Decentralization and Recentralization: Changing Paradigms of the Narrative of Metropolitan Demographics and Historiography

an Applied Research Paper for Submittal

to Dr. Jiawen Yang

in requirement of the Master's Degree of City and Regional Planning

from the School of City and Regional Planning

of the Georgia Institute of Technology

Eugene S. McGuinness, Jr.

4 December 2012

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Overview</u>

This paper is a discussion of the ongoing discourse between scholars of multiple ideologies concerning the commuting aspects of metropolitan decentralization and diversification, whilst concomitantly engaging works from various authors concerning urban core gentrification and capital proliferation. The paper seeks to establish gentrification, the replacement of low-income urban residents, as an autonomic process of capitalism in any moderate-to-large city, and establish gentrification as at least a partial causative factor for the outcomes of the restructuring of urban land markets in the postwar period.

The paper includes a review of relevant literature with narratives relating to gentrification in the urban core 1970-2010, and decentralization and diversification of American metropolitan areas 1970-2010, noting the ongoing limitations in the literature due to the far smaller corpus of relevant works.

The paper also includes a data analysis with a bilateral comparison of Atlanta and Chicago and contextually defined 'tiers' of density following general concentric arrangement.

Literature Review

The commute has been studied extensively with relation to urban spatial form as well as socioeconomics (Kain, 1969; Jencks and Meyer, 1991; Gordon & Kumar, 1989; Shen, 2000) The commute is a highly dynamic phenomenon, where a maelstrom of activity comes into being, producing an enormous burden on system infrastructure. Astonishingly, the average time to work is still nationally under 30 minutes, although peak congestion has worsened to unprecedented levels, with new percentages of peak time and system extent congestion recorded. Total delay and average delay vary widely by metropolis (Urban Mobility Institute, 2010).

Decentralization has occurred in each notable American epoch. Unsurprisingly, therefore, a plurality of Americans now reside in suburban locales. Suburbanization following World War II traditionally described whites migrating to newer residential developments outside the build-out of the extant city. There has since been an increasing trend of minority migration to the suburbs such that a majority of Asians have resided in suburban locales since before 1990; a majority of Hispanics have resided in suburban locales since 1995; and a majority of blacks has been recorded for the first time in 2010.

The emergence of minority groups in the suburbs has its origins in market principles and litigation (De Vise, 1976). Racially mixed suburban areas still experienced arrested growth rates during the period of time suburban areas maintained a competitive advantage above urban ones (Anacker, 2009). Residential segregation has been strongest on Northeastern and Midwestern metros and weakest in the South and West. Discrimination against racial minorities in suburban housing markets was a common feature of the postwar period (De Vise, 1976; Lee, 1986; Kain, 1969). New York and Chicago continued to be hotspots for housing discrimination even into the 1990s (Freeman & Braconi, 2004).

Gordon & Richardson (1991) and Gordon et al (1989) brought attention to a nationally trending "commuting paradox" whereby commute times grew shorter although distances were beginning to reflect sprawling homes and workplaces. The evidence confused scholars as to whether or not the trend would be sustainable. Skills are a determinant of the commute indirectly, since skills dictate income which often extends commuting reach. Crane & Chatman (2003) note that while sprawl of jobs and housing is a transparent trend, effects on the commute are more nuanced and convoluted. They argue that there are sensitivities to urban form, polycentricity, and occupational sector. Gordon, Richardson and Kumar (1989) note that the monocentric city becomes inefficient as urban growth and congestion growth occur nearer to the CBD.

Even though the commuting paradox of 1989 no longer applies, because commute times and distances are now rising more extremely than in prior decades, the shadow effects of decentralization are still producing reductive tendencies upon travel times in areas proximal to employment concentrations. Controlling for other factors the authors state that a 5% increase in employment in outlying metro counties can be associated with 1.5% reduction of average commute distance. Manufacturing and government jobs are hypothesized to produce a tendency to lengthen commutes; wholesale and construction are hypothesized to produce a tendency to shorten them; retail and service are not considered affected, and the net average effect is hypothesized as a tendency for all jobs' decentralization to shorten commutes (Crane & Chatman, 2003).

Taylor & Ong (1995) produce findings that largely refute core tenets of spatial mismatch, dictating that the national effects of race and commuting are tied to location and mode choice. (While the purpose of this paper is not to debate spatial mismatch, the technical reasoning and methodology with respect the systematic variations of commute time are sound and valuable to this project). They

find that travel time to work from 1977 to 1985 was less tied to race than it was to gender, occupational group, or travel mode.

As of 1995, blacks and Hispanics had shorter commute distances than whites. Whites had experienced more recent growth in travel time than minority groups. Paradoxically, blacks experienced longer duration commutes than whites over shorter average distances, even when controlled for travel mode (Taylor & Ong, 1995). The authors venture departure time during system congestion as one possible explanation; the other involves system control density and speed; higher average speeds may be likely to be experienced by whites who live in lower density locales and can very possibly travel comparable distances at higher speeds.

