change the basic. Point. Is. So that I mean to that's a real that's going to still have him lay blame me I don't think you know there are serious moral questions Who are you can look back three plus years and say or be better off by playing it hard you know wife. Well it's very. Early. I actually went up. And I was physically about Saudi. Right you know by. We. Are going to be. Here you know why. I think that we. Need. US that you think you. Know we're really. Going to let. You know. Your worst. And we go right somebody you know. It will go it's just. My name Steve you are living very. Christian I tried to turn approached by one of our. I had a friend who was a Jordanian American came to school. So I have the root of the stuff going on right now how secure is Jordan to this family but we're not but we did a couple of War questions. But we just want. My question is regarding Syria. Today I was listening to Senate Armed Services Committee and last two weeks debate in the media it looks like the biggest confusion is in Syria. We. Have been saying so and so should go so insert should stay like a sack should go he has not done anything to us already most racist ally so the. Pakistan and few others have done more ghastly things to us and the budget in Afghanistan is as true does the border in Syria my question. Right trying to make it more difficult. To fight against ISIS against whom we have a real concern Assad has the same objective like you are saying. Also promoting in your opinion if so-called Free Syrian thing to disrupt We don't even know whom to fight and it will take five thousand soldiers per year training which will take years and none of the senators today versus how this fight with the gender Dempsey's answered today. Hello my name is Harry I'm a Fulbright scholar from Pakistan being from Pakistan I could. I see a lot of sectarianism even back home. It's not Middle East but it's not and we see that you know I think the perception is that Saudi Arabia is you know the head of the game and it's basically Saudi Arabia which is a originating money's coming from Saudi Arabia so and so and so if you go back into the roots if you know the Shiite Shiite and the Sunni conflict it's very interesting to know the fact that it's not only you know the Sunni right it's not just a particular band that is dividing to seventy one different bands of his time and she. She shows them being one of them right so. The band if you stay in Saudi Arabia and even in ISIS it's the same which is the one hobby about if it's not right so there's a lot of what we're not that I see as being a Muslim myself in some of. This weight so I see. A lot of start of stuff going there in Saudi Arabia. And even if America for instance tomorrow goes down with a boot which every action you know America plans to go. I would see. And I says with another name emerging tomorrow you know you kill ISIS today you could say that yesterday ISIS group ISIS today some other things you know grew up what do we do about these tendencies and how do you kill the snake's head you know how do you give that money funding source and you know just talk a bit more about U.S. strategy a strategy to. Thank you. Guys. Come to spend a casual dress I'm a business consultant to N.G.O.s many of whom are operating in the. Middle East right now I'm very fortunate to have amateur Columb graduate in two thousand and nine and my question is many of the groups I'm working with right now or media strategies. That the rise in extremism will create a moderate sort of response people are responding negatively to the increase in extremism and wanting to go. Toward a more moderate direction so there are increasing their media response My question is is this assumption that many of them are basing their deployment of resources on a fair one and to a degree. Do you see this being an effective strategy to create more moderate Islam in diverse ideological activity things like that in the Middle East. And faculty in the non-school Dr Jordan pointed to the large number of foreign fighters in this for flee from ten to fifteen thousand and seventy really interesting to me to read the foreign press on the ISIS issue certainly the Europeans are greatly concerned about fighters moving into Iraq and Syria but another country the think we shouldn't forget about is Indonesia here is the fourth most populous country in the world predominantly Muslim and again many of the people started joining. I asked So what do we do about it how can we stop but what kinds of cooperative arrangements could be happening there. These are the survival. Bill if you want me to wager. Here. There's a regional one. Raised here years ago it's from me and sure this one. Is Real. People and that way. Now you see all the refugees from Iraq. By March. And you see basically. Rescue workers just recently over just the stuff coming years why is. It possible. To make sure that there is. Just you know what we. Really. Are. In. This for the ability to. Wonder whether he's right so far very very serious and I think it is. You know. That's up for another. QUESTION Really quickly what is it Syria. One. Zero. The other one that. Maybe I'll actually follow the dress code you and yours and I was just curious. Which I think is a good question and. I would like to know which which was more specifically if you can follow the. Talk about later. There's going to be rich countries where. That's going to be really nasty. Weather. You know ships about this in the. Big Brother watching. You know. It's