Taylor & Ong (1995) argue that automobile access was of principal importance to improve jobs access for minority groups, and that the phenomenon of spatial mismatch is not explicative of the commute patterns of employed minorities. Minorities in majority-white areas were found to have similar commute profiles to whites in the same area, but whites in minority areas were found to have shorter time commutes. It is important to contextualize the sensation of Taylor & Ong's findings just three years after the racially and class-charged riots in Los Angeles, that brought national attention to these questions of jobs and housing for the urban poor. The tone of their proclamation of an 'automobile mismatch' can be read subtextually as an ideological commitment that the regimen of policies championed during the primacy of Kain's spatial mismatch was failed, and that greater support was needed for a *status quo* solution.

Gordon & Kumar (1989) investigate the spatial mismatch hypothesis and determine that neither minorities nor low-income workers have longer commutes, but that women consistently have shorter

work trips. Using data from Los Angeles Taylor and Ong conclude that minority workers who dropped out of the workforce between the years 1977 and 1985 had shorter commutes than those who remained employed (recorded to have been in the workforce the next survey), arguing that the increasing average distance between home and the workplace would not bring jobs out of reach from these communities.

Yang (2005) outlines a spatial framework for the analysis of commuting and spatial structure as it relates to multiple variables. An 8 km locus from major freeways delineated inner suburbs to be compared to outer suburbs. The outer suburban locales delineated for freeway in Boston exhaust more of the interstices of the region than those of Atlanta, which only requires a single circumferential freeway due to lower densities. These interstices, more inconvenient from major freeways in the region, were not relevant to the study. However, they form an interesting new spatial extent for investigating the degree of recent demographic change in these areas, what these changes have done to the nature of the commute, and whether the effects of growth in congestion have wrought a disproportionate impact on the travel time of newly suburbanized immigrants and minorites.

The aforementioned periurban interstices are of some interest to this study. It stands to reason commute durations are intensified with higher distance from highway infrastructure. Also, we can assume land values to vary accordingly to highway access (although excessive proximity may affect residential preference).

Studying the commute poses unique challenges due to its dynamic nature. The reality of regional economies and urban transportation are changing: some trends continue whereas others have reversed since the scholarship began. There is an importance to place each research finding in temporal context before producing original data analysis and findings for this paper.

Increasing suburbanization of minorities and the foreign-born is one major difference in metropolitan composition; the second is population growth; the third is congestion growth; the fourth is an increase in fuel prices since the 1997 real terms nadir; the fifth is growth in transit patronage, which can increase overall average travel times, especially where transit use is high due to race or transit's prevalence. In each notable epoch, decentralization has occurred. It is also of interest to note important landmarks in the scholarship of both suburban commuting and urban core commuting. The holistic approach to the metropolitan area did not arise until later.

The remainder of this literature review is dedicated to gentrification and its role within the greater phenomenon of metropolitan decentralization. Gentrification is neither an American phenomenon nor a new one. Gentrification is defined by Columbia University's Electronic Encyclopedia as:

> "the rehabilitation and settlement of decaying urban areas by middle- and high-income people. Beginning in the 1970s and 80s, higher-income professionals, drawn by low-cost housing and easier access to downtown business areas, renovated deteriorating buildings in many cities, reversing what had been an outmigration of upper-income families and individuals from many urban areas. This led to the rebirth of some neighborhoods and a rise in property values, but it also caused displacement problems among poorer residents, many of them elderly and unable to afford higher rents and taxes."

Although the definition given is simplistic, the term gentrification entered the Western discourse as a loaded pejorative. Coined by Marxist scholar Ruth Glass in the 1960s to describe demographic changes in inner London boroughs, the term had for decades held a connotation of populist derision and incursion (Schaffer & Smith, 1986).

Literature on gentrification is now exhaustive but it was not before. There was even a paucity of scholarly publication on the subject by 1970 when it was well underway in places such as London and New York. A 1986 article by Smith and Schaffer gives an account of Harlem in New York City,

reporting some gentrification based on "impressionistic reports." The authors carefully note that the trend has not apparently resulted in the displacement of black people yet, although they did predict that there would be an ensuing displacement of working class residents, eventually by white middle-earners. Schaffer and Smith's tone is ambiguous and seems to portray restrained hopes that the gentrification trend would improve Harlem property values from a structuralist sense. The authors call attention to a potential controversy ahead quoting commentator Harold Rose's 1982 concern that insufficient attention had been called amid redevelopment to the fate of urban blacks:

> "…not only is the potential problem ignored or simply denied; gentrification has even been construed as the *solution* to housing problems faced by Harlem residents."

> (Schaffer & Smith, 1986, 363).

In Chicago, Du Page County and the suburban municipality of Arlington Heights, in Cook County were both sued in the 1970s pursuant to exclusionary zoning engendering racially segregated housing markets. Arlington Heights' refusal to produce affordable housing was read as a violation of civil rights law. Kain's 1968 spatial mismatch article helped form bases for the initial lawsuits (DeVise, 1976). Kain and Harrison conducted a regression analyses to determine how badly blacks suffered economically due to their concentration in the urban core. The scholars differed in their assumptions, dissenting against the notion that blacks if introduced to the suburbs would necessarily fill the same labor niches as suburban whites. Harrison also questioned whether the service and retail jobs traditionally held by blacks were migrating to the suburbs at any appreciable rate (DeVise, 1976).

DeVise notes that Chicago lost 50,000 jobs between 1953 and 1960, gaining a marginal amount in the 1960s. Anecdotally without hypothesis he was able to declare that there was a locational barrier to suburban job markets. Now, the supply of jobs in the urban core is transforming more than it is dwindling. It is changing most drastically in industrial and retail sectors (Lee et al, 2006). A

gentrification of several urban core neighborhoods can be therefore be seen as an outgrowth of deindustrialization and neoliberalism as it transpires on the American theatre.

In the 1990s and most recent decade of the 2000s, gentrification became more commonly equated with housing displacement, as many of the more vulnerable low-income populations did in fact relocate from neighborhoods emerging as desirable to urban professionals. The mainstream media has circumscribed a new debate around the trend, and a robust cadre of apologists now defends gentrification, as defined by Columbia University and the mainstream media, as a "rising tide that raises all boats" (Duany, 2001; NHI, 2010). The discourse of the apologists has mentioned that low-income people benefit from neighborhood improvements and other things equal would prosper if the market would permit them to remain. This creates a more incrementalist discourse for public officials, who now openly court comphrehensive redevelopment plans that stress mixed-income mixed-use communities. Mixed income planning is a welcome alternative to the private sector to the creation of additional public housing, which has become an undesirable model beyond New York.

Displacement is very important to distinguish from gentrification. Gentrification can be described by a shift in education attainment or income without necessarily triggering widespread housing displacement. Housing displacement is studied separately as a consequence of profound gentrification, or profound mismatches between neighbors concerning abilities to pay the emerging market rents (Freeman & Braconi, 2004).

The community opposition to gentrification in Harlem would be interesting to synopsize, but in the literature reviewed, the 1986 piece that receives the trend as a novel curion is shown the way to the context of a 1979 article by Neil Smith, which paints a very detailed picture of the controversies and

contestations that had already come up over the competition for housing in Harlem. Community

organizations openly opposed continual proliferation of bargain-seeking professionals, and the

discourse became increasingly tied to race. Harlem may have become the first nationally visible

gentrification-related displacement event that had articulated its racial controversy (Watson, 2004;

Carrillo, 2006; Gaynor, 2012).

The 1990s may have been the decade of gentrification that was controversial only in New York, though

occurring quietly elsewhere, but the 2000s were easily a decade of a sensationalized and increasingly

extremist discourse with obscure cheerleaders/apologists and community activists on opposite sides of

the public forum seeking to articulate how to react to the trend, that has never been fully articulated or

defined in an authoritative manner. Early imposition of Marxist analysis has placed gentrification as a

subprocess of capitalism, an almost autonomic market function, a correction, that placed contested city

districts in the hands of a demographic more apt to wield capital than the preexisting masses.

In Harlem in the 1980s, observers in Columbia University penned a brief article to ascertain whether

they deemed a portion of Central Harlem to be gentrifying. Their findings confirmed that there was a

gentrification event taking place anecdotally and empirically, and that it was being spearheaded by

local blacks from within the community. These individuals worked to drive redevelopment and

property rehabilitation at private risk for private gain. Municipal assistance existed at the time in the

form of multiple grants and economic development subsidies. The New York City Department of City

Planning and Empire State Development Corporation had a corridor-based redevelopment schema in

place from which these early independent rehabilitators benefited (Schaffer & Smith, 1986).

The article also predicted that the gentrification event could not feasibly grow with support driven by

the growth of a black captaincy of rehabilitators, because there would be a relative dearth of higher-income black people in New York City (Schaffer & Smith, 1986). Thus, it was presaged that whites were inevitably to become part and parcel of the movement.

By the late 1980s and 1990s the mainstream press had seen gentrification and a new face of the class-charged displacements that were destined to occur without regulation of the housing market. Harlem became heavily contested, and there was organized community opposition to housing developments for middle class groups, such as condominiums, by the 1990s.The continuation of urban recentralization among a heavily-white cohort of 25-39 year olds, many of whom are college graduates has consistently brought controversy as the displacement has progressed in a racially deterministic manner (Duany, 2001; Freeman & Braconi, 2004).

What was once a curiosity in the eighties and nineties became a mainstream controversy in the first decade of the millennium. An ongoing attempt by the media collective consciousness to comprehend the nebulous phenomenon has to this day been prosecuted entirely without the academic taxonomy of Ruth Glass's original Marxist analysis of the London boroughs' experiencing a bourgeois incursion. Today's major controversy concerning gentrification involves displacement of residents -- the new locales may be higher crime, higher cost, lower level of civil amenities, or may simply be too far from work for the newly displaced resident.

Gentrification in Chicago has been chronicled and has been profound (Kushto, 2008; Ehrenhalt, 2008). One account from the mainstream intellectual press outlines the original situation of a morning commute on the CTA, with inner city blacks boarding a crowded train full of seated whites who live father out, circa 1980. Then, it is mentioned that the trends have switched demographics spatially such

that blacks now occupy the less transit-convenient neighborhoods whereas white professionals have flooded the inner cities such that they have to stand on the train. This simplistic and sensationalized approach can help describe to the unsophisticated reader the phenomenon that this paper likewise describes of "demographic inversion" of inner city and suburb. However, the term "demographic inversion" can be considered biased so as to presuppose a prescription that certain demographic cohorts *ought* to occupy certain density theaters within a metropolitan areas. Ehrenhalt's term was likely not to imply prescription but expectation.