very easy really really. So I think I think it's you know I wonder whether the focus in. All of them. Are a few. Out. Of the search for that sort of thing. And I guess I actually believe the last one. You know what if you do it right there watching it that's just going to keep working together like. I said there's something else. Interesting when I was watching recently one of these I. Interviewed you actually. One of them was from Indonesia and I remember actually thinking that I was kind of. Surprised that they chose me. But now you know. If they're clearly reaching out to areas where they have been I mean obviously there's a huge you know there's a huge militant history in Indonesia. But I think they're reaching out to areas where they haven't been and have been put out the fact that. It just shows how. It is organization and so then you get to the issues of like what do you do. And it really plays out where they are really whether it's like you know they are. Probably going to have the same kind of like. Residence and I think that you can really bring something in recently thinking about kind of this this larger issue or ideological problem terrorism policy for the. Sake of it. But it's something like that. And one thing I was you know reading with a message coming from our Saudi Arabia is going to have a lot more about him than coming from the West and I think that is really interesting. You know thinking about if you ladies are people in different ways than I do because I think differently to Perry and so you know the kind of rhetoric that we use will be probably very different for he'll focus on policy in Indonesia than it would for Egypt or for Saudi Arabia and one of the really interesting things that American like videos that we've been putting out you know show it like it's horrible things that happen kids you know as they go abroad sort of like taking Isis you know using it against them on their first I thought was that this is kind of silly but it is actually it is the fact that in some way it's like having his counter message of saying look you know going to fight in Iraq and Syria it's not like you're going to carry on like this is like really brutal this is a horrible places lots of you know devastation going on videos are just so slickly done that I think they really feel that people are really powerful way just the power of these videos and social media and so many of them you know most of them are pretty or in their twenty's and so for example it's all in the you know like. It's almost like online even I mean this is this is the this is the media so I really feel that you know I say that the more I think about what I've been doing research as I feel it really kind of ideological message is so important and it gets to you know your initial question about your Saudi Arabia and you know this kind of what hobbies are connection and I think that. That plays a big part in life Saudi Arabia just doing like steering China if it fell from the street. You know interpretation here it's. Very obvious which agrees that. The Yellow River might be driven or do you think that's our hope is really. Hope when we go into the store. We'll be. Out of the fire. Then. You raise a very big question about. Syria. I think with the you know major. Major interest of Syria over the place. Where you don't care if you look. Back you go. Girl but. I look at this and I'm not there on. You know right here critical sort of walk back to my little cell where they were heard right. In the meantime so I have your circle there based on what you define to the lines of what they've done all. Over. Or you know they sort of just some. Goal is going worldwide. Anything. Or just might possibly go. Right. And. It does a similar. But but. Carol that I can think of is. Were you carrying. The football being. A pretty good political goal. We're going to give you the reality of the way you. Do if you vote. In the first forty. One. Something like that. You know. The morning the. Plane may have a date. Or something you know so I can be. You know on the ground or it. Can go very very good question how can I says he you know the need for. We're going to. Have to be a great moderation and I think we're just a major force people on the ground on the fact that we. May have you know like all kinds. You know you can't just hand previously handed citizen you're going to you know. You have one play out there that somebody would write. These books so far but one thing is you know missing piece of history we exactly. Know just one way or fire talking Jordan earlier she was talking about resilience of ice I noted the energy France really IS THE NEXT LIST you mentioned about two million dollars a day itself on the market black market thirty thousand barrels a day. For. You to go up from there but what's so interesting about this. It is established business. Week to traders the. Black market this is. Turkey Jordan you read some of the crude refineries in parts of Syria some of the production facilities in the wrong and then you get to the more fire one thing this last one is that. The four fires not only green there's evil and their willingness to. Commit to the cause but you also write. And those words are critical to sustain a black market. And I would argue that one of the short term challenges is present is going to be thinking in financial planning and sort of rolling back some of the money laundering. Coming in and putting a crimp on the financial side of the structure there I think are going to have