Chicago, a city with a strong urban core and a very large inventory of aged housing stock, has always been fertile ground for gentrification. Its large population of working-class residents has also ensured that there have been many neighborhoods in which the transition was to take place. Literature on gentrification in Chicago is rich, with mainstream media and peer-reviewed accounts. Some authors even go so far as to expect a Paris or Vienna that is exhaustively recolonized with wealthy urbanites, but the city is realistically too large to be exhaustively colonized with the group of creative professionals with whom these commentators are so enamored (Glaeser, 2004).
New York's general history with gentrification is well known, well documented, and highly visible on the global stage.

Atlanta's gentrification history is checkered. The city's municipal agenda has been one of service provision and business courting. In policy rhetoric the interests of the city are rarely extricated from the interests of the region as a whole. Macroscopic concepts such as regionalism and port trade have been championed, whereas support for housing subsidization and working families has declined as a talking point. Atlanta's families have been quietly on the exeunt as the City's population of single-person household has increased 56%. Families with children have migrated heavily to neighboring Fulton and

DeKalb counties, but the household size of multi-person families increased, implicating that Atlanta's remaining families are the most destitute ones where children are numerous. The city has gentrified considerably in its northwest and southeast, with the expansion of professionals slowing somewhat with the recession. In 2012, with Case Shiller expected to hit bottom, rental prices surprisingly rose 1.3% year on year. Atlanta's gentrification can be measured carefully and scientifically to determine where neighborhoods are having a professional realignment in the least restrictive sense, but it is easier to use the proxy of racially-deterministic resettlements to see that gentrification is a partial explanation for the City of Atlanta's increasingly non-Hispanic white share of the population.

Analysis of gentrification as a racialized issue may be an initial "trap" of the community interests that seek to combat its ill effects, because it does not fully give justice to the history or the diversity of the phenomenon. However, racialized displacements have been chronicled as well (Lee, 1986) "The process of gentrification has begun to affect the majority of urban areas in the advanced capitalist world, and impressionistic reports suggest that Harlem is undergoing gentrification." (Schaffer and Smith, 1986).

Andres Duany, famous for his leadership of the Congress of New Urbanism and work for internationally-renowned master planning firm Duany-Platter-Zybek, in a 2001 article for *American Enterprise* entitled "Three Cheers for Gentrification," wrote an unabashed display of adulation for the class of individuals willing to take the risks to buttress these communities. He segments the process into three phases: 1) the risk-impervious; 2) the mid-risk; 3) the risk-averse, each cohort bringing their skills to the table to facilitate improvement in the general housing stock of the community. He makes some mention of a creative class and dismissively states "Forget about a *narrow focus* [emphasis added] on affordability." Duany is perhaps the most vocal of the neoliberal cheerleaders, because as an

ideologue, the proliferation of urban professionals becomes not only a movement but a coordinated

personal lifestyle as well.

The following NHI article provides a valuable counterpoint to Duany:

> Residents who remain in gentrifying neighborhoods fear that it is just a matter of time until they are displaced. Instead of appreciating the changes wrought by gentrification, these citizens are organizing to create neighborhood norms that value mixed-income communities. They are organizing to press city government to adopt mandatory inclusionary zoning requirements in order to capture some of the benefits from the current building boom. And they are joining national coalitions to press Congress to stop cuts to federal housing programs. For them, the experience of gentrification is not a boost. It is the daily threat of displacement – for themselves, their families and their communities.

Displacement is keenly articulated as the key word, 'gentrification' having become too tame and

debatable, however, the invocation here of displacement stands valid.

France has been theatre to municipally sponsored gentrification. This can be seen as a hearkening to the

Hausmann period (Glaeser, 2004). However, French authorities were in forthcoming generations very

keen to use state authority to create an urbanity in its densest precincts that would cater appreciatively

to the upper echelons of society. The practice of gentrification existed in the French policy lexicon as

'embourgeoisement' The French intentionally settled its urban neighborhoods with wealthy cohorts and

created cultural amenities to secure their presence. France thus exported its poverty and dischord to its

banlieues, and when immigration became higher it was often consigned to the periphery in this sense.

Today, it is clear to see that political cleavages in France that know no spatial pattern, with the partisans

voting in a checkerboard in all densities (Glaeser, 2006; Savitch, 2007).

Rendering Marxist analysis for these various sources is challenging, because to conceive gentrification,

one must conceive a merger of the personal and professional sphere. The urban business worker seeks

to occupy personal residence nearer to work. The privatization of housing can facilitate more business

workers, but the cultural ramifications are profound when we consider a movement where intellectuals

and holders of advanced degrees are in many cases the backbone of it, and one whose ideologies are guiding not only academic prognostications, but also prosecuting a personal life consisting of entrenching an urban residency.

A Marxist critique of Andres Duany notes the dialectic—Duany is very closely connected to his ideology as a leader of the Congress for New Urbanism. However, his language is excessively dismissive when he discusses elements with which he is not in love. His treatment of "the fuss over gentrification" is very short, relegated to the end of the editorial, and far less founded than his earlier qualified statements about the positives. He dismisses the opposition as "the squawking of old neighborhood bosses who can't bear the self-reliance of the oncoming middle-class, and can't accept the dilution of their political base." He declares that "theirs is a swan song" (Duany, 2001).

Lee (1986) conducts a national analysis of neighborhood change to determine what circumstances are necessary to trigger "reverse" urban change from majority-black to majority-white. The paper states "given the nascent state of research underlying [explanations of regional differences in black-to-white change] I have not been able to consider more than a few of the many possible determinants of reverse change…" Lee's findings mentioned that only Western cities were susceptible to a widespread decrease in the proportion of urban blacks. This was taken into context with the growing Hispanic populations in Californian cities from 1970 onward. Interestingly, the study noted that the Atlanta city limits, for the intercensal 1970 to 1980, ranked number 58th in black-to-white change, with the proportion of blacks in each census tract in the city increasing (Lee, 1986).

The most recent decade, 2000-2010 shows a different story for Atlanta. Urban populations are declining and/or growing very slowly. Families continue to abhor the central city, and suburban schools

maintain primacy. The white flight of the decade where blacks found fewer barriers to urban housing than their Northern counterparts has been replaced by a flight of black families for an affordable halo of newly-built suburban housing in the throes of racial change.

Literature Review Conclusion

Commentators like Duany and Ehrenhalt, who penned the piece on "demographic inversion" are investing their attention to only one side of the complementary phenomenon of metropolitan demographic change. There is room for the empirical analysis of both crescents of this urban crucible of change, but the peer-reviewed contributions tend to be focused more narrowly on individual aspects and measurable metrics of demographic or economic change.

Since there are so many qualitative and cultural dimensions concerning the phenomenon of gentrification, it is difficult to truly describe the phenomenon empirically and scientifically. Suburban diversification is not given the same cultural significance, perhaps because it is not in this era stirring a class or race controversy. The treatment of both by literature should be more scientific, yet more holistic. Commentators should also seek to readdress this phenomenon from a more historiographical perspective. These phenomena now have *histories* internationally and within the United States, and recognized historical classes of events receive a different textual treatment from scholars as the class of events which belongs to the category of trends that are novel and curious.

So our reading into gentrification and decentralization paradigms in the capitalist West renders us a complement. Another side of the coin of the exalted's return to the urban core is the maddeningly swift accession to modesty the suburbs have made in decades. Once the engines of American land value growth, which enticed jobs into the periphery, especially in metros in the South and West with newer

development and activity patterns , the suburbs are now a simple functioning portion of the anatomy of

metropolitan areas, too diverse in character and age to consider as a unique element from cities. Since

the municipal boundary is not an intuitive construct, a municipality with small land area, such as

Charlotte or Atlanta, is not as exhaustive a gargantuan municipal boundary such as Houston.

In their 2003 working paper, Glaeser and Kahn outline a series of points. They note fourthly, that "the

problem of sprawl lies not in the people who have moved to the suburbs but rather the people who have

been left behind" In 2003, it was already too late to articulate such a pronouncement. Now, in the post

recessionary metropolitan landscape, we see that the predilection that Glaeser and Kahn had to this lore

of suburban primacy is fallacious. Yesterday's "left-behind" cohorts are advancing inexorably to the

suburbs without the same housing cost barriers. Urban rents have meanwhile appreciated handsomely.

The fallacy does not continue to the question of prestige-suburbs with preferential jobs locations and

favorable jobs/housing balances. Often, proximity to edge cities is a beneficial attribute that the

wealthier suburbs hold. A spillover of this of course is shorter commutes.

Often, a gentrification event can be characterized by a racial or other socioeconomic schism. Now, the

phenomenon, if isolated for its racially-deterministic patterns, is one critically important to study.

Spatial decentralization of all major racial/ethnic groups became a more concrete trend in the years

1990-2010, which is why literature tends not to fully comprehend the changes underway. Literature and

funded projects of the day focus on a need for core affordable housing in the pre-recession times where

property values and rents continued skyrocketing. These housing provisions were never created, and

may or may not have enjoyed full patronage, since at least some portion of the decentralization of

lower-income groups had to have been based on school quality and spatial preference.

Smith (1979) points out very astutely that:

 "although the very apparent social characteristics of deteriorated neighborhoods would discourage redevelopment, the hidden economic

characteristics may well be favorable. Whether gentrification is a fundamental restructuring of urban space depends not on wher new

inhabitants come from but on how much productive capital returns to the area from the suburbs."

The phenomenon has led to the full-scale displacement and neighborhood transformation early reports

purported could eventually become possible. The gentrification phenomenon in the 2000-2010 decade

has displaced a larger aggregate of persons than it has in prior decade, and the racial determinism of the

changes is increasing. A generation of young minorities are being suburbanized by these mixed forces.