a more dramatic effect on those issues than actually turned on. Or down. Here in the United States. So just over here it's. My name is Khalid I'm doing my masters international affairs here at San Juan school. In Lebanon Hezbollah which is a Shia Islam this militia fighting ISIS in Syria and its supporters in Lebanon locally has recently very recently started recruiting and training Christians and to Lester lesser extent secular Sunni fighters to face the ISIS threat in Lebanon so do you think that as the threat of ISIS grows so does the prospect of a consolation between possibly Baghdad on air below or to a lesser extent Damascus and this and the opposition in Syria. Hi Ali kind of conjuring P.H.D. but from Kuwait which we fear the presence of ISIS in that region My question is on the future of the region. There is about one point three billion Muslims in the world and most of them live under oppressive regimes secular regimes and many of them see a big void in the leadership in Islam cleaner shit so it's pretty easy for the system extremists to appeal to them. Does the US is a US aware of that and doesn't have a long term strategy to empower the moderate versions of Islam or at least empower these groups to grow we saw this void happen in Egypt after Mubarak was overthrown the only group that had the power and organizational structure to mobilize was just like brotherhood and all the others were in a mess two or select who can go between them. If you go ten years from now and there was a big movement toward using come back to fight to extremist and terrorism. Is the U.S. So where now that the strategy creates more extremist not the other way around and what is in the future for that. Let's. Get one more over here that we're going to get this is. My name is Sam And here but I'm from Egypt I just started school here a year and a half ago so I was there with all the action start over there. So I just want to have some comments around US interference with us that's what we know very like that's what we hear from there so it's a good thing that you brought up the problem with the Sunni and that they're in power and they're actually imposing a lot of power on the Sunnis over there that's why S.S. started. And the thing is that's why. We hear from there is that the U.S. when it left Iraq or like when they were in there the help the she asked to gain power over the Sunni's more that Saddam Hussein was a Sunni with a country that's half and half Shia and Muslim. And which brought in a lot of problems after that so I don't think that the U.S. interference again is going to help anything. And like I don't know but I think the U.S. and France before that caused a lot of trouble and I says maybe one of them. And I think it should just give it time. My name is Maz because I work for housing here at Georgia Tech I have two questions but actually. Very quickly in one thousand nine hundred seventy nine Afghanistan. Now I don't know if you saw the movie Charlie's war now so many years after Charlie's war shows something that U.S. supported major had been secretly but later admitting that yes we were behind it now there are some theories in the West that. Some Western intelligence specially British and U.S. intelligence were behind ISIS type of groups early on. Even though ISIS has been killing people. And active in the area as panelist indicated the West did not react. As much until the oil fields were taken by ISIS as well as the beheading started any comments on that please second one is very quickly I am orginally from Turkey so that's why I'm going to ask this question Turkey's a NATO member. There. Is not committing openly as the negotiations go last couple of days. Because there are forty nine Turkish citizens have been held hostages by ISIS in the ISIS controlled territory is now based on the national interest a country in a close ally. Afford to join forces openly forty nine mostly counsel that consulate members being hostile just. Built. It seems to me that all these countries that we're talking about most most countries particularly the ones with the hobbyist these have huge population grows have a sustained huge population grows and their education level and their economic abilities. Are now. Providing opportunities for the for their kids and how could you not have the. Kind of. That we have in all these countries when they have no opportunity to look at the trouble or. You know. Where. By. The. Way. The problem. There. Words without basically imposing. Western cultural values which have been some of these debates but also encouraging something. Just an amazing. These are sometimes done through the N.G.O.s and are very tricky. But these are questions ready to go. And. I think. I think a basis for the very. Broad sweep. Yeah I think it's hard to sort of moderate the fire. By. The other there is that once you support the rebels they may not be seen as credible in their community but one thing that I think about it is that wondering like in terms of the hierarchy that millions of Muslims have one billion Muslims in the world you know really how do you know what is the balance between a sort of more of my right extremists not just militant people but just who are fighting for you know for. Their birthday and you know what's going on that the public opinion will probably get a life where they are but. There is no market more moderate and so what that deal with the banking crisis. Right. Yeah. Are. You. Ready. For. That. Thank you very. Very. Really. Really really. Good