Meanwhile, suburbanization and suburban housing unit constructions boomed in the postwar period.

Firms began to reconcentrate in the suburbs for proximity to workers and the ability to build entirely

new facilities. Spatial mismatch hypothesis literature began with Kain (1969) to determine if blacks,

the most centralized pool of workers spatially, were being alienated by this new proliferation of jobs in

the suburbs. There has been much academic support by the hypothesis that minority groups are left

behind. The antithesis put forward by Taylor & Ong (1995) notes that automobile access remains the

major determinant of job pool welfare, and that blacks in "spatially mismatched" communities were

entirely capable of accessing jobs when the control for auto access was introduced. Taylor and Ong

used racial predominance of aggregated zones to determine whether or not travel characteristics of

blacks were different from whites based on how much black-white segregation existed in the resident's

zone.

The true emergence of a suburban minority cohort became another settling factor, and the 1990s and

2000s brought an unprecedented number of nonwhites to the suburbs. The modern United States is so

enormous that local and regional trade is significant to each metropolis—the urban center's exchanges

with the suburbs are indeed, the generators of wealth for all classes in the MSA, indirectly or directly, with or without multipliers. Newly built suburbs have become denser in some MSAs as a result of land regulations. Otherwise they have a net effect of increasing population densities when they supplant rural areas.

The story of the core, eviscerated by urban renewal and unrecognizable with the density of humanity that arrived in most old industrial centers after WWII. This was a working-class nonwhite group that emerged to exploit labor opportunities in the postwar economy. They did so at a time where jobs and capital were migrating out of the city, and the federal government engaged in openly discriminatory practices to discourage racial mixing of housing (De Vise, 1976; Fainstein & Fainstein, 1987). Often, blight was a condition that was perceived only in nonwhite communities, and this allowed urban renewal to benefit private and institutional actors at the public cost. Scattered site public housing was exceptionally controversial in NYC, and cities are generally contested spaces. The urban North remains the battleground of some of the most pernicious anti-black and anti-poor stands taken by an organized and regimented white populist opposition.

Despite the origins of yesterday's gentrification, today's racialized displacements are confirmed. The phenomenon visited by Schaffer and Smith in 1986 as to whether a solidly black corner of Harlem was gentrifying -- private rehabilitations that were publicly subsidized -- this occurred and was spearheaded by black professionals. The inevitability of white conjoinment of the trend was foreseen and debated even back then. Columbia University, not a stranger to sponsoring gentrification is an ironic place to make the first announcement. The novel challenges that present themselves before a diversifying community can be numerous (Frey, 2010). They are also not always visible they are also not the problems of yesterday.

Glaeser (2006) mentions that income inelasticity is responsible for the poor's preference of urban centers because they possess public transportation. Because of Taylor & Ong, Crane, and Lee et al, we know that public transportation has become less consequential to the poor for jobs access, because jobs have sprawled away from the transit every decade. In the wake of TSPLOST, we must question whether the investments in such centralized fixed-guideway transit would have produced any appreciable benefit to the urban poor at a time when they are emigrating from the City of Atlanta fortuitously.

Morrison and Abrahamse (1983) question conventional wisdom about how commuting dists change when workers migrate from metro to nonmetro areas—decentralization has a more energy-intensive config of residences and job locales. No indication that such migration lengthens aggregate distance of workers' commutes is lengthened. Sprawl vs. nucleation – nucleation of jobs in peripheral nodes appears more realistic. Fainstein and Fainstein (1987) mention the weakness of planning and the legacies of radicalism and conservative reactionarianism that came in its wake 10 years later. This was the death of rational planning, and the rise of job creation as the end to justify all means (Savitch, 2007; Freeman and Braconi 2004). Social planning had all but disappeared and equity has been pronounced an "unrealistic" planning objective.

Data Analysis

This section contains the analysis of density tears in a ten-county region surrounding Atlanta and Fulton County, which is compared bilaterally to Chicago and its own Cook County. The population of Cook County is over five million, which is beyond the total population of the ten major counties in Atlanta's metropolitan area. After tracts are divided into density tiers, the socio-economic demographic differences are compared and discussed with narrative relevance to the literature review. Commentary is provided and further recommendations are given in the Policy Recommendations section.

Chicago's strong center is evident in that the higher-density locales subsume a larger percentage of the regional population. The strength is exaggerated somewhat, since Cook County is only a portion of the (much larger) Chicago MSA. The ten counties selected surrounding Atlanta, however, are a larger percentage of the Atlanta MSA. The breaks chosen were arbitrary, but they still tell us about the trends and where they have left us. All of the analysis used employs data obtained.from the tract-level data from 2011's five-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates.

Density tiers are delineated each with thirty-three percentiles worth of the tract distribution. Study areas were chosen in order to restrict population size in the larger metro. The two maps below show the locations of the density tiers and their critical values. It becomes evident that Chicago's land use had been heavily tied to railroads, whereas outdated suburban centers form the exclaves of density for Atlanta.

Chicago: City and surrounding density tiers

Population Density
Persons/square mile
- TIER III: <6000
- TIER II: 6000 - 15000
- TIER I: >15000

0   3   6   9
Miles

Atlanta: City and surrounding density tiers

POPULATION DENSITY
Persons/square mile
- <1850
- 1850 - 3000
- >3000

0   5   10   15
Miles

The figure below indicates that Chicago is vastly denser than Atlanta. The study areas were chosen in

order to be functional within the scheme of existing demographics, but radical differences already exist

in the spatial framework.

Figure 1: Comparative population densities by tier

Atlanta: Income composition by density tier

	ATL_I	ATL_II	ATL)III
■ LOW_INC	23.18%	17.94%	14.80%
■ MEDINC	56.24%	55.14%	56.51%
■ UP_INC	20.59%	26.92%	28.69%

Chicago: Income composition by density tier

	CHI_I	CHI_II	CHI_III
■ LOW_INC	28.30%	24.35%	17.80%
■ MEDINC	52.19%	54.89%	54.06%
■ UP_INC	19.51%	20.76%	28.14%

Figures 2 & 3: Comparative income compositions by density tier

Low-income residents make a higher percentage of Chicago's tiers at all cohorts. Again, this is because there is a large amount of the Chicagoland MSA that has not been captured in this study.

Below, Figures 4 & 5 show the racial makeup of each of the density tranches. The non-Hispanic white

group predominates most strongly in outer core locales as expected. There has been significant

urbanization of Hispanics in Chicago, and as a result, the pluralities of blacks live in the intermediate

CHI_II density tier.

Figures 3 & 4: Racial compositions of study areas by density tiers

Atlanta: Household size by tenure, by density tier

	OO_HHSIZE	RO_HHSIZE
ATL_I	2.4	2.5
ATL_II	2.6	2.8
ATL_III	2.7	2.9

Chicago: Household size by tenure, by density tier

|	OO_HHSIZE	RO_HHSIZE
CHI_I	2.8	2.5
CHI_II	2.8	2.7
CHI_III	2.8	2.6

**Figure 5 & 6: Household sizes by density tiers**

Chicago and Atlanta have almost inside out patterns of household sizes by tenure and density tier. In Atlanta, homeowners with large households live farther from the core, and renters generally have larger household sizes than owners. In Chicago the larger household sizes belong to the owner-occupiers.

Looking at the units in tenure it is evident that both metropolitan areas share the same trend when it

comes to increasing owner-occupancy toward the suburbs and increasing renter-occupancy toward the

urban core. There is a distinctly larger number of units in the core in Chicago than there are in the

Atlanta study region.

Figures 7 & 8: Aggregate comparative distribution of housing units among tiers by tenure

Figures 8 and 9 below indicate more of the national trend of blacks having been suburbanized, and the pronouncement of that trend in Atlanta. Although the tendency is stronger for non-Hispanic whites, the urban core is the locale where the lowest overall number of either group may be found.

	ATL_I	ATL_II	ATL_III
NH White	386899	588586	835553
Black	467638	499196	548525

	CHI_I	CHI_II	CHI_III
NH White	639690	601548	1037120
Black	419763	505707	362297

Figures 8 & 9: Aggregate comparative distribution of housing units among tiers by tenure

Policy Recommendations and Conclusions

We should think about the paradigm of urban service provision. First of all, 'urban' must be reconsidered. We are now providing urban and suburban services to a socioeconomically diverse periphery. As these communities become more modest, attempts to alleviate transportation burdens must undoubtedly be made. Thence, we ought to see a continual support for reverse commute programs, as well as programs that provide multimodal commuter access when those commuters are lower income. Technology can be used to streamline carpool commuting and establish efficient commuter vanpools, and costs and revenues can be distributed for consumer gains.

Housing policy is important to address in all density tiers. Metropolitan planning organizations can do more to promote inclusionary housing than they do. While the MPO is gladly willing to share labor and expertise with a county or municipality in order to secure federal project funds, the county or municipality, in addition to being too happy to accept, also may or may not be spending dollars collected from their own citizens to prosecute a broadly regressive agenda of control, be it related to zoning, school boards, or economic developments.

New growth in population is dominated by the South and West even in metros where net pop losses are occurring, Gentrification can be a massive influencing factor on where new housing is being produced and for whom. Quality housing is most sorely needed in these locales.

Indeed the newly emerging question becomes *who* is to coalesce the will to overcome these public problems, more so than to ask *what* exactly must be done. Our style of democracy remains perhaps the single most magnanimous hurdle to progressivism in housing and transportation.

References

Anacker, K. (2009). Are we still paying the race tax? Analyzing property values in homogeneous and mixed-race suburbs. *Journal of Urban Affairs, 32.* (1) pp. 55-77.

Blumenberg, E. & Schweitzer, L. (2006). Devolution and transport policy for the working poor: the case of the US job access and reverse commute program. *Planning Theory and Practice 7,* (1) pp. 7-25.

Carillo, K. J. (2006 June 15). Harlem vows to fight gentrification. *The New York Amsterdam News.* pp 3.

Chapple, K. (2006). Overcoming mismatch: beyond dispersal, mobility, and development strategies, *Journal of the American Planning Association, 72* (3) pp. 332-336.