guesser. Just one. Thing. What. I think basically. I think the US will. Sustain. The. World what's going. To be the. Right leadership. One voice reflexive response. Is. The. Only. Thing. I think it also speaks to. Me. Well it's one. Closer to. The very very. A student of physics here and we keep coming back to this issue. Ideology local populations and how these groups keep reemerging each time we throw down another one and so. One of the things I study on my own time is rhetoric and propaganda. Birth of a very powerful tools in this field recently advertising campaigns and I'm curious how you think these tools will be utilized by the U.S. in the. Foreign policy in particular in regard to the Middle East. My is the day to question if we can degrade or destroy ISIS what do we really into Suppose Iraq and Syria will both be able to restore the integrity of their borders and have strong central governments and if they do do we think Saudi Arabia is really going to be happy with serious Iraq. With the governments there that are much more friendly to Iran than the ones that have been certainly in Iraq previously. Kind of piggybacking off of that generally what to me seems like happens is one thing will pop up and everyone will focus their attention on not and other things will sit in the back like in northwest India and Turkey and possibly possibly like all around the world Indonesia there is jihadists fighting and if ISIS is rolled back in NOT area it's still possible that they return back to India and Turkey in Indonesia and while there the small of the prior end up sitting up in the background and growing and then just like what's happened recently you know explode and along with that there is still problems in Gaza and Nigeria and Ukraine so our attention will be split a lot more than what it usually is. What is like them placation that we do with that. Thank you my name is Manolo Curry El curries a Lebanese name and to the last two generations of El curries my family been born here but my grandparents were born in Lebanon and we have a lot of relatives love and I'll say that only to tell you that. My family we've been watching the Middle East for all of my life all my father's life and turmoil and Middle East have been synonymous as long as I've been watching so my questions are you and the the moderator started to answer Are there economic avenues of vailable for us to contain ISIS and what they're doing to make money but my real question is whose problem is this Is there some way for the United States to back the people whose problem this really is. Or is what we do just know. But if. You. Really look at the science you. Use And you. Think this is. OK but then when you start Yes I know you know you know that you can get. Your book and your novel are going. To be totally all about you know. So you know if you're right if you do not you know if you. Are right about your origin I think for you I'm very sought after. Yes I know you also really. You know all. The. Story you write you know you. Live here you know it was all going to fall. So that only thirty years. Ago that whole area. You know. You really really you know. I don't know how that got. My mind. Right. Very very very. Very. Very. Very. Very. Very. Very. Shortly. My question about economic out of new. Job. Well I think this gets to one of the other questions we originally. Posed were you know does trade. Break out but what are the latest thinking about your point here is if you look at what we're doing now cross the number of crimes you see we're sanctioning everything. ISIS has not done it is money into a number of these Alyssa's networks that have been established either to circumvent sanctions on Iran surprisingly there isn't really using. The backing of ISIS oil trading with some of the sanctions busting activity Iran similarly now we have sanctions imposed on Russia and there's going to be sensational circumvention there and I think that view you know one way to stem some of the myopia and think you've already got to do this right now with this drug is we need to think about all these things are related to a certain set of infrastructures and networks that exist out there that we continuously bump up against you know we're we're focusing so I think one way to map your myopia is to be focusing on some of these networks they can strain whole economic he's speaking to some of these players in the short term thirty or so ago last question this fight is this and I think the administration has really suggested that this is really not a core are like you know one of us that you really years someone creating time and space for others on the ground will work direct state and again just to answer some of those questions so I don't think the view that Washington and not with the media are to Maria that whenever you get a call at one of the letters that you have a story I don't think we're going to drive enough right I don't think NAFTA. Just you same thing to go with that let me close by knowing what I've observed number of years over the last several years I've been here is that I'm very far to see the enthusiasm with which. The community here especially the student community could raises their responsibility to take his issues seriously and we are well past the point minister returns of married us this evening and I really applaud all of you for taking the time out to do your work your sleeves and think hard about these because they're not going away. Again. So that we can join you thank you my colleagues.