Crane, R. & Crepeau, R. (1998). Does neighborhood design influence travel? Behavioral analysis of travel diary and GIS data. University of California Transportation Center. Working paper.

Crane, R & Boarnet, M. (1997). L.A. Story: A reality check for Transit-based housing, *Journal of the American Planning Association, 63* (2), pp. 189-204.

Crane & Chatwell (2003) As jobs sprawl, whither the commute? *Access*

De Vise, P. (1976). The suburbanization of jobs and minority employment, *Economic Geography 52* (4), pp. 348-362.

Duany, A. (2001). Three cheers for gentrification. *American Enterprise.* Pp 37-39.

Ehrenhalt, A. (2008). Trading places, the demographic inversion of the American city. *The New Republic.* 19-22.

Fainstein, N & Fainstein, S. (1987). Economic restructuring and the politics of land use planning in New York City. *Journal of the American Planning Association 53,* (2) pp 237-248.

Frank, L. & Pivo, G. (2003) Impacts of mixed use and density on utilization of three modes of travel: single-occupant vehicle, transit, and walking. *Transportation Research Record 1466* pp 44-52.

Frey, W. H. (2010). Baby boomers and the new demographics of America's seniors. *Generations—Journal of the American Society on Aging 34,* (3) pp. 28-37.

Freeman, L. & Braconi, F. (2004). Gentrification and displacement New York City in the 1990s, *Journal of the American Planning Association, 70* (1) pp. 39-52.

Gaynor, G. K. (2012 June 21). State tax break, looming issue of gentrification. *The New York Amsterdam News.* pp 41.

Glaeser, E. & Kahn, M. (2003). *Sprawl and Urban Growth.* Working paper. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Glaeser, E., Kahn, M., & Rappaport, J. (2006). Why do the poor live in cities? The role of public transportation. *Journal of Urban Economics*

Gordon, Richardson, Kumar (1989) The influence of metropolitan spatial structure on commuting time *Journal of Urban Economics*

Gordon & Kumar (1989) The spatial mismatch hypothesis, some new evidence. *Urban Studies.*

Herzfeld, M. (2010). Engagement, gentrification, and the neoliberal hijacking of history. *Current Anthropology 51* (2) pp S259-S267.

Holzer, H. J., Quigley, J. M., & Raphael, S. (2003). Public transit and the spatial distribution of minority employment: evidence from a natural experiment. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 22,* (3) pp. 415-441.

Howell, R. (2012 July 26). Saving the soul of a gentrifying community, the story of Monique Greenwood. *The New York Amsterdam News*

Kushto. E. (2008). *Travel and Transportation Impacts of Urban Gentrification: Chicago, Illinois Case Study.* Dissertation. Northwestern University.

Langendorf, R. (1969). Residential desegregation potential. *Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 35,* (2) pp. 90-95.

Lee, B. (1986). From black to white: reverse racial change in neighborhoods of large American cities, 1970-1980, *Journal of the American Planning Association, 52* (3) pp. 338-345.

Lee, S. Seo, J. G., & Webster, C. (2006). The decentralizing metropolis: economic diversity and commuting in the US suburbs. *Urban Studies 43* (13) pp 2525-2549.

McKinnish T. Walsh, R. White, K. (2008). Who gentrifies low-income neighborhoods? National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper. Press article. *American: a Magazine of Ideas* May 2008

Newman, P. & Kenworthy, J. (1989). Gasoline consumption and cities. *Journal of the American Planning Association, 55* (1). Pp 24-37.

Morrison, P. & Abrahamse, A. (1983). Is population decentralization lengthening commuting distances? *Population Research and Policy Review, 2* pp. 189-206.

Schwarz, B. (2010). Gentrification and its discontents. *The Atlantic.* Pp 85-89.

Taylor, B & Ong, P. (1995). Spatial mismatch or automobile mismatch? An examination of race, residence, and commuting in US metropolitan areas. *Urban Studies*

Transportation Research Board. (2001). *SR 257—Making Transit Work: Insight from Western Europe, Canada, and the United States.*

Schwanen, T. & Mokhtarian, P. (2005). What affects commute mode choice: neighborhood physical structure or preferences toward neighborhoods? *Journal of Transport Geography 13.* pp 83-99.

Savitch, H. A. (2007). industrial planning in New York, Paris, and London. *Journal of the American Planning Association, 53* (1) pp. 80-91.

Smith, N. (1979). Toward a theory of gentrification a back to the city movement by capital, not people, *Journal of the American Planning Association, 45* (4) pp. 538-548.

Spain, D. (1993). Been-heres versus come-heres negotiating conflicting community identities. *Journal of the American Planning Association, 59* (2) pp 156-171.

Watson, J. (2004 February 26) Public invited to gentrification education event. *The New York*

  Amsterdam News. pp. 6.

Williams, P. J. (2008 July 14). Movin' on down. *The Nation.* p 9.

Yang, J. (2005) Commuting impacts of spatial decentralization. *Journal of Reg'l Economics*

Yang, J. French, S., Holt. J., & Zhang, X. (2012). Measuring the structure of US metropolitan areas

  1970-2000. *Journal of the American Planning Association, 78* (2), pp. 197-209.